



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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

DEMOCRITUS AND THE ORIGINS OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The fragments of Democritus constitute the most important body of material for the history of philosophical ethics and psychology before the dialogues of Plato. This fact has not received the attention it deserves, largely because interest in Democritus has focused on his physical doctrines. The physical theory is known to us from Aristotle and the doxography, but the fragments themselves speak primarily about matters of conduct, moral psychology, and the conditions of happiness. Now, of pre-Platonic philosophers whose written work has reached us, only Heraclitus and Democritus deal with such themes. We have every reason to believe that Socrates did so too, but there is no pre-Platonic documentation for his views. Of course, we also have ethical and psychological comments in the works of fifth century orators, poets, and historians and in the occasional words of a sophist such as Antiphon arguing that justice is not advantageous. But before the dialogues of Plato, the only substantial texts dealing with ethics and psychology from a speculative or philosophical point of view, and hence the oldest documents in the history of moral philosophy properly speaking, are the fragments of Heraclitus and Democritus.

The utterances of the dark Ephesian are unquestionably superb, but they are brief, enigmatic, and chronologically remote. Democritus is a contemporary of Socrates, and his literary remains are considerably more abundant than those of any other fifth century philosopher. They provide us with our best evidence for the level that had been reached by moral reflection in the lifetime of Socrates. They permit us to imagine the kind of thing Socrates himself might have said; hence their study will be useful for reconstructing the background for Plato's own work. Even if Plato had not read the books from which these quotations are taken (which seems to me most unlikely), they faithfully reflect, in a way the dialogues cannot do, the climate of opinion within which Plato's ideas took shape and which he could take for granted as the starting point for his own work.

What I propose, then, is to exploit these texts as a documentary source for moral psychology in the age of Socrates. In order to keep the issue of documentation in sharp focus, I must largely ignore the figure of Socrates himself. We can study connections between Heraclitus and Democritus, between Democritus and Plato, and even between Democritus and Epicurus on the firm basis of a comparison between texts written by the philosopher himself. But in the case of Socrates, we have neither his own words nor any reliable fifth century report. Once we begin to use fourth century texts (i.e., Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle) as the basis for a comparison between Socrates and Democritus, we take our stand on slippery ground. For we must then somehow settle by conjecture the question how far our fourth century source is literally faithful to his fifth century subject, and there is no way to check such a conjecture. So I will leave untouched the issue of whether Socrates influenced Democritus, or conversely. I am inclined to believe that they are quite independent of one another, but I would not know how to argue this point.

Before we consider the texts, there is a word to be said about the nature of the evidence. The documentation concerning Democritus is unlike that for any other early thinker. Plato never mentions his name.¹ Aristotle and Theophrastus discuss his physical doctrines at length but are silent concerning his moral philosophy.² Only the Hellenistic doxography, reflected in Cicero, Arius Didymus, Diogenes, and Clement (DK A 169, 167, 1.45, B4), offers a brief summary of what is there construed as his theory of the *telos* or ultimate goal of human life. On the other hand, very few of the nearly 300 surviving fragments deal with physical theory at all; the vast majority discuss topics in ethics and moral psychology. This anomalous situation is further complicated by the fact that 86 brief quotations are preserved in a collection attributed not to Democritus but to "Demokrates." More than one-third of these quotations are found also in Stobaeus, where they are cited under the name of Democritus. Stobaeus is our only source for another 100 fragments on moral psychology, including some that are recognized as inauthentic.³ All this

¹Some scholars have concluded that Plato's silence bespeaks ignorance. Diogenes Laertius (IX.40 = DK 68.A 1) assumes that it is deliberate, and I think he must be right.

²The silence of Theophrastus is easy to understand, since his doxography deals only with natural philosophy. Aristotle's attitude is more puzzling, given his great interest in Democritus' physical theory. Apparently he found the ethical writings not to his taste, perhaps because they seemed so wholly superseded by Plato's dialogues.

³See Stobaeus IV.41, 59 (cited in DK after B 288) and IV.50, 80-81 (after B 296).

gives grounds for suspicion, and some scholars (most recently Guthrie⁴) have expressed doubts about both collections. The problem is too complex for a full discussion here, and I can only briefly state my conclusions.

1. The bulk of the Stobaeus fragments, including all of the longer quotations (with the possible exception of B 297, on which I suspend judgment), seem to me clearly genuine. This judgment is based in the first instance on a sense for Democritus' style after many re-readings of the fragments, together with a feeling for what fits into the conceptual climate of the late fifth century. Although this judgment is inevitably subjective, it seems to be shared by most (not all) of the scholars who have spent much time with the fragments. And the stylistic judgment can be confirmed by two more objective criteria: (a) the use made of Heraclitean phrases in B 171 and B 236, the significance of which will be discussed below, and (b) the echoes of Democritus in the writings of Epicurus. It turns out that in his ethics Epicurus is scarcely less dependent on Democritus than in his physics. In at least one case there is a striking verbal parallel: βραχέα σοφῶ τύχῃ παρεμπίπτει in Epicurus *Kyria Doxa* 16 is directly modeled on βαῖα φρονήσῃ τύχῃ μάχεται in Democritus B 119.⁵ And in many cases there is a close coincidence of thought.⁶ These parallels have been much discussed, and it is generally agreed that they are to be explained by the influence of Democritus' work on Epicurus.⁷ In this respect we have excellent evidence for the authenticity of about a dozen fragments from the Stobaeus collection.

⁴W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, II (Cambridge 1965) 489-92. Guthrie's skepticism has not been generally followed. See recently David B. Claus, *Toward the Soul* (Yale 1981) 142-48, and J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford 1982) 27 f. For an early expression of more moderate skepticism, see H. von Arnim's review of Natorp's *Die Ethika des Demokritos* in *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen* (1894) 881-90, who is rightly suspicious of the Demokrates collection (p. 887), but recognizes that the Stobaeus collection contains some material whose authenticity is much better established (pp. 884, 886). For a full review of the scholarship on authenticity down to 1948, see W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* VII, I.5, pp. 251-53.

⁵This was seen long ago by Usener in his *Epicurea* (1881) 396; cf. Diels' citation of B 119. Note that B 119 is quoted not only by Dionysios but also by Stobaeus; Stobaeus' text is fuller and more accurate.

⁶For examples compare B 174 and B 215 with Epicurus *K.D.* 17 and 34; B 176 with *Epist.* III.134; B 199 and 203 with fr. 496 Usener; B 223 with *Ep.* III.130, *K.D.* 15, 21 etc.; B 224 (and 202) with *Sent. Vat.* 35, fr. 204 Usener; B 234 with *S.V.* 65; B 246 with *Ep.* III.131, fr. 602 Usener, etc.; B 283 with fr. 202 Usener; B 284 with *S.V.* 68.

⁷See R. Philippson, "Demokrits Sittensprüche," *Hermes* 59 (1924) 367-419; P. von der Mühl, "Epikurs Κύρια Δόξαι und Demokrit," in *Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften* (=

2. The situation is not the same for the shorter maxims, including most of those in the "Demokrates" collection. These are on the whole less convincing, both in style and content, and some of them seem clearly to be alien intrusions. Thus, B 45 ("He who does injustice is more miserable than he who suffers it"), B 49 ("It is hard to be ruled by one's inferior"), and B 73 ("Righteous eros desires the beautiful without hybris") strike me as too specifically Platonic to be authentic: one would have to suppose that Democritus had read not only the *Gorgias* but also the *Republic* and the *Symposium* or *Phaedrus*.⁸ There seem to be no clear parallels to the "Demokrates" fragments in Epicurus, and the two Heraclitean echoes in these maxims have a mechanical quality that is quite unlike those in the Stobaeus collection.⁹

3. Since the suspicious Demokrates aphorisms B 49 and B 73 are among those which are also cited by Stobaeus, it seems clear that both collections are contaminated. On the other hand, many of the shorter maxims in both sets are simply summary statements of views more fully expressed in the longer quotations.¹⁰ To this extent even the Demokrates collection contains authentic material. But it testifies to a process of simplification and adulteration that had already begun in the generally superior collection we find reflected in Stobaeus.¹¹

Schweiz. Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft Heft 12, Basel 1975) 371-77; Diskin Clay, "Epicurus' Κύρια Δόξα XVII," *GRBS* 13 (1972) 60 f. I am grateful to Diskin Clay for calling my attention to these parallels.

⁸Of course, one might try to defend B 45, 49, and 73 by claiming that Democritus and Plato are independently preserving an opinion of the historical Socrates. But to embark on this kind of pseudohistorical conjecture is precisely to abandon the documentary approach that I am advocating here. In the case of Demokrates B 83, "The cause of wrongdoing (*hamartia*) is ignorance of what is better," the Socratic-Platonic influence is obvious; and the doctrine seems to contradict Democritus' own account of *akrasia* in B 234 (see below, p. 16).

⁹Demokrates B 64 (πολλοὶ πολυμαθεὲς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσιν) and B 65 (πολυνοήν, οὐ πολυμαθὴν ἀσκέειν χρή) represent feeble imitations of Heraclitus fr. 40 DK.

¹⁰Thus Demokrates B 84 is an abridgment of the important statements on self-respect, B 244 and 264. The clearest case of authentic material in "Demokrates" is B 36, which consists of two out of the three sentences that form B 187, one of Democritus' most distinctive comments on body and soul. Another plausible Demokrates text is B 98, ἐνὸς φιλῆς ξυμετοῦ κρέσσων ἀξυνέτων πάντων, where a Heraclitean thought is expressed in Heraclitean language. But in this case the thought is not original enough to guarantee its authenticity.

¹¹Diskin Clay points out that the relationship of Epicurus' *Vatican Sayings* to his *Kyriai Doxai* shows a similar process: the Vatican collection gives shorter, more diverse material, which in at least one case (*S. V.* 36) cannot be a quotation. How did the Democri-

4. It is normally only the longer fragments that permit us to recognize with some confidence the style and viewpoint of a fifth century author. Hence, with rare exceptions,¹² I shall use the shorter quotations only to support or clarify views that can be documented from the longer texts. Any interpretation that relies primarily or exclusively on brief maxims of the "Demokrates" type is bound to rest on shaky ground.¹³

Turning now to the fragments, I begin with a survey of the principal themes to be illustrated here:

1. Soul and body as a pair, with soul as superior.
2. The soul using the body as its instrument.
3. The soul as seat of happiness and suffering, reason and emotion, character and intelligence.
4. Psychic combat against pleasure or strong emotion, with action and decision determined by the factor that prevails.
5. Desire and pleasure as reciprocals. Desire itself conceived as a lack or need.
6. Reason and sense perception as distinct modes of cognition.

tean collections originate? We do not know. P. von der Mühlh was inclined to believe that Democritus himself composed a book of maxims (*hypothēkai*): see von der Mühlh (note 7 above, p. 374), following Friedländer in *Hermes* 48 (1913) 603-16. Philippson (note 7 above, p. 409) thought of a disciple. More recently Zeph Stewart has suggested that the Cynics helped preserve and transform these collections. See "Democritus and the Cynics" in *HSPH* 63 (1958) 179-91. But Stewart also recognizes that some of Stobaeus' material has come to him "through another and better protected excerpting tradition" (p. 191, n. 44). For a different view of the tradition, see S. Luria, "Zur Frage der materialistischen Begründung der Ethik bei Demokrit," *Deutsche Akademie Berlin, Altertumswissenschaft* 44 (1964) 4.

¹²E.g., B 188 is confirmed by the quotation in Clement (B 4); B 171 and 236 are authenticated by their use of Heraclitus. B 158 is in an entirely different category, since it is not an anthology maxim but a blended quotation in Plutarch; and here again we have a Heraclitean echo.

¹³This seems to me to undermine some of the principal conclusions in Vlastos' brilliant reconstruction in "Ethics and Physics in Democritus," *PhR* 54 (1945) 578-92, and 55 (1946) 53-64. See, for example, his heavy reliance there (1945, pp. 587-92) on B 74 ("Accept nothing pleasant, unless it is beneficial") and B 69 ("For human beings what is good and true is the same for all; what is pleasant is different for different people"), both from the Demokrates collection and unparalleled in the longer fragments. Similar scruples arise for the use of these maxims by C. C. W. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus," *Phronesis* 12 (1967) 16 f. and 25 f.; and likewise in Gosling and Taylor (note 4 above, pp. 31 f. and 34 f.). In what follows, these works by Vlastos, Taylor, and Gosling and Taylor will be cited by the author's name alone. Similarly for Claus, *Toward the Soul* (cited in note 4 above).

7. Rational thought and emotion or desire as distinct principles of motivation.

8. Democritus' conception of virtue and the good life.

Except in connection with the last theme, I shall not be primarily concerned with Democritus' originality as a thinker, though I will touch on this point. My aim is to exploit the fragments as evidence for the general level reached by moral psychology in the age of Socrates. The issue of originality could be adequately dealt with only on the basis of a much fuller comparison with contemporary authors.

1. *Soul and body as a pair, with soul as superior*

Here there is no doubt that both the parallel and the contrast between body and soul are part of the common conceptual equipment of Democritus' generation: the evidence from Antiphon the orator, Lysias, and Gorgias is unambiguous.¹⁴ And the view of the soul as in some sense superior is also common to other authors; after all, *psychē* connotes life, while *sōma* designates the corpse. What is more striking is the peculiar twist that Democritus gives to this superiority.

B 187. It is fitting for men to take more account of the soul than of the body. For the perfection of soul corrects the inferior condition of the body. But strength of body without calculation (*logismos*) makes the soul no better.

Note the suggestion here that the excellence of the psyche lies in reasoning or prudence—in other words, that virtue is knowledge. But we are even more directly reminded of Socrates' insistence in the *Apology* that one should be concerned "neither for bodies nor for wealth before or to the same degree as making one's *psychē* as good as possible," since "excellence (*aretē*) is not produced from wealth, but from excellence men acquire wealth and all other goods."¹⁵ The two texts are sufficiently differ-

¹⁴See, e.g., Gorgias *Helen* 1: "the adornment of body is beauty, of soul it is wisdom." Full documentation in Claus, ch. 4 (pp. 141 ff.). How old is this body-soul parallelism? With a different terminology it can be traced back as far as Xenophanes fr. 23: "one god . . . not similar to mortals in shape (*demās*) nor in thought (*noēma*)."

¹⁵*Ap.* 20B. Cf. Vlastos (1945) 580, with n. 16. Note that *aretē* (of the soul) in the *Apology* corresponds neatly to *teleotēs* and *ameinōn* (*psychē*), contrasted with *mochthēriē*, in B 187. For the general thought, see also *Protagoras* 313A ff., esp. 313A: "the psyche, on which all your affairs depend for turning out well or ill." There is a more rigorous development of the thought of B 187 in *Republic* X: "The evil (*ponēria*) of the body will not produce psychic evil in the soul" (610A5), where a Democritean premise is used in the proof of immortality!

ent for neither to count as a verbal echo of the other, but they agree in defending the greater importance of psychic excellence in terms of its causal priority: the soul is the source of other goods.

We have a much closer parallel to B 187 in *Republic* III, as Natorp noticed long ago. At the beginning of the discussion of gymnastics Socrates remarks: "It does not seem to me the case that, when a body is in good shape (*chrēston*), it will by its own excellence make the soul good; but on the contrary, a good soul renders by its excellence the body as good as possible" (403D). Here we have precisely the thought of B 187, and the resemblance is too close to be a chance coincidence. It is just possible that both authors are following a common source; the notion that intelligent living can preserve or restore health is a familiar enough idea in this period.¹⁶ But the exact parallelism of negative and affirmative clauses is most naturally explained by the assumption that one author is echoing another, perhaps unconsciously. If B 187 is authentic, Plato must be the debtor here, and everything points in that direction. For B 187 expresses a crucial Democritean doctrine, the conception of the psyche as agent or guiding principle of the body. (See B 159, cited in the next section.) For Plato, on the other hand, the passage quoted from *Republic* III is a casual remark introduced solely to justify the more extensive treatment of music as training for the psyche. Plato will end this discussion by rejecting this contrast and insisting instead that gymnastics too aims to train the soul (410C–411E).

The notion that the soul rules or controls the body is always taken for granted by Plato and never argued for. (See, e.g., *Phaedo* 94B4–6.) One might suppose that it is an idea he got from Socrates; I want to suggest that he got it from Democritus: this is an idea Democritus had developed so systematically that Plato can take it for granted.¹⁷ If it had been a specifically Socratic claim, he would have been *less* inclined to take it for granted. For his general practice is to argue for Socratic con-

¹⁶See Antiphon fr. 2 (cited below in note 17) and the medical literature on regimen.

¹⁷Democritus is developing a common view: "For all human beings the mind (*gnōmē*) leads the body both to health and disease and to all other things" (Antiphon fr. 2). But note that Antiphon does not mention the *psychē* here. I can find no pre-Platonic parallel to Democritus' systematic emphasis on the causal responsibility of the *psychē*. Where the soul is mentioned in connection with medical regimen, it tends to be the object, not the subject, of therapy. See Claus, pp. 150–53.

It is often assumed that Plato was ignorant of Democritus' work. As far as I can see, this assumption is based largely on an over-interpretation of B 116 (= D.L. IX.36): "I went to Athens, and no one knew me." (What Diogenes claims in this connection is that Democritus was unknown to Socrates, not to Plato!) I think the parallel between B 187 and *Rep.* III, 403D is enough by itself to prove this assumption false.

clusions from premises which his interlocutor is prepared to accept. I think that Democritus must be, behind the scenes, one of Plato's principal interlocutors in the early dialogues. As the major philosopher of the previous generation, he is in some respects an opponent against whom Socratic theses must be defended. But in other respects Democritus has decisively prepared the way for Plato's own restatement of the Socratic notion of soul tendance.

2. *The soul using the body as its instrument*

This is the moral equivalent of Democritus' physical doctrine, reported by Aristotle, that the psyche is the cause of motion in the body.¹⁸ The fragments express this view only in moral terms.

B 159 [from Plutarch]. If the body takes the soul to court, accusing it of all the pain and suffering of a lifetime, and he [sc. Democritus] is to be judge of the case, he would gladly find the soul guilty for having ruined the body with neglect and dissolved it with drunkenness, for having debauched and distracted it with sensual indulgence; just as the user of a tool (*organon*) or equipment in bad condition is held responsible for its reckless misuse.

The trial of the *psychē*, accused by the body of criminal neglect, is one of Democritus' more picturesque inventions, comparable to the dialogue between the senses and the mind (*phrēn*), from which we have the memorable line: "Poor mind, you overthrow us but you take your convictions from us: our overthrow is your fall" (B 125). The imagery of the lawcourt in B 159 parallels that of the wrestling match in B 125. The surprising note in the contrast between body and soul is that the psyche figures here as source of vice and corruption for the very same reason that it is the source of virtue and health in B 187: the soul is in charge of the body and must be held responsible. The causal relation here is precisely that expressed in Plato's doctrine that the soul rules the body, but by emphasizing the harm that the soul may cause, Democritus turns the point of this doctrine against the rather different view that we know from the *Phaedo* and elsewhere—that the body is (in Vlastos' phrase) a moral nuisance,

¹⁸DA. 405^a6-9, 405^a10, 406^b16, 20-22, etc. See DK A.101 and 104. As Vlastos points out (1945, p. 579, n. 9), Plato later adopts this view in his own definition of the soul as self-mover and source of motion (*Phaedrus* 245E). Unfortunately, I can find no clear trace of the physical doctrine in the fragments. B 191, which speaks of the *kinēseis* of soul, describes it only as moved (by extreme experiences), not as cause of motion.

the source of sensual indulgence and psychic pollution.¹⁹ Now if B 159 preserves an authentic statement of Democritus, which seems to me certain, it cannot be directed against the *Phaedo*. Is it directed against the historical Socrates? Or, more plausibly, is it directed against some older, quasi-Orphic view of the body as tomb or prison of the soul?²⁰ We do not know. What we can recognize in B 159 is a negative attitude to the psyche which would be antipathetic to Plato. But we also recognize a view of the body as *organon*, the tool or instrument of the soul, which Plato and Aristotle can take for granted.²¹ In Plato and Aristotle, the metaphor of the "tool" is faded or fading; in Democritus it is vivid and probably original.

The negative and (to speak anachronistically) anti-Platonic tendency is conspicuous in another fragment that focuses on a mind-body contrast.

B 223. What the body (*skēnos*, habitation) requires is available to all without toil and trouble. What requires toil and trouble and makes life painful is not what the body longs for (*himeiretai*) but what (is desired by) the bad grasp²² of the mind (*gnōmē*).

The personification of the body here as subject of desires is not strictly compatible with its role as passive instrument of the psyche. We will see that such inconsistency is typical for Democritus' references to desire. The term *gnōmē* here (for "mind," "thought," or "cognition") occurs where B 187 and 159 would lead us to expect *psychē*. I think it would be a mistake to regard the two terms as synonymous, though they may have been competitors in this period as expressions for the emerging notion of

¹⁹Vlastos (1945, p. 579), with references to Plato in n. 13. Note that this view is potentially inconsistent with the doctrine that the soul controls the body. In the *Republic*, Plato eliminates the inconsistency by transferring sensual appetite from the body to a distinct part of the psyche. The *Timaeus* attempts to reconcile both views by explaining the "mortal" aspects of the psyche as a consequence of its presence in the body (42A ff., 43A, etc.).

²⁰Compare Democritus' designation of the body as *skēnos*, the tent or habitation (of the psyche). Whether or not this terminology is original with him, it is in any case justified by his physical doctrine. It also seems to be directed *against* any view of the body as tomb, prison, or place of exile. For Democritus, only in the body can the soul be at home.

²¹*Rep.* VI, 508B3: the eye as the most sun-like among "the *organa* for the senses"; so also *Theaet.* 184D4, 185A5, etc. Cf. Aristotle *DA* 412^a28-^b6 and Bonitz *Index* 521^b31 ff.

²²κακοθιγῆν: "bad touch" or "contact"? Text and interpretation are uncertain.

a psychic center, "the core and carrier of the personality."²³ It was probably the Socratic-Platonic choice of *psychē* for this role that determined the terminology that remains standard to this day. But that choice was itself favored by the wide range of meanings for *psychē* in earlier usage, including manly spirit, subject of sensual gratification, and the principle of silent thought and prudent counsel.²⁴ The term *gnōmē* (from *gignōskō*, to recognize or know) was limited by its primarily cognitive or deliberative connotations. Democritus' usage is fluctuating, however, and in B 223 *gnōmē* seems to be a candidate for the same role that *psychē* plays in B 187 and 159. The issue is more than terminological. The precise relationship between the *psychē* as such and rational thought and planning (as designated by *gnōmē*) is one of the unresolved problems of Democritean psychology, and more generally of psychological thought before Plato. Aristotle says Democritus identified soul (*psychē*) and intellect (*nous*),²⁵ but that is misleading. It would be more accurate to say that he did not clearly distinguish the two, because he had no entirely consistent terminology for designating either one. (See further under topic 7.)

What Plato would find *most* antipathetic in Democritus is, of course, his materialism—that is, his view of the psyche as a purely corporeal constituent that is destroyed or dissipated with the death of the body. This view is abundantly documented in the testimonia but not directly expressed in the fragments (unless B 297 is authentic). It presumably underlies the statements about cognition that emphasize the extent to which our thought is dependent on corporeal factors.

B 9. In truth, we know nothing exactly, but <what we know is> what changes about according to the disposition of the body and the things which enter <the body> and the things which press against it.

Here again we may wonder how this passivity of our cognition in regard to bodily changes is compatible with the causal initiative of the psyche in B 187 and 159. We do not know whether Democritus tried to reconcile these views or simply treated the psyche as active in decisions but passive

²³ Arthur W. H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (London 1970) 65, referring to *psychē*. In Antiphon fr. 2 (note 12 above), *gnōmē* designates the mind as source of planning and control, but in B 223 it is apparently responsible for desire as well.

²⁴ See Claus, ch. 2 *passim*.

²⁵ *DA* 404^a28 (= *DK A* 101). As H. Langerbeck points out (*Δόξης ἐπιρρομή*, [Berlin 1935] = *Neue Philologische Untersuchungen* 10) 80, this is interpretation rather than report on Aristotle's part.

in cognition. It seems to be the same physiological psychology as in B 9 that underlies one of the most fascinating brief quotations.

B 158 [from Plutarch]. As Democritus says, human beings think new thoughts every day (*nea eph' hēmerēi phroneontes*).

Here we have an unmistakable verbal echo of Heraclitus fr. 6 (Diels) "the sun is new every day"; and the context in Plutarch confirms some reference to the sun. But Democritus has combined this allusion with two other Heraclitean thoughts: (1) the river of restless change (Heraclitus frs. 12 and 91), and (2) the conception of our mental state as a reflection of our physical condition. Heraclitus had joined the mental with the physical in his statements that it is a "wet soul" that causes the drunken man to stumble (fr. 117), whereas the "dry soul is wisest and best" (fr. 118). Democritus' psychophysics is more complex: "our opinions are shaped by the formative flow from outside" (B7).²⁶ Hence the novelty of our thinking (*phronein*) is both a strength and a weakness. It keeps us in touch with the outside world, providing us with information and also (like Heraclitus' sun) with renewal and persistence; but it reveals the hopelessly partial and ephemeral character of our cognitive grasp. B 158 makes clear that the Heraclitean echoes in Democritus are no mere ornament of style but involve profound rethinking of Heraclitean ideas. This will be illustrated for the next two topics as well.

The discussion of B 9, 7, and 158 has led us from the theme of the soul's causal responsibility for the body to the rather different notion that mental phenomena depend on bodily processes. There need be no doctrinal inconsistency, since the psyche itself is a corporeal principle, composed like fire of spherical atoms (A 104). But in the absence of any detailed account of the mechanics of perceptual judgment and decision making, we must simply leave it an open question how far (or whether) Democritus tried to link up the psychophysiology of his theory of cognition with his discussion of moral psychology and action.

²⁶ἐπιρυσμὴ ἐκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις. I see no reason to doubt that Democritus intends both readings of ἐπιρυσμὴ in B 7: (1) his own version of the Heraclitean "onflux" (cf. ἐπιρρεῖ in Heracl. fr. 12), and (2) the notion of "reshaping" our corporeal nature by cognitive experience. Compare διδασχὴ μεταρρυσμοῦσα φύσις ποιεῖ in B 33. Taylor's insistence (p. 15) on separating the notion of "reshaping" from "restructuring" or "re-forming" does not do justice to the poetic richness of Democritus' language, which at this point resembles that of Heraclitus; but Taylor is probably correct in denying any *direct* reference in B 33 to the theory of the soul interpreted as an atomic cluster.

3. *The soul as seat of happiness and suffering, reason and emotion, character and intelligence*

B 171. Fortune (*eudaimoniē*) dwells not in flocks nor in gold; the psyche is the dwelling of the *daimōn*.

As the body is the habitation (*skēnos*) of the soul, so the soul in turn is the home of the *daimōn*, the divine power of happiness and misfortune. The last three words, ψυχῇ οἰκτῆριον δαίμονος, are almost as richly suggestive as the formula of Heraclitus, which they are designed to recall: ἥθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων (fr. 119), "man's character is his *daimōn*," his fortune for good or for evil. This echo of Heraclitus implies that for Democritus too the soul is the seat not only of happiness but also of character.²⁷ For both philosophers, this will be so because happiness and misery are themselves directly dependent on moral character and cognitive insight or the lack thereof.

Democritus' general doctrine is clear enough on this point, but to see how it is articulated in his conception of the psyche, we must pay close attention to the fragments. Again, his depiction of the role of the psyche is not wholly consistent. On the one hand, according to B 187 (p. 6) the excellence or perfection (*teleotēs*) of the soul will correct the defects of the body by reasoning or calculation—that is, by control of the vital motions in accordance with a rational understanding of what contributes to health and "cheerfulness" (*euthymie*). The function of Democritus' moral aphorisms is precisely to provide such an understanding. They teach us that an excess or deficiency in pleasure or other intense experiences "will impose great movements upon the *psychē*," which is incompatible with its stability and cheerfulness (B 191). If one misdirects his mind (*gnōmē*) and thought (*dianoia*), he will fall prey to *pleonexia*, excessive desire, and "suffer harm in his soul" (*kakopathein tēi psychēi*, *ibid.*). Thus, in B 191 the psyche is the passive victim of emotion,²⁸ whereas in B 187 it was the active agent of control. This systematic inconsistency at the level of verbal imagery will be most naturally explained if we assume that Democritus (like Gorgias and other authors of the late

²⁷For *ēthos* in the fragments, see B 192 and (in the Demokrates collection) B 57, 61, and 100. None of these texts is above suspicion, but the general conception is borne out by the longer fragments.

²⁸Compare our passivity in cognition in B 9 (where there is no reference to the psyche): "In reality we know nothing certain, but only what changes according to the disposition of the body and what enters and what presses against (the body)."

fifth century) conceives the soul rather vaguely as the field or locus of what we recognize as distinct psychic factors, so that it can in different contexts be identified in turn with rational thought and guidance or with passive perception, with emotional experience, feeling, and one's overall "state of mind," or with the person himself as the subject of these states.²⁹

I assume, then, that the daimon of B 171 which dwells in the psyche is the mental state of happiness or misery as this depends on one's character and rational understanding. But the language of the fragments does not suggest the notion of the psyche as a unified subject of experience, nor do we get any coherent picture of how the various psychic factors are related to one another. In this domain Democritus' language is expressive rather than analytical or explanatory. This is best illustrated by the long text of B 191, from which I have already quoted some phrases:

Human beings acquire cheerfulness (*euthymīē*) by moderation in enjoyment and measured balance in their life. But deficiencies and excesses tend to change about <into their opposites> and to cause great movements in the soul. Souls that move over great intervals are neither stable nor cheerful. So one should keep one's mind (*gnōmē*) on what is possible and be satisfied with what is present and available, taking little heed of people who are envied and admired and not fixing one's attention (*dianoia*) upon them, but observe the lives of those who suffer and notice what they endure, so that what you presently have will appear great and enviable and you will no longer suffer evil in your soul by desiring more than you have. . . . <One should> compare one's life to those who are less fortunate and count oneself happy by considering what they suffer and how much better your own life is. If you hold fast to this frame of mind (*gnōmē*) you will live more cheerfully and drive not a few plagues (*kēres*) from your life: envy and jealousy and ill-will.

Besides anticipating a famous passage in Lucretius (II.1-6) on beholding the misfortunes of others, this text illustrates the practical acuteness of Democritus as a psychological observer and the lack of any theo-

²⁹The use of *psychē* in fifth century poetry also permits the word to mean (according to context) sexual passion, courage, or simply "life"; see Claus (pp. 69-91). It is presumably this bewildering flexibility and not some unattested and inexplicable decline in ordinary usage that accounts for the avoidance of the term *psychē* by an austere author like Thucydides. (Contra Claus [p. 91], who speaks of the term's "being eliminated from common prose usage" in Herodotus and Thucydides. But in the first place we have no substantial evidence for *any* prose usage before Herodotus; and furthermore the evidence from Antiphon, Lysias, and Gorgias, as well as from Democritus [all cited by Claus (pp. 141 ff.)], shows that the term was freely used by some early prose authors.)



retical fixity or precision in his conception of the psyche. At one point he speaks of the soul as if it were the subject of the mental state: it is the psyche itself which is "neither stable nor cheerful." This phrase treats the psyche as simply equivalent to the human being, who is the proper subject of cheerfulness. But in the very same sentence the soul is also said to be "moved over great intervals," and these motions are "imposed" or "inflicted" on the soul by excesses or deficiencies of pleasure and desire.³⁰ It is obviously not the human being as such who is moved over great intervals by strong emotion. Thus, the psyche is also conceived as the passive or affective aspect of one's personality, one's mood or state of mind, where this is thought of as *acted upon* by the forces of pleasure and desire, themselves weakly personified as distinct agents acting as it were from outside. Similarly, in the last sentence of B 191, the emotions of envy, jealousy, and ill-will (*phthonos, zēlos, dysmenie*) are represented as evil powers or *kēres* to be driven from one's life. In this almost Homeric personification of psychic powers, the soul figures as a passive plaything, victimized or rescued by forces beyond its control.³¹ So in B 290: "Expell by reason (*logismōi*) uncontrolled grief from <your> paralyzed psyche." Here the soul is numbed by sorrow, salvaged by reflection,³² and both of these factors, as well as the psyche itself, are at least verbally distinct from the person to whom the command is addressed.

What these expressions show is not that Democritus has an inconsistent concept of the soul, but rather that his treatment of the psyche is not fully conceptualized. His description of mental phenomena has not reached the level of a psychological *theory*; he relies entirely on the shifting metaphors of quasi-poetic speech. Hence, in some contexts the psyche (or its excellence) can be identified with the person either as a rational agent, using his reason (*logismos*) to improve the body (B 187),

³⁰I do not mean to rule out the possibility (urged by von Fritz and Vlastos) that the *kinēseis* of the soul are ultimately to be interpreted in terms of its atomic constitution. But there is nothing in the fragments on *psychē* that directly suggests or supports such an interpretation. The "stability" of one's life and character may be a reflection of the relative immobility of one's soul-atoms, but that is surely not the primary meaning of *eustatheis* in B 191: the natural reading is in terms of lived experience, not psychophysics. We do not even know whether *kinēsis* is the term Democritus would have used for the motion of atoms (though he does use it for the movement of the waves in B 164).

³¹Compare B 285: human life is "feeble and brief and beset by many plagues (*kēres*) and difficulties."

³²So in B 31: as medicine cures the body of disease, so wisdom frees the soul from passions (*pathē*), where the thought is Democritean, even if the language is not. (See note 49 below).

or as an irresponsible agent, damaging the body by his neglect (B 159).³³ In other contexts, as we have just seen, the psyche is not the agent or person himself but his emotional nature, which is moved by pleasure or numbed by grief (B 191, 290). Probably no thinker who attempts to describe our mental and emotional life can avoid such inconsistency in expression. But in Democritus there is no trace of any *attempt* to escape the limitations of this idiomatic phraseology, no effort to frame a coherent model for psychological description and explanation. This task remained for Plato to undertake. We can see the first step toward such a model in the passage of the *Gorgias* which speaks of "that part of the soul where the desires are located" (493A); but a full-scale model comes only with the tripartite psychology of the *Republic*. It is the merest beginnings of such an effort that can be recognized in Democritus' treatment of the next theme.

4. *Psychic combat against pleasure or strong emotion, where action and decision are determined by the factor that prevails*

Agonistic imagery runs all through the fragments, as in the wrestling match between mind and the senses (B 125) and the lawsuit between body and soul (B 159).³⁴ But for psychic conflict Democritus again takes his cue from Heraclitus.

B 236. To fight against anger (*thymos*) is hard. But it is a man's task to conquer (*krateein*) if he has good sense (*eulogistos*).

Heraclitus had depicted *thymos* as a formidable opponent, "hard to fight against, for it buys what it wants at the expense of the psyche" (fr. 85 Diels). Whatever Heraclitus may have meant by *psychē* here, Democritus takes up the notion of courage or manliness (*andros de . . .*), which is one of the idiomatic connotations of *psychē*, reinforced here by the metaphor of combat. In his own version of the unity of the virtues, Democritus points out that courage depends not only on *thymos* (as in Plato's tripartite psychology) but also on prudence and good judgment.³⁵

³³So also in B 212 if (with DK) one construes ἀπαιδεύσις with ψυχῆς: it is lack of rational training on the soul's part that can account for unseasonable sleep.

³⁴Cf. B 176: Nature, as the weaker but more reliable factor, prevails (*nikai*) over fortune.

³⁵For the interdependence of courage, knowledge, and justice (*orthoprageein, euthygnōmos*), see B 181; for the connection of courage and temperance, see B 214, cited in the text. In B 179 *aretē* is said to be "held together" or supported (*synechein*) by a due sense of shame (*aideisthai*).

Implicitly, then, we have a combat between reason and passion. In B 236, passion is conceived, however, not in general but specifically as anger,³⁶ and reason is not articulated as a separate factor but included in the adjectival characterization of the man who acts (*anēr eulogistos*). (Contrast the appearance of *logismos* in substantival form in B 187 and 290.) So although Democritus has pursued the imagery of psychic conflict further than Heraclitus by referring to the victory of the stronger party, it is still a combat between the man and his emotion as a quasi-external opponent, not between two rival factors in the soul. The same holds for B 214:

The brave man is he who prevails (*kreissōn*) not only over enemies but also over pleasures. There are some who are masters of cities but slaves to women.³⁷

Here, instead of the manly force of anger, we have as psychic opponent the effeminate power of sensuality. This idea of being dominated by sensual pleasure brings us close to the classic notion of *akrasia*, lack of mastery over the impulse of pleasure and desire. This notion is made explicit in B 234:

Men in their prayers ask for health from the gods; they do not know that they have the power for this in themselves. But because of a lack of mastery (*akrasia*) they act on the enemy's side and themselves betray the cause of health to their desires (*epithymiai*).

In this case, the enemy is not pleasure as such but desires whose gratification will ruin one's health. (For the close conceptual tie between pleasure and desire see the next topic.) *Akrasia* consists precisely in being defeated by such desires, when it is in one's power to prevail. Democritus' point is that such a defeat occurs because the agent goes over to his opponent's side, by identifying himself with his desires.

Democritus' reference to *akrasia* reminds us of the vulgar account of "being defeated by pleasures" which Plato rejects in *Protagoras* 352D ff., but it differs from that account in two respects: (1) Democritus emphasizes the responsibility of the agent as an accomplice in his own de-

³⁶For this interpretation of *thymos*, see *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, p. 242, with n. 334 on p. 331.

³⁷See the remark attributed to Sophocles in old age (Plato *Rep.* I, 329C): when someone asked him if he could still have intercourse with a woman, Sophocles replied, "Peace, man! I am glad to have escaped that, like someone who has run away from an insane and cruel master" (*despotēs*; cf. *despozousi*, *douleuousin* in Dem. B 214).

feat, and (2) he does not mention the point that is essential to Socrates: that the agent "knows what is best" but acts otherwise. On the contrary, says Democritus, such men "do not know that they have this power (for health, i.e., for what is best) in themselves." So Democritus does not actually describe the phenomenon that Socrates wishes to deny. On the contrary, he implies that such loss of mastery depends on a failure of understanding: wisdom should be able to rid the soul of its destructive passions (B 31). Thus, Democritus defends a position that is close to that of Socrates at the end of the *Protagoras*, although the role of reason is understood in quite different terms. (The fragments show no trace of a hedonistic calculus such as we find in the *Protagoras*. See under topic 8 below.)

In each of the three texts just discussed (B 236, 214, 234), the conflict is not between reason and passion but between the human agent and powers that assail him as it were from outside. Given these descriptions, it seems but a small step to recast the combat as a contest between rational and nonrational factors *within the psyche*. But that is precisely the step that will transform these vivid metaphors into a coherent psychological model. And I see no evidence of anyone's having taken this step before Plato.³⁸ Certainly Democritus did not.

5. *Desire and pleasure as reciprocal concepts; desire itself understood as a lack or need*

As noted, the combat with pleasures in B 214 is paralleled by the combat with desires in 234. This is characteristic of Democritus' use: desire is desire for pleasure; pleasure is (typically, if not exclusively) the gratification of desire. I assume that Democritus is not so much innovating here as reflecting the ordinary sense attached to these terms.³⁹ We recognize the conjunction or equivalence of *epithymia* and *hēdonē* that is taken for granted in the debate with Callicles in the *Gorgias*⁴⁰ and in

³⁸The *appearance* of such a step can be given by the quasi-allegorical suggestion of a combat between good sense (*noos*) and anger or passion (*thymos*), as in Theognis 631 ᾧτινι μὴ θυμοῦ κρέσσων νόος, αἰὲν ἐν ἄταις. But here there is no reference to the psyche and hence no psychological model at all: *noos* and *thymos* are conceived simply as possessions or as intimate companions of the person in question.

³⁹Compare the saying ascribed to Thales, "the sweetest thing is to get what you desire (*epithymēis*)," DK I, p. 64, n. 10, with parallels cited in *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, p. 182.

⁴⁰See *Gorgias* 484D5; 491D12, E9-492A3, A7; 494A7, C2, etc.

Aristotle's definition of *epithymia* as "desire for pleasure." This connection between the concepts of pleasure and desire may seem to us the merest common sense. But common sense needs to be articulated before it can be incorporated into a psychological theory. Here again we find Democritus providing the articulation from which Plato and Aristotle will construct their theory.

This connection is illustrated in the longest discussion of sensual appetite, which also introduces the notion of desire as a lack.

B 235. Those who derive their pleasures from the belly by exceeding a due measure in food or drink or sex, all these get pleasures that are brief and temporary, lasting only as long as they are eating and drinking; but the griefs they get are many. For this kind of desire is ever present for the same things; and when they get what they desire, the pleasure is quickly past and there is no good in these things except for the brief enjoyment. And then they feel the same needs again.

What Democritus classifies as "pleasures of the belly" are just what Plato and Aristotle will recognize as the basic appetites (*epithymiai*): hunger, thirst, and sex. Democritus' point is the grave disproportion between these desires and their gratification. Whereas the desires are permanent and recurrent, the corresponding pleasures are momentary and fleeting. So the pursuit of this kind of pleasure is doomed to frustration; we will have to satisfy the same desires again and again. Hence, moderation (*kairos*) is the only rational course. Democritus may be some sort of hedonist, since he recognizes joy and joylessness, *terpsis* and *aterpeia*, as marking the boundary between what is advantageous and disadvantageous (B 4 and 188). But he is no Callicles, avid for the maximal experience of desire and gratification. On the contrary, his insistence on the insatiable character of these appetites prefigures Socrates' allegory of filling the leaky jar with water from a sieve (*Gorgias* 493B).

Another fragment extends this analysis to the lust for riches, with a striking echo of Heraclitus.

B 219. The desire (*orexis*) for wealth, unless it is limited by satisfaction (*koros*), is much harder to bear than extreme poverty. For greater desires produce greater needs.

The last five words reinstantiate the phonetic-syntactic pattern of a mysterious five-word aphorism of Heraclitus (fr. 25): "Greater dooms are allotted greater destinies" (with the same juxtaposition of *mezonas* . . . *mezones* in the center of the clause). Whether there is any contact with the thought of the Heraclitean aphorism is uncertain, since that frag-

ment is one of the darkest. But the characteristic use of Heraclitean phrasing in B 219 seems to guarantee its authenticity, which is important for two reasons: (1) this is the first attested occurrence of the noun *orexis*,⁴¹ which is never used by Plato but which provides Aristotle with his generic term for desire; and (2) by correlating desire with lack or need (*endeia*), B 219 suggests the conception of desire as deficiency, with the corresponding notion of pleasure as the "fulfillment" of this lack. Democritus himself does not *have* a deficiency theory of pleasure and desire: desires are said here to produce needs, not to be produced by them. And satisfaction (*koros*) is not schematized as a filling up but allegorized as a kind of mythical person, marking off the boundary that sets limits to desire.

For completeness, I list in the Appendix all Democritean fragments dealing with the notion of desire. In these texts the general level of conceptualization is that of weak personification, as with the treatment of other psychic factors examined so far. Thus, intense desires are said to "blind the psyche" for other interests (B 72, in the Demokrates collection). Note that if this metaphor is taken literally, desires and psyche are conceived of as independent agents.

6. Reason and sense perception as distinct modes of cognition

Democritus' theory of knowledge lies beyond the scope of this paper, but some general grasp of his concept of the mind is required for understanding his moral psychology. B 11 (from Sextus), which draws the distinction between genuine (*gnēsīē*) and dark or spurious cognition (*skotiē gnōmē*), enumerates the dark kinds as "sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch." The nobler sort is "separate from this." Thus, Democritus recognizes the five special senses and a sixth, more refined mode of apprehension which is quite different and which we might call "thinking."⁴² The fragments offer no general term for sense perception (other than "obscure *gnōmē*"); but the verb *aisthanesthai* does occur in the reference to touch in B 11, and the corresponding noun (*aisthēsis*) could

⁴¹With B 72 and 284, B 219 represents the only occurrence of the term *orexis* before Aristotle.

⁴²I see no point in speculating (with Guthrie [note 4 above] 449-51) on what might lie behind the obscure doxographical report that Democritus recognized *more* than five senses "for irrational animals, wise men, and gods" (DK A 116). Aetius is too confused a source for us to have any hope of reconstructing the basis of such a report.

well have been used by Democritus in the great mass of his writing that has been lost.⁴³ Another quotation (from Galen) has the senses as a group addressing themselves to the mind or *phrēn*, presumably the organ of genuine *gnōmē*; "Poor *phrēn*, you overthrow us . . ." (B 125).⁴⁴ Galen paraphrases *phrēn* by *dianoia* "thought," a word that occurs elsewhere in the fragments as an equivalent of *gnōmē* (B 191; cf. *dianoēisthai* for mathematical thinking in B 155). Democritus thus anticipates, probably for the first time,⁴⁵ the classic distinction between sense perception and rational or nonsensory thought which both Plato and Aristotle can take for granted. It is, I suggest, the work of Democritus which permits Plato

⁴³Langerbeck Δόξιν ἐπιποσμήν (note 25 above, p. 114) emphasizes that there is no generic term for sense perception in B 11, and wishes to deny that Democritus has made the epistemic distinction between perception and thought (p. 115). But he offers no alternative explanation either for the two kinds of *gnōmē* in B 11 or for the opposition between *phrēn* and "we others" in B 125.

⁴⁴*Phrēn* is the term for a cognitive faculty or organ in B 125 and also in B 129: φρενὶ θεῖα νοῦνται. Its cognates signify practical wisdom: *phronēsis* in B 2, 119, 193; *phronein* in B 183. (Similarly in the Demokrates aphorisms B 42 and 58.) Because of the nature of the texts selected by the anthologers, most cognitive terms are attested primarily or exclusively in this practical sense, e.g., *nous* in B 175 and 282, *logismos* in B 187 and 290, *dianoia* in B 191. But the same vocabulary would presumably serve for theoretical reason when the occasion arose. Thus, *gnōmē* ("thought," "judgment," "mind," "state of mind") generally occurs in the fragments in connection with an emotional state or practical intent, but it also designates the two types of cognition in B 11. Similarly for *dianoia*, *dianoēisthai*, which is practical in B 191, theoretical in B 155. In B 129 *noēisthai* apparently refers to nonsensory cognition.

⁴⁵The distinction may have been drawn by Leucippus, but we have no evidence for this. The roots go back to Parmenides, of course, who urges his reader to "behold beings with the mind (*noos*)" in fr. 4 and "to judge my proof by rational argument" (*logos*) in fr. 7.5. But the text of Parmenides' poem does not sharply distinguish the senses as Democritus does in B 11 and 125. Thus, in Parmenides fr. 7.5, the tongue stands not for taste but for talk, and *noos/noēma* applies indifferently to perception and thought (fr. 16). Anaxagoras (fr. 12) and Diogenes (fr. 5) explicitly assign *nous/noēsis* to animals as well as to humans; in effect, they identify sensation, cognition, and animal vitality. Empedocles is even more generous: for him "all things have a share in *phronēsis* and *nōma* (= *noēma*)" (fr. 110.10). It is not in such a context that we can expect a sharp differentiation between sensory and nonsensory cognition.

If Walter Burkert were correct in including Philolaus B 13 with the genuine fragments (B 1-7), we would have a clear anticipation of the Platonic distinction between *nous* and *aisthēsis* prior to Democritus, and with a terminological precision that has no parallel even in Democritus. See his *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (= *Weisheit und Wissenschaft*, transl. E. L. Minar, Jr.) 269-71. In view of the other pre-Socratic evidence just cited, this terminological isolation should cast some doubt on the authenticity of Philolaus B 13. And in my opinion the anatomical distribution of psychic functions in this text smacks suspiciously of the *Timaeus*.

to refer without a word of explanation to “seeing and hearing and the other senses” (*Phaedo* 75A-B) and to contrast this with a kind of knowledge that is radically different, whose object is accessible “only to the reasoning of thought” (*ho tēs dianoias logismos*, 79A3).⁴⁶ Plato and Democritus are both heirs to the epistemic dualism of Parmenides, but in different ways. Democritus can draw a rigorous distinction between two kinds of cognition because he has succeeded in separating the sense qualities as such, which exist only by custom (*nomos*), from the objects of genuine knowledge: atoms and the void, which exist in reality (B 9 = B 125). The identification of the sense qualities and the recognition of the senses as such go hand in hand, and in both cases Democritus seems to have been a pioneer.

7. *Rational thought and emotion or desire as distinct principles of motivation?*

We might expect to find Democritus drawing a distinction between reason and passion corresponding to his antithesis between reason and sense. Unfortunately, the conceptual development is not that straightforward, and the fact that it is not may itself be the most important insight that we can derive from a close study of the fragments. Like all later authors, Democritus uses the same terms for reason or intellect in its practical-prudential as in its theoretical-scientific application: for reason as the principle of intelligent behavior and for reason as the principle for knowing the truth about the world.⁴⁷ It is, of course, the practical sense of rationality—acting intelligently rather than foolishly, thoughtfully rather than recklessly—which is the older, more familiar notion and more abundantly attested in the fragments. The other, properly epistemic notion of reason is essentially a creation of the new science and a correlate of the philosophic distinctions between appearance and real-

⁴⁶For *logismos* and *dianoia* in Democritus, see note 44 above. The parallel between vision and the eye of the mind (*gnōmē*) is common in late fifth century texts. See Antiphon B 1 with the Hippocratic passage cited by Diels ad loc. (*de arte* 2), where *gnōmēi noēsai* stands next to *ophthalmoisîn ideîn*.

⁴⁷See note 44 above on *gnōmē*, *dianoia*, and *logismos*. The fact that *logismos* is attested only in a practical sense is probably an accident of our documentation. It is interesting that *nous* (*anoia*, *anōēmōn*, etc.) also occurs in the fragments only for practical intelligence, whereas Plato and Aristotle will establish this as the standard term for the cognitive faculty, thus consecrating the union of the two concepts of reason.

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ity, between traditional errors and true insight into the nature of things. It is, as we have seen, Democritus (following Parmenides and others) who first defines the epistemic concept of reason in a rigorous way by a sharp contrast with sense perception. But he still has no precise terminology for the new notion; he simply uses the terms that have traditionally been associated with rationality in the practical sphere: *phrēn*, *gnōmē*, *dianoēisthai*. The use of this vocabulary reflects an important but unrecognized assumption that has rarely been questioned, then or since: that prudential and epistemic⁴⁸ rationality, practical and theoretical reason, are the exercises of a single principle or at least spring from a common source.

The conceptual development of the notion of reason is closely tied to the history of its terminology, but the two do not coincide. Although Democritus has no unambiguous term for "reason" as a mode of cognition, he has defined the concept unambiguously by a negative feature, its contrast to sense perception. Given the global notion of cognition as information and belief about the world, rational knowledge is identified as that kind of cognition that is not directly dependent on the anatomy of the sense organs. It is important to note here that, because of their natural basis in the human body, the enumeration of the five senses reports a plain matter of fact, like the shape of the earth or the explanation of a solar eclipse. Hence, when the senses are enumerated, whether by Democritus or by some unknown predecessor, the job is done once and for all: the five senses are the same for us as for Democritus. And insofar as the notion of rational cognition is defined negatively, by its distinction from sense perception as in Democritus B 11 and 125, the reference of this concept is fixed with equal definiteness, even though the terminology for it is still fluctuating.

When we turn from cognition to motivation and look for a neat contrast between reason and passion to match that between reason and sense perception, we find nothing of the sort. For here there is no natural or secure basis for marking off the domain of emotion, feeling, and affect, nothing that can correspond to the anatomical delineation of the

⁴⁸Note that *epistasthai*, the verb from which we have the term *epistēmē* for (scientific) knowledge, originally indicated the practical mastery of a subject matter, the know-how that is characteristic of an overseer or supervisor (*epistatēs*) who "stands over" the task to be performed by virtue of his skill (*epistamēnos*).

senses.⁴⁹ The ordinary, pre-theoretical notion of reason is not defined by a contrast with emotion at all but by the opposition between acting reasonably or foolishly, with foresight or without. This practical notion of rationality is then given an entirely new content by the philosophers (beginning with Heraclitus and Parmenides) who develop a notion of mind or intelligence as a theoretical capacity to understand the nature of things. It is this notion which Democritus has identified by the contrast with sense perception. And once he has done so, the concept of mind or reason is in a state of creative fermentation and confusion. It will have to be clarified by a systematic account of the parts or faculties of the psyche, in which the epistemic and prudential roles of reason are somehow distinguished and reconciled. That will be the work of Plato and Aristotle. But until this work is done, there is no basis for any clear contrast between reason and emotion. The general concept of emotion (or passion or affect) remains to be identified, and from the beginning its definition will be heavily theory-laden in a way that the identifying definition of sense-perception need not be. The classification of the emotions, and even the choice of a term for "emotion," will reflect some theory or model for conceptualizing the psyche. Hence, the absence of a combat between reason and passion in Democritus, to parallel the oppositions between reason and sense, body and soul, is more than an incidental fact about the use of metaphor in the fragments. Before Plato no one can describe such a conflict because no one has the conceptual equipment needed to refer to feeling, emotion, and affect in general terms, so as to set them over against the principle of reason. That is what we see emerging for the first time in the passage of the *Gorgias* where Plato speaks of "the part (or region) of the psyche where the desires are found" (493A3-B1).

It is the concept of desire with (as has been pointed out) the intimately connected concept of pleasure that plays the central role in what we may describe as Democritus' theory of the emotions. But this role reflects not so much a theoretical view as simply the facts of the case in our mental life. It is desire (and particularly the animal appetites) together with pleasure and pain as positive and negative states of feeling that come closest to providing a natural or objective point of reference for the realm of emotion and affect. Hence, Aristotle will on the one hand attempt to classify all sorts of motivational impulse under the head-

⁴⁹As Amelie Rorty has put it, "emotions do not form a natural class" (in "Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of the Passions," forthcoming in *RMeta*).

ing of "desire" (*orexis*), while on the other hand he offers a characterization of *pathos* ("affect") as "appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, affection (*philia*), hatred, yearning, jealousy, pity, and generally whatever is accompanied by pleasure or pain" (NE II.6, 1105^b21 ff.). In Democritus we find no comparable attempt at generalization.⁵⁰ Various emotions are mentioned, but there is little or nothing in the way of classification or conceptual unification. Aside from cheerfulness (*euthymia*), pleasure and joy, pain and grief, and desire (see the Appendix), all of which occur frequently, the fragments refer separately to:

- fear (*phobos* B 268; cf. 41, 297; *deima* 199, 215; *dedoika* 174, 205, 206; cf. *hyperdedoika* 278)
- confidence, fearlessness (*tharsos*, *athambiē* 215, 216, 258)
- boldness (in bad sense: *thrasos* 254)
- hope (*elpis* 185, 221, 287, 292; cf. 58)
- shame or respect (*aidōs*, *aideisthai*, *aischynesthai* 179, 244, 264; cf. 84)
- admiration (*thaumazein* 191)
- envy (*phthonos* 191, 245; cf. 88)
- jealousy (*zēlos* 191)
- ill-will (*dysmenia* 191)
- goodwill (*eunoia* 268)
- friendship, affection (*philia* 186; cf. 103, etc.)
- hatred (*stygēin* 199)
- contentiousness (*philonikia* 237, 252)

It is probably an accident that sexual desire (*erōs*), greed (*pleonexia*), and regret (*metameleia*) are attested only in the Demokrates collection.⁵¹

⁵⁰There is only an apparent exception in B 31 (from Clement): "according to Democritus, medicine cures diseases of the body, but wisdom rids the soul of passions (*pathē*)."⁵⁰ Although this probably does reflect something Democritus said, the phraseology is certainly Clement's. (The idea of rhetoric or philosophy as medicine for the soul is a common one, echoed for example by Socrates in the *Hippias Minor* 372 E7 ff.: "you will do me much greater good by ridding my soul of ignorance than by ridding my body of disease"; and compare the *technē alypias* in Antiphon A 6 with Guthrie's comment, *History* III, 290.) *Pathos* in the sense of "emotion, affect" is introduced by Aristotle as a technical term (NE 1105^b21, cited above; cf. Bonitz, *Index* 557^a41 ff.); in Plato and earlier writers it simply means "experience" or "what happens to one." Clement's formula actually presupposes the Stoic definition of *pathos* as an excessive or harmful affect that reason should eliminate. Democritus cannot have meant that wisdom should eliminate *emotions*, since the desirable condition of cheerfulness (*euthymia*) is itself an emotional state.

⁵¹B 73, 86, 43 (cf. *metanoia* in B 66).

Except for the allegorical reference to three negative emotions as "plagues" (*kēres*) in B 191, the fragments show no trace of any larger grouping or classification. As noted, there is at best a first glimmer of the notion of a combat between reason and emotion in B 236 and 290.

8. *Democritus' conception of the good life*

This discussion has not focused on Democritus' originality as a thinker but rather on the evidence of the fragments for the stage that psychological reflection had reached in the generation before Plato's dialogues. In many respects, Democritus has appeared here simply as the spokesman for his age: in the parallelism of body and soul, in the depiction of psychic conflict, in the conception of the psyche as locus for happiness and misery, character and emotion, and in making use of a notion of rationality that is both prudential and epistemic. In other respects, he seems to have achieved greater clarity in the formulation of ideas that other authors must have prepared: in the conception of the psyche as master and user of the body, in the intimate link between pleasure and desire, above all in the sharp distinction between sense perception and some more adequate type of cognition. A full account of Democritus' original contribution to moral psychology would have to include his conception of happiness as *euthymia* and his use of pleasure as a criterion. However, my understanding of Democritus' treatment of pleasure differs so greatly from the usual view that I can only offer here a few grounds for dissent.

An extreme version of the standard view was recently formulated by Gosling and Taylor:

He (Democritus) attempted to ground his moralizing in a systematic ethical theory He explicitly laid down a test or criterion to be applied in deciding questions of conduct, that criterion being fixed by consideration of an ultimate aim or purpose in human life. The achievement of that aim was the supreme good, and human conduct and things which human beings use were to be judged good or bad in so far as they tended to help or hinder the achievement of it Democritus saw the aim of life as the achievement of a state of tranquillity rather than as a life of pleasure as it would commonly be recognized, and thus anticipated the central doctrine of Epicurean ethics . . . [but, like the Epicureans, he thought] that the life of tranquillity is the pleasantest life.⁵²

⁵²Gosling and Taylor, pp. 29-31.

To assign to Democritus an ethical theory of this kind is to take for granted the notion of a *telos* or supreme good, the unifying goal of human life "for the sake of which everything else is chosen," a notion gradually elaborated by Plato in the dialogues and systematized by Aristotle in his *Ethics*. Now this notion is explicitly presupposed by the Hellenistic doxography that we find reflected in Cicero, Arius Didymus, Diogenes Laertius, and Clement, where Democritus' view is assimilated to the *telos* theories of post-Aristotelian moral philosophy.⁵³ But we need not follow the doxographers in attributing the Hellenistic concept of *telos* to a pre-Platonic moralist.⁵⁴ An unprejudiced reading of the fragments does not support the view that Democritus' ethical thought is dominated by the pursuit of any single goal. And insofar as one principal preoccupation can be discerned throughout the fragments, it is a concern for the role of reason in human life—that is, for the extent to which thoughtful judgment and careful reflection can protect us against the uncertainties of fortune on the one hand and self-inflicted grief on the other. Here moral philosophy is a guide to life not by telling us how to decide what is right or what is expedient but by increasing the share of reason and hence of autonomy in our experience of good and evil, joy and grief. The term *autarkeia*, "independence, self-sufficiency," is as conspicuous in the fragments as is *euthymia*,⁵⁵ and Democritus might almost be regarded as a precursor of the Stoics rather than of the Epicureans.

Seen in his own time, however, the natural point of comparison is with Socrates. Like Socrates, Democritus has an "inner" conception of happiness, located in the psyche rather than in possessions or in the esteem shown to you by others. And as for Socrates, this inner peace and comfort rests for Democritus too upon the consciousness of a life lived

⁵³DK A 169, 167, 1.45, and B 4. Note the appropriate caveat of Bailey: the end (*telos*) "is the conception of a later age and implies a far more logically worked-out system of ethics" (*The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, pp. 190 f.).

⁵⁴For a justified protest against this misreading of Democritus, see Langerbeck (note 25 above) 56–75: Democritus' thought is focused on the notion of security (*asphaleia*) and stability (*mēketi metapiptein*); but "nothing points to *euthymia* as systematic center for a scientific ethics" (p. 60). We may add that even Epicurean theory was probably not as rigorously consequentialist as Gosling and Taylor would suggest for Democritus, with all judgments of good and bad based solely on the contribution to the final goal as in Utilitarian theory. Certainly Aristotle's own ethics is not "teleological" in this sense.

⁵⁵For *autarkēs*, see B 176, 210; the thought without the word is there in 119 and 146. Cf. B 234 (the power of health is in ourselves). Hence the importance of *ponos* and *mathēsis*. And see below on *aidōs*: the standard for conduct is also in ourselves, not in the eyes of others.

according to *aretē* or moral excellence. Again, as with Socrates, Democritus' conception of excellence is a unified one in which the "quiet" or cooperative virtues of justice and temperance occupy center stage and determine the content of more "competitive" excellences like courage (see, e.g., B 214). More than Socrates, however, Democritus is prepared to recommend the virtues for their role in making one's life agreeable: "*sōphrosynē* increases one's delights and makes pleasure greater" (B 211). Pleasure and grief, joy and joylessness, may thus be invoked as "the boundary mark (*ouros*) of what is advantageous and disadvantageous" (B 4, 188). Here Democritus reminds us of Socrates' unexpected hedonism at the end of the *Protagoras*.⁵⁶ But other texts are difficult to reconcile with hedonism, even with the measured hedonism of the *Protagoras*: "one should not choose all pleasure but pleasure in what is noble (*to kalon*)" (B 207); the brave man must "prevail over pleasures" (B 214); the soul debauches the body "by indulgence in pleasure" (*philēdoniai*, B 159); it is from such pleasures that wickedness is produced (*kakotēs*, B 178). Democritus' attitude to pleasure seems rather like that of Aristotle: "our whole study and pursuit of virtue must be concerned with pleasures and pains; for someone who deals with these well will be a good man, but he who deals with them badly will himself be bad" (*NE* II.3, 1105^a10). And just as Aristotle holds the life of virtue and *eudaimonia* to be the most pleasant life, so does Democritus insist on the positive experience of joy or "cheerfulness" which marks success in living a rational life and which can serve as a guide in the choice of particular pleasures: "the best thing for a man will be to live his life with as much joy (*euthymeisthai*) as possible and as little grief. And this will be, if he does not take his pleasures in things mortal" (*ta thnēta*, B 189)⁵⁷—for example, in the fleeting pleasures of the belly (B 235).

As Vlastos has pointed out, the hedonism of B 189—that is, the pursuit of cheerfulness and the avoidance of grief—is not so much a new philosophical doctrine as the expression of a widespread view, shared by the poets and by the medical writers, that joy is the natural feeling of health and vitality whereas joylessness, grief, and pain are the marks of

⁵⁶The parallel to the *Protagoras* is often drawn, e.g., by Guthrie (note 4 above) 494.

⁵⁷The authenticity of B 189 has been doubted by Claus (p. 148n) on insufficient grounds. (B 235 on the brevity and futility of sensual pleasure can show what Democritus meant by *ta thnēta*.) The language here seems to me much more convincingly Democritean than in the Demokrates aphorism B 37, which describes the goods of the psyche as "more divine" than those of the body.

death and disease.⁵⁸ Here again, Democritus is performing the pre-theoretical role of articulating in general terms a popular view of pleasure, which Plato will then develop as a systematic theory in the *Protagoras*. The hedonism that Socrates expounds in the *Protagoras* is not Democritus' view, and it is not the view of "the many" either, since they do not formulate philosophical theories. But it would not be inaccurate to see Democritus here as the intermediate stage between the inarticulate hedonism of common sense and popular literature, on the one hand, and the philosophical hedonism of the *Protagoras* on the other.

That pleasure as such cannot be the final consideration for Democritus is best seen in what is probably the most original feature of his ethical doctrine, his remarks about shame and self-respect. Whereas Socrates' appeal is ultimately to reason or cognition, to the judgment of "one who has knowledge" and to "the *logos* which seems best upon reflection" (*Crito* 47D ff., 46B), Democritus' appeal is to an inner standard that is less principled and more personal: "Do not feel more shame before men than before yourself; be no more willing to do evil if no one is to find out than if all men are to know. But show respect above all before yourself and establish this law for your soul, so as to do no unseemly act" (B 264). The phrase *heōuton aideisthai* means both to show yourself respect and to be ashamed in your own eyes.⁵⁹ The force of this expression can only be understood in the light of the traditional shame standard of Greek morality, which is here stood on its head. In place of the hero's code, which identifies his self-respect with his status in the eyes of others, Democritus proposes an inner "law for the psyche" that is an almost literal anticipation of Kant's notion of the moral law as autonomy or self-legislation. The Democritean sage is a free spirit, traditionalist in many respects, dissident in others (for example, on begetting children and on concern for the afterlife). For morality as for happiness, his standard is internal: "the psyche is the dwelling place of the *daimōn*." The *daimōn* is, traditionally, the divine power that assigns good or bad fortune; for Democritus, the human being is himself largely responsible for this outcome. In the notion of the indwelling *daimōn* as in the notion of self-

⁵⁸See Vlastos (pp. 586 f.).

⁵⁹For a parallel comment on self-shame and self-respect, see B 244 with B 84. B 179 emphasizes the role of shame in moral education: *to aideisthai*, "the greatest support of *aretē*." Shame before others is the training and propaedeutic for the final stage of shame before oneself. The importance of *aidōs* for Democritus again reminds us of Plato's *Protagoras*, where *aidōs* and *dikē* are presented (in the Prometheus myth) as the basis of social morality.

respect (rather than in his looser, less coherent notion of the psyche), Democritus might claim to have made the first attempt at a philosophical formulation of the concept of the self.⁶⁰

*Appendix:
Democritus' References to Desire*

The fragments make regular use of two terms for desire: *orexis*, *oregomai* (six occurrences) and *epithymē*, *epithymēein* (five occurrences). Other verbs occur more rarely.

I. *Orexis*, *oregomai*

- B 72 (Demokrates): Violent *orexeis* for one thing blind the soul for other things.
- 201. Fools desire (*oregontai*) long life without enjoying the length of their life.
- 202. Fools desire (*oregontai*) what is absent, but they waste what is present, which is more profitable than things which are past.
- 205. Fools desire (*oregontai*) life in fearing death.
- 219. Desire (*orexis*) for money, if it is not limited by satiety, is much harder to bear than extreme poverty. For greater desires (*orexeis*) produce greater needs.
- 284. If you do not desire (*epithymeis*) many things, a few things will seem many to you. For small desire (*orexis*) makes poverty as strong as wealth.

II. *Epithymia*, *epithymēein*

- 70. (Demokrates): Immoderate desire (*epithymēin*) is the mark of the child, not of a man.
- 191. Human beings achieve cheerfulness by moderation in enjoyment (*metriotēti terpsios*) and a measured balance (*symmetria*) in their life . . . You should observe the lives of those who are in distress . . . so that you will no longer suffer evil in your soul by desiring (*epithymeonti*) more than you have . . . <The person who admires those who are more fortunate> is obliged always to try for something new from the desire (*epithymia*) to do something irremediable and against the law.

⁶⁰For some pre-Democritean reflection on the self, see Heraclitus frs. 101 and 116 (Diels) with my comment, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, p. 116.

224. The desire (*epithymia*) for more spoils what one has, like the dog in Aesop's fable (who dropped its bone reaching for its reflection).
234. By failure of self-mastery (*akrasia*) they betray the cause of health to their desires (*epithymiai*). (For full text, see above, p. 16.)
235. [The pleasures of the belly are brief. . . .] For this kind of desire (*epithymein*) is always present for the same things, and when they get what they desire (*epithymeousi*), the pleasure is quickly past. . . . (For full text, see above, p. 16.)
284. See above, under *orexis*.
- III. *Other expressions for desire or preference*
- A. *Ephiesthai* B 73 (Demokrates, and unusually suspicious): Legitimate eros is striving after (*ephiesthai*) handsome objects (boys?) without doing them violence.
- B. *Himeiresthai* B 223. The body does not long for (*himeiretai*) things that require toil and trouble and make life painful. (See fuller text below under *chrēizein*.)
- C. *Ethelein*
199. Fools who hate life want (*ethelousi*) to live from fear of Hades.
206. Fools want (*ethelousin*) to grow old because they fear death.
(Note: The formula in 199 and 206 is parallel to that in B 201, 202, 205, where we have *oregontai* instead of *ethelousin*.)
- D. *Chrēizein*
223. What the body requires (*chrēizei*) is easily available to all without toil and trouble; as for those things that require (*chrēizei*) toil and trouble and make life painful, it is not the body that longs for these but the ill grasp of the mind.
- E. *Diōkein*
203. Human beings pursue (*diōkousin*) death in fleeing from it.
(Note: The formula parallels that with *oregontai* and *ethelousin*: see above on B 206.)

The various verbs seem almost interchangeable and require no comment. However, the nominalizations (*orexis* and *epithymia*) become subjects in turn for a different verb and thus take on the literary color of a slight personification: desires make the soul blind (B 72) or produce

needs (B 219); moderate desire strengthens poverty (284), as desire for more ruins what one has (224). This personification of desire follows the normal pattern in Democritus and other authors for abstract terms formed by nominalization of the corresponding verb.

Note that *orexis* is desire for wealth in 219 and 284; *epithymein* refers to sensual desires ("the belly") in 235 and probably in 234. Since both nouns occur in the same context in 284, Democritus is not likely to have intended any substantial difference between the two terms. The verbs are slightly more vivid and perhaps more individual: there probably persists an etymological connotation of "reaching out for" in *orego-mai* and "having one's heart (*thymos*) set upon" in *epithymeein*.

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PENELOPE "ΠΟΛΥΤΡΟΠΟΣ"*

Although Penelope's regular epithet in Homer is περίφρων ("very intelligent"), the rare quality of her intelligence, more elusive than her celebrated loyalty, has not received the attention it deserves.¹ A closer look at Penelope's character, as presented in the *Odyssey*, will demonstrate the appropriateness of this epithet, while illuminating the complex woman behind the legend.

Penelope's actions relative to the suitors are enigmatic and seem, at first glance, anything but wise. Telemachus, Athena, and three of the suitors (Antinous, Leiodes, and Amphimedon) state specifically that Penelope has given the persistent nobles reason to be hopeful. Athena's assessment of the situation ("Penelope raises the hopes of all [πάντας μὲν ἔλπει] and sending out messages, makes promises [ὑπὸσχεται] to each man, but her real wishes are different" [13.380-81]) is echoed by Telemachus as he tells Odysseus: "She neither says no to a marriage she hates nor is she able to end the matter" (16.126-27; cf. 1.249-50). The similar testimonies of Athena and Telemachus make credible the suitors' complaints that Penelope, "exceedingly cunning" (ἥ τοι περί κέρδεα οἶδεν, 2.88), has been leading them on (e.g., 2.91-92). Even in the underworld, the soul of Amphimedon attributes his undoing to Penelope's guile ("she neither said no to a marriage she hated nor did she make it come to pass, devising [φραζομένη] for us death" [24.126-27]).

Antinous' retort to Telemachus early in the poem (2.85-128) outlines the suitors' complaint. It charges that Penelope, too clever for her own good, made fools of the suitors for more than three years by the personal words of encouragement she sent to each man and by her pre-

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¹Studies have emphasized, for example, Penelope's nobility (J. W. Mackail, "Penelope in the *Odyssey*," *Classical Studies* [London 1925] 54-75), her conservatism (Philip Whaley Harsh, "Penelope and Odysseus in *Odyssey* XIX," *AJP* [1950] 1-21), her cautiousness (Agathe Thornton, *People and Themes in Homer's Odyssey* [Dunedin and London 1970] 93-114), and her tenacity (John A. Finley, *Homer's Odyssey* [Cambridge, Mass. 1978] 1-24).

tense of weaving a shroud for Laertes while they sat dumbly by. The suitors trusted her and were deceived. They will be patient no longer. Penelope may be the most "wily" (2.118) of women but "in this at least she has not exhibited good sense" (2.122). There can be no turning back. Telemachus must send his mother away and she must at long last choose one of the Achaeans "whomever she will" (2.128). As long as Penelope continues to keep the suitors dangling, they will retaliate by maintaining their bold presence in her halls. Antinous assesses the situation succinctly for Telemachus: "Great fame she makes for herself, but for you regret for your (once) abundant livelihood" (2.125-26). Antinous' accusation of Penelope is tacitly accepted by Telemachus, who responds only by stating his reluctance to send Penelope home to her father (i.e., the dowry price, his mother's curses, and public opinion) and by appealing to the suitors' sense of decency (2.129-45; cf. 20.341-44).

Penelope substantiates much of Antinous' and Amphimedon's accusations (19.139-56, 24.128-46) as she pours out her heart to Odysseus, disguised as a beggar. Admitting that the angry suitors reproached her loudly (19.155) when they discovered the deception of the weaving, she acknowledges that she has allowed herself to be backed into a corner: "And now I can neither escape marriage nor come up with another plan" (μητις, 19.157-58). It is noteworthy that Penelope at no time mentions directly the encouraging messages which Antinous and Athena claim that she sent to each of the suitors (2.91-92, 13.380-81). She mentions, as an example of her δόλοι, only the weaving of the shroud, which she speaks of proudly as a divine inspiration (19.138), successful for more than three years until disclosed by her treacherous maids (19.154). Although there is no reason why Penelope should have mentioned the private messages to the sympathetic stranger, her reasons for sending them may have been more involved than she cared to explain.

Penelope's apparently contradictory motives for sending private messages of encouragement to men who she claims are courting her against her will must be sought in a consideration of her status as a woman in Ithacan society. Although we lack precise knowledge of the social constraints and obligations on her, we can make reasonable inferences from her behavior in the *Odyssey*. Her seemingly imprudent action of encouraging the suitors, whose suit she claims to detest, makes sense only if there was the strong expectation, even pressure, for her to remarry once there was no realistic hope of Odysseus' return. Such a

view is consistent with current scholarship on the organization of the Homeric *ōikos*.² By the time the action of the poem begins, Odysseus has been away from Ithaca for nineteen years, almost three years longer than Menelaus, the last of the Greek heroes to return home (4.81–82).

Although we have no way of knowing for certain over what period of time specifically the private messages extended, we can assume from the use of the present tense by Antinous and Athena that the sending of private messages had been Penelope's regular practice for some time, as the complaint of Antinous charges. The time sequence of Penelope's weaving and the suitors' feasting is more explicit, however. Athena states (13.377) that the suitors' flagrant abuse of Odysseus' property began three years earlier, the approximate time of Penelope's weaving (2.93–95). It seems obvious that the suitors' persistent presence in Odysseus' halls prompted the *dólos* of the weaving. Less certain is the role that Penelope's encouraging messages played in promoting or exacerbating the situation. If we consider, however, that Antinous mentions Penelope's messages before he mentions her weaving and places her deception of the suitors generally in a framework of three to four years (2.89–90), the conclusion is unavoidable: Penelope's private messages encouraged the suitors to press their suit en masse and thus began the three-year siege on the palace.³

If Penelope had no realistic hope of remaining a "widow" with the same status she had held as Odysseus' wife, it would explain her even-

²For the dependent position of women in Homeric society, see W. K. Lacey, "Homeric *Hedna* and Penelope's *Kyrios*," *JHS* 86 (1966) 55–69, and *The Family in Classical Greece* (London and Southampton 1968) 33–50; and James Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago and London 1975) 119–23 (e.g., "a woman's social position is defined by her relations with men," p. 122). The ambiguous political situation on Ithaca is discussed by M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (London 1978² rev.) esp. 88–91, 129–30. The absence of a clear picture of Ithacan society, however, should not prevent us from examining Penelope as Homer has presented her, in the context of his poem and in relation to the other characters who react to her. Cf. A. A. Long, "Morals and Values in Homer," *JHS* 90 (1970) 121–39, who asserts the importance of literary context for the study of Homeric ethics.

³There is nothing in the Greek, as I read it, that necessitates the interpretation of Fritz Wehrli, "Penelope und Telemachos," *MH* 16 (1959) 231, that Penelope's actions of sending messages and weaving the shroud were in successive time periods of three years each. Antinous, speaking with strong emotion, may mean only that within a three- to four-year period, the suitors were deceived simultaneously by Penelope's messages and weaving (ἡ δὲ δόλον ... μερμήριξε, 2.93) but that the messages began first. It seems unlikely that the suitors, after receiving encouraging messages (which are spoken of in the present tense, e.g., 2.91–92, 13.380–81), would wait three years before pressing their suit.

tual acceptance, even encouragement, of the long-delayed courtship and her private messages to the suitors. Despite insinuations of some characters to the contrary, Penelope never acts as though she has any option of dismissing outright the prospect of remarriage, which even her own father and brothers are urging (15.16-17). She insists on her prerogative of naming the day, however, and the circumstances of her remarriage (19.525-29). She has the option of returning to her father's household in Sparta and from there selecting a new husband who could be expected to bring her countless bride-gifts (19.529). Evidently, she also has the option of remaining in Ithaca. In this way, she is able to retain her esteemed position as Odysseus' "widow" and exercise continued control over his extensive properties (19.525-26), while she goes through the motions of encouraging courtship. It is not surprising that prudent Penelope took the latter course of action. Although Telemachus leaves no doubt that he himself would prefer that Penelope return to her father's home, his reply to Antinous attests to public support for Penelope's decision to remain in the palace while she makes up her mind (2.136-37; cf. 16.75).

By remaining in Ithaca, Penelope, at the risk of alienating her son, could acquiesce in the social pressure which would see her remarry, all the while keeping intact Odysseus' household (cf. 11.178) and nurturing the hope of his return. What Penelope had said in her private messages to the suitors we can only suppose. Without committing herself, she no doubt provided for the day when, all hope of Odysseus' return gone, she would decide to consider seriously the many proposals of marriage she had garnered, however inferior the prospective bridegrooms might be to Odysseus (cf. 4.724-26). Penelope, at her most candid in conversation with the beggar, admits that her "heart stirs itself in two directions" (19.524), whether out of consideration for her husband's memory and public sentiment to remain in Ithaca or since her son urges her to leave, to marry the best and most generous of the Achaeans and make a new life for herself (19.524-29). The pragmatic value of Penelope's private messages has been assessed in a recent work on the *Odyssey*: "If she gained nothing final, she lost nothing final and meanwhile, though at a loss of property, maintained a kind of order and kept the future open for Telemachus and for herself."⁴

⁴Finley (note 1 above) 5. Penelope's freedom to refuse the suitors has been maintained by some critics, notably W. J. Woodhouse, *The Composition of Homer's Odyssey* (Oxford 1930) 81-83. Penelope has not been without her detractors. The most unflattering view of the lady in relation to the suitors is that of Samuel Butler, *The Authoress of*



Penelope's practice of sending private messages had a more subtle effect, however. What περίφρων Penelope must have seen is that her encouragement of large numbers of suitors would actually protect her position at Ithaca. As long as she remained in the palace, she would share in Odysseus' γέρας, superior to any she would acquire by marrying one of her wealthy suitors, and retain possession of, in her own words, her "belongings, servants, and great high-roofed house" (κτῆσιν ἐμὴν, δμῳάς τε καὶ ὑπερεφές μέγα δῶμα, 19.526). The suitors, whatever their precise motives, were as much interested in Penelope's position at Ithaca as in herself, as Penelope was well aware.⁵ By encouraging the suitors individually, Penelope kept alive the hopes of each man and promoted a keen and distracting competition among their ranks without committing herself to anyone in particular. In this light, Penelope's encouragement of wide-scale courtship can be viewed not as the action of a vain or insecure woman but as the action of a very cunning woman, who is using the suitors to enable her to acquiesce in the social pressure to remarry, all the while being "forced" by their very numbers to stay where she intends to stay, and where the suitors want her to be when she chooses one of them: Odysseus' house.⁶

the Odyssey (London 1897) 125-36. So also Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths II* (Baltimore 1955) 374-75. Cf. Apollod. *Epit.* 7.38-39 for the tradition that Penelope was seduced by one of the suitors and for her infidelity was subsequently sent away or even killed by Odysseus. The sources for the later tradition of Penelope's infidelity are discussed by Howard Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides* (Princeton 1974) 246-49. The suspicion that Penelope was unfaithful has no support in Homer.

⁵E.g., 21.68-72. On the suitors' goal of acquiring Odysseus' γέρας, cf. Telemachus' assessment: μητέρ' ἐμὴν γαμέειν καὶ Ὀδυσσεύος γέρας ἔξειν (15.522) and Eurykleia's assurance to Odysseus that his γέρας remains his possession in his absence (11.184). For γέρας as both property and status, see Redfield (note 2 above) 111-12. Women as "properties" also constituted γέρας (e.g., Sarah Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* [New York 1975] 25-26: "an extra measure of prestige accrued to the warrior who possessed a slave who was once the wife or daughter of a man of high status"). Cf. *Il.* 9.367 on γέρας with relation to Briseis.

⁶Cf. 16.384-86 (Antinous advocates seizing Telemachus' property, dividing it equally among all the suitors, and ceding only the palace to Penelope and her new husband). Whether the suitors, as gracious losers, would have accepted a husband for Penelope, chosen from their ranks, early in their wooing of her, before her δόλοι and false promises made them resentful, is debatable. Their angry passions are exacerbated to such a degree, however, that by the time the action of the poem begins, it seems doubtful that the marriage of one of their number to Penelope would have contented the rest of them, despite Antinous' claims to the contrary (e.g., 2.128, 18.288-89).

Penelope's position at Ithaca comes to be one of being virtually besieged by men who are courting her against her will (literally), but if courted she must be, Penelope has complied with defiance and has managed to have the situation serve her own self-interests. She has made her arrogant wooers her protectors, in a manner of speaking. If Telemachus, rapidly approaching manhood, tried to force her to return to her father in Sparta (cf. 19.533), she would have, in effect, a veritable army of suitors to defend her position in Odysseus' household.

A comparable situation is found in the case of Clytemnestra. Her marriage to Aegisthus enabled her to retain power after Agamemnon's death, which she would not have been able to do as a woman alone.⁷ Although Clytemnestra and Penelope are poles apart in virtue in the *Odyssey*, Telemachus finds himself in a situation parallel to that of Orestes and is so reminded by Athena. She holds up Orestes' punishment of Aegisthus (1.298-300) as a model for his own actions in Ithaca against the suitors (e.g., 1.289-96), who are destroying his father's property and one of whom his mother may yet choose as husband while still Queen of Ithaca with certain consequences to himself.

From this perspective, Penelope's practice of sending encouraging messages to scores of men whom she prays never to marry, but who through their expectations and very numbers will protect her freedom to choose one of them in Ithaca, is cunning indeed and is consistent with her reputation for possessing φρένας ἐσθλὰς (2.117), more than even Antinous realized. If the suitors were using her for the γέρας inherent in her position, she might use them too for her own purpose. Penelope, though to appearances at the mercy of the suitors, in reality exercised some control of the situation at Ithaca, at least in the beginning. Her playful words to the suitors at the commencement of her weaving (κοῦροι . . . μίμνετε, "Boys . . . wait awhile!" 19.141-42; cf. 2.96-97) reflect, I suggest, her initial view of the suitors as men who, though expected to be persistent, could be controlled, nonetheless, by a clever woman, in some respects not unlike the geese she kept around the palace as pets. These geese, in fact, are equated with the suitors by the eagle that appears to Penelope in her dream (19.548), as we shall see later.

⁷This has been noted by Charles Rowan Beye, "Male and Female in the Homeric Poems," *Ramus* 3.2 (1974) 97: Clytemnestra's situation is the "exact parallel of Penelope's except that there is but one suitor and he has been successful in his suit." Cf. Pomeroy (note 5 above) 21.

Her confident ability to control the suitors is also glimpsed in Book 18 when, after a refreshing nap sent by Athena, Penelope gives a revealing demonstration of her compelling presence by extracting costly presents from the dazed suitors with a self-assuredness and finesse that even Odysseus must admire (18.274-83). Penelope's remarkable assertiveness extends also to Telemachus, whom she scolds at length for not yet being the man he claims to be, at least in matters of hospitality (18.215-25). Athena stage-manages this appearance of Penelope primarily for Odysseus' sake (cf. 18.158-62), so that he might rejoice in his incomparable wife, seen here for the first time since his return to Ithaca, as he observes the ease with which she replenishes his treasury. The staggering effect on the suitors of Penelope's enhanced beauty is attributed by Homer to divine intervention. Penelope's extraordinary hold over the suitors, however, judging from their years of enthrallment, would seem to be very much the product of her own remarkable qualities.⁸

Penelope's encouragement of the suitors ("cunning arts such as we have never yet heard," 2.118) drove a wedge of misunderstanding between Telemachus and herself. His constrained and abrupt treatment of her is understandable in light of the offensive presence of the suitors, for which he blames his mother. He seems to enjoy humiliating her in front of them on the rare occasions that she appears publicly in the halls (15.516-17) by reminding her that her place is upstairs tending to her weaving (e.g., 1.356-58, 21.350-52). It is tempting to read into Telemachus' reprimand both a taunt at the suitors for being taken in by a woman's "weaving" and sarcasm directed at Penelope for the failure of her grand scheme (to which Telemachus may not have been privy), which brought the suitors daily into the palace. In any case, Tele-

⁸Folkloric elements underlying the depiction of Penelope's relationship with the suitors help to account for the cartoon quality of the enthralled suitors whose numbers and slavish doggedness have not been satisfactorily accounted for otherwise. Aspects of Circe are evident in Penelope (see Beye [note 7 above] 97-98) and may explain certain details of the narrative. Penelope, however, as presented by Homer, is a three-dimensional character who is not above using her wiles to achieve her desires but not immune to feelings of anxiety and regret either. For the folkloric tradition underlying the suitors' waste and profligacy (the unjust-guest tale), see H. L. Levy, "The Odyssean Suitors and the Host-Guest Relationship," *TAPA* 94 (1963) 147-53. Comic aspects of the suitors are noted by Douglas Stewart, *The Disguised Guest* (Cranbury, N.J. 1976) 100-01. Cf. Uvo Hölscher, "The Transformation from Folk-Tale to Epic," in *Homer: Tradition and Invention*, ed. Bernard Fenik (Leiden 1978) 51-67, for the transformation of Penelope's character from folklore to epic.

machus refuses to confide in his mother as he sets off on his important mission to Pylos, saying "we don't want her to spoil her lovely complexion by weeping" (2.376). Despite her heartfelt demonstrations of grief for his absent father in the presence of the suitors (e.g., 1.343-44, 18.251-56), Telemachus seems to doubt her sincerity or, at very least, is uncertain about her real feelings ("my mother's heart wavers in two directions [δ[ι]χ[α] in her breast," 16.73). Athena, playing on his mistrust, urges him to hurry back to Ithaca before Penelope marries one of her suitors after all and walks off with some of his possessions (15.10-20; cf. 1.276). Telemachus' immediate return home proves that to him, at least, Athena's suggestion is not farfetched.

Telemachus seems predisposed to judge his mother harshly. His curt description of her to the suitors at the commencement of the contest of the bow ("But you yourselves know this well enough; why should I praise my mother?" 21.110) may be attributed to nervous anticipation about the impending confrontation, but his angry outburst at Penelope's cool reception of Odysseus ("Cruel mother [δύσμητερ] . . . But then your heart is always harder than stone," 23.97-103) is inexplicable unless prompted by the belief that here, at last, was proof that Penelope, despite her tears, did not love his father as she had claimed to do these many years. How else could Telemachus accuse his emotionally overwrought mother of being "*always* harder than stone"—the very woman he chided the day before for being "too emotional" and weakening his own resolve (17.46-47; cf. 1.353). While it is true that Telemachus might not be reliably consistent in his own emotions, his readiness to criticize Penelope demonstrates the gulf of misunderstanding between them.

Penelope's encouragement of the suitors, however shrewd on one level, necessitated the δόλος of the weaving or some other delaying tactic to buy her the time she needed. By the time the action of the poem begins, time has all but run out for Penelope, and her anxiety about coming up with another δόλος to put off the incensed suitors has left her emotionally strained, to say the least, particularly after she learns of their plot to murder her son (4.697-702; cf. 16.432: ἐμὲ δὲ μεγάλως ἀκαχίζεις). Declaring a timely sneeze of Telemachus a favorable omen (17.541-45), Penelope prophesies, not without a prayer: "Therefore shall unending death beset all the suitors, nor shall one of them escape" (17.546-47; cf. 4.684-85).

The fear that she might actually be forced to accept a "loathsome" (18.272) marriage with one of the men she has come to regard as "ene-

mies" (ἐχθροί, 17.499) causes her such anguish that she prays to die quickly at Artemis' hands or, like the daughters of Pandareus, similar to herself in beauty, wisdom, and skill in handiwork, to disappear in an instant from the face of the earth as the inevitable time of marriage draws near (20.61-82). Earlier in the poem, Penelope had drawn the revealing parallel between herself and another daughter of Pandareus, who unintentionally killed her own son Itylus. Transformed into a nightingale, this daughter sings sweetly all the while she mourns for her dead child. The true significance of this simile has been missed by commentators, who have noted only that Penelope likens her wavering mind to the changing melody of the nightingale's song.⁹ The deeper significance, which makes this particular simile so apt, is that Penelope identifies with the hapless daughter of Pandareus (19.512-23), whose unintentional act of killing her own son brought unending grief upon herself. Penelope, too, must question whether she, in her encouragement of the suitors, did not unintentionally create the painful situation which prevails in Ithaca and is bringing to herself seemingly unending grief. Both women, moreover, have known bereavement of a sort — Pandareus' daughter "unwittingly" (οἱ ἄφραδίᾳς, 19.523) killed her son. Penelope's own son is, in some ways, dead to her too, and her inability to settle the issue of the suitors very nearly caused her son's death in fact, herself unwitting. Penelope might well wish, though, for the wings of Pandareus' daughter to fly away from Ithaca. The strain of the situation, becoming increasingly intolerable, has worn her down emotionally. It is not surprising that her initial reaction upon facing that idealized and long-awaited husband, who has freed her from the suitors forever, is a blend of elation, relief, disillusionment, resentment, possibly even shame: "I cannot find a word to say to him nor can I question him about anything. I cannot even look him in the face" (23.106-07).

⁹E.g., Anne Amory, "The Reunion of Odysseus and Penelope," in *Essays on the Odyssey*, ed. Charles Taylor (Bloomington, Ind. 1963) 131, n. 9 and refs., and Norman Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* (Berkeley and London 1975) 228-29. Cf. W. B. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* (London 1965²) ad 19.521-23, who believes that the general effect of the comparison is to enhance the dignity of Penelope's grief. In later accounts of the myth, the daughter, unnamed by Homer, is identified as Aëdon, wife of Zethus, co-ruler of Thebes. In a jealous rage, she attempted to kill her sister-in-law's (Niobe's) eldest son, but in the darkness unintentionally turned the sword on her own child instead (Schol. ad *Od.* 19.518; Eustath. ad *Od.* 19.519). For the myth of Pandareus' daughters handed over to the Furies for their father's wrongdoing, see Paus. 10.30.1-2 and Stanford's notes ad 20.66-82.

Although Penelope's emotional resources are exhausted, her intelligence prevails. The proposal of the contest of the bow, suggested to her by talk of Odysseus' apparel (19.218-42), is another example of her cunning, a desperate, final attempt to put off the suitors forever, with any luck.¹⁰ Her relief at coming up with another δόλος helps to explain her unusual animation in this scene (e.g., 19.325-28). The plot against Telemachus has shown her the urgency of the situation, and the assurances of Odysseus' imminent arrival from Theoclymenus and the beggar have given her the courage to make a move. Only Odysseus, who is never coming home, can string the bow. Let the suitors try and, defeated, abandon their suit. If Odysseus really is coming home, so much the better. The contest will, at very least, buy her more time. She explains the timing of her decision to remarry (Telemachus' growing a beard) to be in accord with Odysseus' parting wishes (18.260-70). Penelope has seized upon the comment of the housekeeper regarding Telemachus' beard (18.175-76) to make plausible her sudden willingness to remarry. Leiodes grasped her purpose in part when he stated that after all the suitors perforce give up in the contest of the bow, Penelope can marry whomever she chooses (21.157-62) or no one, we may add, at least for the present, if she chooses. Even if Penelope had resigned herself to the idea that one of the suitors might succeed in stringing the bow, it is hard to see that she could have acted much differently. It was

¹⁰This view accords with Frederick M. Combellack's interpretation of the timing of the contest ("Three Odyssean Problems," *CSCA* 6 [1973] 32-40). It has been variously suggested that Penelope more or less consciously recognizes Odysseus in the course of Book 19 (e.g., C. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* [Cambridge, Mass. 1958] 303; Amory [note 9 above] 105-08; and W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme* [Oxford 1954] 55 and further refs., 253, n. 25). Among those opposing this interpretation are Fr. Eichhorn, *Homer's Odyssee, Ein Führer durch die Dichtung* (Göttingen 1965) 23, who also quotes U. von Wilamowitz, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus* (Berlin 1927) 46. Denys Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 123-30, argues forcefully that the ambiguous circumstances of Odysseus' homecoming in the poem as we have it (particularly the timing of the contest of the bow) arise from the poet's familiarity with an earlier version of the legend in which Penelope is reunited with Odysseus before he murders the suitors. Along the same lines, cf. G. S. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962) 245-49. The timing of Penelope's decision to hold the contest of the bow does not necessarily presuppose a prior recognition of Odysseus. It is entirely consistent with her penchant for δόλοι and the urgency of the situation within her household. Penelope's instinctive timing and the "causal order of events" leading to her decision are discussed by Finley (note 1 above) 2-15, who also takes into account the views of Lydia Allione, *Telemaco e Penelope nell' Odissea* (Turin 1963), and by J. Russo, "Interview and Aftermath," *AJP* 103 (1982) 4-18.

too late in the game simply to choose her favorite, reputedly Amphinomus (16.397-98), from among the suitors, given their threatening mood brought on by the years of infuriating delay and her own empty promises. Penelope prudently saw that what was needed was a dramatically decisive issue, agreed upon by all. With any luck, her celebrated cunning would prevail. The fear that she might be wrong, however, brings her a sleepless night with thoughts of Pandareus' daughters snatched away (rescued to her mind) from the fate which she may have to face in the morning.

When face to face at last with her husband, Penelope is subdued (cf. 23.85-87). She could hardly be expected to welcome warmly a virtual stranger, if indeed her long-awaited husband ("I know well what manner of man you were," 23.175), after all that she has been through in his absence. Only after she has shrewdly put him to the test regarding the secret of their wedding bed (23.183-204) does she accept the reality of his return. She weeps as she embraces Odysseus (23.205-08), and she begs his forgiveness for her cool reception of him. Her skillful words enable us to see Penelope's intelligence at work. She begins by blaming the gods, who prevented them from sharing the joys of youth. Second, she says that she was always afraid that someone would "beguile her with words" (23.216) to fall in love, as had happened to Helen; since "many men plan evil things" (23.217). These words echo Penelope's earlier description of the suitors as men who talk prettily but are evil-minded (18.168). Penelope goes on to say that Helen, deluded by a god, would not have fallen in love if she could have foreseen the grief (πένθος) her "woeful folly" (λυγρὴ ἄτη) would bring to so many people (23.222-24; cf. 11.438). We might well ask why Penelope, in her plea for pardon to Odysseus, should attempt to justify Helen's adulterous conduct? The apparent incongruity of these lines has made them suspect since the time of Aristarchus. Several modern commentators, arguing for the lines, have viewed them as Penelope's assertion, by way of contrast with infamous Helen, of her utter faithfulness to Odysseus despite temptations.¹¹ This much is true, but Penelope is saying something

¹¹E.g., Harsh (note 1 above) 6, and Amory (note 9 above) 120-21, who states that the reference to Helen demonstrates that Penelope was faithful to Odysseus not out of "sheer unimaginativeness." Stanford (ad 23.218-24) objects to the lines on the grounds that the case of Helen is not really parallel to that of Penelope ("one would certainly have expected a clearer illustration of the danger of rashly accepting the advances of a guest"). If that were all Penelope was trying to say in the passage in question, the author would

more subtle, I would suggest. With characteristic prudence, she is also pleading for understanding if, in her own situation, she too may seem guilty of a kind of "folly" (i.e., deluded by a god) in the management of the suitors, which has brought grief in varying degrees to many and still more to come for Odysseus and Telemachus (23.117-22).

In this context, it is appropriate to consider Penelope's much discussed dream in which her pet geese are slain by an eagle (19.535-53). In the dream, Penelope grieves over the dead geese until the eagle tells her to take heart because he is really her husband who has come to take vengeance on the suitors (χῆνες μὲν μνηστῆρες, ἐγὼ δέ τοι αἰετὸς ὄρνις, 19.548). The dream must be viewed as having two distinct stages. In the first stage, Penelope sees the eagle destroying her pets. Her reaction to this is violent grief (κλαῖον, ἐκώκυον, ὀλοφυρομένην, 19.541, 543). In the dream, Penelope weeps profusely for her beloved pets, who probably brought her what little delight she knew (cf. Odysseus' obvious affection for Argus; 17.304), and her grief is intensified because she is utterly helpless to avert their sudden and terrifying destruction. In the second stage, Penelope is informed of the meaning of the dream. She will not be comforted until the eagle itself assures her that the dream is true (οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, 19.547) and that the geese are really the suitors. Everything the eagle says implies its goodwill toward Penelope, and she can only be relieved by its message. Penelope would be happy to be rid of the suitors at last, we may suppose, judging from her own words at 17.546-47 (οὐκ ἀτελὴς θάνατος μνηστῆρσι γένοιτο πᾶσι μάλ'). She awakens from the dream, however, to find the geese feeding at their customary trough and the situation unchanged at Ithaca. While on one level, she may be relieved to see her pets alive, on another level, insofar as they represented the suitors in her dream, she takes little comfort.¹² Had she awakened to find the geese

agree with Stanford's assessment. For a summary of the arguments for and against the Homeric authorship of Book 23, see Dorothea Wender, *The Last Scenes of the Odyssey* (Leiden 1978) 10-18.

¹²This interpretation is consistent with Penelope's first act upon awakening. She searches for the geese (παπτήνασα, 19.552) to confirm that her dream is really true, as the eagle said it was. Upon her discovery that the geese are alive, she is thrown into doubt, and this accounts for her worried conversation with the beggar about true and false dreams. The sequence of Penelope's feelings argued here—(1) grief over geese (as geese), (2) relief over geese-suitors equation, (3) doubts about dream's validity, and (4) need for reassurance—is more simple and direct than recent studies have concluded; e.g., Joseph Russo's sensitive analysis (note 10 above), which illustrates the way in which

dead, that would have been sure confirmation of the validity of her dream (ὑπάρ) and she would, therefore, have no reason to be worried about Odysseus' return. But if the dream is false (ὄναρ), there may well be reason to fear Odysseus' reaction to the presence of the suitors, inasmuch as her relationship with them could be considered suspect. Thus, Penelope tries to get assurances from the sympathetic stranger that her dream was in fact a true one (19.560-69).

The dream and its aftermath reveal Penelope's foreboding fears of what Odysseus' actions will be when he discovers the suitors within his halls. The dream shows that Penelope imagines her husband's desire for vengeance will be as terrible and ineluctable as that of a violent bird of prey, and to the extent that she feels responsible for the presence of the suitors on Ithaca, she fears a potentially angry and dangerous confrontation, both consciously, as we see in her reference to Helen, and subconsciously, as the dream indicates. Since the eagle in the dream equated the suitors with her pets, might not Odysseus in reality assume that her relationship with the suitors has also been an affectionate one? As in the Pandareus' daughter episode, the dream shows us a worried Penelope, and we can only surmise the extent of her feelings of anxiety and what prompted them. Penelope's subconscious guilt, illustrated by the dream, emerges in her confrontation with Odysseus. In her waking hours, however, she is not merely a helpless spectator as she was in the dream. The eagle is, after all, her husband, and she is fully capable of

critics have been at pains to explain Penelope's apparently contradictory feelings in the dream: (1) Penelope weeps for the geese (as suitors) out of some subconscious liking for them; (2) she is cheered by the eagle's message ("The small pleasure she takes in the attentions of the 'geese' pales before the intensity of the very idea of her husband's return," p. 10); and (3) she is reluctant to accept the dream's validity because of an "emotional vulnerability" or fear of disappointment. Cf. Finley's attractive but complex theory (note 1 above, p. 19) that the geese represent not so much the "flattering companionship" of the suitors themselves as the "state of half-orderliness that had been her [Penelope's] comfort." My own reading of Penelope's dream is indebted to the coherent and convincing interpretation offered by A. H. M. Kessels, in *Studies on the Dream in Greek Literature* (Utrecht 1978) 91-110, who rigorously disavows the application of Freudian dream analysis to the Homeric text and argues forcefully against the widespread notion that Penelope is aware of the equation of geese and suitors when she weeps for the slain geese. The recognition that Penelope is weeping for her pets per se gives the most natural and Homeric explanation for Penelope's initial tears over the slain geese, rather than supposing, as many commentators have done (e.g., A. V. Rankin, "Penelope's Dreams in Books XIX and XX of the *Odyssey*," *Helikon* 2 [1962] 617-24), that the tears are necessarily a sign of Penelope's affection for the suitors.

forestalling any possible criticism Odysseus might have of her or her actions.

By the well chosen reference to Helen, intelligent Penelope not only highlights by way of contrast her own fidelity, but she also uses it to bolster her defense of any "folly" for which she herself might be criticized by Odysseus, a folly (she implies) which in the normal course of events she never would have committed had Helen not committed hers first and a folly having obviously less severe consequences than those resulting from Helen's. This interpretation would support the contention that Penelope had not recognized Odysseus disguised as the beggar. She now knows that her husband witnessed her spirited appearance before the suitors, which won for her expensive presents.¹³ She does not know, however, as the reader does, that Odysseus had been informed that her actions and real desires were sometimes at variance and that he actually delighted in the ease with which she wheedled costly gifts from all her wooers (18.281-83). The very presence of so many suitors in the palace and the obvious economic consequences (e.g., 19.534) need, she may feel, an explanation. Stanford (ad 23.218-24) makes the intriguing observation that Penelope seems "embarrassed" by her reference to Helen, but he attributes this only to the fact that one epic heroine does not normally compare herself directly to another, as Penelope has done. Penelope may well be embarrassed! She does not yet know what Odysseus really thinks about her relationship with the suitors or where she stands in his esteem. The reference to Helen shows that careful Penelope is taking no chances of being judged harshly.

Here we see a vivid example of Penelope's celebrated cleverness and sangfroid, which is akin, perhaps, to the hard-heartedness that Telemachus attributes to her (e.g., 23.97-103). Her apology is so smoothly executed that one has to look twice to see what she has accomplished. She has diverted some responsibility for her own conduct, such as it was, to Helen and has made it seem minor indeed compared to that of her infamous cousin.¹⁴ Penelope, completely self-possessed and in control,

¹³Cf. K. L. Kayser: "Ipsa regina ad artes prope meretricias descendit," *Homerische Abhandlungen* (Leipzig 1881) 41, and the recent study by Thomas Van Nortwick, "Penelope and Nausicaa," *TAPA* 109 (1979) 272-76, which concludes that Penelope's appearance before the suitors was prompted by her "unconscious resurgence of interest in men."

¹⁴Genealogical and mythical parallels between Penelope and Helen, including their common origin as pre-Hellenic goddesses of vegetation, have been convincingly set forth by Marie-Madeleine Mactoux, *Pénélope, Légende et Mythe* (*Annales Littéraires de*

is at her most impressive in this critical confrontation with her husband, who she is not yet certain appreciates the emotionally trying circumstances she was forced to endure.

Penelope's reference to Helen has been defended on psychological grounds as the reaction of a sexually frustrated woman who is attempting to justify her innermost "thoughts, temptations, and wishes, though not her deliberate actions."¹⁵ The long years of waiting have taken an emotional toll on Penelope, and more and more she indulges in solitary weeping (e.g., 17.102-03, 19.595-96), the excess of which is noted by even the housekeeper (18.174). Penelope is only too aware of the passage of time and regularly reacts to direct compliments by disparaging her beauty, which she says the gods destroyed (ῥέσσαν) at the time Odysseus departed from Ithaca (18.180-81; cf. 18.251-53, 19.124-26). Her readiness to appear before the suitors with tear-stained face (what use beautifying herself?) shows that she is not being falsely modest when she makes such remarks (18.178-81). It may also show that she was confident that the power she had over the suitors depended more on her presence of mind than on her physical beauty, considerable though it may be. Underlying resentment may well be present in Penelope's speech to Odysseus and explain the reference to unfaithful Helen specifically, but we do Penelope an injustice to minimize her conscious control of the situation. At the moment she is concerned with righting herself in Odysseus' eyes. It is a tribute to her powers of intellect that she can subordinate effectively to this end whatever discordant emotions she may possess. Her careful defense not only disarms her husband but potential critics as well, who have all but missed the subtlety of her words. Crafty Odysseus, completely won over, is moved to tears by Penelope's words, and he holds close his loyal wife "who suited his own mind" (θυμαρέα, 23.231-32).

The kind of relief Penelope felt at unburdening her heart to Odysseus is likened to the emotions of a drowning man rescued from the rag-

l'Université de Besançon) 175 (Paris 1975) 203-14. The author asserts that Penelope's mythical origins, all but lost in Homer, are preserved by mythographers who insist on linking her genealogically to Helen and retain such details as the footrace for Penelope's hand and her abduction by Odysseus (e.g., Paus. 3.12.1-2, 3.20.10-11; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.10.6-7, 9-10).

¹⁵George Devereux, "Penelope's Character," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 26 (1957) 384.

ing sea (23.233–40).¹⁶ Not without cost to herself did she succeed in her goal of keeping intact Odysseus' household, entrusted to her care twenty years previously, and her own position in it. She had endured much in his long absence: loneliness, the alienation of her son, and anxiety over the worsening situation with the suitors. What does it matter that Odysseus will be gone soon to attend to some new duty? She has fulfilled hers. If her method of preserving Odysseus' home was not without some negative consequences, she had nonetheless succeeded in accomplishing what perhaps no other woman could under such difficult circumstances. Her intelligence had prevailed. And what if Odysseus had not returned when he did? Penelope would have come up with another δόλος, we may be certain, to enable her to wait—unattached and in Ithaca—her husband's return.

Throughout the poem, Penelope's loyalty to Odysseus is highlighted by the implicit contrast with her unfaithful cousins, Helen and Clytemnestra (e.g., 11.444–46, 24.198–202). It is to the latter's murdered husband, paradoxically, that we owe the most tender depiction of Penelope in the poem: the remembrance of the young bride, infant son at breast, bidding farewell to her husband (11.447–48). The final word on Penelope is also Agamemnon's when, upon listening to Amphimedon's complaint of Penelope's guile, he nonetheless proclaims her full of "great excellence" (μεγάλη ἀρετή, 24.193) for her loyalty to her husband.

Agamemnon, understandably, chooses to see only Penelope's faithfulness, the characteristic that historically has assured her reputation. The suitors, on the other hand, have won little sympathy. They stand guilty of "destroying the property and dishonoring the wife of a prince" (24.459–60), whatever provocation they might claim. Penelope's observation that the suitors, for the most part, used their wooing of her as a cover for baser motives (21.68–72) is confirmed by Eurymachus himself, speaking about Antinous (22.50–53; cf. 16.364–92). If Penelope was not above reproach in her dealings with the suitors, it has gone largely unnoticed in light of her overpowering loyalty. Her deception of the suitors would probably find few critics, in any case, cunning being

¹⁶For the importance of this simile as an indicator of Penelope's readiness to accept the reality of Odysseus' return and as an expression of the "like-mindedness" of husband and wife, see Helene P. Foley's "'Reverse Similes' and Sex Roles in the *Odyssey*," *Arethusa* 11 (1978) 7–26.

rated as highly as it is in the *Odyssey*. The beauty of Homer's depiction of Penelope is that the cunning woman is also a complex woman.

* * *

There is much more we should like to know about the intelligent woman whose cleverness made her the ideal counterpart of Odysseus. The exercise of her intelligence brought her considerable inner turmoil, much as Odysseus in the physical world was ever buffeted by wind and waves. Both used their wits to different ends, and both suffered because of them. To Penelope's regular epithet of περίφρων, we may be permitted to add another, rich in nuance, borrowed from Odysseus. Consider, if you will, Penelope πολύτροπος ("of many turns"), fitting mate for her wily husband.¹⁷

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¹⁷Penelope's intelligence is precisely the kind characterized as πολύτροπος by Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Sussex, England, Highland, N.J. 1978) 40: "The πολύτροπος one . . . is distinguished by the control he possesses . . . he is always master of himself and is only unstable in appearance. [He possesses] supple *metis* which appears to bow before circumstances only so that it can dominate them more surely."

HERODOTUS ON THE EARLY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN AEGINA AND ATHENS

The description by Herodotus of the early confrontation between Aegina and Athens (5.82–88) stimulates both historical and historiographical inquiry. Calculations of probability, shaped by modern historical sensibility, can be applied to determine which elements of the account accurately report archaic events. As there are no accounts of these events which are independent of Herodotus (cf. Duris *FGrH* 76 F 24), a historical reconstruction, as opposed to a validation of all or part of Herodotus' narrative, is impossible.¹ An appraisal of the historicity of the data presented is affected by analysis of the methods and purposes of the historian. This section of the narrative offers a promising field for an investigation into Herodotus' methodology, because different types of information are united here, and because varying accounts by Athenians, Aeginetans, and Argives are explicitly juxtaposed. In turn, a determination of the nature of Herodotus' working of his evidence allows us to hypothesize about this source material in its original form. Thus, while only some statements in Herodotus accurately describe archaic Aegina and Athens, we are compensated for the loss of material about the archaic period by a better understanding of the attitudes and preoccupations of Herodotus' contemporaries.

Herodotus' careful, relatively detailed treatment of the episode bespeaks his interest in the interrelations of Athens and Aegina. The importance given to the three bouts of hostility between Aegina and Athens (5.82–88; 5.79–81, 89–90.1; 6.49–73, 85–93) mirrors the preoccupations of his informants. When Athenians and Aeginetans thought of each other, they thought primarily of past violent encounters. The historian, as passive observer, was prey to the emphasis of his informants because he could not decide what was historically significant in isolation from his informants/audience. To this extent, the establishment of deeds *μεγάλα τε καὶ θαυμαστά*, "great and marvelous," was a social process, where the original topics about which the historian questioned his informants were amplified by the preoccupations which they expressed.

¹My treatment may be compared with T. J. Dunbabin, "'Εχθρη παλαιή," *ABSA* 37 (1936–37) 83–91. See notes 5, 8, 10, 16, 19, and 37 below.

Nonetheless, Herodotus utilized the Athenian-Aeginetan conflict to serve the themes of his own history. Important factors in forming the policy of Athens and Aegina during Xerxes' campaign, the treatment of which was the centerpiece of the work, were that Athenian ships, built for use against Aegina, were available for service against Persia (7.144) and that the war between Aegina and Athens had been mediated by the Hellenic League (7.145.1). These hostilities, to which the Athenian naval program was a response, began c. 490 because of the Aeginetan submission to Persia (6.49.1-2). Medizing was the final result of the πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος, "Heraldless War," opened by the Aeginetan attack on the Attic coast in 506 (5.79-81). Significantly, Herodotus appended the Damia/Auxesia episode to his treatment of the Aeginetan decision to attack Attica. The Aeginetans were prompted by the *ἐχθρὴ παλαιή*, "ancient hatred," toward Athens begun by the early hostilities.

A summary is in order here. The people of Epidauros, suffering from a crop failure, were advised by Delphi to dedicate images in Attic olive wood of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia (Hdt. 5.82.1-2). For the wood, the Epidaurians were to perform annual sacrifice to Athena Polias and Erekhtheus (82-83). The Aeginetans, rebels from Epidauros, appropriated the statues (83.1-3). The Athenians tried to recover the statues, eventually using force against Aegina (84). Ensuing events were reported differently by Aeginetans and Athenians. The Athenians spoke of sending a trireme, while the Aeginetans asserted that the Athenians could not have come without many ships. The Athenians claimed that thunder and an earthquake occurred simultaneously with a fit of madness that overcame their men, who killed each other. The Aeginetans added that the statues sank to their knees to thwart Athenian theft and that an Argive force attacked the Athenians (85-86.3). All agree that there was a single Athenian survivor. The Aeginetans and Argives claimed that the Athenians were slain by the Argives, while the Athenians blamed the aforementioned supernatural occurrences (87.1-2). The survivor was slain on his return by the wives of his dead comrades, by means of dress pins (87.2). Thereupon, Athenian women were made to discard Dorian dress for the Ionian style, which lacked pins (87.3). The Argives and Aeginetans commemorated these events by using pins (until Herodotus' time) half again as long as those used previously, and by dedicating pins in the shrine of Damia and Auxesia. Also, the introduction of Attic products, especially pottery, into the sanctuary was forbidden (88.2-3).

Aetiologies

Much of the material in the narrative appears to have had an original rationale in providing aetiological explanations for fifth century customs, either specifically concerning cult or social mores in general. The kneeling statues of Damia and Auxesia are traced to their resistance to theft. The impious behavior of the Athenians explains the prohibition against the introduction of Attic products into the sanctuary. The practice of dedicating *περόναι*, "dress pins," in the sanctuary was created to commemorate the brutality of the Athenian women toward the expedition's survivor. All this is aetiological in the strictest sense: it explains cult practice. An inscription of the Attic cleruchy, established on Aegina in 431, recording that many iron pins (356) were in the sanctuary, supports Herodotus' observation that pins were dedicated there.²

Herodotus was otherwise well informed about the cult. He knew the name (Oie), the location (ἐς τὴν μεσόγειον), and distance from the city (c. 20 stades) of the cult place. According to Herodotus, sacrifices and female choruses celebrated the goddesses' rites. Ten men were chosen as *χορηγοί* to each of the deities. The choruses ridiculed the women of Aegina. These rites were the same as those performed at Epidauros, but there were also mystery rites in that city. The willingness of Herodotus to vouch for the continued wearing of longer dress pins (mistaken though this may be) by the women of Argos and Aegina until his own time (ἐτι καὶ ἐς ἡμέ) goes back to personal experience, a visit to the island, or perhaps even to the sanctuary (cf. 1.92.1, 2.122.2, 2.130.1).³ There Herodotus collected material from Aeginetans claiming to be knowledgeable both about the cult of Damia and Auxesia and about local history. From the perspective of the Aeginetans, a foundation story for the cult of Damia and Auxesia lies behind the account in Herodotus.

Since the posture of the statues, the prohibition of Attic pottery, and the practice of dedicating pins are motivated by details within the story of the Athenian attack, Herodotus' informants must have believed that they were unusual, needing special explanation. Nevertheless, kneeling statues of deities connected with fertility and childbirth can be

²IG IV 1588.10-14, 27, 35-37, 40-44, where Damia = Mnia. See P. Jacobsthal, *Greek Pins and their Connexions with Europe and Asia* (Oxford 1956) 90-91, 97-100.

³See F. Jacoby, "Herodotos," *RE* Suppl. Bd. 2 (Stuttgart 1913) cols. 268-69.

paralleled.⁴ But the comparative rarity of similar statues might have prompted the Aeginetans to seek a special cause. The dedication of pins in itself does not demand a specific cause, as excavation has attested similar deposits elsewhere.⁵ Herodotus' statement that Aeginetan and Argive women adopted and still wore longer pins in commemoration of this affair is refuted by archaeological data (see note 16 below). A shift to longer pins does not appear in the material remains, and at no time during the archaic period did the pins worn by Argive and Aeginetan women differ much from those of their neighbors. This error of Herodotus, in turn, makes it difficult to reconstruct what the Aeginetans originally reported about the use of περόναι and what facets of the cult they intended to explain.

The prohibition against the use of Attic pots in the sanctuary seems to have been unusual enough to demand some special cause. The prohibition, generalized to the entire island, has been used to date the episode by seeking a time when Attic imports are in default on Aegina.⁶ Thus, most recently, Coldstream dates the early war in the mid-eighth century, since pots of Attic LG Ib have not been discovered on Aegina.⁷ However, a generalization of the ban seems to go beyond the text of Herodotus: προσφέρειν πρὸς τὸ ἱρόν, "to introduce into the sanctuary"; αὐτόθι, "on the spot," refers to the τὸ ἱρόν of the previous phrase. Moreover, a general ban is not aetiological in the same sense as an explanation for the kneeling statues, for it goes beyond explaining facets

⁴R. Carpenter, *Observations on Familiar Statuary*, *Amer. Acad. Rome* 18 (1941) 54-59; F. Dümmler, *RE* 2.2 (Stuttgart 1886), s. "Auxesia," cols. 2616-18. Parallel are the statues of Eileithuia at Tegea (Paus. 8.48.7), and of an unidentified goddess from Sparta. See B. Palma, "APTEMIZ 'OPΘIA," *ASAA* 52-53 (1974-75) 301-07. Cf. *AD* 24 B'1 (1968) 131. I should like to thank Professor B. S. Ridgway of Bryn Mawr College for information on kneeling posture in archaic and classical art.

⁵Note the similar women's dedications to Artemis Brauronia (cf. U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* [Berlin 1893] 2.282). See the excavation reports of P. Papadimitriou: *Praktika* (1945-51, 1955-59); *Ergon* (1956-62); *BCH* 73-75 (1949-51); *BCH* 82-87 (1958-63). See also Dunbabin (note 1 above) 86; Jacobsthal (note 2 above) 97-105.

⁶See, e.g., beginning of the seventh century: P. N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge 1922) 167-68, 314-20; mid-sixth century (ban valid for Argos too): J. C. Hoppin, "The Vases and Vase Fragments," *Argive Heraeum* (ed. C. Waldstein) (Boston and New York 1905) 2.57-184, esp. 174-76; Hoppin, "The Argive Exclusion of Attic Pottery," *CR* 12 (1898) 86-87.

⁷J. N. Coldstream, *Greek Geometric Pottery* (London 1968) 361, n. 10; *Geometric Greece* (New York 1977) 135.

of the cult of Damia and Auxesia. It is also noteworthy that the prohibition is against anything Attic, not only pottery. If generalized to the entire island, such a total embargo would certainly have forbidden the importation of other Athenian craft goods, and might also have prohibited Athenian grain, olive oil, silver, and slaves. Seen in this perspective, the ban (like other embargoes) seems at least as damaging to its imposers, the Aeginetans, as to its victims, the Athenians. If a ban against anything Attic ever existed, it is unlikely that it could have lasted long. Also, Herodotus' Aeginetan informants seemed to have told him about fifth century conditions. A ban in the past would be the exception.

The dating of a general ban against pottery alone is equally problematical. To date it, one would need to isolate a period during which no Attic pots were found on Aegina. Such a hypothesis as that of Coldstream, based on the absence of Attic LG Ib, could be confounded by a few finds on an island where relatively few sites have been excavated. Although previous scholars did not have Coldstream's exact classification of Geometric pottery, nevertheless, one may note that Welter and Kraiker saw no eighth century hiatus in Attic importations.⁸ The supposition that Attic pots were never totally absent but fell off in numbers is difficult to reconcile with the notion of a ban. To argue for the general prohibition, one must assume that it did not work completely. And if it did not, why did the Aeginetans not anticipate that it could not be successful and devise some surer response to the Athenians? When the prominence of Aeginetan merchants (like Sostratos) in the sixth century trade in Attic pots is recalled, the prohibition becomes an embarrassment to Herodotus' Aeginetan contemporaries rather than a reminder of Athenian impiety.⁹ Therefore, it remains preferable to cleave to a literal reading of Herodotus; that is, the prohibition was limited to the sanctuary.¹⁰ The prohibition seemed especially odd to fifth century Aeginetans and their visitors, since Athenian fifth century pottery was otherwise common in sacred and profane contexts on the island. Hence, Herodotus singled out pottery among Athenian goods with the phrase

⁸G. Welter, *Aigina* (Berlin 1939) table, p. 129. See W. Kraiker, *Aigina: Die Vasen des 10. bis 7. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Berlin 1951) 23-25, 26-29, 84-92. See also Dunbabin (note 1 above) 84, 89.

⁹A. W. Johnston, "The Rehabilitation of Sostratos," *PP* 27 (1972) 416-23; F. D. Harvey, "Sostratos of Aegina," *PP* 31 (1976) 206-14. On Aeginetan trade with Athens and in Athenian goods, see T. J. Figueira, *Aegina* (New York 1981) 145-46, 237-51, 269-71.

¹⁰Dunbabin (note 1 above) 84-85.

μήτε κεράμων (cf. 4.76.2). A linking of the ban with an early war with Athens made for a dramatic rationale for the practice.

There is, however, no certainty that the prohibition had to be old. In the 480s, after the failure of the Athenian-backed popular uprising, the Athenians established Aeginetan fugitives at Sounion (6.90). From there, they raided their homeland. Architectural changes made in the temple of Aphaia may have been to protect against raids by the exiles.¹¹ Similarly, the exiles might have tried to carry off the statues of Damia and Auxesia. If so, a historical raid has been lost amid aetiological speculation. Moreover, the ban fits the tone of Aeginetan-Athenian relations in the first half of the fifth century. In 506, there had begun the πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος between the two states, whose name "Heraldless War" suggests a conflict outside the conventions of international relations.¹² Even without a specific act of impiety, a spirit of anti-foreign exclusiveness (like the exclusion of Dorians from the Acropolis [Hdt. 5.72.3], which was used against Kleomenes) caused Athenian goods to be considered polluted, at least for use in a fertility cult, closely associated with the collective existence of the community.¹³ A belief, however, that Dorian Aegina was different from Ionian Athens might have been a factor in excluding Athenian pottery from the sanctuary at any time after Solon, who emphasized that Athens was an Ionian community (fr. 4a.2 [West]).

Herodotus reserves or suspends judgment at several points in recounting this aetiological material. The statement that Attica alone produced olive trees at the time of the Epidaurian request for olive wood is introduced by λέγεται (5.82.3).¹⁴ Herodotus suggests that a belief in the especially sacred quality of Attic olive wood was the reason. Where motivations were at issue, he could rationalize, but he could not when impossible statements were made. Herodotus observes that it is unbe-

¹¹G. Welter, "Aeginetica I-XII," *AA* (1938) cols. 1-33, esp. I, col. 3. Cf. H. Thiersch, "Aeginetische Studien, II," *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft Göttingen* (1928) 168-94, esp. 168-71, 193, who blames Nikodromos' raiders for the destruction of one set of East Pedimental sculptures.

¹²Hdt. 5.81.2. See A. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina: 510-480 B.C.," *ABSA* 37 (1936-37) 1-7, esp. 1-2.

¹³Observe that the prohibition of Megarian entry into the Agora (cf. Thuc. 1.139.2; Plut. *Per.* 29.4, 30.3; Diod. 12.39.4-5), a focus of religious as well as economic life, by the Megarian Decree(s) is parallel to the prohibition on Attic products.

¹⁴R. W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books* (London 1895) 1.228, citing 4.184.5, 5.42.1.

lievable to him that the statues went to their knees to resist capture (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστὰ λέγοντες), but that it is believable to someone else (ἄλλω δέ τῳ) (5.86.3). Here Herodotus is not envisaging that a member of his audience will be more gullible than he, especially given his strong disavowal. Rather, the ἄλλος τις is his informant(s) who received an incredible story from his source and credulously transmitted it to Herodotus (cf. 4.42.4 for similar phrasing).

Herodotus' source(s) of information was close to Aegina's ruling oligarchy, for he possessed a detailed understanding of the conduct of the cult of Damia and Auxesia. He was particularly well-informed about the defiance by the Aeginetan Krios of the Spartan King Kleomenes on the eve of Marathon, even knowing about Kleomenes' wordplay on Krios' name (6.50.3). He was aware that Kleomenes later sent Krios to Athens as a hostage. He knew of Krios' son Polykritos, a winner of the individual *aristeia* at Salamis (8.93.1). Polykritos confronted Themistokles at that battle in an interchange in which the advantage was to the Aeginetan (8.92.2). Presumably the anecdote had an Aeginetan source. The prominence of Polykritos at Salamis may have induced Herodotus to interview Polykritos or a relative, if he was unavailable.¹⁵

Good local information may be contrasted with the statement, incorrect on the basis of material remains, that dress pins were made longer and continued so in commemoration of this incident.¹⁶ His Aeginetan informants, knowing about contemporary dress, could not have been his source. Their account was meant only to explain cult practices, not social mores. If Herodotus based his conclusion on long pins, which he saw in the sanctuary, he extrapolated incorrectly. In doing so, he provided a symmetrical counterpart to the Athenian abandonment of pins.

Consider the pins of the inscribed inventory of the sanctuary on Aegina (*IG* IV 1588). They are iron, which was no longer in general use as a material for pins after the Protogeometric period.¹⁷ There are three alternatives to explain the deposit: (1) the deposit was dedicated after a

¹⁵See Jacoby (note 3 above) 269. A second possibility would be Pytheas, son of Iskheneos (7.181.1, 8.92.1) or a relative (cf. Lampon, son of Pytheas [9.78.2]; Pytheas, son of Lampon [Pi. N. 4.5, 43; I. 5.19-21, 6.58; fr. 4]).

¹⁶Jacobsthal (note 2 above) 90-91. See also Dunbabin (note 1 above), who, however, implausibly introduces the spit money of Pheidon of Argos.

¹⁷Jacobsthal (note 2 above) 87-89, 98-99. See also A. M. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (Edinburgh 1971) 225-26.

Protogeometric war; (2) old pins were dedicated in the archaic period; and (3) Protogeometric-style pins continued to be dedicated. The improbability that a Protogeometric war was remembered tells against the first. The fragility of iron pins argues against both the first and second. This leaves the last, the dedication of iron pins being a tradition. An Aeginetan aetiology attempted to explain the dedication of these pins of a much earlier type, not the use of long pins by fifth century women as Herodotus thought.¹⁸

Let us now consider the sequel in Athens to the attempted theft of the statues, a change from Dorian to Ionian dress (from pinned peplos to unpinned chiton). The artificial character of this explanation is apparent. A widespread, gradual change in custom is said to have had a single cause, to have been legislated, and to have taken place instantaneously. Yet, this change from the Dorian to the Ionian style of dress has been used to date the early hostilities between Athens and Aegina, placed thereby c. 560 or 550.¹⁹ The actual change took place in the first half of the sixth century, especially during its second quarter.²⁰ An upper limit for the transition is the initial appearance of the chiton in Ionia, dated to 580-570.²¹

Who told Herodotus about the change of dress at Athens? Superficially, an Athenian source ought to balance an Aeginetan source on the practice of dedicating pins at the Damia/Auxesia sanctuary. However, as will become clear, the Aeginetans, Argives, and Athenians framed their versions of the dispute with an eye toward partisan interests. The account of the change in dress brings no luster to the Athenians. The brutal murder of the survivor puts both the Athenian women and the menfolk who could not control their behavior in a bad light. Also, an implied invidious comparison is made with Dorians like the Aeginetans who could still safely allow their women the use of *περόναι*. A polemic between Ionians and Dorians over the moral valence of their respective dress styles may be at issue since *δωριάζειν* could mean to an Ionian like

¹⁸Jacobsthal (note 2 above) 99. Welter, "Aeginetica XII-XXIV," *AA* (1938) cols. 480-540, esp. 496-97, 512-17, reports a chamber tomb (the characteristic elite burial form on Aegina), dated late seventh or early sixth century, containing an iron pin.

¹⁹See references in Ure (note 6 above) 168-70, esp. n. 1. Note the skepticism of Dunbabin (note 1 above) 85-86.

²⁰G. M. A. Richter, *Korai: Archaic Greek Maidens* (London 1960) 9-10.

²¹L. Bonfante, *Etruscan Dress* (Baltimore 1975) 38, 119-20, n. 32-33; J. Boardman, "Two Archaic Korai in Chios," *Antike Plastik* 1 (1962) 43-45.

Anakreon "to be naked" (fr. 54 [Page]; Schol. Eur. *Hec.* 934 [Schwartz]). That the Athenians initially used a style of dress based on that of their Dorian neighbors undercuts Athenian claims to cultural independence and preeminence, as does the observation that the Athenians turned to copying the Ionians out of shame: as the founders of Ionia, they ought to have been leading. An obvious similarity between Athens and Ionia, the same style of dress, is thereby shown to have been assumed by the Athenians to suppress an embarrassing incident.

The structure of the narrative by its division into Athenian and Aeginetan subsections after the introductory section (recounting the creation of the statues and their appropriation by the Aeginetans) suggests an Aeginetan provenience for the account of the change in dress. After the introductory section (82-84), *oratio obliqua* predominates. First, the events are told from the Athenian standpoint: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν λέγουσι (85.1). This section concludes with a similar phrase: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν οὕτω λέγουσι γενέσθαι (86.1). The Aeginetan version begins with: Αἰγινῆται δέ (86.1). The Aeginetan account of Athenian actions (86.1-3) is followed by their version of their own counteractions, introduced by σφέας δὲ Αἰγινῆται λέγουσι (86.4). What is said in this brief section is corroborated and closed: λέγεται μὲν νυν ὑπ' Ἀργείων τε καὶ Αἰγινητέων τάδε (87.1). The Aeginetan version is then interrupted by a parenthesis explaining that the Athenians agreed on the existence of one survivor (ὁμολογέεται δὲ καὶ ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων [87.1]). To this Herodotus adds that the Argives claimed to have killed the other Athenians (Ἀργεῖοι μὲν λέγουσι) and that the Athenians attributed the result to divine intervention (Ἀθηναῖοι δέ) (87.2). The rest of this section, including the sections concerning the change in dress, proceeds, introduced by μέντοι in its progressive sense (87.2), in infinitive constructions without attribution. Herodotus states in the indicative the nature of the change in dress, noting the Karian origins of Ionian dress (87.3-88.1). The closing section of the narrative describes the actions of the Aeginetans and Argives to commemorate the impiety and defeat of the Athenians. An Aeginetan account clearly lies behind these data. The brutal killing of the survivor and the change in dress at Athens, told in indirect speech, should be interpreted as subordinated to an understood verb whose subject is Αἰγινῆται. The Athenian account of the fate of the survivor of the expedition is not reported, and there is no certainty that such an account ever existed.

Styles of dress and their variety is one of Herodotus' ethnographic

preoccupations.²² However, the association of the change in dress with early hostilities between Aegina and Athens is not Herodotean speculation. Herodotus marks his own contributions by a shift from indirect speech to a finite construction: Athenian women had previously dressed like the Corinthians; the change in dress was the adoption of the chiton; Dorian dress was the original Hellenic style; and the Ionians and Athenians abandoned Hellenic dress for Karian. Although the last statement is not trivial inasmuch as he believed that the Ionians were Hellenized Pelasgians (1.56.2-3), by these details Herodotus dulls the partisan edge to the contrast between Dorian and Ionian customs, implicit in the report of his Aeginetan informants.

Although modern scholars have used the change in dress to date these hostilities, there is no reason to think that the Aeginetans dated anything by it, that is, by comparing dedications in the sanctuary with Athenian statuary in Dorian dress. As can be seen from a sixth century inscription recording a reconstruction at the Aphaia sanctuary in a particular priesthood, there could have been chronological information on the foundation of the cult of Damia and Auxesia.²³ Pindar's fifth century Aeginetan patrons could tell him about ancestors' victories in the seventh and sixth centuries;²⁴ and the Aeginetans probably had a date for their independence from Epidauros. The traditions of oligarchic families, some of whom continued to be important down to the mid-fifth century, ensured the survival of such information. Yet, the fantastic events, which the Aeginetans incorporated into their account, places the story in mythic, not historical time. To make their polemical point against the Athenians, the Aeginetans needed but one piece of information, that Athenians once wore Dorian dress.

Herodotus did not gather *logoi* which existed in a pristine or raw state; rather, the process of collection shaped the material offered by his informants. Herodotus' intention to immortalize the heroic deeds of the Persian wars, in which (in this case) Aeginetan accomplishments had a prominent part, allowed him an initial means of approach to the Aegi-

²²Herodotus on comparative dress: 1.135.1, 1.195.1, 1.202.3, 1.215.1, 2.36.3-37.2, 3.98.4, 3.106.3, 4.23.2, 4.43.5, 4.106, 4.168.1, 4.189.1-2, 5.9.1, 7.61-87 (the army list of Xerxes). Less variable Greek dress called for few references, except where foreign dress is compared to it (1.195.1) or Greek dress was derived from non-Greeks (1.171.4, 4.189.1).

²³IG IV 1580. See M. Guarducci, *Epigrafia Greca* (Rome 1967) 1.197-98; L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961) 110-12.

²⁴E.g., Hegesimakhos and Praxidamos of the Bassid family (Pi. N. 6).

netans. Much as an epic poet through knowledge of the glorious actions of heroes and his mastery of genealogy (along with his technical skill) established his authority with a Dark Age aristocratic audience, Herodotus needed to demonstrate to the Aeginetans of the mid-fifth century his historical skills promising contemporary immortality. For his part, Herodotus adopted the posture of a listener for his *historiē*. His Aeginetan informants presented to him *logoi* selected as appropriate from what was probably a rich stock of anti-Athenian material, then current among the island's elite.

Polemics and Propaganda

The various accounts of the Damia/Auxesia episode also shed light on the political situations and attitudes of fifth century Aeginetans, Athenians, and Argives. But did Herodotus date the data of his Aeginetan sources early because of their marvelous features and because he accepted the axiom that the hostility between the two states must be very old? Then did he also date most of his Athenian information on the same affair to 490 because of the participation of Sophanes of Dekeleia, a fifth century figure? Wilamowitz believed so and he cites similarities between the fighting described in the Damia and Auxesia incident and that in the conflict c. 490 as indicating that the same episode was the basis for both versions.²⁵ Yet, similarities (e.g., the landing of an Athenian expeditionary force and the intervention of the Argives) are explicable on the grounds that warfare between Athens and Aegina was not infinitely variable. The Athenians made expeditions against Aegina, and the Aeginetans called on Argive infantrymen to complement their fleet twice, and perhaps on other occasions of which we know nothing. The character of the fighting was built into the geographical situation.

It is, however, unlikely that the Athenians could have penetrated to the Damia/Auxesia sanctuary at Oie in the Mesogaia c. 490. It would have been imprudent for them to detach a large force (strong enough to annihilate a picked corps of 1000 Argive hoplites) while an Aeginetan fleet of 70 triremes might reappear. The interior of the island, in any case, is rough terrain for the most part, scarcely the place to fight a hoplite engagement. The disparity between the results of the Argive in-

²⁵ Wilamowitz (note 5 above) 2.285-87; cf. Andrewes (note 12 above) 1-2.

tervention in the early war (annihilation of the Athenians) and in the fighting in the early 480s (their own annihilation) argues that the two accounts cannot derive from the same incident told variously by the citizens of different cities. A drawn battle could conceivably have been represented in the traditions of both sides as a victory, but it strains belief that both Argives and Athenians claimed to have virtually annihilated the enemy's force. It is possible that an Argive victory over the Athenians in the early war either was exaggerated to become an annihilation or, more probably, an Athenian disaster was invented by the Argives to balance the fifth-century destruction of their thousand volunteers. Thus, it is a mirror-image of the fighting in the early 480s, not a garbled doublet of it.

The friendship between Argos and Aegina was old by the fifth century, as the Argive fining of the Aeginetans for collaboration with Kleomenes during the Sepeia campaign demonstrates (Hdt. 6.92.1-2). The appearance of the Argives in the early war, whether genuine or anachronistic, is not implausible. The testimony of the Argives, supporting the Aeginetans on the size and fate of the Athenian expedition, has been in the background of our discussion so far. That both Argive and Aeginetan aristocrats shared a self-laudatory account of the early war points to continued ties between the two cities, at least sentimental, even after Athenian subjection of Aegina, when Herodotus was making his inquiries.

Yet, it is important to note that the Athenian treatment of the military phase of the episode is minimizing and seeks to deflate the Argive and Aeginetan claims. Elements, however, in the narrative appear to be Aeginetan rebuttals to Athenian claims. For instance, the Aeginetans used an argument of probability to demonstrate that the Athenians did not come in a single ship. They could have repelled one ship even without ships themselves. Such an argument suggests that Herodotus had called an Athenian version to their attention. Therefore, although we cannot rule out that Herodotus questioned informants more than once about the incident, it is probable that Herodotus had heard from the Athenians about the Damia/Auxesia affair before his trip to Aegina and the sanctuary.

Herodotus does not attribute the account down to the Athenian expedition to Aegina to any one of the participants. In a narrative where he is careful to distinguish what is controversial from what is not, it is hard to believe that impromptu storytelling can have been retold uncritically. As we shall see below, the tone of the introductory section is

hardly pro-Aeginetan. As elsewhere in Herodotus, an anti-Aeginetan tone suggests non-Aeginetan informants (cf., e.g., 6.49.1-2, 6.91.1-2, 9.78-79, 9.80-83).²⁶ These are possibly Athenian. However, it should not be ruled out that Herodotus questioned the Epidaurians, since at the outset these events so closely concerned them. Epidaurian corroboration would convince us of the existence of independent traditions on the subject.

According to Herodotus, Aeginetan independence is to be associated with the islanders' building of ships and becoming *θαλασσοκράτορες*. This favorable military situation allowed the Aeginetans to commit acts of piracy against Epidauros. There is no reason to doubt that Aegina had once been under the control of Epidauros. The foundation stories that claim Epidaurian settlement of Aegina reflect historical claims (of eighth or seventh century vintage) to ownership of Aegina. The data that associate Prokles of Epidauros with Aegina point in the same direction.²⁷ Epidauros has at least four times the arable land as Aegina. As long as both states drew mainly on their agricultural potential, Epidauros may have been strong enough to retain her hold over Aegina. Yet, when Aegina began to draw on resources outside the island through commerce (contributing to the growth of the Aeginetan navy), the islanders broke the grip of the Epidaurians. The sequence in Herodotus—subjection to Epidauros, growth of navy, independence from Epidauros, campaign of reprisal against Epidauros—has at least a superficial plausibility.

The importance given here to seapower is redolent of views that became firmly established during the Pentekontaeteia, when the dominant feature of international affairs was the hegemony of Athens over her allies through the application of seapower. Herodotus shows his appreciation of seapower when, for instance, he describes the tactical discussions among the Greek commanders before Salamis (8.49, 60β-62) or when he describes the military position of Polykrates of Samos (3.122.2). The decisive role of emergent Athenian naval power during Xerxes' campaign also receives emphasis (7.139).

²⁶ At other times, Herodotus transmitted anti-Aeginetan material with a stronger element of personal judgment. For instance, he condemns the raid on Phaleron (5.79.2-3, 6.87) and by implication Aeginetan Medism (6.61.1; cf. 6.49).

²⁷ Compare Hdt. 8.46.1 with Paus. 2.29.5; Strabo 8.6.18 C375 for the Epidaurian colonization of Aegina, and Schol. Pi. N. 3.1b, O. 8.39a-b (cf. Schol. P. 8.29a); Strabo C375 for Aegina as a colony of Argos. Prokles and Aegina: Plut. *Mor.* 403C-E; Pythainetos *FGrH* 299 F 3. See T. J. Figueira, "Aeginetan Independence," *CJ* 79 (1983-84) 8-29.

Perhaps the *locus classicus* for Greek ideas on the role of seapower in history is the "Archaeology" of Thucydides, where, in the general treatment of the growth of military power to the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the historian puts a special emphasis on the evolution of combat at sea.²⁸ He recognized, as did the "Old Oligarch," that seapower was a mode of military activity especially suited to imperialism.²⁹ Athenian seapower was linked with Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη, which, although controversial, could still be defended.³⁰ The little information, however, that we have on Aeginetan seapower portrays it mainly in the negative. Here, as elsewhere in Herodotus, the Aeginetan climb to naval eminence goes hand in hand with a growth in arrogance among the islanders. In 5.81.2, the Aeginetans attack the Athenian coast because they are incited by their great prosperity, certainly a reference to Aeginetan commerce. In our episode, it is the Aeginetan acquisition of numbers of ships that permitted raids against Epidaurus. The fact of the theft of sacred statues (along with the refusal to tender the requisite ritual duties to the Athenian cults) may in itself be considered an accusation against the Aeginetans. Nor is this interpretation limited to Herodotus. The account of Diodorus, based on Ephorus, on the hostilities between Athens and Aegina in the fifth century attributes responsibility for them to Aeginetan arrogance, which sprang from their naval and commercial power.³¹

²⁸Thuc. 1.4.1-5.1; 1.8.2-4; 1.9.3; 1.13.1-15.3. See *HCT* 1.120-26.

²⁹See Thuc. 2.62.2-5; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.1-8, 11-16 (the term θαλασσοκράτορες appears in 2.2, 14). Cf. Plut. *Them.* 4.4-5 with Stesimbrotos *FGrH* 107 F2. In general, see A. Momigliano, "Seapower in Greek Thought," *Secondo Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici* (Rome 1960) 57-67.

³⁰The Corinthian speech at Sparta (Thuc. 1.70-71) is a distillation of criticism of Athenian activism. Yet, in the *Epitaphios*, πολυπραγμοσύνη is portrayed positively, even as an aspect of Athenian imperialism (2.40.1-5). Seapower was a dimension of πολυπραγμοσύνη. Urging the naval expedition against Syracuse, Alcibiades sees in ἀπραγμοσύνη the greatest threat (6.18.6-7), while the expedition may be undertaken safely because the Athenians will be ναυκράτορες of all the Sicilians (6.18.5). See V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," *JHS* 67 (1947) 45-67.

³¹Herodotus emphasizes that ἀγνωμοσύνη went along with the growth of the Aeginetan fleet (5.83.1). The same term describes Ionian senselessness in the face of invitations of surrender at Lade (Hdt. 6.10). Compare Diodorus on the so-called "revolt" of Aegina (Diod. 11.70.2 [465/3]) where the Aeginetans are described as filled with φρόνημα "pride" and on the war between Athens and Aegina (11.78.3-4), where they are said to have been arrogant (πεφρονηματισμένους). Ephorus, Diodorus' source, whose understanding of naval warfare was praised even by Polybius (*FGrH* 70 T 20), seems to have seen seapower as a central factor in Aeginetan history (*FGrH* 70 F 176). We

Possibly, the Aeginetans told a different, perhaps laudatory, story about the circumstances under which they acquired the statues, and this account has not been reported. The Aeginetans made much of their upholding of the rights of ξένοι and of their justice in dealings involving themselves and foreigners (Pin. *O.* 8.19-27; *Paian* 6.131-32; *N.* 4.12-13). The success of the Aeginetans in commerce may have depended on legislation favorable to outsiders and a fair adjudication of contractual differences. That the Aeginetans had to conduct their legal affairs at Epidauros would have been irksome in such matters.³² One may hypothesize an Aeginetan treatment of their use of seapower against Epidauros that justified the raids as requital for injustices toward themselves and their ξένοι. Such a version might have been passed over by Herodotus because his non-Aeginetan sources agreed in a negative judgment of the appropriation of the statues, which coincided with other mid-fifth century evaluations of Aeginetan seapower. Once more, however, the polemical character of the account in Herodotus counsels caution. If one accepts the premise that Aeginetan seapower is customarily misused, then the raids against Epidauros and the theft of the statues look as though they belong together. Yet, it is possible that in earlier stages of transmission the traditions on the theft of the statues (with the events following it) and on Aeginetan independence from Epidauros were separate.

It is necessary to consider again the concept of thalassocracy itself before leaving the topic of Aeginetan seapower. Let us start with the "Thalassocracy List" preserved in Eusebius.³³ The list records a series of ἀρχαί at sea by single states, concluding with Xerxes' campaign of 480 when the Athenian thalassocracy presumably begins. The Aeginetan

may contrast the favorable appraisal of Aeginetan seapower which is prominent in Pindaric epinicia. There praise for Aeginetan justice and hospitality toward ξένοι is juxtaposed with epithets for the island like "long-oared," "famous for ships," and "ship-ruling daimon" (*O.* 8.19-23; *N.* 5.8-13; *I.* fr.1.1-5; *Paian* 6.123-31). *Pythian* 8, in honor of Aristomenes of Aegina, opens with an invocation of the goddess Hesukhia, who makes cities great (8.1-20). Athenian activist imperialism is the implicit contrast.

³²On the economic relations between Epidauros and Aegina, see Figueira (note 9 above) 170-92. On the judicial hegemony of Epidauros, cf. P. Gauthier, *Symbola: les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques* (Nancy 1972) 249-51.

³³Eusebius *Chron. Arm.* (Karst) 106-07; *Hier. Chron.* (Helm) 106-07. Cf. J. L. Myres, "On the 'List of Thalassocracies in Eusebius,'" *JHS* 26 (1906) 84-130, for the view that the list derives from fifth century thought (esp. 85-89) and for the Aeginetan thalassocracy (esp. 95).

thalassocracy runs from 490 to 480 on the list.³⁴ Clearly, to date the Damia/Auxesia episode in this period would be to tax Herodotus and his informants with gross errors. While the principles of organization of the list are only dimly glimpsed, it is clear that a rather simplistic appraisal of the naval situation in favor of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War has been crudely transported into the past. To Herodotus and Thucydides, as is apparent not only from their use of related terminology but from their description of naval warfare, thalassocracy was the ability to conduct amphibious expeditions against enemies without hindrance and to deter or defeat such expeditions against oneself. In our text the term θαλασσοκράτορες should admit a meaning of tactical and strategic superiority in a specific military or geographical context.³⁵ This definition does not preclude simultaneous thalassocracy by more than one state inasmuch as thalassocracy is not understood to entail sea-lane control, a modern feature of naval preeminence impossible for the ancients because of technological limits. Nonetheless, the concept of naval warfare of the list is far removed from the practical conduct of naval warfare in the archaic period. A serial list of thalassocrats is a structural feature which seems to have been borrowed from dynastic chronography and applied without much thought to military practice. Therefore, by the time of Herodotus' writing, views had not so crystallized on this subject as to forbid the Aeginetans being described as θαλασσοκράτορες at a time other than their canonical place on the list and with a sense short of absolute superiority.

Herodotus was disturbed by the Aeginetan statement that the Athenians could not have come in one or a few ships, and he shows his

³⁴On the List's organization, see, e.g., W. G. Forrest, "Two Chronographic Notes," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 95-110, esp. 95-106.

³⁵In the only other passage in which he uses a related term, Herodotus calls Polykrates the first of the Greeks after Minos to θαλασσοκρατέειν (3.122.2) (J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* [Cambridge 1938] 165). This passage ensures that a limited sense of thalassocracy is at work in 5.83.3, unless the Damia and Auxesia episode is after Polykrates, a date irreconcilable with Herodotus' treatment of it. Possibly, collective and individual (e.g., Polykrates') thalassocracy were different matters to Herodotus, but the conjunction with raiding for both the Aeginetans and Polykrates (3.39.3-5) may be significant. Thucydides uses θαλασσοκρατέειν (7.48.2, 8.30.2, 8.41.1) and θαλασσοκράτωρ (8.63.1) to express tactical superiority in specific situations. The term ναυκράτωρ is used in the same way (7.60.2). Predominance at sea is expressed by ναυκρατέειν (5.97.1, 5.109.1, 6.18.5), used only in speeches by Athenians to refer to their naval primacy. See T. Gardiner, "Terms for Thalassocracy in Thucydides," *RhM* 112 (1969) 16-22.

disquiet in his careful report of the Aeginetan argument.³⁶ The Aeginetans said that one or a few ships could have been repelled by them, even if they had no navy. This is not impressive reasoning. Herodotus points up its inadequacy by observing that they were unable to report whether they had withdrawn in the face of superior Athenian numbers or had meant to lure them to defeat at the hands of the Argives.

Any consideration of the development of thalassocracy on Aegina (with her limited resources) prompts a sobering conclusion. The historical significance of the early confrontation varies in proportion with the trust that is put in the Aeginetan/Argive version of the hostilities, inasmuch as only they reported large-scale fighting.³⁷ The Athenian version of the affair is throughout at pains to minimize the scale of the incident. The Athenians talked of a single trireme and a supernatural disaster rather than a military confrontation. In their own view, the expedition need not even have been seen by them as aggression, but as an attempt to reclaim their own property. The Aeginetans may have insisted that many Athenian ships had come to their island in order to set the stage for an Aeginetan victory at sea to close the story. Thus, the early hostilities would more closely parallel the sequence of events c. 490. An early discomfiture of the Athenians could have served as a (albeit) partial palliative for the shame of fifth century defeat and subjection by Athens. Such a reconstruction is perhaps too skeptical of the historical value of the Aeginetan version, but, in any case, there is little justification for preferring it to the Athenian account.

Another aspect of the account of the Damia/Auxesia episode may show the influence of fifth century political partisanship. The Epidaurian cult of Damia and Auxesia had a strong connection with Attica, and the Epidaurians performed ritual duties to Athena Polias and Erekhtheus. Since Herodotus reported no variants on this matter, one may assume unanimity or, at most, minor disagreement among his sources. It is possible to see what valence might have been given to the sacrifices by the parties involved. The Epidaurians were directed by Delphi to acquire Attic wood for the statues because it was especially holy or because the olive grew nowhere else then. It is unlikely that Epidaurians and

³⁶Macan (note 14 above) 1.230.

³⁷Modern commentators have been quick to follow the Aeginetan lead by turning an Athenian defeat in this "war" into the reason for a supposed Athenian decadence in the second half of the eighth century. See Dunbabin (note 1 above) 88-90 and the citations of the works of Coldstream (note 7 above).

Aeginetans would have made up a story with such a setting. This motif is of the same spirit as Athenian claims that grain cultivation was a gift of Demeter to the Eleusinians and disseminated from Attica to the rest of mankind in return for which the Greeks were to offer firstfruits to the Eleusinian goddesses.³⁸ Herodotus' informants may have had their eye on requirements (promulgated after the transfer of the treasury in 454) that each Athenian ally contribute a cow and a panoply for the Great Panathenaia, or on the τεμὲν of Athena Polias which may have been established in allied cities during the Pentekontaeteia.³⁹ The obligatory sacrifices might have served as both a positive precedent for the duties of allies in the minds of fifth century Athenians and as an admonitory example of the antiquity of Athenian imperialism for the Aeginetans and Epidaurians. Moreover, any relationship between Athens and Epidauros exhibiting a subordination of Epidauros to Athens was valuable as a precedent for Athenian political influence in the Argolic Acte. During the First Peloponnesian War, Athens had put pressure on Epidauros to bring it into the Athenian sphere of influence in order to improve access to Argos (Thuc. 1.105.1; cf. 2.56.4-5; 4.45.2; 5.53). To say, however, that these duties inspired contrasting associations among Herodotus' informants does not necessarily mean that the duties are apocryphal.

The credence that Herodotus seems to have given to 5.82-84 by relating it without variants may suggest the use of Epidaurian sources. Herodotus informs us that the Aeginetan and Epidaurian cults of Damia and Auxesia were much alike. While this observation could have an Aeginetan source, an Epidaurian one is also possible. As has been noted previously, the treatment of Aeginetan independence is more critical of the Aeginetans than of the Epidaurians. Presumably, the argument that the Epidaurians were absolved of their obligations to Athena and Erekhtheus because they no longer had the statues, which Herodotus puts in the mouth of the Epidaurians, was derived from them (5.84.1).

³⁸See *Suda* s.v. "Proērosiai"; Isoc. *Paneg.* 4.31. On Demeter's gift of grain to the Athenians, see the references in N. J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 194-96.

³⁹Panathenaia: Aristoph. *Clouds* 386-87 and Schol ad loc.; R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford 1969) nos. 40.3-4, 46.40-43, 49.11-13, 69.56-58; *Temenē* of Athena Polias: in general: Aelian *VH* 6.1; on Aegina: *JG* IV 29-32. See J. P. Barron, "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League," *JHS* 84 (1964) 35-48, esp. 44-45. See also C. J. Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias* (Manchester 1955) esp. 12-15.

The Epidaurians, although staunch allies of Sparta and threatened by Athens, did not simply deny that they had ever owed such duties. Obligations to Athens, even if placed in the distant past, would not have been the sort of thing that would have been concocted by the Epidaurians in the mid-fifth century. If someone wished to fabricate a story connecting an Epidaurian and Aeginetan cult with Attica, he would hardly have chosen two goddesses who have no Athenian cult. This is another argument against wholecloth fabrication. There emerges then a common thread of agreement which binds the introductory section of Herodotus' narrative together, namely that Athens had a real connection with Damia and Auxesia.

Aeginetan Independence and Hostility Toward Athens

The associations between Epidauros and Aegina in political tradition as well as in myth support the Herodotean assertion that Aegina was once under the control of Epidauros. At some point Aegina, minting her own coins no later than 550, must have gained her independence. There is, however, no certainty that this independence needed to have been achieved suddenly, in one step, or violently. The role of Epidaurian juridical rights as a provocation to the Aeginetans and of Aeginetan seapower in the liberation struggle is plausible. But that same plausibility becomes suspect as it coincides with what we know about views on fifth century Aegina. Although the aetiological material explaining facets of the cult of Damia and Auxesia is suspect, the fact that a foundation story for the Aeginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia centers around appropriation of the statues and hostility toward Athens indicates that conflict with Athens and Epidauros was associated by the Aeginetans with the beginning of their independent history. This belief, apparently strongly held, must provide the basis for any further discussion.

A conjunction between the cult of Damia and Auxesia and Aeginetan independence may explain how memories of early political events were transmitted. On independence from Epidauros, a cult reorganization to emphasize local associations and to affirm the religious authority of the Aeginetan aristocracy may have taken place. If, in the case of Damia and Auxesia, this process created difficulties with Athens (a refusal to fulfill cult obligations), then it is possible that this confrontation was remembered by the cult personnel and their descendants. On oligarchic Aegina, cult officials will have been members of the hereditary

aristocracy. There may have been something in the sanctuary of Damia and Auxesia which passed for material proof among fifth century Aeginetans. The sacred inventory from the sanctuary lists several military dedications (4 shields [*IG* IV 1588.19-20, 21-22, 39]; 2 breastplates [20-21, 38-39]). Yet, the incongruity of weapons dedicated to goddesses of childbirth and fertility may have led to the hypothesis of a war involving the cult. Thence it is a short step to positing the Athenians, bitter enemies of Aegina, as opponents in such a war. From this perspective, the hostilities themselves become part of an aetiological explanation of the cult of Damia and Auxesia.

It is another matter, however, to go from an acceptance of a climate of hostility between Athens and Aegina to an acceptance of the hostilities as reported by Herodotus or of an early war. Only in the Aeginetan version (supported by the Argives) did a military conflict take place. To the Athenians, their ship had come to grief mysteriously. Aeginetans and Athenians both agreed on a single survivor, but the motif of the single survivor plays a different role in each of their stories. His brutal murder is necessary so that the Aeginetan story can motivate the changes in dress. For the Athenians, the existence of the survivor provides a witness to guarantee that the Athenians did not suffer a military defeat. Neither Athenians nor Aeginetans bother to tell us how the survivor got back to Attica. The Aeginetan version ends with Athenian humiliation, while we have no Athenian report of an aftermath to the expedition.

That an Athenian account may have ended rather abruptly is understandable when the character of Athenian polemics against Aegina is noted. Herodotus cuts short the Athenian preparations for revenge for the Aeginetan coastal raids of 506 with the march of Kleomenes of Sparta against Attica. Later, in c. 489, when the Aeginetans ambush an Athenian *θεωρία* at Sounion,⁴⁰ Herodotus speaks of them as committing a further outrage before the Athenians had an opportunity to requite them for their earlier misdeed, the raids of 506 (5.81.2). Here the historian has accepted the perspective of his Athenian informants, who saw themselves as repeated victims of Aeginetan abuse. Athens' savage subjugation of Aegina in the 450s and the latter's reduction to tributary status in the Delian League had cast the Athenians in a bad light, because Aeginetan autonomy may have been guaranteed by her member-

⁴⁰For this date, see T. J. Figueira, "The Chronology of the Conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Book 6," *QUCC* (1984).

ship in the Hellenic League. The Athenians countered sympathy for Aegina by portraying Athens as the victim of an early Aeginetan misdeed, the sacrilegious theft of the statues of Damia and Auxesia and the equally sacrilegious refusal to continue the requisite cult services. The Aeginetans could be tarred with the same brush as the Megarians, who in the Athenians' minds continually encroached on the Hieria Orgas, a place sacred to Demeter on the border between Eleusis and the Megarid (Thuc. 1.67.4, 1.139.1-2). Thus, Athenian conquest of Aegina was the long-postponed requital of a sequence of Aeginetan outrages.

Historical Causation

It remains to consider the narrative on the creation of the ἔχθρη παλαιή in its role as a historical determinative. The importance of the Aeginetan decision to attack Athens in 506 for the Herodotean treatment of the repulse of the Persians has been mentioned. A late sixth century political decision is explained largely in terms of a much earlier confrontation rather than in terms of topical influences. Intermediate between the early confrontation and the Aeginetan decision of 506 is the ἔχθρη παλαιή, an emotional state out of which the Aeginetan decision emerges.

A similar retrojection of causation can be seen in the Herodotean narrative on an attempt by Samian aristocrats, supported by Sparta and Corinth, to overthrow the Samian tyrant Polykrates. Herodotus cites Spartan and Corinthian anger over Samian aggressions of (at least) a generation before as reasons for their actions (Hdt. 3.47-49; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 859e-860c). The Samians themselves attributed Spartan help to a reciprocation of earlier services by them to Sparta. However, a topical cause could be offered in Polykrates' rapprochement with Persia. Some time later, the exiled Samians established themselves in Kydonia in Crete and were expelled from there by the Aeginetans. To Herodotus, the Aeginetans acted out of a hostility toward Samos caused by the expedition of King Amphikrates of Samos against Aegina some time before (Hdt. 3.59), much as the ἔχθρη παλαιή led to a move against Athens in 506. As an alternative reason for the Aeginetan action at Kydonia, contemporary commercial rivalries might be suggested. These suggestions are by no means self-evident (other plausible causes could be offered). They differ from those in Herodotus because they are grounded in the chronological context and can be derived from a calculation of results.

Thus, considerations of momentary expediency or events of the immediate past do not receive exclusive emphasis in policy making as presented by Herodotus. One may compare the intervention in decision making of oracles, which, by their nature, are nontopical. The Aeginetans are confronted with a choice of whether or not to open hostilities against Athens, because the Thebans received advice from Delphi to seek the help of those nearest to them. This, properly understood, meant to appeal to the Aeginetans, because the nymphs Thebe and Aigina were sisters. Just as it was hard for Herodotus to give an accurate treatment of decision making, decision makers themselves did not publicize their reasoning. In the Dark Age and early Archaic period, the decision to invade a neighbor for land, slaves, and booty, or to repel such an invasion, was closely involved with momentary feelings. However, when it became necessary to act to the city's advantage by intervening in situations in which the community was less emotionally involved, the common man's sensitivity toward policy probably lagged behind that of politicians. Mechanisms were needed to mobilize the community's energy, drawing strength from its values, for warfare involving personalized violence. These were found in oracle-mongering, in manipulation of traditional memory, and in an encouragement of notions of racial (more properly ethnic) affiliation. What remained in popular memory were not the initial phases of decision making among small (often familial or partisan) groups, but only the most public aspect of policy making, mass validation of the leadership's decisions.

Had Herodotus questioned his contemporary, a mid-fifth century Aeginetan or Athenian, on why Aegina was hostile to Athens in 506, one suspects that the almost universal response would have been that the two states had always been enemies. Athenian-Aeginetan animosity was a part of their engrained prejudices and their background. This is not surprising, given that the animosity by the mid-fifth century had been among the preoccupations of both states' foreign policies for more than fifty years. There is a tendency to assume that the intensity of deeply held social and political attitudes is proportionate to their antiquity. Thus, the origin of the hardened hostility between the Athenians and the Aeginetans—which in point of fact could have been generated by relatively recent political occurrences, albeit reinforced by the mistrust attendant upon differences in dialect or custom, by the countless instances of friction between neighbors, or by envy—must be very old. Yet, as far as we know (and, paradoxically, much of our information is drawn from Herodotus himself), Athens and Aegina were not contin-

ually at war throughout the seventh and sixth centuries. The ἔχθρη παλαιή is an insufficient explanation of why Aegina or Athens sought war at any precise moment.

Nonetheless, that the ἔχθρη παλαιή was the cause of the Aeginetan attack in 506 more nearly approximates the Aeginetan view than the Athenian. The Aeginetans gave Herodotus a detailed account ending in a major military confrontation. All of this is of a quality and on a scale to justify an inveterate hatred. Thus, the hatred was προοφειλομένη "owed already" to the Athenians (5.82.1; cf. 6.59 [?]), a term used especially of hostile acts deserved as requital (Eur. *IT* 523; Aristoph. *Wasps* 3; cf. Thuc. 1.32.1). The Athenians spoke of the failure of a single ship's mission, not even necessarily a military one. This was scarcely enough to motivate an ancient hatred, commemorated by cult practice and civil enactment. To Athens, the Aeginetan attack in 506 was an outrage. Thus, if the positing of the ἔχθρη παλαιή as a cause gets in the way of understanding the reasons for the Aeginetan decision in 506, the responsibility for this inadequacy is borne to a large extent by the Aeginetans.

Herodotus' informants, however, seem to have been members of the Aeginetan ruling class. This suggests that deliberate suppression of information played a part. It may be that the Aeginetan decision to attack in 506 could not be justified in terms of the system of values of the Aeginetan aristocracy and in light of the conventions of contemporary interstate behavior. It was, on Herodotus' evidence, without a *casus belli*. The name of the war which it began was the πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος, itself outside diplomatic conventions. In retrospect, the decision of 506 must have seemed disastrous to the Aeginetans. It inaugurated twenty years of intermittent warfare which, at length, prompted two counter-measures: the fortification of the Peiraieus and the Themistoklean ship building program, which forever relegated Aegina to second class status as a naval power. Although the Hellenic League mediated this war, its legacy of bitterness lay in the background of the climactic struggle with Athens in the 450s. At its end, Aegina was a subject of Athens, having suffered irreparable material, economic, and demographic losses. One can see why anti-Athenian Aeginetan aristocrats (like the family of Krios and Polykritos) chose to see the attack on the Attic coasts as just another stage in a long feud and a natural outgrowth of reciprocal hatred. Herodotus was prepared to follow the Aeginetan lead in interpretation because he had no technique, so long after the events, to distinguish between the causes of policy and their public justification, and

because the intense mutual antipathy exhibited by his Athenian and Aeginetan informants made the determinative force of the ἔχθρη παλαιή seem plausible.

Conclusion

First, we may consider what our investigation has brought forth about historical data. Much of what Herodotus reports concerns the cult of Damia and Auxesia. As far as this involves contemporary cult practices (the annual choruses, ten χορηγοί, the nature of the rites themselves) based on evidence collected from elite Aeginetans during a visit to the island (see above pp. 55-56), there is no reason for doubt. Other statements (the dedication of pins, the statues of Damia and Auxesia, the ban on Athenian products) were probably also matters of current cult procedure. However, for these practices, aetiological explanations were created, tracing them to a conflict with Athens. Herodotus partially distorted his aetiological source (trying to explain the dedication of obsolete pins) in stating that Aeginetan and Argive women continued to wear longer pins until the present. To the aetiologies of Aeginetan cult practice, there is added a pseudo-aetiology of Aeginetan provenance about the adoption of Ionian dress at Athens. The aetiologies are otiose, farfetched, and polemical. The most credible of them is that the ban on Athenian products was caused by a conflict with Athens involving Damia and Auxesia. But the credence to be placed in the explanation of the ban depends on one's belief in the historicity of the war.

Concerning the political background to the episode more of the material is likely to be historical, as might be expected. The Aeginetans would not have ruined what they meant to be plausible aetiologies with obviously false background details. That Aegina was in some sense subordinated to Epidauros is supported by external evidence. The part played by legal jurisdiction in this subjection may be historical, but is suspect, if, as is likely, it was used in an Aeginetan defense of their break with Epidauros. The help given by the Argives can be paralleled, and the friendship between the two states was an old one. Without outside corroboration, however, it could just as well be a plausible conjecture. That the rise of Aeginetan naval power led to a more independent stance by Aegina is probable, if only because Aegina had so few other resources on which to draw. That it led to a struggle for independence which included raids against Epidauros may also be true. While Aegi-

netan seapower may have had a sinister reputation, making such a reconstruction plausible, the reputation itself probably had some historical basis. Whether these raids included the theft of the statues depends on the strength of the connection between the cult and Aeginetan independence. It is possible to hypothesize about how memory of such a connection was preserved. Finally, we come to perhaps the most important piece of information in the narrative, namely the connection of the Aeginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia with Athens. Although we have suggested reasons why Herodotus' informants wanted to talk about this connection in the way in which they did, the fact that none chose to deny its existence is most important. The very singularity of the Epidaurians and Aeginetans deriving a cult from Athens argues for its historicity. Moreover, there was agreement that the cult was caught up in the animosity between Athens and Aegina. Yet, the force of this agreement is vitiated by the polemical use to which the hostilities were put by the Aeginetans, attempting to justify the *ἔχθρη παλαιή*, and to a lesser extent by the Athenians, portraying themselves as victims of Aegina. The account of the fighting itself may easily be doubted. There is no easy way to reconcile the Athenian story of a strange disaster befalling one ship and the Argive/Aeginetan story of a military debacle. The aetiological role of the latter version and the fact that it seems a compensation for fifth century defeats undercut it. Nevertheless, the Athenian story, with its earthquake and madness, taken in isolation of the Aeginetan, tells us nothing.

When considered as a document on Herodotean methodology, further conclusions may be drawn from our treatment of these chapters. Herodotus brought together the evidence of Aeginetan, Argive, Athenian, and perhaps Epidaurian informants. He carefully distinguishes the explicit disagreement among these informants. Where there was complete agreement or where the informants of one city were opposed by the agreement of the other informants, the narrative does without citation of source. Herodotus explicitly criticized the tale of the statues going down on their knees, and implicitly doubted that there was a time at which only Attica had the olive tree. He marked where he found the Aeginetan account wanting in detail about the Athenian landing on Aegina. It seems that Herodotus may have curtailed an even more detailed and anti-Athenian Aeginetan version. Significantly, he gives his own interpretation on the change in dress at Athens, which falls short of what the Aeginetans would probably have made of it. Yet, it must be noted that Herodotus limited his rationalizing to doubts and omissions.

A CASE OF CLIENT-KINGSHIP

In 1 B.C. Gaius Caesar, Augustus' grandson and adopted son (C. Caesar Aug. f.), made a long circuit of the eastern Mediterranean on his way to fight a small but highly symbolic war in Arabia. He was to conduct this war as consul in A.D. 1 and then to negotiate a settlement with the Parthians in the current dispute over the Armenian succession. Among the places Gaius Caesar visited was Samos, where he apparently delayed some time and where, I will argue, Tib. Claudius Nero and King Archelaus Sisinnus of Cappadocia each paid his respects.¹ The elements of political intrigue, managed by M. Lollius (Gaius' *comes et rector*), embroiled the honorand, his visitors, and general staff in a dramatic confrontation. The new rift between Archelaus and Tiberius specifically attracted Tacitus' and Dio's notice; and in their accounts this incident prompted Archelaus' later trial before the senate in A.D. 16-17. This trial was not, however, Archelaus' first, for he had previously been indicted and tried before Augustus c. 25 B.C.²

¹Suet. *Tib.* 12.2 gives Samos, Dio 55.10.19 has Chios. My point will not be materially affected if the meeting occurred at Chios. The present argument aims to fix the relative simultaneity of the two visits to C. Caesar, wherever they occurred. Whether Archelaus should also be called Sisinnus is a disputed point; but cf. App. *BC* 5.7 and R. D. Sullivan, "The Dynasty of Cappadocia," *ANRW* II, 7.2 (Berlin 1980) 1153-54—if only his welcome job of collecting and arraying the evidence for Archelaus' career had appeared sooner! Even Sullivan's minimalist approach to interpretation, however, reveals several key points of disagreement between us. For Gaius' itinerary and accomplishments, see F. E. Romer, "A Numismatic Date for the Departure of C. Caesar?", *TAPA* 108 (1978) 187-202. For his military exploits, see G. W. Bowersock, "A Report on Arabia Provincia," *JRS* 61 (1971) 227-28; T. D. Barnes, "The Victories of Augustus," *JRS* 64 (1974) 22-23; and F. E. Romer, "Gaius Caesar's Military Diplomacy in the East," *TAPA* 109 (1979) 199-214.

²R. S. Rogers, *Criminal Trials and Criminal Legislation under Tiberius*, APA Monograph VI (Middletown, CT 1935) 25-27, discusses the evidence for both trials. W. E. Gwatkin, *Cappadocia as a Roman Procuratorial Province*, University of Missouri Studies 5.4 (October 1930) 7, discusses the date of Archelaus' second trial; and he thinks the summons for it may have come as early as A.D. 14 (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.42.4 *ut [Tiberius] imperium adeptus est*); but Tacitus and Dio assign the outcome to A.D. 17 when Archelaus died, although we do not know precisely how this second trial ended (cf. note 31 below). R. J. A. Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome* (Princeton 1984), does not discuss the second trial that took place before the senate.

Two passages, not yet appreciated for their full worth, can be supplemented to reconstruct key moments during this meeting at Samos. In effecting this reconstruction, we will illustrate the workings of influence and mutual benefit (*gratia, officium, beneficium*) within the system of client-kingship, and Archelaus himself will emerge as something more than the shadow he otherwise is to us. Tacitus and Dio recalled Archelaus' rejection of Tiberius in c. 1 B.C. because of the effect it had had on the future *princeps*. Since aspects of this trial appeared incongruous to them, they calculated that Tiberius' resentment later vented itself in bringing Archelaus to trial in A.D. 16-17. In understanding the motivation of the second trial so simply, Tacitus and Dio—perhaps like their predecessors—were guilty of anachronism, read back the arbitrariness of Tiberius' later principate into his earlier actions, and either ignored or did not know the details of Archelaus' interaction with Augustus. We will proceed, then, from examining Archelaus' relations with Augustus and with the principate as an institution, through a description of the circumstances and motivation of Tiberius' self-imposed withdrawal of 6 B.C., to a proposed reconstruction of what happened at Samos in 1 B.C. and why.

I

We may begin with the later account first. Dio states (57.17.3-4) that, although he had once begged Tiberius for legal aid, Archelaus had ignored him during the latter's seclusion at Rhodes; and at the same time the king had attended C. Caesar in the East. Dio also notes Tiberius' unremitting anger over this affront:

Τὸν δὲ δὴ Ἀρχελάων τὸν τῆς Καππαδοκίας βασιλέα δι' ὀργῆς σχών, ὅτι πρότερόν οἱ ὑποπεπτωκώς ὥστε καὶ συνηγόρω, ὅτε ἐπὶ τοῦ Αὐγούστου ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων κατηγορήθη, χρήσασθαι, μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ μὲν ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον ἀπελθόντος ἡμέλησε, τὸν δὲ δὴ Γαίον ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐλθόντα ἐθεράπευσε, μετεπέμψατο ὡς καὶ νεωτερίζοντά τι. . .

The summons (μετεπέμψατο) under discussion by Dio is on the second charge leveled in A.D. 16-17 and does not concern us for the moment. The *synēgoria*, however, occurred in reference to the first trial, which, as will be seen, bears directly on our question. Tacitus omits (*Ann.* 2.42.3-4) both the earlier request for legal assistance and Archelaus' homage to C. Caesar, but he does associate the king's rejection of Tibe-

rius with Gaius' prominence. Tacitus also adds that Archelaus was impelled to rebuff Tiberius not by his own arrogance but by the confidants of Augustus:

Rex Archelaus quinquagesimum annum Cappadocia potiebatur, invisus Tiberio quod eum Rhodi agentem nullo officio coluisset. Nec id Archelaus per superbiam omiserat, sed ab intimis Augusti monitus, quia florente Gaio Caesare missoque ad res Orientis intuta Tiberii amicitia credebatur.

Before we may explain why Archelaus rebuffed Tiberius in the heyday of Gaius Caesar, the problems surrounding both Archelaus' own career and our knowledge of it need to be more fully introduced; and it will first be necessary to examine our evidence about the king's earlier trial. With very different results, G. W. Bowersock and B. Levick have each examined the chronology of Archelaus' first trial and also of his changing relationship with Tiberius. Bowersock questioned the conventional date of c. 27-23 B.C. for this trial before Augustus. The basic evidence for dating it comes from Suet. *Tib.* 8.1: "Civiliū officiorum rudimentis regem Archelaum Trallianos et Thessalos, varia quosque de causa, Augusto cognoscente defendit." The question is whether Suetonius listed these events of Tiberius' early career in chronological order. Bowersock thought he did not and hence offered his own arguments for redating them. Moreover, his analysis made two assumptions that Levick later challenged. First, he assumed that Archelaus did not seek Tiberius' legal aid until 20 B.C., for in that year the king found his opportunity to do so when he accompanied Tiberius into Armenia Maior to secure the throne for Tigranes II (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 15.105). Second, in the same year, "Augustus presented Archelaus with Rough Cilicia and Lesser Armenia, and this indication of imperial favour may have piqued the opposition to the king at home." Bowersock concluded that "the trial will have occurred between 19 and 16, most probably c. 18 B.C."³

Barbara Levick, on the other hand, noticed that "Suetonius is writing by topics, but within these topics he is, at least in chapters 7, 9, and 10, keeping to chronological order." She produced a detailed argument that suggests Suetonius used the same procedure in chapter 8, though she also had to face squarely our lack of secure dating for his

³G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford 1966) App. III, 157-61.

defenses of the Trallians and Thessalians, of which she could originally say only "that they should be later than 26 or 25." On Bowersock's second assumption, no doubt Archelaus' territorial acquisition did pique the opposition to him in Cappadocia; but, she argues, "an attack on Archelaus was just as likely in 26 or 25 as it was in 20." Dio apparently recorded the transfer of Cilicia Tracheia under the year 20 without indicating exactly when this transfer took place (Dio 54.9.2): ἐκεῖνα (sc. τὰ τῆς Κιλικίας παραθαλασσίδια) γὰρ τῷ Ἀρχελάῳ μετὰ τῆς σμικροτέρας Ἀρμενίας ἐχαρίσατο, ὅτι ὁ Μῆδος ὁ πρὶν αὐτῆς βασιλεύων ἐτεθνήκει. Because of its strategic importance, however, this territory ought to have been transferred as soon as possible after its former overseer had died. Cilicia Tracheia was previously under the control of Amyntas, king of Galatia, who was dead by 25 B.C. when Galatia became a province, though he may already have died in 26. Archelaus' appeal for Tiberius' advocacy had not to do with the coincidence of Tiberius' presence in the East in 20, but depended more pragmatically on "a pre-existing connection between Tiberius and Archelaus," which she suggests was "even perhaps one of patronage" but which she could trace only to Tiberius' father and Archelaus' grandfather. The net effect of her arguments is convincing, and she has returned the first trial of Archelaus to the conventional period and probably to a date in 26 or 25 B.C.⁴

Tiberius' advocacy belongs early in a long period of formal cordiality between the two men, and it apparently antedated their joint Armenian expedition in 20 B.C., as Levick has correctly shown. C. 25 B.C. Archelaus was alerted by the territorial grant after the death of Amyntas and contemplated the aggrandizement of his own kingdom in return for collaborating with Rome. Archelaus' choices were neither novel nor entirely unpredictable. Perhaps the attack on him by a rival Cappadocian faction was also not unpredictable, since Archelaus' family had a known connection to the Claudii Neronēs whose most prominent member was the stepson of the *princeps*—what better way to test the strength of the new *princeps*' victory?

Levick traced this family connection back to Archelaus' grandfather and Tiberius' father. In fact, Tiberius' three speeches mentioned in

⁴B. Levick, "The Beginning of Tiberius' Career," *CQ* 65 (1971) 478-86. On the death of Amyntas and its consequences, cf. her *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor* (Oxford 1967), ch. IV and App. III; her note 5 on p. 29 does not make it clear whether she prefers c. 26 or c. 25 B.C. for the transfer of Cilicia Tracheia to Archelaus. See also M. Pani, *Roma e i re d'oriente da Augusto a Tiberio* (Bari 1972) 107-11.

Suet. *Tib.* 8.1 all depend on similar inherited responsibilities. Recalling the hereditary relationship of Tiberius' father to Nysa and the connections between Nysa, Tralles, and Tiberius, Levick urged that the claims of *patrocinium* were again working when Tiberius spoke for the Trallians; and E. Badian has suggested that Tiberius' *patrocinium* over the Thessalians stemmed from Appius Claudius Nero and Flaminius' campaign of 198 B.C.⁵ Archelaus' inherited tie to the Claudii Neronēs, then, is sufficient to explain his appeal to Tiberius for aid at the time of his first trial c. 25 B.C. Observing social form—and perhaps to tighten his bond with the young and favored Tiberius—Archelaus used claims of family connection in appealing for Tiberius' advocacy. Tiberius predictably complied.

Whether in Spain, at Rome, or elsewhere, Archelaus' trial before Augustus was hardly more than a political inconvenience for the king. The charges against him, though lost to us, were recognized by Augustus for what they were, a political ploy by a rival faction in Cappadocia; and Archelaus was easily acquitted.⁶ Nevertheless, because of Cappadocia's strategic importance after the land grant(s) of c. 25, Augustus would have been remiss had he not summoned Archelaus for a hearing and appointed a regent in his absence.

Dio reports (57.17.4–5) that Augustus appointed a regent, ἐπίτροπος (*procurator*), in Cappadocia during a period of Archelaus' real or supposed mental debility (παραφρονεῖν δοκοῦντα). Scholars usually conceive this regency as a third incident distinct from either of Archelaus' trials. We may be suspicious, however, of Dio's account; and if the following argument is correct, we may conjecture that this regent served in Cappadocia when the king went to his first trial c. 25 B.C.⁷

⁵E. Badian, "The Thessalian Clients of Tiberius Nero," *CR* n.s. 24 (1974) 186, where an officious printer's devil regrettably crossed out his footnotes.

⁶D. Magie, *RRAM* I (Princeton 1950) 475: "The grounds for the charge are unknown, but evidently there was no reason to doubt Archelaus' efficiency as a ruler or his loyalty to Rome." See also Rogers (note 2 above) loc. cit. The fact of Archelaus' return to his capital at Elaeussa Sebastē guarantees his acquittal, and the subsequent marriage of his daughter to one of Herod's sons assures us of Augustus' continuing favor.

⁷A. Stein, *PIR*² A 1023, thought that this regent served during the settlement immediately following the battle of Actium. G. W. Bowersock (note 3 above) 54 refers to an "instability" in Archelaus after his first trial, ascribes the regency to this period of instability, but neither dates the regency more closely nor associates it with Dio's suggestion of Archelaus' senility. (See also note 18 below for D. Magie's related view.) On the other hand, A. H. M. Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Empire*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1971) 181, avoids referring explicitly to Archelaus' mental deterioration at any time, but does link

We might already have questioned Dio's report without the following argument based on a worrisome, even if inferential, corroboration from Suetonius (*Aug.* 48.2) to justify our suspicion:

Reges socios etiam inter semet ipsos necessitudinibus mutuis iunxit, promptissimus affinitatis cuiusque atque amicitiae conciliator et fautor; nec aliter universos quam membra partisque imperii curae habuit, rectorem quoque solitus apponere aetate parvis mente lapsis, donec adolescerent aut resipiscerent. . . .

If Suetonius has not merely taken one instance as establishing the norm, then the sense of iteration in *solitus* is disturbing. It is not clear, in an unenlightened age, how many *mente lapsi* might be expected to recover and return to rule. In his note to this passage, Ruhnken adduces Sall. *Jug.* 65 in order to explain *mente lapsi* with Sallust's phrase *mente paulum imminuta*.⁸ Ironically, Sallust's full phrase is more revealing and deserves to be cited: Masinissa's grandson, Gauda, is "morbis confectus et ob eam causam mente paulum imminuta." The full expression with its causal relation illustrates an association of ideas that helps explain why Dio actually put the incidental information of the Cappadocian regency with Archelaus' second trial.⁹ That Dio says nothing of Archelaus' physical disability during the regency, but speaks only of his mental lapse, may lead us away from the events juxtaposed by Dio and on to Archelaus' other involvements.¹⁰

this regency with the king's "advanced age"; and J. G. C. Anderson, writing in *CAH* 10 (1934) 744, puts Archelaus' insanity and the regency "about A.D. 10." Finally, R. D. Sullivan (note 1 above) 1159 says, "no firm indication of the date of his illness emerges from the evidence," and he does not explore the question very far.

⁸J. Geel, *Dav. Ruhnkenii scholia in Suetonii vitas Caesarum* (Leyden 1828; reprint, Amsterdam 1966) 170 ad loc. Tacitus' *mente lapsi* apparently conforms to contemporary medical terminology; cf. Cels. 55.26.13, "quaedam mente labuntur." E. S. Shuckburgh, *C. Suetonii Divus Augustus* (Cambridge 1896) 104 ad loc., adduces the *tutela* of Roman law as analogous in such cases, but this observation does not help to solve our basic interpretative problem.

⁹A similar nexus of ideas obtains in the case of Gaius Caesar, who was wounded in Armenia on or about 9 September A.D. 3. Although he appeared to recover (Florus 2.32.45), we are told that he was weakened and his mind wandered (Vell. 2.102.2, Dio 55.10a.8). The indication of his mental state seems to have been his idea to give up public life and to remain where he was in Syria (Vell. 2.102.3, Dio 55.10a.8). Cf. Romer (note 1 above [1979]) 212-14.

¹⁰A. Stein (note 7 above) loc. cit. cites Dio 57.17 to say "propter morbum et demetiam Augustus procuratorem ei adiunxerat." He repeats the ancient prejudice, although τοῦτο at Dio 57.17.5 best refers to παραφρονεῖν in the preceding phrase and not to both παραφρονεῖν and δεινῶς ποδαγρῶντα as motivating Augustus' appointment of a regent.

Archelaus' extensive intervention in Judaeae politics is better attested than other aspects of his reign, and Josephus preserves an unusual story that may help us.¹¹ About 10/9 B.C. Pheroras, King Herod's brother, found himself in trouble twice. First, he was tried and acquitted of political charges leveled by anonymous informers; and in the anomy that followed, careful lies and forced confessions implicated Herod's sons, Alexander and Aristobulus, in a conspiracy. Alexander then published a work acknowledging his plot, but naming his denigrators as accomplices and singling out Pheroras and Salome (Herod's sister) as chief among them. Alexander's father-in-law, Archelaus of Cappadocia, arrived to mediate between Herod and Alexander. Archelaus pretended to denounce Alexander and his wife, conducted an investigation, and (to his own surprise!) exonerated the couple even while implicating Pheroras. On Archelaus' advice, Pheroras pleaded insanity (παρακοπήν δὲ φρενῶν καὶ μανίαν ὀδυρόμενος), and, in requesting clemency, Archelaus adduced analogies from his own family (χρῶμενος οἰκεῖοις ὑποδείγμασιν). Pheroras was then forgiven by Herod,¹² and out of gratitude Herod accompanied Archelaus to Antioch, where he patched up a quarrel between the Cappadocian and M. Titius who was governor of Syria.¹³

Nothing in the text suggests that this method of exculpation peculiarly suited Herod's eccentricities. Though Pheroras may have been lying about his insanity, Josephus' story depends on the credibility of the claim with Herod and with the world. Clearly, Pheroras' madness sufficiently explained his motivation and exculpated him from the acts of conspiracy he admitted. Likewise, the designation *mente lapsi* in Suet. *Aug.* 48.2 may disguise political claims against particular individuals, and, depending on the ideology of the source from which the information or interpretation is derived, that insanity may be described as real, unreal, or pretended.¹⁴ Augustus' regularly appointing regents (cf. *solitus*) for supposedly deranged client-kings suggests disciplinary action,

¹¹For secondary discussion of Archelaus' involvements in Judaea, see A. Schalit, *König Herodes* (Berlin 1969) 610-13 and 616-29 *passim*.

¹²Thus far my summary follows Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.483-512; but cf. also *Ant. Jud.* 16.194-270.

¹³Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 16.270: . . . καὶ μέχρις Ἀντιοχείας ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ παρῆλθον. ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα Συρίας Τίτιον, ἐκ διαφορᾶς Ἀρχελάω κακῶς ἔχοντα, διήλλαξεν Ἡρώδης, καὶ πάλιν εἰς Ἰουδαίαν ὑποστρέφει.

¹⁴Pheroras' difficulty in curbing his passion was well known (cf. Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.484 and 486); and his madness, it seems (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.506), came from passion for his wife!

not medical or psychological concern, and all the more reason to identify Augustus' regent in Cappadocia with Archelaus' appearance at the *cognitio* of Augustus in c. 25 B.C.¹⁵

Dio's remark about the regency occurs in his account of Archelaus' second trial and seems to represent his attempt to comprehend material already obscure in his own day. It is worth examining Dio's account in more detail since the king does not quite seem the madman or fool Dio makes him out to be. The passage cited above continues as follows (Dio 57.17.4-5):

... καὶ τῇ τῆς γερουσίας ψήφῳ παρέδωκεν, οὐ μόνον ὑπεργήρων ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεινῶς ποδαγρῶντα καὶ προσέτι καὶ παραφρονεῖν δοκοῦντα. ἔπαθε μὲν γάρ ποτε τοῦτο ὄντως, ὥστε καὶ ἐπίτροπον παρὰ τοῦ Αὐγούστου τῆς ἀρχῆς λαβεῖν, οὐ μέντοι καὶ τότε ἔτι παρελήρει, ἀλλ' ἐπλάσσετο, εἰ πῶς ἔκ γε τούτου σωθεῖη. κἂν ἐθανατώθῃ, εἰ μὴ καταμαρτυρῶν τις αὐτοῦ ἔφη ποτὲ αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὅτι "ἐπειδὴν οἶκαδε ἐπανεῖλθω, δείξω αὐτῷ οἷα νεῦρα ἔχω."

This passage, which contains a number of difficult ideas, deserves to be translated here:

... and [Tiberius] consigned him to the senate for trial when Archelaus was a very old man, was suffering severely from gout (arthritis?), and appeared to be mad. At one time he had indeed suffered (ἔπαθε) from that kind of trouble, badly enough so that Augustus appointed a regent to take his place; at the time of this trial, however, he was no longer insane but was faking in the hope that he might save his life if he were thought to be out of his mind. Moreover, he would even have been condemned to death, had a witness against him not reported that he [Archelaus] had once claimed, "When I go back home, I'll show him [Tiberius] what muscles I have."

Dio adduces no compelling evidence for the alleged weakness of mind which he associated with Archelaus' age. Tacitus speaks of the king's anguish (*angor*) and general exhaustion from old age (*fessus senio*) in A.D. 16-17 without any suggestion that Archelaus' mental capacity was diminished.¹⁶ Although he produced no clear evidence, Dio bluntly sug-

¹⁵Even if the regency in Cappadocia and Archelaus' first trial did not occur simultaneously as argued here, any claims of mental incapacity against a reigning monarch and necessitating a regency *pro tempore* should reflect political grievances by one party or another against that monarch.

¹⁶Tacitus and Dio apparently had a common tradition for Archelaus' anxiety (*angor*, παραφρονεῖν) and his great age (*fessus senio*, ὑπεργήρως). Tacitus circumspectly juxtaposes *angor* and *fessus senio* and seems thereby to exclude the application of

gested Archelaus' senility in the form of childish playing, παραφρονεῖν δοκοῦντα.

The appearance of Archelaus' mental deterioration is Dio's device for interpreting the events of A.D. 16–17, which were already obscure to him. He takes the unlikely position that Archelaus, once truly overcome by his mental weakness and temporarily removed by Augustus, had recovered from that first lapse only to feign derangement in his own defense before the senate in A.D. 16–17. (Dio does not explain why an excessively old Archelaus would want—or would risk—another regent until he recovered from his feigned mental illness at a time when the king was both old and close to death.) This account has the earmark of invention, and the subsequent anecdote provided by the prosecution witness invites suspicion. The witness' anecdote is ambiguous and deployed to Dio's set intention. At the verbal level, the witness only attests that Archelaus' weakened *physical* condition could give his words an ironic ring.¹⁷

Dio seems to have conflated two facts: (1) that toward the end of his long life (ὑπεργήρως) Archelaus was seriously gouty or arthritic (δαινῶς ποδαγρῶν), and (2) that Augustus at one time appointed a regent for Archelaus, perhaps because of his *alleged* mental debility. The king's advanced age and well-known handicap are taken by Dio to guarantee the presence of another frequent characteristic of great age, childish playing—itself a sign of mental deterioration. This is not a big leap, given the common prejudice that other impairments may imply mental aberration (cf. Sall. *Iug.* 65, above p. 80 and note 9). With the problem of Archelaus' derangement thus reduced, the regency itself is the only remaining difficulty in Dio's notice.

senium to mental deterioration in this passage: Archelaus' mental state is described by *angor*, his physical by *fessus senio*. Either Tacitus neglected the extraneous detail of the king's arthritis or gout (ποδαγρῶν), or else Dio derived his information about it from another tradition—the one perhaps from which he will have gotten both the information about the regency and the witness' testimony at the second trial. One thing is clear: either Tacitus did not know of the regency or he did not consider it important. Dio's expansiveness, on the other hand, looks like an attempt to make sense out of separate traditions—the one is more detailed, the other more vague.

¹⁷Gwatkin (note 2 above) 8 already distrusted Dio's anecdotal account of this trial. It is unclear from the context whether, in Dio's opinion, the witness' report of Archelaus' remark (Dio 57.17.5: ἐπειδὴν οἰκαδὲ ἐπανεῖλθω, δείξω αὐτῷ οἷα νεῦρα ἔχω) and the reaction provoked by it point either to Archelaus' physical or mental weakness or else to both. Dio leaves the reader to do his own inferring.

That the regency occurred is virtually certain. A governorship *pro tempore*, although not otherwise known, is not contradicted by internal inconsistency or by circumstantial evidence. The occasion of Archelaus' original trial (his only one under Augustus) required such a regency, and I urge that the regency and this first trial occurred in conjunction with one another. However transparent the charges, and even if despite his own predisposition, still Augustus needed to appoint a regent to assure Cappadocia's internal stability during the required absence of its monarch. There were two reasons for this action. First, Cappadocia was only newly established as Augustus' bulwark on the eastern frontier, and this trial would provide an early occasion for all to explore Augustus' *clementia* and his commitment to a former partisan of Antony.¹⁸ Second, if a rival party was moving against Archelaus, it was on what we might call "nationalist" grounds; and it made claims against the legitimacy of his rule, the matter of his Roman policy, and the strength of his Roman connections—all problems which combined to obstruct his ruling easily. As the *princeps* had interests in Cappadocia, the king had his own in Roman rule. A developing anti-Archelaan faction in Cappadocia will have been contained by the presence of a regent. Dio's source had presumably alluded to a regency in connection with a trial of Archelaus, but Dio, not knowing much about the first adjudication, inferred its relevance for the later trial.

II

Bowersock also offered a new date for the origin of Archelaus' and Tiberius' falling out. He thought their rift began not c. 1 B.C. but c. 9 B.C. when, during M. Titius' governorship of Syria, King Herod of Judaea ended the *diaphora* between Titius and King Archelaus (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 16.270).¹⁹ Levick rightly doubted that the reconciliation so

¹⁸Thus Magie (note 6 above) modifies only slightly Stein's suggestion (note 7 above) in order to date this regency to c. 25 B.C. He accepts that this regency was a concession to post-Actian politics. Augustus had deposed most of Antony's appointees, and only Amyntas and Archelaus were allowed to retain lands assigned by Antony (Dio 51.2.1).

¹⁹Bowersock (note 3 above) 159: "This reconciliation will have been the time of Archelaus' desertion of Tiberius. . . . Archelaus was an enemy of Titius while he was a friend of Tiberius, and an enemy of Tiberius after he had contracted a friendship with Titius. A network of intrigue is exposed by which a king whom Tiberius had once defended was made to slight him on Rhodes."

affected the relationship between Tiberius and the Cappadocian because, *inter alia*, Tiberius' star had been rising since the mid-twenties and would be in the ascendant between 9 and 6 B.C.²⁰ The gist of her argument is that Archelaus would have carefully preserved his avenue to Tiberius during these years and especially after the death of Drusus in 9 B.C.

There are other reasons also for doubting the pivotal significance which Bowersock assigned to the reconciliation between Titius and the king of Cappadocia. Archelaus' network of intrigue, noticed by Bowersock, did exist, but the king's friendship with Titius is not our key to discovering it. At least two additional considerations militate against such an interpretation: (a) "Archelaos scheint ein verschlagener Mann gewesen zu sein,"²¹ and (b) our other evidence is quite insufficient for supposing that the reconciliation of Archelaus and Titius affected Tiberius' interests or attitudes at the time it occurred.

Bowersock's argument relied on Vell. 2.79.6 to indicate Tiberius' dislike of Titius:

cui (sc. Titio) in tantum duravit hoc facinore contractum odium, ut mox ludos in theatro Pompei faciens execratione populi spectaculo, quod praebebat, pelleretur.

Velleius merely relates, though, that an enduring *odium* accrued to Titius because he murdered Sextus Pompeius on Antony's orders and that because of it Titius was later driven from the Theater of Pompey amid the wild cursing of the spectators during games he was sponsoring. These unflattering remarks may indeed typify Velleius' pro-Tiberian editorializing,²² and perhaps an antagonism between Tiberius and Titius does underlie Velleius' inclusion of this incident. Without more substantial evidence, however, the origin of their supposed hostility cannot be dated, and this hostility itself should not be exaggerated. Vel-

²⁰Levick (note 4 above) 484, and *Tiberius the Politician* (London 1976) 34-38, which incorporates and replaces her earlier work (but see Romer [note 1 above (1978)] 190, note 7 for references to those earlier arguments as they bear on this point).

²¹Schalit (note 11 above) 610.

²²On Velleius' bias, see G. V. Sumner, "The Truth about Velleius Paterculus: Prolegomena," *HSCP* 74 (1970) 257-97; A. J. Woodman, "Questions of Date, Genre, and Style in Velleius: Some Literary Answers," *CQ* 25 (1975) 272-306, and, of course, his *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94-131)* (Cambridge 1977) 28-56. Sumner's cautionary words (270) bear repeating: "It behoves the historiographer to be reasonable in the demands he would make of a contemporary historian of Tiberius."

leius' information cannot be pressed to mean more than that Tiberius may have become angry with Titius at some indefinite time before Velleius was writing—that is, prior to c. 30 A.D. In fact, in its own narrative context Velleius' anecdote, like the *odium* itself, points only to the extraordinary public reaction against Titius because he murdered the man who had previously spared his life.²³

Titius' career is not more helpful in showing either the origin and nature of his quarrel with Archelaus or the date of his possible falling out with Tiberius. He was born the son of Munatia Planca and L. Titius.²⁴ In the aftermath to Julius Caesar's assassination, his father, then proscribed, sided with Sextus Pompeius and was with Sextus in 40 B.C. (Vell. 2.77.2–3, Dio 48.30.5). Our Titius, however, had other ambitions. During the same year, after raising a flotilla in his own cause, Sextus' forces caught him off the Narbonese coast, but for his father's sake his life was spared (Dio 48.30.5–6). Titius next appears as *quaestor* during Antony's Parthian campaign of 36 (Plut. *Ant.* 42.3). The following year he became *praefectus classis* to Antony, and under orders Titius pursued Sextus Pompeius into Asia after the battle of Naulochus. Sextus was slain, and so Titius earned the *odium* which endured for years at Rome (Vell. 2.79.5–6). Shortly after eliminating Sextus, Titius became proconsul of Asia under Antony.²⁵ His allegiance to Antony lasted until 32 when, with Munatius Plancus, his maternal uncle, he went over to Octavian (Dio 50.3.1, Plut. *Ant.* 58). Subsequently, Titius and Statilius Taurus led a strategic charge on Antony's cavalry in the preliminaries to the battle of Actium and won over for Octavian's cause King Philadelphus of Paphlagonia (Dio 50.13.5–6). As *legatus Augusti*

²³L. R. Taylor, "M. Titius and the Syrian Command," *JRS* 26 (1936) 164–65, also accepted Vell. 2.79.6 at face value, and in her opinion disagreements between Titius and Tiberius may explain why Velleius included the material, although nothing can be said to date the origins of those disagreements. In any case, Dio refers to the same incident (48.30.6) as a prominent (proverbial?) example of double-dealing. Vell. 2.83 again denigrates Titius' character since his maternal uncle, there denounced in detail as a scoundrel, provided a model of action for Titius.

²⁴See *PIR*¹ III T 196. The *praenomen* of Titius' father is guaranteed by *CIL* IX 4191 (see note there).

²⁵Cf. *ILS* 891, cited by Bowersock (note 3 above) 22, note 2 and perhaps intended by Taylor (note 23 above) 164 when she states that "... in a dedication made to [Titius] as their patron by Roman citizens in business at Miletus (*ILS* 878) he is styled *proconsul*, *praefectus classis*, *consul designatus*." But *ILS* 878 pertains to L. Afranius, is not from Miletus, and does not generally correspond in other particulars to her description. *ILS* 891, on the other hand, generally meets her description, but is from Mytilene.

pro praetore, Titius governed Syria at some time between 13 and 8 B.C., when his quarrel with Archelaus was resolved; as governor he also received the royal Parthian hostages from Phraates IV.²⁶

Nothing suggests that the quarrel between Titius and Archelaus was of long standing, although it may conceivably have dated from the period of their mutual allegiance to Antony. That their *diaphora* was ended by another former Antonian is no clue. Herod's utility in the matter derived from his high position in Augustus' regard (note 27 below), and his assistance indicates that the reconciliation had practical importance for him as well. Archelaus' other considerations were rightly overridden by the political expediency of his being on good terms with the governor of Syria, who was also a favorite of Augustus. Titius, for his part, yielded to the good intention of Herod, whose ponderous influence extended into Syria. Their reconciliation should not have aroused Tiberius nor should it serve as a simple measure of Archelaus' disaffection from Tiberius.²⁷ As far as the record shows, Archelaus' quarrel with Titius was easily ameliorated, and its ending had no consequences for Archelaus' relations with Tiberius. Archelaus remained in Tiberius' good graces until, with compunction, the king broke from him at Samos in c. 1 B.C.

The story of Cappadocian aggrandizement has usually been told from the Roman point of view. After all, there is no other reasonable explanation for the rapid development of the once landlocked king-

²⁶Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 16.270 for the approximate date of Titius' governorship and the reconciliation with Archelaus; Strabo 16.1.28 for the receipt of the hostages, and cf. Bowersock (note 3 above) 154 with reference there for this date. One should, I suppose, still see T. Corbishly, "Note on the Date of the Syrian Governorship of M. Titius," *JRS* 24 (1934) 43-49. Taylor (note 23 above) argues for a second Syrian governorship for M. Titius; but cf. now R. Syme, "The Titulus Tiburinus," *Vestigia* 17 (1973) 585-601, which removes from the discussion the inscription on which she based her argument. Among his other honors, Titius held a *pontificium* and was designated *patronus* by the colonists at Auxinum (*CIL* IX 5853).

²⁷οἱ πάσης Συρίας ἀριστοὶ πλὴν Ἀρχελαοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.538) implies a tripartite division of power in those parts of the Levant and adjacent areas under Roman domination. Archelaus controlled the northern regions, the governor of Syria the middle, and Herod the southern (with his influence spilling over into Syria). Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.399-400 records that in 20 B.C. Augustus made Herod ἐπίτροπος (*procurator*) of all Syria and that even some Roman procurators were subordinate to him. Herod is also described there, perhaps only with a touch of hyperbole, as considering himself second in the affections of Augustus and Agrippa (whose mutual affection for each other came first). Good sense and politics clearly required that Archelaus and Titius be reconciled at this time.



dom. Augustus, preoccupied with maintaining a secure eastern frontier, charged Archelaus with protecting key areas including the Cilician Gates and the Euphrates border. A formidable front was needed against Parthia, especially after the death of Amyntas, who had been used in similar operations, and after the breaking up of his Galatian holdings.

It is not difficult to imagine the shape of Archelaus' Roman policy. With the acquisition from Augustus of Cilicia Tracheia (to which he removed his capital) and of Armenia Minor,²⁸ Archelaus began to form a plan to increase his holdings and to extend his influence throughout the eastern reaches of the Roman empire. These additions gave him a territorial wedge across eastern Anatolia from the Mediterranean to the mountains of Armenia Minor and almost to the Black Sea. (He would win direct access to the Black Sea at some time after c. 8 B.C. when he married Pythodoris of Tralles, widow of Polemon I and queen of Pontus [see below, p. 98].) To extend his influence in the East, Archelaus required the full support of Augustus and his successor. This need alone would have prevented the king from jeopardizing his connection to the Claudii Neronas as long as he could before Augustus' succession plan was actually realized.

A summary of Archelaus' career before 1 B.C. tells the story. An outsider, he became king in Cappadocia c. 36 (Dio 49.32.3), putatively because his mother enjoyed Antony's favor (Mart. 11.20; App. *BC* 5.7). After Actium, like other *reges socii*, he came over to Octavian. Cilicia Tracheia was strategically entrusted to him probably c. 25 as we have seen, and he acquired Armenia Minor at the same time or within a few years. He was tried before Augustus also c. 25 and was certainly acquitted. (A regent *perhaps* ruled Cappadocia during this trial.) Five years later Archelaus campaigned with Tiberius in Armenia Minor, and his

²⁸For Archelaus' removal to Elaeussa (also called Sebastē, i.e., Augusta), see Strabo 12.2.7 and 14.5.6, also Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.456 and *Ant. Jud.* 16.131 and 332. Archelaus' numismatic titulature is revealing. Κτιστής perhaps reflects his interest in rejuvenating the ancient kingdom after the land grants of c. 25, while φιλόπατρις asserts his legitimacy. Archelaus, carefully calling his new capital Elaeussa Sebastē, also changed the name of his old capital (previously called Eusebeia in Greek) to Caesareia between 12 and 9 B.C. See B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum* (London 1911; reprint, Chicago 1967) 751–52, and also W. Wroth, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Galatia, Cappadocia, Syria* (London 1899; reprint, Bologna 1964) xxxiii–xli and 44–46. For Archelaus' mint at Elaeussa Sebastē, see Head, pp. 734–35, and G. F. Hill, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Lycaonia, Isauria, and Cilicia* (London 1900; reprint, Bologna 1964) xviii–lxxi and 238, although it is not clear that the only coin that Hill attributes (p. 238) to Archelaus actually belongs to him.

prestige continued so that some time after 25, and probably after 20, Augustus approved the marriage of Archelaus' daughter, Glaphyra, to Herod's son, Alexander.²⁹ Later, Archelaus extricated the young couple from suspicion of conspiracy in Judaea, and, in return for this help, Herod managed an end to the quarrel of Archelaus and Titius. In moving his capital to Cilicia Tracheia and building a new city there, Archelaus honored Augustus and called his foundation Sebastē. Now, between 12 and 9 Archelaus also gave his old capital Eusebeia (Mazaca) a new name, Caesarea (note 27 above). The king cultivated his ties to Rome: he had become a favorite of Livia (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 2.42.4), apparently had other influential friends at Rome (Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.456), and had not lost his tie to the Claudii Neronēs. In 7/6 B.C., when Herod tried his sons at Berytus (Beirut), Augustus required him to impanel Archelaus among the jury, although Herod failed to do so (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 16.357). King Archelaus had remained prominent in Augustus' plans for the eastern frontier, and nothing in events before 6 B.C. points to anything like the rupture between Archelaus and Tiberius that Tacitus and Dio associated with C. Caesar's service in the East. Archelaus had no reason to break with Tiberius before 6 B.C. and no occasion to do so before the advent of C. Caesar in the East c. 1 B.C.

In outline this is the career of a driven, ambitious man who saw his own advantage and advancement in diverse situations. Archelaus' more personable qualities are lost; but then Josephus, whose sources knew Archelaus best, gives us little about those qualities to judge by. Our record shows the king's singleness of purpose and hardminded pursuit of his own advantage. Closeness to men in power was the key to his advancement, and access to the *princeps*, the imperial family, and imperial favorites was important to him. For this reason he used his hereditary tie to the Claudii Neronēs c. 25, preserved that tie as long as possible, and abandoned it only at the last possible moment c. 1 B.C. (as Tacitus and Dio both indicate).

It is gratuitous, therefore, to assume that Archelaus had no interest in the expansion of his own kingdom except as Rome's obstacle to a Parthian danger. The king was an observant politician who quickly exploited his own centrality in the imperial defenses to better his own ad-

²⁹For the marriage, cf. Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 1.446-47 and *Ant. Jud.* 16.11, and *passim* in both works. A rough date for the wedding can be inferred from *Bell. Jud.* 1.455-57. The marriage, although politically motivated, may well have been founded in affection (cf. *Bell. Jud.* 1.449 and *Ant. Jud.* 16.206-8).

vantage. We may also infer something of his methods and intentions from his machinations in Judaea. Contrary to Tacitus' and Dio's opinions, Archelaus' affront to Tiberius during the latter's withdrawal is insufficient grounds for motivating the king's second trial. Tiberius' anger was perhaps real enough (cf. Dio's $\delta\eta$ at 57.17.3, quoted above p. 76), but on such motivation Tiberius as *princeps* might simply have removed his abjurer. In A.D. 16 there was apparent cause to try Archelaus for *maiestas*, and that cause lay in the latest manifestation of the king's political habits. An unknown official in Cilicia may even have been killed for complicity (Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* 1.12).³⁰ Despite his own crippled condition, King Archelaus was then directing attempts to maintain his grandson Tigranes V on the throne of Armenia Maior contrary to the *princeps*' expressed intention.³¹

III

As far as we can tell, then, the record does not indicate that Archelaus had sufficient reason to break his connection to Tiberius until the time Gaius Caesar appeared in the East—exactly as our two sources

³⁰See Gwatkin (note 2 above) 9–10. Philostratus' source, Maximus of Aegae, cannot be dated, and Gwatkin observes that "... in spite of all the difficulties, it seems safe to conclude, at least, that in the vicinity of Aegae up to the time of Maximus there existed a tradition that Archelaus was engaged in revolutionary activities." Minimally, perceptions of his revolutionary activities emerged from a lifetime of Archelaus' subordinating all other questions of policy to his own design for a greater Cappadočia.

³¹For the most part I have followed R. S. Rogers (note 2 above) 25–27 for this account of Archelaus' second trial. Rogers' translation of Dio's $\nu\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota$ (57.17.4) as *perduellio* should be resisted (cf. C. W. Chilton, "The Roman Law of Treason Under the Early Principate," *JRS* 45 [1955] 77–79; and see also A. Magdelain, "Remarques sur la perduellio," *Historia* 22 [1973] 405–22). Archelaus' second arraignment was before the senate as both Tacitus and Dio agree; but the memory of Tiberius' extreme interest in the trial (which Dio [57.17.5] interpreted as his determination to influence the outcome, cf. $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\tau' \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu\delta\acute{\omicron}\ \tau\iota\beta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\tau\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\nu$) caused both Tacitus and Dio to echo old rumors that the earlier rebuff was the motive for Archelaus' second trial in A.D. 16–17, even though such a motive was insufficient. We do not know the exact outcome of this second trial: "It seems that either the king was acquitted or the trial was abandoned when conviction appeared impossible" (Rogers, p. 25). It is uncertain what bearing Philostratus' report (*VA* 1.2) about the unnamed magistrate has on the trial's outcome. We should note also that Archelaus' grandson may be either Tigranes IV or V, depending on whether he is the same as the Tigranes of Aug. *RG* 27 (cf. Gwatkin [note 2 above] 12, n. 41). Gwatkin prefers to call him Tigranes IV, but I follow R. D. Sullivan (note 1 above) and call him Tigranes V.

indicate. Archelaus was an astute observer of imperial politics. There was no breach of sufficient gravity for him to rescind their tie until 6 B.C., when Tiberius refused to execute the commission he had received from Augustus and at the same time withdrew to Rhodes. Even if this occasion might have provided sufficient reason, it did not in and of itself provide the opportunity. Archelaus did not forego his connection to the Claudii Neronēs without compunction. To be sure, Tiberius' bad faith in 6 B.C. was no trivial matter, and (depending on the exact chronology of the events) there may even be a suggestion in the record that Archelaus might have received an indirect check from Augustus because he was connected to Tiberius, now in official disfavor. For we do not hear of any rebuke of Herod by Augustus as a result of Herod's failure to impanel Archelaus during the trial of Alexander and Aristobulus at Beirut in 7/6 B.C. (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 16.356-60). If the connection between Tiberius' self-imposed withdrawal and the silence of our record about Herod's omission is right (and there is nothing necessary in this suggestion), then Archelaus was wary about paying too close attention to Tiberius from that time forward.

At Rhodes, Tiberius set about acquiring a Greek education.³² He had offered nothing in the way of clear explanation when he had left Rome, but later he gave it out that he had gone voluntarily, *sponte* (Suet. *Tib.* 10.1), to Rhodes to avoid seeming rivalrous with C. and L. Caesar (Suet. *Tib.* 11.5), while at the same time he alleged as his model the example of Agrippa in the time of Marcellus (Suet. *Tib.* 10.1-2). But a close reading of Suet. *Tib.* 11.5 suggests that this claim did not come until 1 B.C., when the term of his tribunician power had formally expired ("transacto . . . tribuniciae potestatis tempore")³³ and he had

³²One interesting curiosity turns up in this regard. Based on the attributions in the manuscripts and on references by authors in late antiquity, D. B. Gais, *The Aratus Ascribed to Germanicus Caesar* (London 1976) 16-20, cannot determine whether Tiberius or Germanicus wrote this poem. Gais writes (20): "... in lines 3-4 the author calls the poem *doctique laboris / primitias*, i.e., his first work. But Tiberius' *Conquestio de morte L. Caesaris* must surely have been written soon after Lucius' death, i.e. many years before the death of Augustus. But it is conceivable that Tiberius composed most of the poem many years before and added lines 1-16 and 558-60 (1-16 presumably replacing a previous introduction closer to Aratus) only after Augustus' death, thus producing a sort of second edition." If the poem was written by Tiberius, the original version may have occupied him during a part of his stay at Rhodes.

³³Notice also Suetonius' emphasis at *Tib.* 10.1-2 that Tiberius did not give this explanation immediately. According to Augustus' original plan, Tiberius' Armenian commission was to expire at about the same time as his grant of tribunician power, but

petitioned Augustus for another sign of good faith, which was refused with sharp words.

According to Suet. *Tib.* 11.5, Tiberius asked to be allowed to rejoin his relatives and friends at Rome whom he dearly missed ("petit ut . . . permitteretur revisere necessitudines, quarum desiderio teneretur"), and Augustus bluntly refused with a warning that "demitteat omnem curam suorum, quos tam cupide reliquisset." The matter was formally a private one, but something else was also at stake. Although Augustus had earlier complained to the senate about his abandonment (Suet. *Tib.* 10.2), Tiberius was strictly in voluntary retirement at least down till this time. Tiberius' mention of C. and L. Caesar is revealing, particularly if it occurred (as virtually no one can doubt) at the same time he used as an analogy Agrippa's reaction to the preferment of Marcellus (Suet. *Tib.* 10.1-2). That the cases are not strictly parallel need not detain us. The merit of the analogy lay only in whatever use Tiberius made of it. If Tiberius perceived a benefit from the analogy, it resided in the fact that five years after his own withdrawal in 23 B.C., Agrippa received both a renewed *imperium proconsulare* (to replace a previous commission lapsing in 18 B.C.) and a new five-year grant of tribunician power.³⁴

Tiberius pressed the analogy, I suggest, because what he wanted from Augustus was a renewal of powers, some office to indicate his political or military future. He wrote privately, and perhaps less than directly, to broach the subject of his coming home and resuming political or military life. This inference seems safe, because Suetonius next adds that Augustus rejected the idea of Tiberius' return altogether (Suet. *Tib.* 11.5). Suetonius then reveals the following three facts (*Tib.* 12.1), which he conceived in this chronological order as his syntax reveals: (1) Livia intervened on her son's behalf, (2) Augustus reluctantly yielded to Livia by making Tiberius *quasi legatus Augusto*, and (3) thereafter Tiberius remained at Rhodes *contra voluntatem*. This last point is difficult to understand unless "remansit igitur Rhodi contra voluntatem" implies that Augustus somewhat farcically restricted the competence of

we have no firm evidence that Tiberius actually took up the *imperium* by leaving, for example, *paludatus* from the city in 6 B.C. It is a possible inference from Suet. *Tib.* 11.5 that he had not formally taken up his *imperium*; but Suetonius at least thought Tiberius could be attended by lictors during this period (Suet. *Tib.* 11.1 and 3). See also Romer (note 1 above [1979]) 202, n. 8.

³⁴Cf. Dio 54.12.2-5. See M. Reinhold, *Marcus Agrippa* (Geneva, NY 1933) 167-69, on the probability of Agrippa's *imperium proconsulare* granted in 23 B.C. and 98-99 on its renewal and the bestowal of *tribunica potestas*.

Tiberius' empty office to Rhodes. Tiberius, once restricted to Rhodes *contra voluntatem*, effectively became an exile and proved the butt of many jokes.

The year 1 B.C. was also critical for Tiberius' relations with Gaius Caesar. The young prince had recently been appointed *Orienti prae-positus* (whatever exactly that meant), and he had been equipped with a general staff (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2) and dispatched to solve the resurgent Armenian problem, which had become complicated by Parthian interference (Dio 55.10.18). Gaius, traveling to the East, was greeted at Samos by Tiberius, who found the still impressionable youth contumacious (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2).

Suetonius may even have indicated the occasion of Gaius' contumacy when he wrote (*Tib.* 12.2) that at Samos Tiberius found Gaius "alieniorem sibi . . . ex criminationibus M. Lollii comitis et rectoris eius." The charges are also preserved in the next sentences. Tiberius was suspected of a revolutionary plot when some of Gaius' centurions, deeply obligated to Tiberius, returned to camp and—apparently on their own initiative—reported curious orders that they had received from Tiberius (*Tib.* 12.3):

Venit etiam in suspicionem per quosdam beneficii sui centuriones a com-
meatu castra repetentis mandata ad complures dedisse ambigua et quae
temptare singulorum animos ad novas res viderentur. De qua suspicione
certior ab Augusto factus non cessavit efflagitare aliquem cuiuslibet or-
dinis custodem factis atque dictis suis.

"De qua suspicione certior ab Augusto factus" indicates that an official courier brought Augustus a report from either Gaius or Lollius. Although Tiberius protested his innocence and appealed for constant surveillance, under Lollius' influence Gaius read what was wanted in the *ambigua mandata* and thus remained officially convinced of Tiberius' guilt.³⁵ Tiberius was therefore compelled to kowtow to Gaius and to his entire entourage before leaving the island (Dio 55.10.19).

³⁵Levick (note 20 above [1976]) 45 wrongly infers that the incident of the centurions was merely a rumor. Elsewhere, "Tiberius' Retirement to Rhodes," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 811, she wonders whether the incident of the centurions was "a misguided attempt on the part of supporters to win sympathy or a frame-up by Lollius and his clique?" Tiberius always blamed Lollius for Gaius' hostility (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2, Tac. *Ann.* 3.48). Both Vell. 2.97.1 and Pliny *HN* 9.118 speak of Lollius' rapacity. Bowersock (note 3 above) 24 recognizes the enmity, but calls it rumor that Lollius influenced Gaius. The present argument tries to demonstrate that both points are somewhat more than rumor. Lollius' greed is sufficient motive for trying to dominate Gaius, and it was Gaius' impressionability that required the appointment of a *rector* in the first place.

As long as Lollius was overseeing day-to-day operations, there was no restraint in Gaius' camp for abusing Tiberius, now secluded again at Rhodes. Lollius' opinion of Tiberius may already have affected Gaius prior to Tiberius' visit, but after his obeisance Tiberius became a joke in camp. This free rein for humiliating Tiberius found its support in Augustus' recent refusal to welcome Tiberius' return and in the trivial appointment Augustus had conceded to him. From the time of his Samian visit, Tiberius' voluntary withdrawal was widely perceived as a *de facto* form of exile imposed by Augustus. Faced with Augustus' suspicion of his malfeasance, Tiberius slumped from wary fear (*metus*) to a sense of imminent danger (*discrimen*), as Suetonius says proleptically (*Tib.* 12.2). After Tiberius left Samos, an unnamed man, possibly an officer, rose at table to vow the death of the *exsul* (as Tiberius was now dubbed) if only Gaius approved.

The travesty of the Samian visit and lingering suspicion of revolutionary intent drove Tiberius to the Greek dress that he wore for about the last two years of his time at Rhodes (Suet. *Tib.* 13.1-2). Too much stress should not be given to the Greek dress in itself. Although Romans wearing Greek dress at Rome was generally condemned, its use by Romans in Greek cities was considered a matter of convenience and correct manners. Suetonius' attention to Tiberius' clothing emphasizes that, after the shock at Samos, Tiberius never again appeared at his customary cavalry maneuvers with his Roman bodyguard or at Rhodian affairs of state. These were the occasions on which Tiberius was expected to lay aside local garb for official dress. His rejection of the perfunctory appointment as *legatus* conceded by Augustus was complete, and he considered his withdrawal from Roman civic life to be irrevocable.³⁶ The scar of Lollius' rough handling was so painful that two decades later Tiberius delivered to the senate a scathing denunciation of his provocateur. The occasion of Tiberius' denunciation was his eulogy on the

³⁶A Roman wearing Greek dress even in Greek cities can still be an enigmatic subject. The same man can speak for the practice (cf. Cic. *Rab. Post.* 26-27) or against it (cf. Cic. *Pis.* 92), depending only on whether the speaker sympathizes with the subject's position or not. A Roman official with the robes and symbols of office in a Greek city was not always a welcome sight to natives (cf. App. *BC* 5.76). Perhaps most revealing in interpreting the significance which Suetonius attaches to Tiberius' Greek dress is the fact that as *princeps* Tiberius mildly reprimanded Germanicus for adopting Greek clothing on his unsanctioned visit to Egypt (Tac. *Ann.* 2.59). However innocuous Germanicus' own intention may have been, Tiberius apparently felt that well-bred Romans could wear Greek clothing even in the Greek East as a symbolic protest.

death of Sulpicius Quirinius, Lollius' successor in Gaius' command. Quirinius, the *novus homo* from Lanuvium, had, on the other hand, earned extraordinary treatment because he had honored Tiberius at Rhodes despite the temper among Gaius' followers (Tac. *Ann.* 3.48).

Although neither Tacitus nor Dio assigned a date to his rejection of Tiberius, it is safely assumed that King Archelaus' attention to C. Caesar also occurred at the Samian camp and perhaps, as the following argument shows, that it overlapped Tiberius' visit as well. Dio specified that Archelaus' attendance on Gaius occurred with the latter ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐλθόντα, not to Syria, Armenia, or elsewhere. Archelaus therefore met Gaius prior to 1 January A.D. 1, when he began his consulship in or near Egypt.³⁷ After his consulship, Gaius never came farther west than Limyra in Lycia, where he made an emergency landing and died in February A.D. 4, about two years after he had acquiesced in Tiberius' return from Rhodes. In any case, had Archelaus visited Gaius in Egypt, Syria, Arabia, or elsewhere east of Rhodes, there was little poignancy in juxtaposing, as both Tacitus and Dio did, his discourtesy to Tiberius and his service to Gaius; and Tiberius' personal reaction to Archelaus would simply have been peevish.

That Tiberius was not simply being peevish emerges from Tacitus' and Dio's emphasis on his genuine resentment: *invidia* for Tacitus, ὀργή for Dio.³⁸ Two possibilities may be offered to explain the intensity of Tiberius' reaction. First, Archelaus might actually have sailed from Elaeussa Sebastē, for example, directly to Samos *bypassing* Rhodes altogether on the journey. If the rebuff were so simply executed, it is difficult to account for the warnings Tacitus mentioned from the *intimi Augusti*. Both Tacitus' "(Tiberium) Rhodi agentem" and Dio's (Τιβερίου) ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον ἀπελθόντος are broad chronological references that do not necessarily mean Tiberius' physical presence on the island during the incident. Bypassing Samos does not explain the intensity of the anger which both authors say Tiberius felt. In fact Archelaus had no reason to bypass Rhodes until he was warned off by the imperial advisors,

³⁷But contra Gardthausen, *RE* X, 426; cf. Romer (note 1 above [1979]) 204-5, n. 19 for the explanation and references.

³⁸Tacitus' *invidia* and Dio's ὀργή may reflect either a common source or simply a well-known tradition. These words can be taken as explanations, after the fact, of the same change that Suetonius describes in greater detail. Tiberius' personal hatred may have been transferred in the retelling from Lollius to Archelaus. (Personal hatred is itself certainly insubstantial ground, as has been noted above, on which to try so important a client-king as Archelaus.)

and those advisors themselves had no reason yet to intervene. Even in Tiberius' last two years at Rhodes, when he had panicked, renounced all public business, and moved inland to escape visitors, still passing generals and magistrates pressed their visits on him (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2). Archelaus, in all probability, put in at Rhodes and found Tiberius gone. The second, and more likely, explanation is therefore that Tiberius' and Archelaus' visits to Samos overlapped. This explains Tacitus' (or his source's) observation that Archelaus overlooked Tiberius not "per superbiam" but "ab intimis Augusti monitus." The intimates of Augustus, observing Archelaus, then warned him against his inclination to approach Tiberius, who had already been accused of treason.

Dependent on the principate as an institution to sanction his own plan of aggrandizement, Archelaus recognized in Gaius an heir-designate to Augustus. Whether he believed the charges of sedition against Tiberius was irrelevant. Tiberius, long ago the heir-presumptive, appeared to have been displaced first by his own withdrawal in 6 B.C. and now, in 1 B.C., by his humiliation at Samos. There Archelaus saw Gaius' antagonism and Tiberius' obeisance. This explanation accounts for the confusion in the historiographical tradition between Tiberius' personal resentment against Lollius and Archelaus' utility in emphasizing Lollius' machinations.

A great deal obviously depends on who these *intimi Augusti* were, and the most attractive possibilities are from Augustus' appointees to Gaius' general staff. These men were drawn from the uppermost echelons of the *amici principis*, on whose advice Augustus regularly drew in governing the empire. Lollius headed the staff as *comes et rector*, and his role in the incident is obvious. Others on the staff included L. Licinius (*CIL* VI, 1442)³⁹ and perhaps Sulpicius Quirinius, who succeeded Lollius at his death. Licinius' part cannot be known, but Quirinius continued to honor Tiberius at Rhodes. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus apparently also served as "comes ad Orientem C. Caesari iuvenis" (Suet. *Nero* 5.1).⁴⁰ Precisely because he too was young and relatively inexperienced,

³⁹Cited in this regard by Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* II (Leipzig 1891-1904) 744, n. 22.

⁴⁰Although scholars have generally questioned Suetonius' accuracy on this point, J. Pollini has argued persuasively against that view; cf. "Gnaeus Ahenobarbus and the Ravenna Relief," *Röm. Mit.* 88 (1981) 133, n. 83. He writes: "To my knowledge, no historian who has questioned the accuracy of Suetonius' explicit reference to Nero's father Gnaeus as *comes* of Gaius Caesar in the East has taken into account Gnaeus' repre-

Ahenobarbus is likely to have followed Lollius' lead. Aelius Sejanus may have served with C. Caesar at this time, but he was not a full-fledged *comes* (cf. Tac. *Ann.* 4.1: "prima iuventa Gaium Caesarem divi Augusti nepotem sectatus").

One prime source of admonition, I suggest, was King Juba II of Mauretania. Juba's presence on Gaius' staff is not explicitly attested, but it is reasonably inferred from Pliny *HN* 6.141 that Juba was present later to record Gaius' campaign in Arabia:

... nec sum oblitus sui quemque situs diligentissimum auctorem visum nobis introitu operis; in hac tamen parte arma Romana sequi placet nobis Iubamque regem ad eundem Gaium Caesarem scriptis voluminibus de eadem expeditione Arabica.

His presence there strengthens Pliny's justification in varying his usual method and following Juba's account of Arabia rather than a native's: Juba apparently had firsthand knowledge of that campaign, and he certainly qualifies as *intimus Augusti* since he himself accompanied Augustus on several campaigns (Dio 51.15.6). In addition to a friendly literary rivalry with Archelaus,⁴¹ Juba was now married to Archelaus' daughter, Glaphyra,⁴² and had special care for his interests. Observant of Lollius'

sensation in the processional frieze of the Ara Pacis as a child of about seven years of age in 13 B.C. Though Suetonius' historical reliability should always be open to question, the evidence of the Ara Pacis provides a strong support for his accuracy at least with regard to Gnaeus' service with Gaius Caesar."

⁴¹For evidence of Archelaus' literary career, see Pliny *HN* 37.46, 95, 104, and perhaps Diogenes Laertius 2.17. For evidence that Archelaus and Juba occasionally wrote on the same subjects, see Pliny *HN* 37.107-8.

⁴²Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* 2.115 and *Ant. Jud.* 17.350 indicate that Glaphyra was widowed by Juba; but this must be wrong since Strabo (17.3.7), revising his work in the early years of Tiberius' principate, refers to Juba's recent death. Juba's coinage attests his forty-eighth year in power and proves that he lived at least until A.D. 23 (calculated from the exchange of Numidia for Mauretania in 25 B.C.). Archelaus' continued interest in Judaea after the death of Herod will have occasioned Glaphyra's divorce from Juba when opportunity offered itself. This divorce, however, did not occur until after Archelaus' own marriage to Pythodoris had revived his prestige and allowed him renewed influence in Judaea. After she was divorced from Juba, Glaphyra was married—contrary to Jewish law (cf. Lev. 18.16 and 20.21)—to her first husband's brother. (The principle of levirate marriage would obtain only if she had *not* already had children from her first husband [cf. Deut. 25.5 and also Mark 12.19], but Glaphyra had two sons from that marriage [*Ant. Jud.* 17.12].) The outrage she committed is reflected by the dream reported at *Bell. Jud.* 2.116.

effect on the camp at Samos, Juba will also have alerted the king against overt friendly gestures to Tiberius.

One final point needs clarification: the purpose of Archelaus' visiting Samos. Ordinary protocol even for a newly appointed and prestigious *Orienti praepositus* might have waited for Gaius' expected arrival in, for example, Rhodes (if a visit there had been planned), Syria, or Egypt. Archelaus' ostensible purpose in going to Samos and in not waiting was, I urge, to obtain Gaius' approval for his intended marriage to Pythodoris, queen of Pontus.⁴³ He considered this approval necessary since his marriage would bring him access to or effective control over a broad belt of land connecting the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Augustus' policy was to encourage interdynastic marriages among his client-kings (Suet. *Aug.* 48.2), but Gaius' feeling in this regard was unknown and had to be cultivated. Archelaus' once landlocked kingdom now had direct overland access to both seas.⁴⁴ To retain this powerful position for his own ambition, Archelaus had to reaffirm his first loyalty to Rome. This he did at the Samian camp of Augustus' heir-apparent when he broke formally with Tiberius.

Archelaus' break with Tiberius came in 1 B.C. as our sources indicate, but for the pragmatic reasons we have been left to infer. Archelaus' connection to Tiberius rested on custom, intuition, and his own desire for a grander kingdom. In 1 B.C., when that connection no longer appeared serviceable and even seemed dangerous, ambition superseded caution, and Archelaus finally gave it up. The changes in Augustus' succession plan due to the deaths of his adopted sons in A.D. 2 and 4 and manifested in the adoptions of A.D. 4 could not have been foreseen or prevented. In his last years, motivated by his own awareness of his im-

⁴³Pythodoris had been widowed by Polemon c. 8 B.C. Magie (note 6 above) II, 1346, n. 54, and cf. 1286, n. 25, puts the marriage between 2 B.C. and A.D. 2. S. Treggiari kindly directed me to T. Mommsen's "Observationes epigraphicae" in *Eph. Epig.* I (Rome 1872) 270-76, esp. 271-75, where he argues that Pythodoris' mother was a daughter of Antony. If so, then there is all the more reason for Archelaus' needing permission to marry her. There is no cause to speculate here about Tiberius' relationship to a half-sister of his brother's wife, but we might simply recall the entanglements of Iullus Antonius and Julia in 2 B.C.

⁴⁴Sullivan (note 1 above) 1159 remarks as follows: "By this marriage to the queen of Pontus, Archelaus consolidated a powerful domain encompassing Eastern Asia Minor from the Black Sea to the Gulf of Issus: the royal lands in Pontus, Armenia Minor, Cappadocia, and much of Cilicia. If the attempt to establish his Judean grandson, Tigranes V, as king of Armenia had succeeded for long, he would have presided directly or indirectly over a virtual empire."

portant political loss, Archelaus took military matters more into his own hands in order to keep his grandson as king of Armenia Maior during the transition from Augustus' principate to Tiberius'. He was attempting to present the new *princeps*, who continued to resent Archelaus' part in the Samian incident, with a *fait accompli* for the Armenian succession. More than that is difficult to say. There can be no real doubt that in A.D. 16-17 the formal charge against Archelaus was *maiestas* (cf. νεωτερίζοντά τι, Dio 57.17.4), though its verifiability and any substantial particulars have been lost (note 31 above). No doubt *invidia* and ὀργή played some part in reinforcing Tiberius' decision, but neither was in itself sufficient to justify the trial. "The probable cause of the removal of Archelaus remains his extraordinary power, in combination with Pythodoris, and the threat this presented to Tiberius at a time of transition and of upheaval in the East."⁴⁵

* * *

The purpose of this essay has been to explore various aspects of the direct relationship King Archelaus of Cappadocia enjoyed with the *princeps* at Rome. Though a good deal is known about Archelaus' machinations in the East thanks to Josephus, his direct relations with Rome have been the object of little systematic attention in antiquity or in contemporary scholarship until recently.⁴⁶ It is hoped that by examining critical interactions with the *princeps* and his representatives we have been able to discover something of what Archelaus thought was at stake in those confrontations and interactions. Archelaus' family had long maintained ties with the Claudii Neronēs, and these ties were useful to Archelaus from the time of the victory at Actium until Augustus' neglect of Tiberius made his connection with the king a liability. Both Tacitus and Dio are clear that the break between Tiberius and Archelaus occurred during the heyday of Gaius Caesar in the East. The preceding argument ended with a close analysis of what little evidence we

⁴⁵Sullivan (note 1 above) 1161. He rightly challenges (1160-61) details in Gwatkin's reconstruction (cf. notes 2, 31 above) of Archelaus' revolutionary involvements c. A.D. 14.

⁴⁶Even so I cite here one book, which has only just come into my hands, but which, despite its subject, makes no mention of our Archelaus: A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B.C. to A.D. 1* (Norman, OK 1984).

have pertaining to their interaction in the East in order that we may better understand what transpired between them.

The end goal of this study was to pull into perspective the reciprocal benefits that could be achieved through the system of client-kingship. The *princeps*' benefits almost go without saying, since it is Rome that generated the necessity of such alliances. Too often, however, scholars write as if client-kings were no more than factotums through whom the *princeps* achieved his own ends and enforced both his own policy and his own will. That there are elements of truth in such views cannot be doubted seriously, but that they comprise the whole truth is not reasonable. A great deal of leverage lay with the individual *reges socii* and the *principes* involved, and the outcome of specific negotiations depended heavily on the importance, personality, ambition, and effectiveness of the client-king. After all, no client-king acceded to his status as a dependent of Rome unless he could look to specific gains. Sometimes the gain might be minimal, like keeping himself on the throne in otherwise adverse circumstances, but often the client-king stood to gain much more. In the case of Archelaus, Josephus' account is clear about the extent of the gains and of the power Archelaus sought for himself. The marriage alliances Archelaus made for his daughter and for himself showed the importance he attached to positioning himself at the center of Rome's eastern frontier with its difficult politics and military diplomacy. The present argument has tried to illuminate the general principles that (1) the system of client-kingship was based at least in theory on the idea of mutual benefit, (2) some kings at least understood how to multiply their own advantages without neglecting Rome's concerns, and (3) King Archelaus was for a long time one of the more successful *reges socii* in so doing.

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INTERPRETATIONS

NIKH, *IHMI, ICIO, IACIO

On the etymology of νίκη Chantraine *s.v.* regards Pokorny's placing of it in the family of νεῖκος as implausible on grounds both of form and of sense.¹ The semantic difficulty is more serious than the phonological: there are a few possible early cases of $\bar{\iota} < \epsilon\iota$ in Attic Greek,² but the notion that a meaning "victory" could be developed from "quarrel," or the reverse, is scarcely acceptable. Prellwitz proposed derivation from *ni-* (*nieder*, Skt. *ni-*) + *ikā* ("das Schlagen, zu lat. *icere*") or else from **nivikā* ("das Niederkämpfen zu lat. *vinco*").³ Since the latter proposal would call for a dialect form νιϜικᾶ, it is not wholly satisfactory, but the notion of derivation from **ni-ikā* "a striking down" is very plausible. *ni-*, a prefix known chiefly in Indo-Iranian, is widely distributed in Skt. *nīdah*, Arm. *nist*, Lat. *nīdus*, Ger. and Eng. *nest*, all from **ni-sd-os*. **ikā* would be an abstract noun of the type of δίκη, μάχη, πάθη, etc. If this derivation is accepted, the cognates of νίκη would include not only Lat. *īco* but also Gk. αἰχμή, Myc. *ai-ka-sa-ma*, Cypr. *i-ki-ma-me-no-se* "the wounded."⁴ The root then will be *aik/ik-* or, in laryngeal terms, *ae₂ey-k/i-k-*.

Before reading Prellwitz, the idea had occurred to me that connection of νίκη with Lat. *iacio* might provide a satisfactory etymology for νίκη "a throwing down." After reading Prellwitz, I suspected that *icio* and *iacio* might both be from the same root and hence both related to νίκη. The question has to be discussed on the phonological and morphological level and on the syntactic and semantic level. The latter question will be taken up in the last part of this article. It is sufficient to say at this point that it involves the interchangeability of two construc-

¹Frisk regards νίκη as having no convincing etymology; he mentions the alleged connection with νεῖκος but does not give it his active support.

²L. Threatte, *Grammar of Attic Inscriptions I* (Berlin, New York 1980) 194, cites ἱματιον, χῖλιοι, Μῆλιχιος, but he, and also Schwyzler, *Gr. Gr. I*, p.193, both call attention to the assimilatory influence of ι in a following syllable, a factor which could not explain νίκη < **veikā*.

³W. Prellwitz, *Etym. Wb. der gr. Sprache* (Göttingen 1905).

⁴Schwyzler, *Dial. gr. exempla*, no. 679; Buck, *Gr. Dial.*, no. 23. In view of the failure of the Cyprian syllabary to distinguish voiceless, voiced, and aspirate stops, we must also admit the possibility of *i-gi-ma-me-no-se* and *i-khi-ma-me-no-se*.

tions: prepositional phrase or its equivalent for the target + accusative of the missile + verb, or accusative of the target + a case with instrumental force for the missile + verb: "throw stones at the dog"/"pelt the dog with stones."

The verb *icere* has several features which require attention. There is metrical evidence for the length of the *i* in both present and perfect: Lucr. 3.160, "corpus propellit et icit"; 4.1050, "emicat in partem sanguis unde icimur ictu"; Caecilius fr. 24 Warmington, "Si usquam quisquam vidit quem catapulta aut balista icerit"; Plaut. *M.G.* 28, "at indiligenter iceram." The stem-class of the present is uncertain; hence the lexicons fluctuate between *īco* and *īcio*.⁵ The latter form is in violation of the rule that verbs in *-io* follow the third conjugation (type of *facio*) if the root-syllable is short but the fourth conjugation (type of *audio*) if the root-syllable is long; yet *īcio* has the support of Aulus Gellius 4.17.8: "Nam verbum ipsum, cui supradictae particulae praepositae sunt, non est 'icio' sed 'iacio,' et praeteritum non 'icit' facit, sed 'iecit.'" The aspect is prevailingly aoristic; the present forms *icit* and *icimur* in the two Lucretian passages just cited are present of habit, not of action in progress, and the same is true in Pliny *N.H.* 16.24, "fulmine saepissime ictur" (*sc.* the tree *haliphloeos*). In Plaut. *Cas.* 849, "pectus mi icit non cubito sed ariete" we have probably a perfect of action just performed, rather than a present, and similarly in *Persa* 846, "eil colapho me icit"; *M.G.* 205, "ita vehementer icit," though in *Truc.* 601, "dentibus frendit, icit femur," it is better taken as present. Forms made with the perfect passive participle *ictus* are especially common. The perfect indicative *ici* is in a suppletive relationship to *ferio*, whose perfect it supplies when used of the slaughter of sacrificial victims and in the expression *foedus ferio*.

Latin *ī* has several sources, though vowel weakening of the type seen in *caedo* : *cecīdi* can naturally not be thought of here. The idea that the spelling *iecit* in the text of Plautus might be taken as evidence for original *ei* is rejected by Walde-Hofmann *s.v.* *ico*, *īcio*, and moreover it would force us to sacrifice the semantically plausible connection

⁵*TLL s.v.* *īco* cites the passage from Aulus Gellius shown below and also cites Prisc. gramm. II 496.18 simplex "icio, -is," but then continues: "sed eam formam a grammaticis secundum analogiam compositorum verbi 'iaciendi' falso esse formatam verisimile est." *TLL* cites Prisc. gramm. II 509.22 "'ico' praeterea paenultima brevi profertur in praesenti teste Capro, sed producit eam in praeterito perfecto . . . 'īco, īci'" but then cites (quite rightly) as contrary evidence the two Lucretian passages and Plaut. *M.G.* 205, where the manuscript reading is *iecit*.

with αἰχμή etc., whereby the *i* in the participle *ictus* is in normal ablaut variation with *ai*, while the long *i* in *icit* still has to be explained. IE *i* can alternate with *yV*; for example, Skt. *devī*, gen. *devyāḥ*, and other feminine derivatives where *i* (< *-yā₂*) alternates with *-yā* (< *-yeā₂*); βῆῶναι, ζῶω : Lat. *vīvus*, Skt. *jīvaḥ*, etc. (*-(i)yeā₃* : *-yā₃*); the optative sign in unthematic forms (OLat. *siem*, *siēs*, *siet* : *simus*, *sītis*, *sint* (*-yē* < *-yeā₁* : *-i* < *-yā₁*)).⁶ It is proposed here to set up a paradigm in which *yē*- alternates with *i*-, full grade having presumably appeared originally in the singular and zero grade in the dual and plural. This formation should be regarded as a root-aorist, with full grade forms reflected in ἦκα, Lat. *iēci*, zero grade in *icere*. The relation of the root *yeā₁/yā₁* to *ā₂ey/ā₂y* (αἰχμή/*ictus*) is analogous to that of *gero* (< **g-es-o*) to *ago*; Goth. *wahsjan*, Skt. *vakṣayati* to αὔξω, in the sense that in State II the initial laryngeal with no full grade vowel following it is lost but the root is extended by a suffix: *s* in the case of *gero*, *ā₁* in the case of forms based on the root *yeā₁/yā₁*. The *-k-* which is present in ἦκα and throughout the conjugation of *icere* would be an *élargissement* in Benveniste's sense.⁷

Etymological connection between ἦμι, ἦκα and Lat. *iacio*, *iēci* is affirmed by Walde-Hofmann, Ernout-Meillet, Frisk, Chantraine, and Pokorny.⁸ The idea that Lat. *icio* and *iacio* are both related to ἦμι and to each other should not be rejected out of hand. It is conceivable that in Latin they may have originally belonged to different dialectal strata, though I have no evidence to support such a view. In the discussion of case-usage for the missile or weapon and for the target, I hope to show that connection between all these verbs is not objectionable on semantic grounds. There are in IE languages scattered instances of different verbs from a single root, with different though related meanings and with fully separate "principal parts." Lat. *ago* : *gero* come to mind, also *facio* and the compounds of the series *abdo*, *condo*, etc., which as a result of the sound-change *dh* > *d* have become blended with the compounds of *do*, *dare*; also τεύχω and τυγχάνω.⁹

⁶Cf. J. Puhvel, *Laryngeals and the Indo-European Verb* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1960) 60.

⁷For *suffixe* and *élargissement* and the distinction between them, see *Origines de la formation des noms* (Paris 1935) 148.

⁸Connection of ἦμι with Lat. *sero*, with spiritus asper from *s-* rather than from *y-*, is generally in disfavor on the ground that *sero* and other forms from root **sē-* (Lat. *sēmen*, OCS *sēmę*, etc.) are mostly distributed over the northern and western IE dialect area and are limited in meaning to scattering, sowing seed.

⁹These instances are quite different from more regular patterns of derivation such as *dīcere*/*dīcēre*, *iacere*/*iacēre*, or primary/iterative.

If IE $\bar{i} < y\bar{a}$ is the zero grade of $y\bar{V} < ye\bar{a}$, as has been argued above, the alternation seen in *iacio* : *iēci* and in ἵημι : ἵεμεν both call for explanation. Traditionally the reflex of \bar{a} , the zero grade of \bar{e} , \bar{o} , \bar{a} , has been taken to be \bar{a} in both Latin and Greek, both among pre-laryngealists and among laryngealists; Gk. ϵ , o in ἔθεμεν, θετός, ἔδομεν, δοτός etc. must then be explained analogically as extensions of the alternation η : e , ω : o of other origin. Some on the other hand believe that in instances of this kind ϵ , α , o actually represent a survival, in Greek alone, of the differently colored laryngeals \bar{a}_1 , \bar{a}_2 , \bar{a}_3 .¹⁰ In either case, however, it is a question of shwa or laryngeal after obstruent, while $y\bar{a}$, $w\bar{a}$ yield \bar{i} , \bar{u} . I therefore propose to explain *iacio* : *iēci* after *facio* : *fēci* (where \bar{a} would be, at least in Latin, the regular reflex of \bar{a}), and to explain ἵημι : ἵεμεν after τίθημι : τίθεμεν. *iacio* may have been a relatively recent formation developed in connection with the gradual change of the Latin verb system from one essentially dominated by aspect to one dominated by time. The case of ἵημι is somewhat different; since it lacks the k , it cannot have been derived morphologically from ἥκα but must have been derived from an earlier k -less stem. The ϵ which alternates with η in both aorist and present, if it is not simply analogical to such forms as τίθεμεν beside τίθημι, may be an instance of Greek failure consistently to contract $y + \bar{a}$, just as in $\gamma\lambda\omega\tau\tau\alpha < * \gamma\lambda\omega\chi - y\bar{a}_2$ beside $\gamma\lambda\omega\chi\acute{\iota}\varsigma$. Lat. *īcio*, with \bar{i} , the normal alternant of $y\bar{e}$, appears to have detached itself early through the plural forms of a paradigm having the vocalism $-y\bar{e}/\bar{i}-$ and to have started a life of its own, with a case-syntax different from that which is normal for ἵημι and *iacio*.

The verbs discussed in this article typically signify the propulsion of an object toward a goal or target, frequently in situations of hostile encounter. The object may be held in the assailant's hand (e.g., αἰχμή) or may be thrown (e.g., *iaculum*). Related and derived senses include the throwing of oneself forward or downward and the injury or killing of the victim by lightning, snakebite, etc., or metaphorically the fact of being stricken with grief, fear, etc. There are two types of case-construction for the substantives: the object propelled is in the accusative case with an active verb or is the nominative subject with a passive verb, while the target is in an oblique case, frequently, though not always, as object of a preposition. We here call this construction A. Otherwise the

¹⁰R. S. P. Beekes, *The Development of the Proto-Indo-European Laryngeals in Greek* (The Hague, Paris 1969) 182-85, argues strongly for this view.

target is in the accusative case with an active verb or is the nominative subject with a passive verb, while the missile or weapon (or lightning or emotion, etc.) may be the nominative subject of an active verb or else is in some case having instrumental value (Greek dative or Latin ablative) with a passive verb or with an active verb accompanied with an animate agent in the nominative case. We here call this construction B.

īcio shows no instances of construction A. For instances of construction B, see the second paragraph above, where both active and passive examples occur and where the passage from Aulus Gellius is cited for the assignment of compound verbs in *-icio* to *īacio* rather than to *īcio*.

For *īacio*, some examples of construction A are: Caes. *B.C.* 3.48.2, "panis vulgo in eos . . . iaciebant"; Vitruvius 5 pr. 4, "tesserae quas in alveo ludentes iaciunt." There are no examples of construction B with simplex *īacio*, but certain examples with *traicio* show at least a close resemblance to B: Caes. *B.G.* 5.35.6, "Tito Balventio . . . utrumque femur tragula traicitur"; Livy 42.7.7, "pars magna equitum mediam traiecit aciem." Some examples with *traicio*, however, fit neither A nor B but constitute a kind of blend of the two, with accusative both of the forces transported and of the river crossed: Caes. *B.C.* 1.83.5, "Caesar Germanos . . . flumen traiecit"; Livy 21.56.8, "cum praesidium castrorum . . . ratibus Trebiam traicerent."

Circumicio has a syntax akin to construction B in Cic. *Tim.* 26, "sic animus . . . extremitatem caeli . . . rotundo ambitu circumiecit." The more usual construction, however, is that in which ramparts, military forces, etc., are set around ("thrown around") the object to be defended or attacked (construction A).

Dono in its case-usage for the gift and the recipient shows a similar duality of construction. A: Cic. *Pro Rosc. Amer.* 8, "non pauca suis adiutoribus . . . donabat." B: Plaut. *Amph.* prol. 137, "donis plurimis donatus"; Caes. *B.C.* 3.53.5, "cohortemque postea duplici stipendio . . . militaribusque donis amplissime donavit."¹¹

Among Greek verbs βάλλω shows examples of both constructions. A: *Il.* 12.628-29, ἐν νηυσὶν μενεαίνετε ποντοπόροισι / πῦρ ὀλοὸν βάλλειν. *Od.* 9.495-96, πόντονδε βαλὼν βέλος ἤγαγε νῆα / αὐτίς ἐς ἥπειρον. B: *Il.* 13.518, ὁ δ' Ἀσκάλαφον βάλε δουρί. Pind. *Pyth.*

¹¹Compare the twofold English usage: present a book to the library / present the library with a book.

8.56-57, αὐτὸς / Ἀλκμᾶνα στεφάνοισι βάλλω. Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.12, αὐτοὺς . . . οἱ βάρβαροι ἐτόξευον καὶ ἔβαλλον.

πλήττω usually has construction B. A typical example is *Il.* 2.265-66, σκήπτρῳ δὲ μετάφρενον ἥδ' ἐκαὶ ὦμῳ / πλήξεν, and LSJ show many others, some with accusatives both of the person struck and of the part affected. Construction A is rare: *Il.* 5.503-4, ὄν (sc. κονίσσαλον) ῥα δι' αὐτῶν / οὐρανὸν ἐς πολύχαλκον ἐπέπληγον πόδες ἵππων. Pind. *Nem.* 10.71, Ζεὺς δ' ἐπ' Ἰδοῖα . . . πλάξε . . . κεραυνόν. Call. *Act.* 3.1.37, πλήσσονται λινέαις ὀρτυγες ἐν νεφέλαις.

ἵημι has a decided preference for construction A: *Il.* 13.650, Μηριόνης δ' ἀπιόντος ἵει χαλκῆρέ' οἰστόν. *Il.* 21.158, Ἀξιοῦ, ὅς κάλλιστον ὕδωρ ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἵησιν. Hes. *Th.* 684, ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι ἴεσαν βέλεα. B: Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.12, τῶν δὲ Μένωνος στρατιωτῶν . . . τις, ὥς εἶδε Κλέαρχον διελαύνοντα, ἵησι τῇ ἀξίνῃ.

The argument of this paper may be summarized as follows: there was an IE root having the form $\alpha_2 e\gamma/\alpha_2 y$ - (State I) or $y e\alpha_1/y\alpha_1$ (State II, with loss of the initial laryngeal α_2 and extension with α_1 , which accounts for the \bar{e} in *iēci*, ἦκα, etc.) and the sense of directing an object toward a goal (animate or inanimate). The root had an *élargissement* -*k*- regularly in Latin, partially in Greek (ἦκα, νίκη). The forms of the root in a post-laryngeal stage may be reconstructed

State I: ay -(*k*)- (αἶχμή)

i-(*k*)- (Cypr. *ikmamenos*; νίκη with $\bar{i} < \bar{u}$; Lat. *ictus*)

State II: $y\bar{e}$ -(*k*)- (ἵημι, ἦκα, Lat. *iēci*)

\bar{i} -(*k*)- (Lat. *icio*)

A stem $y\bar{e}k/\bar{i}k$ -, underlying a verb of aoristic aspect, underwent bifurcation, with the full grade of the singular generalized in *iēci* and the zero grade of the dual and plural generalized in pf. *īci*. Each verb developed its own present system. νίκη is from **ni-ikā* with \bar{i} from contraction of \bar{i} + zero grade \bar{i} .¹² In the case-syntax with the verbs derived from this

¹²νίκη may be accompanied by subjective genitive of the conqueror: *Il.* 3.457, νίκη κέν δ' ἡ φαίνεται ἄρηιφίλου Μενελάου, or by objective genitive: Ar. *Eq.* 521, ὅς πλείστα χορῶν τῶν ἀντιπάλων νίκης ἐστήσε τροπαία, Pl. *Leges* 840 c, τῆς τῶν ἡδονῶν νίκης ἐγκρατεῖς. The fact that νίκη has evolved far from its etymological meaning, "a throwing down," toward the meaning "victory" as we understand it is shown not only by derived senses like "victory (over adversaries in a choral contest)," "victory (over pleasures)," but by its use with genitives specifying neither the victorious nor the vanquished party but the type of strife in which the victory was won: with μάχης *Il.* 7.26, 8.171; with τῶν πολεμικῶν Xen. *Mem.* 3.4.5; with παγκρατίου Pind. *Isth.* 7.22.

root, constructions A and B are both theoretically possible, but to a certain degree, for reasons which are not clear, one construction could be generalized at the expense of the other. ἱημι (like the semantically similar βάλλω) admits both. *īcio* admits only construction B, while *iācio* admits only A, though some of its compounds admit B or at least a construction rather like it.

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NAMED CHOREUTS IN SATYR PLAYS

The *locus classicus* from which all discussions of the origins of the three major ancient dramatic forms begin is of course Aristotle's sketch of the origins of tragedy and comedy in the *Poetics*. At *Poetics* 1449 a 9-25, Aristotle states that tragedy evolved to its present *physis* by passing through two evolutionary stages¹ involving, first, the *exarchontes* of dithyramb and, second, a *satyrikon*. If this *satyrikon* is to be understood as "the satyr play," then Aristotle means to say that tragedy evolved out of satyric drama. Scholars who have accepted this interpretation are therefore perforce obliged to confront the evident contradiction between Aristotle's alleged testimony and the ancient tradition (retailed most memorably by Horace *A.P.* 220-24), that satyr play was introduced to Athens from the Peloponnese by Pratinus of Phleius at a comparatively late date, after the rise of tragedy, and have gone through various intellectual contortions attempting to reconcile these two apparently contradictory accounts.²

¹Two stages, not one: Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*² (Oxford 1962) 87-89.

²Cf. for instance E. Rostagni ad loc. in the *editio maior* of his edition of the *Ars Poetica*, and Peter Guggisberg, *Das Satyrspiel* (Zürich 1947) 1-16.

But in the absence of the definite article, there is no reason why Aristotle's *satyrikon* has to be equated with satyr play as it existed in the classical period, and therefore no contradiction really exists in our evidence.³ Furthermore, the fact that vases showing satyrs in mythological situations, such as might be inspired by satyr plays, begin abruptly at the end of the sixth century B.C. may probably be interpreted as corroboration of ancient testimony that satyric drama was brought to Athens by Pratinas.⁴

Such a line of reasoning is familiar to anyone who has studied the question of dramatic origins. The considerations set forth in the preceding paragraph are plausible, but one would still prefer that they be supported by concrete evidence. Is there any evidence that tragedy is *not* descended from satyr play?

The purpose of this note is to point to one distinctive feature of satyr play not shared by tragedy; the fact that this feature is not shared by both genres is conceivably evidence that the one is not descended from the other. Certainly the facts we are about to consider are neglected in studies of dramatic origins but deserve to be taken into account in future such investigations.

This is Sophocles *Ichneutae* 183–94 (in S. Radt's new lineation):

ὁ Δράκις, ὁ Γράπις, [non plus 6 litt.]
 [Ο]ὐρία, Οὐρία. ἀδ[.....]κεις
 παρέβης· Μεθυ[non plus 11 litt.]
 ὅ τι ποτεφερ[.....]·[.]ν
 ἔποχον ἔχει τι[non plus 13 litt.]
 στίβος ὁδενε.[non plus 12 litt.]
 Στράτιος, Στράτιος.....] ὕ [..]
 δεῦρ' ἔπιου· τ[.]δρ[]
 ἐνι β[ο]ῦς, ἐνι πονο[]
 μὴ μεθῇ κρ[.]κι..
 οὐχὶ καλ[ὸ]ν ἐπιδ[]
 ὁδε γ' ἀγαθὸς ὁ Τρε[]

Carl Robert was the first to realize that Drakis, Grapis, Ourias, Methy[, Stratios, Tre[—which he thought might be Trechis—and also, in his opinion, Krokias in line 192 represent proper names, evidently names of

³D. F. Sutton, *The Greek Satyr Play* (Meisenheim am Glan 1980) 1–5.

⁴Frank Brommer, *Satyroï* (Würzburg 1937) 34–38, and *Satyrspiele*² (Berlin 1959)

individual satyrs in the chorus.⁵ This interpretation also appears to apply to the second word of Aeschylus *Dictyulci* 802, ὦ Φίντων ἴθι δεῦρο.

The curious reader may wonder why seven choreuts are named in the passage of *Ichneutae* quoted here, at least according to Robert's assumption that Krokias is a named choreut. This number may be illusory, as more names may be concealed in the hidden portion of the text. But according to the assumption that this is the full count, it is tempting to speculate that the Sophoclean chorus of fifteen (or fourteen, if Silenus is the coryphaeus, a question of no great importance here) is drawn up in two rows facing the audience and that the seven names represent the choreuts of the front row.

The naming of individual members of the chorus is familiar in Aristophanic comedy (*Wasps* 230-34, *Lysistrata* 254 ff.). But we may doubt that the use of named choreuts in *Dictyulci* and *Ichneutae* is to be explained as a borrowed trait of Old Comedy. The former of these plays, at any rate, is earlier than any known Old Comedy with named choreuts; so might also be the latter. And it is very attractive to associate the naming of satyr-choreuts with the familiar practice of naming satyrs on vase-paintings.⁶ So it would appear more likely that the use of named choreuts is an inherent feature of satyric drama. If so, here is a way in which satyr play differs from tragedy. For tragedy can contain passages in which individual choreuts have brief solos. This occurs most memorably at Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1348-71, as understood by most editors, according to the supposition that the play was written for a chorus of twelve. But tragic choreuts are never given individual names.

For those interested in the origins of drama, the fact that named choreuts are found in satyr play but not in tragedy may appear to be a significant albeit previously neglected point that tells against the theory that tragedy evolved directly out of satyr play. Indeed, this fact appears all the more significant when we remember (as those who write about dramatic origins rarely do) that a number of Old and Middle Comedies had satyr choruses.⁷ If it appears unlikely that Old Comedy influenced satyr play in respect to the use of named choreuts, it may be less improb-

⁵C. Robert, *Hermes* 47 (1912) 548 f.; cf. also W. Vollgraff, *Mnemosyne* n.s. 42 (1914) 165.

⁶This subject is comprehensively treated by Brommer, *Satyroi* (note 4 above).

⁷Besides various comedies entitled *Satyroi*, Cratinus' *Dionysalexander* was such a play (it also serves to remind us that other comedies may have had satyr choruses although their titles do not reveal the identity of the chorus).

able that satyr play exerted some kind of formative influence over Old Comedy regarding use of named choreuts, use of satyr choruses, and perhaps other matters as well. This possibility seems all the more reasonable when we recall that several observers have pointed out the numerous affinities between Old Comedy and the earliest passage we possess written for performance by a satyr chorus, Pratinas' fr. 1 Snell.⁸ This familiar fragment does not appear to represent either a satyr play (if by "satyr play" we mean a dramatic production similar to those of the fifth century B.C.) or a dithyramb. Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge thought that Old Comedy originated in an amalgam of several previous *komos*-forms;⁹ perhaps, therefore, Pratinas' fr. 1 gives us a reasonable idea of what at least one such form looked like, and these affinities between satyr play and Old Comedy are perhaps best explained by thinking that one of these *komos*-forms standing behind Old Comedy was also the immediate ancestor of satyr play as we know it. In any event, the appearance of named choreuts in satyr play but not tragedy should be cited as evidence against any interpretation of Aristotle that makes satyr play the parent-form of tragedy.

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⁸H. W. Garrod, "The Hyporcheme of Pratinas," *CR* 34 (1920) 133; Max Pohlenz, "Das Satyrspiel und Pratinas von Phleius," now in his *Kl. Schr.* (Hildesheim 1965) 2.491; Schmid-Stählin, *GGL* 1.2.180.

⁹Pickard-Cambridge (note 1 above) 132-62; cf. also Sutton (note 3 above) 7-12.



THE END OF ARISTOTLE'S *ON PRAYER*

Jean Pépin recently devoted a lengthy study to Aristotle's *On Prayer*;¹ there is good reason to think that the work never existed. *On Prayer* is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotle's writings

¹J. Pépin, in *Aristote: de la prudence*, etc. (Paris 1968) 47-77.

(5.22) and in the *Vita Hesychii*.² The only other evidence for its existence is a passage of Simplicius³ that tells us that at the end of *On Prayer* Aristotle says clearly that God is either mind or somehow beyond mind (ὁ θεὸς ἢ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ). The claim that God is beyond mind is unique in an unemended Aristotelian text, but the notion would be acceptable to Simplicius both because, as a Neoplatonist, he would believe it to be true, and because as a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle he would be happy to find evidence of the basic philosophical harmony of Aristotle and Plato. Our problem, therefore, is to see why Simplicius thought that Aristotle held this view; and of course the immediate answer is that he thought he had found it in a text of Aristotle's called *On Prayer* (or perhaps more likely in an anthology of Aristotelian material which claimed that this was Aristotle's view in such a work). But if there was no such work *On Prayer*, how could Simplicius (or his source) think there was, and what is the actual source of the apparent fragment which claims that for Aristotle God might be "beyond Mind"? It is possible to understand how Simplicius was misled.

There is a Latin work in two chapters called *De bona fortuna*. It is composed of *Magna Moralia* 2.8 and *Eudemian Ethics* 8.2. Of the 56 surviving manuscripts of *De bona fortuna*, the earliest datable version is Vat. lat. 2083, of the year 1284. The producer of this text is unknown. *De bona fortuna* is not an excerpt from existing Latin translations of *Magna Moralia* and *Eudemian Ethics*, because although Bartholomew of Messina translated the *Magna Moralia* between 1258 and 1266, and although a Greek manuscript of the *Eudemian Ethics* may have been known in Messina before 1250, there are no mediaeval Latin translations of the *Eudemian Ethics* as a whole;⁴ indeed the only other section of the text translated is *E.E.* 8.3.⁵ The original sources of *De bona fortuna* were known to at least some of those who copied it in Latin, but the

²Cf. I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 83.

³W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* (Oxford 1955) 57.

⁴For information on Latin translations of Aristotle, see *The Cambridge History of Later Mediaeval Philosophy* (ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg, Cambridge 1982) 62, 78-79. For the manuscripts of the *Eudemian Ethics*, see D. Harlfinger, "Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik," in *Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik* (ed. P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger, Berlin 1971) 1-50.

⁵See *Aristoteles Latinus* 1 (Rome 1939) 161-62, Harlfinger (see note 4 above) 25, 30-31, A. Pelzer, "Les versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote en usage au XIII^e siècle," *Rev. Néoscol. de Phil.* 23 (1921) 316-23.

work itself is a direct translation from Greek.⁶ So unless the translator also both excerpted and combined the two parts of the *De bona fortuna* himself, and showed no concern for the fact that the rest of the *Eudemean Ethics* was still untranslated, and perhaps even still unknown⁷ (which is highly unlikely), he must have used a Greek original of *De bona fortuna* in the form of a *separate treatise* composed of *M.M.* 2.8 and *E.E.* 8.2. The title of the treatise, presumably, was the Greek equivalent of *De bona fortuna*, that is, περὶ εὐτυχίας. We have no means of telling when it was assembled, but there is no reason why it should not be ancient and indeed have been available to Simplicius or (if Simplicius is quoting an anthology of some sort) to his source.

E.E. 8.2 (1248A28) unemended, reads as follows: τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴποι πλὴν θεός. Spengler added the words καὶ νοῦ after εἴποι, following the reading *et intellectu* found in *De bona fortuna*. Thus, the Greek original of *De bona fortuna* read: τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης εἴποι καὶ νοῦ πλὴν θεός. Thus, in περὶ εὐτυχίας God is greater than Mind. Now, admittedly περὶ εὐτυχίας did not say that God is *beyond* Mind (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ), only that he is greater than Mind. But in Platonic or Neopythagorean writings of late antiquity these phrases are virtually interchangeable.⁸ The most striking evidence is from Plotinus, who uses ἐπέκεινα νοῦ dozens of times and also gives the best examples of the One being "greater (κρεῖττων) than Mind" (5.3.14.16-18, 5.3.16.38, 5.3.17.1-3).

Simplicius thought he knew about an Aristotelian text *On Prayer* (περὶ εὐχῆς). Let us suppose that he had direct or indirect access to a work originally called *On Good Fortune* (περὶ εὐτυχίας). The corruption of εὐτυχίας to εὐχῆς is easy. In this text Simplicius found the remark that God is "greater than Mind." There is no reason to assume that Simplicius is quoting *On Good Fortune* verbatim. For Simplicius,

⁶Pelzer (note 5 above) 318.

⁷Harlfinger (note 4 above) 30 shows that the Latin *De bona fortuna* (and the Latin translation of *E.E.* 8.3) are based on a Greek manuscript (or manuscripts) which is not a direct ancestor of the earliest *surviving* manuscripts of the Greek text of the *Eudemean Ethics*. There is no reason to assume, of course, that the translator of *De bona fortuna* possessed a complete Greek text of the *Magna Moralia* (let alone of the *Eudemean Ethics*), or that he is to be identified with the translator of *E.E.* 8.3.

⁸Cf. in general J. Whittaker, "Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ οὐσίας," *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 (1969) 91-104. Whittaker (p. 102) cites Ps-Archytas (in Stob. *Anth.* 1.280, 15 ff. Wachsmuth), who has νόου τι κρέσσον, and notes the *debate* about whether God is Mind or "beyond Mind" (reflected, for example, at Origen, *Contra Celsum* 7.38).

as a Neoplatonist, to say that God is "greater than Mind" is the same as to say that he is "beyond (ἐπέκεινα) Mind." The use of ἐπέκεινα in this way derives, of course, from Neoplatonic, Middle Platonic, and Neopythagorean interpretations of Plato *Republic* 509B.

Let us therefore posit the following sequence of events. A Greek text, including (but necessarily restricted to) *M.M.* 2.8 and *E.E.* 8.2 is compiled and originally entitled περὶ εὐτυχίας. It comes to contain, at some point, an unaristotelian phrase (absent from the original text of the *E.E.*, and based on a misinterpretation of that text) saying that God is "greater than Mind." The title of the work is at some stage corrupted: περὶ εὐτυχίας becomes περὶ εὐχῆς. Simplicius either reads it under this title or, more likely, finds it so cited by an excerpter or commentator of Platonizing tendencies. Either Simplicius or the excerpter paraphrases κρεῖττον τοῦ νοῦ as ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ. Hence our alleged fragment of Aristotle's work *On Prayer*, found in Simplicius, is really a corrupted fragment of περὶ εὐτυχίας, a work of which the origin is lost but which reaches Simplicius, or becomes known to Simplicius, through the medium of a Platonizing tradition.

The date of the *original* compilation περὶ εὐτυχίας remains unknown, but it must have been early enough for its title, in a mistaken form, to have found its way onto the lists of Aristotle's writings. But the corruption of the title was probably achieved by a librarian's error long before the crucial phrase καὶ νοῦ (absent, as we have seen, from the *Eudemian Ethics*) was imported into the text itself. This can hardly have occurred before the revival of Neopythagoreanism,⁹ that is, before the second century B.C. It is not impossible that it was post-Plotinian.¹⁰

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⁹See J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, Ithaca 1977) 342-45.

¹⁰This note has been improved by the comments of Brad Inwood.



CORRESPONDENCES

In the ferocious style which he affected as proconsul and which his older and wiser brother deplored, Quintus Cicero informed a Roman Knight that he would personally see to it "*fumo ut combureretur plaudente tota provincia*" (Cic. *Q. fr.* 1.2.6). For *fumo* Ursinus conjectured *furno*, whereas W. S. Watt substitutes *vivus*, an unpublished conjecture of Housman's ("ut et patrem et filium vivos comburat" and "uti iudicio comburantur" occur just below from another of Quintus' letters in the same vein).

Granted that "*fumo comburi nil potest, flamma potest*" (Plaut. *Curc.* 54), the change of the straightforward *vivus* to *fumo* is an unlikely error. In my edition the former is retained: "it is safer to allow that Quintus in his splenetic mood expressed himself improperly." Smoking to death or by way of torture is attested in Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.45 and *Hist. Aug.* 18.36.2. For reinforcement I can now quote Lucian *Ver. Hist.* 2.31, where one Cinyras is found *καπνῶ ὑποτυφόμενον ἐκ τῶν αἰδοίων ἀπρητημένον*. *ὑποτύφω*, "burn with a smouldering fire beneath," has no Latin equivalent, but *comburo*, "burn up," comes close enough for comfort.

Cicero ends a letter to Atticus (6.2), "*valebis igitur et valere Piliam et Caeciliam nostram iubebis et salvebis a meo Cicerone*" ("my Marcus sends his love"). The construction of the last words seems to be unique. But Sophocles' Creon says in *O. T.* 596, *νῦν πᾶσι χαίρω, νῦν με πᾶς ἀσπάζεται*. Jebb quotes four interpretations of *πᾶσι χαίρω*, which he rejects, and gives his own thus; "all men wish me joy: lit. 'I rejoice with the consent of all men: all are content that I should rejoice.'" Then two irrelevant "parallels," in which *πᾶσι* means "in the judgment of all." The note continues: "The phrase has been suggested by *χαῖρέ μοι*, but refers to the meaning rather than to the form of the greeting: *i. e.* *πᾶσι χαίρω* is not to be regarded as if it meant literally, 'I have the word *χαῖρε* said to me by all.' This is one of the boldly subtle phrases in which the art of Soph. recalls that of Vergil." Kammerbeek backs Mazon "*je me trouve à mon aise avec tous*."

Is not *χαίρω* here just about on all fours with Cicero's *salvebis*? "Young Cicero says '*salve*,' all men say *χαῖρε*."

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CLEOPATRA AND "THE TREASURE OF THE PTOLEMIES": A NOTE

In this journal in 1942,¹ in a note entitled "Cleopatra and 'The Treasure of the Ptolemies,'" I set out some arguments against W. W. Tarn's moving and eloquent defense of the Egyptian Queen² from the charge that after the defeat at Actium, in her great need of funds for her final plans, she had carried through executions, confiscations of property, and spoliation of the sacred treasures in the temples of Egypt. According to Tarn, the relevant passages in Dio and Josephus³ on which the charges were based derive from calumnies originally spread abroad by Cleopatra's enemy, Herod of Judaea, and Octavian's propagandists. A review of the financial difficulties of the later Ptolemies, and particularly those of Ptolemy XII Auletes, Cleopatra's father, had made it seem very probable that, even though these sources may admittedly be far from unbiased, the conditions in Egypt and, indeed, of the other eastern provinces, too, at that time left her hardly any other recourse.⁴

Tarn holds that she could still have recourse to the famous ancestral "Treasure of the Ptolemies" and that this constituted the large treasure still in her possession which Octavian maneuvered so warily—and needed so desperately—to secure intact in order to pay his troops and to relieve intense shortages in Rome. Here are Tarn's own words: "The truth is that she possessed a great treasure accumulated by her predecessors, the famous Treasure of the Ptolemies; her father may have diminished it somewhat, but he had met most of the difficulties by debasing the coinage." Only years afterwards did I find an ancient text which seems strongly opposed to Tarn's view. It occurs in Athenaeus (*Deipnosophistae* 5.206 C-D) and follows immediately after two long passages which describe the extravagant display of wealth and luxury in the Dionysiac procession in Alexandria in the time of Ptolemy II Philadelphus and in the great pleasure boat constructed by Ptolemy IV Philopator. These descriptions derive from a near contemporary, Callixinus of Rhodes, but the much later source of the following comment is not

¹*AJP* 63 (1942) 328-32.

²*Cambridge Ancient History* X, 36-37

³Cassius Dio 51.5.3-5, and 17.6; Joseph. *Contra Apionem* 2.58; cf. *BJ* 1.356-63, 365, 389-91; *AJ* 15.88-103, 191.

⁴On the fiscality of the later Ptolemies, see C. Préaux, *L'économie royale des Lagides*, esp. 411 ff.; and on Ptolemy XII Auletes, Edm. Bloedow, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Ptolemaios XII* (diss. Würzburg 1964) 47 ff., 75 ff.

stated. It runs as follows in Professor Gulick's translation in the Loeb Classical Library: "All the wealth of Ptolemy Philadelphus, after being retained for so long a period, was dissipated by the last Ptolemy, the same who got up the Gabinian war; he was not a man, but a fluteplayer and a juggler."⁵ For this source, it appears that however Cleopatra may have collected her final treasures, they did not include the "Treasure of the Ptolemies." It is one of the ironies of historical circumstance that Cleopatra remains charged with impieties while Octavian, who profited so greatly by his seizure of her wealth, remains free from blame.

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⁵Πᾶς δ' ὁ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου πλοῦτος τοσοῦτον χρόνον φυλαχθεὶς κατελύθη ὑπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου Πτολεμαίου τοῦ καὶ τὸν Γαβινιακὸν συστησαμένου πόλεμον, οὐκ ἄνδρὸς γενομένου ἀλλ' αὐλητοῦ καὶ μάγου. Ptolemy Auletes was, of course, not the last Ptolemy, but he was the last, besides Cleopatra herself, to rule over Egypt for a significant period.



CENA ROSARIA, CENA MITELLITA:
A NOTE ON SUETONIUS NERO 27.3¹

Indicebat et familiaribus cenas, quorum uni mitellita quadragies sestertium constitit, alteri pluris aliquanto rosaria.

(Suetonius *Nero* 27.3)

This passage from Suetonius' *Nero* is difficult. The two types of *cena* which Nero demanded from his friends are uncertain of definition. To date, the most illuminating comment has been that of B. H. Warmington: "*mitellita* would derive from *mitella*, a decorative head-

¹Thanks are due to Professor D. E. W. Wormell of Trinity College, Dublin, who saw an earlier version of this article in a different form.

band which would be worn by all the guests, and the *rosaria* would imply an equally lavish expenditure on roses."²

K. R. Bradley, in his recent commentary on the *Nero*,³ offers a context for the *cena rosaria*. Following the suggestion of W. Allen,⁴ Bradley claims that the party given by Tigellinus (for details, see Tac. *Ann.* 15.37) was in fact not merely a night of debauchery, but a quite eccentric celebration of the Floralia, the festival especially of prostitutes; he further cites Ovid's *Fasti* (5.331 ff.) to the effect that roses were associated with the celebration of the festival. It would not be farfetched to suggest that the explanation of *mitellita* might likewise be found in the context of a parody of religious rites.

The word *mitellita* is *hapax legomenon*, but clearly is the adjective corresponding to *mitella*, the diminutive of *mitra*. The *mitella* was a form of headgear restricted to the use of women; if a man were to wear one, he would be considered effeminate.⁵ That *mitellae* might be worn by homosexuals is no surprise, and Nero's homosexuality, in particular his transvestism, is alleged by Suetonius (*Nero* 28-29; but see the skeptical comments of Verdière⁶). The *cena mitellita* may be further explicable with the aid of a passage of Juvenal. In *Satire* 2.83-85, we read:

Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. Accipient te
Paulatim qui longa domi redimicula sumunt
Frontibus. . .

Juvenal refers to the secret society of homosexuals who dress up in women's clothing to celebrate the women's festival of the Bona Dea. Modern commentary on the passage has suggested that Juvenal actually knew of some such group.⁷

It is notable that the costume of these secret devotees of the Bona Dea included *longa redimicula*, that is, ribbons hanging from the *mi-*

²B. H. Warmington, *Suetonius Nero: Text with Introduction and Notes* (Bristol 1977) 84.

³K. R. Bradley, *Suetonius' Life of Nero: An Historical Commentary* (Bruxelles 1978: Collection Latomus 157) 159-60.

⁴W. Allen, "Nero's Eccentricities Before the Fire," *Numen* 9 (1962) 99-109.

⁵See TLL, s.vv. *mitella*, *mitellita*.

⁶Raoul Verdière, "A Verser au Dossier Sexuel de Néron," *PP* 30 (1975) 5-22; see esp. 16-22.

⁷See L. Friedländer, *D. Junii Juvenalis Saturae Lib. V mit erklärenden Anmerkungen* (Leipzig 1895) vol. 1, 174; E. Courtney, *A Commentary on the Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 135.

tra.⁸ Taken in conjunction with Suetonius' statement, that is suggestive. A group of transvestites would gather, according to Juvenal, attired in *mitrae* to celebrate the rites of women; according to Suetonius, Nero was the guiding force behind a *cena* at which *mitellae* were featured. Bearing in mind Juvenal's policy of satirizing only the dead (see *Satire* 1.170–71), we may suspect a close connection between the two passages.

Such a notion receives support from the context: if the *cena rosaria* was in fact an unusual celebration of the Floralia, the suggestion that a *cena* associated with a parodic celebration of the rites of the Bona Dea was held in Nero's circle becomes quite plausible. Suetonius' connection of the two events makes sense.

To summarize: Suetonius mentions two *cenae* which Nero imposed on his friends. One, described as *rosaria*, is quite likely to have been connected with a celebration of the Floralia; the other, *mitellita*, is also connected with the parody of religious rites, those of the Bona Dea.

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⁸In Rome, like the *mitella*, a specifically feminine piece of headgear—see Friedländer and Courtney (note 7 above) and the sources they cite.



ASIARCH RECONFIRMED

Among a number of inscriptions recently edited by A. R. R. Sheppard in *Anatolian Studies*, there is a fragment illustrating the career of one of the Carminii from Attuda.¹ The restored text reveals that Carminius Claudianus was *stephanephoros* (locally at Attuda) and Chief Priest (*archiereus*) of the province of Asia.² The editor remarks that

¹A. R. R. Sheppard, "Inscriptions from Uşak, Denizli and Hisar Köy," *AS* 31 (1981) 25–26, with photograph Pl. III (b).

²PIR² C433: M. Ulpus Carminius Claudianus.

"this text is the first clear epigraphic evidence for his holding provincial office, a fact hitherto known only from coins of Attuda." The text also gives welcome support to the contention argued in *AJP* 100 (1979) 94-98 that a mason's error in the long inscription from Aphrodisias honoring Carminius Claudianus (*CIG* 2782) was responsible for the apparent oversight of his provincial office. The epigraphic silence is now doubly lifted.

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ΛΙΘΟΥΛΚΟΣ, ΚΙΡΣΟΥΛΚΟΣ

My purpose is to define exactly the Greek words λιθουλκός and κίρσουλκός. As substantives both terms denote instruments of surgery. Etymologically speaking, neither term can of itself be translated more precisely than "stone extractor" and "varix extractor," respectively (so LSJ). Herein lies the problem: What shape did these "extractors" assume?

Milne, the chief authority on Greco-Roman surgical tools, strongly favored identifying the λιθουλκός with the special "uncus" described by Celsus for the removal of bladder stone (VII, XXVII).¹ Thus, the λιθουλκός would have been a type of hook. However, Milne could not exclude the possibility that this instrument was a kind of forceps. As he saw, the Greeks apparently had applied at least one name ending in -ουλκος to a forceps (βελουλκός, "missile extractor"); and Aetius (16.111 [101], Zervos) and Paul of Aegina (6.60), who were Milne's sources for the λιθουλκός, only mention the instrument but do not describe it. So Milne conceded that he could not prove that Cornarius and Adams were wrong when they rendered λιθουλκός as "forceps" in their translations of the above passages.

¹J. S. Milne, *Surgical Instruments in Greek and Roman Times* (reprint New York 1970) 146-48.

After Milne, the only other investigators known to me who have touched on the problem are T. Meyer-Steineg and M. Tabanelli. The former was completely undecided whether the λιθουλκός was a hook or a forceps²; the latter, while entertaining the idea that the term denotes a forceps, simply rendered it "extratore dei calcoli."³

It seems that the references to the λιθουλκός in Aetius and Paul have been the only ones familiar to students of Greco-Roman surgical tools. I should like to cite yet a third text, which I believe resolves the question: Oribasius 45.6.2 and 6 (Raeder). In treating of πῶρος or tophus, a stonelike tumor affecting various parts of the body, Oribasius directs us to cut through the overlying tissue, separate the sides of the incision with retractors, and then remove the tumor τῇ τοῦ σμιλίου λαβῇ ἢ ἀναβολέως ἢ λιθουλκοῦ καμπῇ, "with the handle of the scalpel or the bend of either a lever or a λιθουλκός." The word καμπῇ or bend is inappropriate for a forceps, but it applies well to a hooklike instrument. Thus, it is appropriate to use it of the ἀναβολεύς, a lever usually employed by Greco-Roman surgeons as an instrument of reduction. Some examples of these miniature crowbars survive; they are indeed bent at the end.⁴ I think then that there can be no further question about the shape of the λιθουλκός. Oribasius clearly shows that it was a curved or hooklike instrument, not a forceps. Thus, Milne was correct in wishing to identify it with the "uncus" attested by Celsus.⁵

So far as I know, Milne is the only scholar who has treated the κίρσουλκός.⁶ Citing Galen, XIV, 790 (Kühn), Milne concluded that this instrument, "can scarcely have been anything else than a forceps of some kind." Galen, however, only mentions but does not describe the instrument. And again Milne has ignored Oribasius who in fact pro-

²T. Meyer-Steineg, *Chirurgische Instrumente des Altertums* (Jena 1912) 40-41: "Ob das—λιθουλκός genannte Instrument der gleiche Haken oder aber eine Zange ist, kann man nicht sagen."

³M. Tabanelli, *Lo Strumento Chirurgico e la sua Storia* (Forlì 1958) 145-48.

⁴Cf. Milne (note 1 above) 134, and Pl. XLI, 1; R. Caton, *JHS* 34 (1914) 115 (III), and Pl. X, 15; L. J. Bliquez, *Archaeology* 34 (1981) 15.

⁵Several examples of the λιθουλκός /uncus are preserved. Milne cites two specimens in the Naples Museum (loc. cit., note 1 above) and Meyer-Steineg one which accords very closely with Celsus' description (loc. cit., note 2 above). Since this note was accepted for publication, my colleague Ernst Künzl of Mainz has published still other examples which have recently come to light. He and I are in complete accord on the shape of the instrument; cf. E. Künzl, "Eine Spezialität römischer Chirurgen: die Lithotomie," *Archäologisches Korrespondenzblatt* 13 (1983) 487-93.

⁶(Note 1 above) 135-36.

vides the critical text. In detailing the surgical treatment of varicose veins, Oribasius tells us to secure ἄγκιστρα τῶν σφόδρα μικροκαμπῶν, καλουμένων δὲ κίρσουλκῶν γαμμοειδῇ κατὰ τὴν καμπήν: "hooks of the type only slightly curved and called κίρσουλκοί, gamma-shaped at the bend (45.18.5 Raeder)." Clearly Milne is wrong. Far from being a forceps the κίρσουλκός was yet another type of hook, in this case bent at a right angle to the shaft. That these hooks were sharp is shown by the fact that they were used to pierce (καταπείραντες) the tissue over the varix in preparation for the incision which exposed it, and by the fact that they are contrasted with a blunt type of hook used in the operation (45.18.8). We are also told that the κίρσουλκός was used to extend the varix so that it could be severed (45.18.39).

A hook, which fits Oribasius' description quite well, can be found in an instrumentarium from Asia Minor now in the Römisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum in Mainz.⁷

The pionèering work in Greco-Roman surgical tools was done long ago. However, as this footnote to that work shows, there are still useful points to be made, even at a very basic level.

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⁷F. J. Hassel, E. Künzl, "Ein römisches Arztgrab, usw.," *Medizin-historisches Journal* 15 (1980) 408, Taf. III, 9, and E. Künzl, F. J. Hassel, S. Künzl, "Medizinische Instrumente aus Sepulkralfunden, usw.," *Bonner Jahrbücher* 182 (1982) 47, 9.



REVIEWS

T. JAMES LUCE, Editor. *Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome. Volume I. Homer to Caesar*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982. Pp. xix + 599. \$55.00.

T. James Luce has given the contributors to this volume a difficult assignment, asking for "essays that a wide range of readers, from students in secondary school to advanced classical scholars, would read profitably and with pleasure" (p. ix). Granted that we may be hearing an echo from the marketing division of Scribner's, this is nevertheless daunting. Perhaps in recognition of their dilemma, the contributors have also been given an unusually free hand in approaching the material: "We have not tried to produce articles on the model of an encyclopedia, with a standard format and even coverage, whose primary if not exclusive purpose is to transmit information. The aim here has been rather for the authors to write personal, even idiosyncratic, essays in order to show what in their eyes constitute the significant achievements of the writers of the ancient world" (p. x). Though the contributors are all well-qualified professionals, there is surely some risk in such a laissez-faire editorial policy. The nonspecialist, for instance, having read Stanford's genteel entry on Homer, taken up largely by plot summary, plunges ahead into Nagy's Hesiod to discover,

The root * ḣ^{h} eh of *Hēsi-* recurs in the expression *óssan hieísai* (emitting a [beautiful/immortal/lovely] voice), describing the Muses themselves at *Theogony* 10, 43, 65, 67, while the root * ḣ^{h} od- of *-odos* recurs as * ḣ^{h} ud- in *audé* (voice), designating the power of poetry conferred by the Muses upon the poet at *Theogony* 31.

Classical scholars will know and appreciate such free-form pyrotechnics, but our nonspecialist may excusably feel that he has somehow wandered into a very different part of the woods.

As it happens, these first two essays are the poles between which all the rest oscillate. The success of each subsequent essayist's attempt to balance the conflicting demands imposed by his or her intended audience will depend in part of course on where in Scribner's wide net the reader falls. But if in fact the book is to fulfill the admirable goals which the editor puts forth, then the scope for idiosyncrasy is probably somewhat narrower than it may first appear. The book (volume one of two) is handsomely produced, very well edited (three minor misprints in 600 pages), and has the look of a rather costly reference work which will sell mostly to libraries. Although there is much to interest them if they should take the time to sift through the introductory material, classical scholars are not likely to consult such a work in the course of their teaching and research. Students, either in high school or college, might well use such a collection, although in college courses teachers will probably focus on more specialized works. This leaves as the primary audience the educated nonspecialist, per-

haps high school teachers looking for an introduction to a particular author, perhaps the inquisitive browser found in public libraries on Saturday morning.

With these criteria (admittedly somewhat subjective) in mind, this reviewer found himself asking in the case of each author, "How would I do it?" Strategic decisions are required according to the amount of extant material and its accessibility to the uninitiated. Thus, Most, faced with the fragments of the lyric poets, begins with some sensitive remarks on two short pieces, so as to establish that these snippets are indeed worthy of the poetry reader's attention, then goes on to a lucid discussion of the problems of what "lyric" means, etc. Keaney, attempting to give a coherent presentation of Plato's thought, focuses on the Socratic problem, the *Laches* as a representative early dialogue, the *Republic*, and the theory of forms. Stambler on Herodotus and Connor on Thucydides both face similar problems of selection, and both are judicious.

The essays are also supposed to be "protreptic," urging further reading (p. ix), and so bibliographies are important. There is a wide variety in both content and scope here, from one or two pages of basic works, mostly in English (which seems appropriate), to much longer lists (more than six pages for Aristotle), sometimes heavy on specialized scholarly works in German, French, or Italian (Hesiod, Terence). But the most important thing to read next may be for many the actual text of the author's works, and too much plot summary in some of these essays may unfortunately serve to inoculate rather than stimulate potential readers.

In a few cases the essayist chooses to discuss at some length rather specialized material, inserting translations and other parenthetical asides in an attempt to bring the nonspecialist along. Some taste of scholarly issues might pique the curiosity of nonprofessionals, but not much, one suspects. Rather, the most successful entries are those which aim for a broad, basically humanistic perspective, addressed to the question, "Why would an intelligent person be interested in this writer?" The distinction being made here will be clear to anyone who compares Sandbach's discussion of Terence, centered around the rather arid question of "Greek sources," to Wright on Plautus, a lively, sympathetic survey which takes as its premise that people will want to read a comic poet who is in fact funny.

But the contributors are, as we have said, an impressive group, and even the less lively essays have much of value for those who persevere. Among the more accomplished entries are: Aeschylus (Bacon), with a useful introduction on the genre of tragedy and a very stimulating (*Agamemnon* compared to *Il Trovatore*!) discussion of the plays, tracing certain basic characteristics of Aeschylus' thought through the corpus; Euripides (Wolff), with a thoughtful treatment of Euripides' interaction with other fifth century thinkers and an illuminating discussion of *physis-nomos* in *Hippolytus*; Aristophanes (Moulton), good on the peculiarities of Aristophanes' topical humor and written in a lively style appropriate to the material; Isocrates (Cawkwell) where, on the other hand, lively writing makes a rather remote figure come alive; Hellenistic Poets (Clayman) and Cicero (Rawson), vast and variegated subjects handled with admirable clarity.

Finally, three essays stand out even amid this high level of accomplishment. C. Segal's entry on Sophocles is excellent on the general characteristics of Sophocles' thought and offers penetrating, exciting discussions of all the plays

with the focus always on what is generic in human life as Sophocles presents it. Pearson's Demosthenes essay is beautifully written, moving easily between Demosthenes' life and speeches, with a splendidly light touch in presenting his (often devious) strategies for getting the average Athenian to vote the right way. At once substantive and accessible, this entry reflects a lifetime spent happily with its subject. Aristotle is perhaps the most forbidding author in the collection for the novice (here include many classical scholars), but Nussbaum's superb treatment will surely win converts. She offers admirably clear explanations of the central features of Aristotle's thought, then follows these through her analysis of specific works. The level of discussion is consistently high, but always informed by the question of what a particular, often technical, aspect of Aristotle's thought has to tell us about how to live in this world. To quote a representative passage: "what is one searching for when one searches for substance or substances, and to what real problems that might grip or trouble us does such a search respond?" (p. 386)

The editorial decision to turn the contributors loose was, as we have said, risky, but ultimately wise. Instead of writing out another bland summary of their author's work, the scholars were encouraged to take the project seriously, to engage the literature in a way which was stimulating to *them*, surely the first step in producing first-rate essays. The level of achievement in the resulting collection is, with a very few exceptions, high. And this is important work. Classicists continue to turn out specialized work for their colleagues; students will generally find aid and stimulation in their course work. But if we cannot reach out to engage that third group of curious, intelligent grownups, to convince them that these writers with whom we commune in our solitary way can also speak to *them*, then all our worst fears about the displacement of classics as a seminal field of study will be confirmed.

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T. JAMES LUCE, Editor. *Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome. Volume II. Lucretius to Ammianus Marcellinus*. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982. Pp. 547. \$55.00.

Volume I of this work, containing whatever prefatory matter there may be, is not accessible to me in Cambridge. Scope and readership must therefore be inferred from the book itself. These are large tomes (page size 276 × 214 mm), handsomely printed in double columns: a format more suitable for consultation in the library than for reading with feet on the fender. Emphasis is on what these writers have to say rather than on how they say it; Zetzel on Catullus is exceptional in providing a modicum of quotation in Latin. These are evidently "major" authors: no Nepos, no Valerius Flaccus (let alone Maximus), no Silius, which is understandable; no Elder Pliny, which in view of his immense later importance is perhaps questionable; no Ausonius and no Claudian, which would be defensible if the editor had called a halt after the second century,

which he has not; and no Longus, which I account an error. Still, nobody with experience of such decisions will be too hard on an editor whose judgment in such a matter happens to differ from his own.

Luce has done a good job of picking contributors. The first item in the volume, D. J. Furley's Lucretius, provides an almost entirely admirable introduction to the philosophy of the *De Rerum Natura*. By the same token it exemplifies a recurrent deficiency in an especially striking way: Furley gives almost no idea of the power and *authority* of Lucretius' poetry—the compelling part, for instance, played in his argument by imagery. "We can see and appreciate the ardent excitement that informs, not just particular passages but the whole structure of the epic, and creates a kind of beauty even in a theory of the qualities of liquids or the magnet" (p. 619). Absolutely true; but nothing in what Furley has written substantiates it. The uninstructed reader must simply take the poetry on trust.

That this was not inevitable even given the book's planned limitations is shown by Zetzel's Catullus, which succeeds in conveying, for instance, a notion of the rich texture and experimental literary character of c. 68. These two items incidentally illustrate the drawback of parcelling literature out author by author (*experto credite*): our friend the uninstructed reader would not gather from this book that Lucretius and Catullus had anything in common but contemporaneity.

The other contributions must be for the most part summarily noticed. D. C. Earl, Sallust. Earl concludes, unsurprisingly, that Sallust was not in any modern sense a historian: "[his] preferred mechanism of analysis and explanation is moral," an analysis which Earl approves as "fundamentally correct and not without relevance to the present day" (pp. 640–41). Another boost for those Victorian values we (on this side of the Atlantic) hear so much about these days? Style again gets rather short shrift.

J. A. Hanson, Vergil. This is on the bland side and in some respects ill-informed: for anybody who writes that *Eclogues* 2, 3, 7, and 8 (even with the saving qualification "in isolation") are "little more than imitations" of Theocritus (p. 673) seems to me to be announcing that he has not read either Theocritus or Vergil with due care. Similarly the problems of the *Georgics* are swept under a carpet of appreciative paraphrase. Hanson is much better on the *Aeneid*; his final verdict strikes a note familiar in current Virgilian criticism: "[The *Aeneid*] ends in ambiguity, driving its readers back into the poem again and again, to find their own hope or despair mirrored in the powerful and disturbing images of Vergil's poetry" (p. 700). A helpful feature of this piece is the extensive quotation in English translation.

D. H. Porter, Horace. This concentrates on *Satires* I and *Odes* I–III as most extensively read, though Porter suggests in passing that *Epistles* I "is one of his most affecting creations" (p. 711). "Affecting" is not to my mind the mot juste; do *Epp.* 1.8.3–12 really convey "great agitation of spirit"? Nor is it because the first book of *Epistles* comes chronologically between *Odes* I–III and *Odes* IV (ibid.) that it is important but because it represents Horace at his best.

J. P. Lipovsky, Livy. Lipovsky attempts "to transcend the exclusive presentation of Livy either as a literary or historical writer" (p. 736). Fair enough; but any such reconciliation runs full tilt against Livy's own words in the *Praefatio*.

tio, which Lipovsky does not quote, and Burck's comparison with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which is not mentioned either, shows the poet, the *maker* of history, at work. "[Livy] lacks the poet's concern for people and their emotions *per se*" (p. 742). This, to me, is a dark saying. What does "*per se*" mean?

J. P. Sullivan, Tibullus and Propertius. Short and unexceptionable; it is a pity that room was not found in the bibliography for Jasper Griffin's seminal article, "Augustan Poetry and the Life of Luxury," *JRS* 66 (1976) 87-105.

W. R. Johnson, Ovid. "Ovid's technical skill is an effect, not a cause, of his growth and achievement as a poet—in other words, his formal dexterity increases, keeps pace with, the deepening of his moral and spiritual vision" (p. 784). That Ovid may be allowed to have had such a thing as a moral and spiritual vision shows how far we have come in recent decades; that the suggestion should be couched, as this is, in a context of slight defensiveness shows how far we still have to go. In essence Johnson's estimate of Ovid is one that I can applaud and commend. That an "emphatic affirmation of human dignity is crucial throughout [the *Metamorphoses*]" (p. 800) is profoundly true and important. The essential rightness of Johnson's judgment atones for one or two flaws. His assessment of the *Amores* is vitiated by unsubstantiated assumptions (pp. 790-91) about the relationship between the two editions. That the *Ars* and *Remedia* caricature "the neurotic theoretician of love" (p. 797) strikes me as jolly but implausible. I am especially sorry to find the poetry of exile underrated. The most serious defect is the miserably small number of quotations—from the *Metamorphoses* none at all.

Elisabeth Henry, Seneca. Again a sign of the times that the tragedies are taken seriously and examined with care and sensitivity. It seems to me a pity to pass over the *Apocolocyntosis* in a sentence, and odd to say nothing about *Ep. Mor.* 114.

W. Arrowsmith, Petronius. The suggestion (p. 836) that the *Satyricon* was written for oral presentation hardly needs to be presented so tentatively; I mention it because it is the only place (that I noticed) in the book where we are reminded that Greek and Latin literature was written to be listened to. This is one of the liveliest pieces in the volume.

W. S. Anderson, Persius and Juvenal. A sound appreciation, as was to be expected; though Anderson's description of Nero as "a quixotic tyrant" reminded me of the man mentioned somewhere by Swift who, pressed for his opinion of the same emperor, volunteered that he was a wag.

On Z. Yavetz, Josephus, I do not presume to comment.

R. E. A. Palmer, Martial. A generous appraisal in more ways than one: 28 pages as against Ovid's 24. It is supported by lavish quotation in English.

F. M. Ahl, Lucan and Statius. Parallel treatment of these two was an especially good idea. The emphasis is again very much on the message: Lucan's style, the structure of his epic, his treatment of sources, are hardly discussed. On Statius, Ahl comes out fighting: "My assumption in examining the poet is that Statius' poetic skill and intellectual force may be matched, but they are not surpassed by any Roman writer" (p. 926). It is interesting to compare the cooler assessment of C. S. Lewis: "It stands . . . at about the same distance from true epic seriousness as the *Gerusalemme Liberata*" (*The Allegory of Love* [1936], p. 56). For Ahl it is "one of the profoundest works of Latin literature" (p. 938).

This is all very well until you try reading it; and Ahl again has nothing to say about its style.

G. Kennedy, Quintilian; C. P. Jones, Plutarch; A. A. Long, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. These three pieces, all by acknowledged experts, need no recommendation from me.

T. J. Luce, Tacitus. This is a somewhat flat treatment of the archpoet of ancient historiography. Like Lipovsky on Livy, Luce's paraphrastic mode of exposition gives the reader little idea of Tacitus' dramatic artistry and the poetic colouring of his narrative. It is helpful as far as it goes to refer the reader to Walker's excellent *The Annals of Tacitus*; more analysis like that of Claudius' speech (p. 1027) would have been welcome. Critics of Tacitus still need to digest the implications of such studies as Woodman's "Self-Imitation and the Substance of History" (in D. West, T. Woodman, eds., *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature* [1979] 143-55).

E. Champlin, Pliny the Younger. A stimulating and mildly provocative presentation of the letters as an exercise in image building. Champlin rightly praises Pliny as a literary innovator, the inventor of the *epistula curatius scripta*, the precursor, as Professor Goodyear has remarked (*CHCL*, II, 659) of Mme. de Sévigné and Horace Walpole.

G. B. Townend, Suetonius. This crisp analysis clearly distinguishes Suetonius' *Caesars* from history proper, as that was understood in antiquity, and by no means to his disadvantage. "His refusal to shun the commonplace and the low means that his Lives provide a picture of imperial Rome by no means limited to the interior of the palace and bring the reality before our eyes more vividly yet with less exaggeration than do the works of virtually any other Latin writer" (p. 1060). It is indeed refreshing to find a Roman writer who is content to record without moralizing.

J. L. Logan, Longinus. Here is another unique figure: a critic who treated of what turned him on rather than what he had been conditioned to believe was good for him. An odd omission here is that, though *kairos* is accorded a footnote (p. 1067), the word *hypsos* itself is not even mentioned in the discussion of what Longinus may have meant by "sublime."

C. Robinson, Lucian. This illustrates the axiom that each age interprets the classics to suit itself. Lucian is hardly read at all these days, but was prodigiously influential from the Renaissance to the beginning of the nineteenth century, on the basis of "a total misreading" (p. 1095). For Robinson he is not a moralist, positively or negatively, but the dispenser of "an elaborate series of literary cocktails" (p. 1092), "an intellectually sophisticated cabaret artist" (p. 1094).

J. Tatum, Apuleius. Here, conversely, is a writer who has been undervalued and is now coming into his own as the author of the only surviving ancient novel "that attempts to make a universal statement" (p. 1114). Tatum produces a new and ingenious theory to explain the anomalous number of eleven books in the *Metamorphoses*: a complete but inferior Pythagorean *tetractys* ($10 = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4$) followed by an incomplete but genuinely sacred *tetractys* ($1 + \dots$) (pp. 110-12). Even if this is wrong, it is just the sort of thing Apuleius might have thought of. It is particularly unfortunate that Apuleius' style, to which Tatum is certainly not insensitive, should get such short measure: something

should surely have been said about the wonderful opening chapters of Book 11 in this connexion and perhaps to repair the failure of commentators to do justice to (or even recognize) the richness of the literary texture of Cupid and Psyche—and incidentally the technical problems that Apuleius created for himself in this part of his great novel.

J. F. Matthews, Ammianus Marcellinus. Chronologically the odd man out, as has been noted; but the juxtaposition with Apuleius is apt. In the brilliant chapter of Auerbach's *Mimesis* to which Matthews refers (p. 1118), it was shown that Ammianus' style represents an extreme development of "a highly rhetorical style in which the gruesomely sensory has gained a large place; a somber and highly rhetorical realism which is totally alien to classical antiquity." But if Ammianus, why not Claudian at least? Here was another Greek writing powerfully and effectively in Latin, enormously influential down to the nineteenth century and likewise esteemed by Gibbon (see A. Cameron, *Claudian* [1970] 419 ff.)—and infinitely more entertaining than Statius.

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ANTONIO ALONI. *Le Muse di Archiloco: Ricerche sullo Stile Archilocheo*. Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, 1981 (*Opuscula Graecolatina* vol. 23). Pp. 172, 2 figs.

The chief value of this new book on Archilochus lies in its strong argument that an archaic Greek poem is a performance for a specific audience and occasion and not just a text, and in its application of this view to a reappraisal of the recently found 35-line fragment, P. Colon. 7511. But parts of Aloni's presentation are weak, and his overall achievement uneven.

Part One, on Archilochus' formulaic style, offers a good theoretical framework for studying the language of archaic poetry: the context of performance and the nature of the audience strongly condition the diction: epic diction indicates the widest audience (as in Sappho fr. 44, the epithalamium for Andromache and Hector) and the more private diction and more complex communication "codes" of elegaic and iambic verse indicate smaller, more specialized interest groups. Thus epic-heroic diction can be a base-line code against which all other codes can be measured. This is a fertile idea, a creative extension of W. Rösler's analysis (*Hermes* 103 [1975]) of Sappho fr. 44. Unfortunately Aloni is unable to make it work with much clarity through most of his book, until he arrives at his analysis of the Cologne Epode in Part Two.

The bulk of Part One is given to useful formulaic and rhetorical analyses of frs. 1W, 2W, and 4W, under the unquestioned assumption that some parallels to, and adaptations of, Homeric diction, as well as the presence of anaphora and unperiodic enjambment, constitute *proofs* of oral composition. Although citing Parry and Lord repeatedly, Aloni misses the essential point that formulaic repetition indicates oral genesis specifically for *long epic narratives*, where

length of recitation required some improvisatory re-creation of the poem through heavy reliance on formulas to aid fluency in rapid performance. Aloni's argument that Archilochus composed his elegiacs and epodes "orally" turns out, therefore, to mean relatively little, since the shorter, lyric type of poem is not subject to similar pressures of "metrical impasse." These poems should more accurately be called "oral-aural," since their distinctive quality is not a quasi-improvisatory genesis but a form specialized to meet the needs of mouth-to-ear communication, a valuable concept in itself, but not quite the same concept as that articulated in the Parry-Lord theory. Such oral-aural qualities serve ideally the processes of vivid communication, easy verbatim memorability, and successful transmission and circulation for re-use in minimally altered form—a distinct functional esthetic from that governing oral epic performance, although analogous to some extent. Since there are more kinds of "orality" than Aloni imagines, there will be less opposition than he thinks to his argument that the complexity of communicative levels in the Cologne Epode can be consistent with oral poetry. His appeal to Finnegan's comparative evidence from the native poetries of Malaysia, Polynesia, and Australia is most apt; but he could just as well have cited the successful oral communication involved in the performance of Pindaric or tragic choral odes to make the same point.

Part Two, devoted to the erotic Cologne Epode, mixes intelligent analysis of the poem's complexity with some weak methodology. After good analysis of the poem's debt to traditional epic diction, Aloni's claim to have found its underlying structure in a division into seven segments seems arbitrary (how, for example, can verses 16-17 belong to separate segments?). Far worse, however, is the argument that occupies the center of Part Two, that the Epode is organized around a set of "themes" whose key is conveyed in the double stem *tolm-/tl-*, a motif meaning "daring/enduring." Aloni's method is to locate five Homeric passages, ranging from 40 to 84 lines, where some form of *tolm-/tl-* is used, and to note that many other "themes" from the Epode co-occur. These include (not all in one passage) the words (sg. or pl.) for man, woman, god, friend/loving (*phil-*), two, other, daughter, each other, touch, know, spirit (*thymos*), appear, want, earth, many, steal(th); also the stem *men-/menos* in any form (including Menelaos), *mēd-/med-* in any form (including Diomedes, Amphi-mēdo), all uses of *amph-*, the adverbs *mega* and *mala*, and the verbs "to do" and "to be" (*poieō*, *eimi*). What larger design these thematic atoms are supposed to serve is never stated; whatever argument is intended by Aloni remains unbelievably vague and flimsy. Most of these words are so unexceptional that their occurrence, even their co-occurrence, can hold little significance, especially in the absence of any cogent explanatory hypothesis. Moreover, Aloni seems to have no notion that his inventory is *lexical*, not *thematic*; that "theme" has been carefully and technically defined, by Albert Lord for epic and by many other scholars for other genres, as a unit of narrative, not a single vocabulary item. In any poetics, theme must be a sub-unit of the story line and not just a word, least of all an adverb like "very"—meaningless without a context—or an all-pervasive verb like "do" or "be." By Aloni's criteria one could almost label "the" and "and" thematic, and in fact he approaches such absurdity when he relates the *ton nūn* of *Il.* 24.35 to the Epode's *hē nūn*, *hēn nūn*, *to dē nūn*,

hēn dē, and *tēn d'* as "the same thematic material" (pp. 100, 105). One waits in vain for some clear picture of what the author is after, but the occasional glimpse we get of how these "thematic matrices" (p. 102) might be related within the larger "semantic strategy of the compositions" (p. 114) should perhaps make us grateful that Aloni's theories remain embryonic. The claim (p. 104) that ξανθῷ Μενελάῳ, as juxtaposition of two "themes," represents the same "nexus" as seen in the description of orgasm in the Epode's last line, λευκὸν ἀφῆκα μένος ξανθῆς ἐπιψαύ[ων τριχός]—with no further explanation—seems nothing less than bizarre.

As if there were not problems enough with Aloni's method, small inaccuracies dot his analyses of the epic passages. The adj. *pinutos* is falsely related to *pistos* (p. 114), as is *eureia* to *eurōessa* (pp. 109, 114); *mazōi* at *Od.* 11.448 is connected (p. 114) with line 32 of the Epode where Aloni has, however, already rejected *mazōn* in favor of *mērōn*, and to which he has already (p. 111) connected the *mērou* of *Od.* 10.321; the inf. *menein* is considered "thematically" identical to the *mene-* of *dusmeneōn* (p. 103); *telethousi* (p. 159) is singled out apparently because of superficial resemblance to the unrelated *tēlethaessi* of the Epode. Perhaps Aloni's theory allows that any similar sound can thematically evoke any other (a loose application of the "phonic" argument in B. Peabody's *The Winged Word*). But he never makes this explicitly clear, and surely such freedom to make associations so totally free of any semantic constraints would reduce his already flimsy "thematic structures" beyond all redemption.

Fortunately the book ends on a stronger note: Aloni's treatment of the multiple levels of communication, and resultant rich ambiguity, of the Epode's structure. He makes ambiguity, seen in the repetitions of *amphi/amph-* and *duo/di-*, a major theme of the Epode, its "generating strategic principle"; thus, the message received by the girl in the poem changes when reinterpreted within the larger framework of a performance before an audience of lusty young men. Here Aloni is finally exploiting the rich possibilities of his earlier thesis that a narrowly restricted communication code implies a narrowly specialized audience. This audience would be reflected within the poem itself, in the young men, *neoi andres*, mentioned in line 9. This social group, Aloni argues (following Vidal-Naquet and Calame), would have marginal status between mere *paides* and full *andres* (= citizens, soldiers, husbands). Social convention would exclude these young men, as well as the *parthenoi* represented by the girl in the poem, from full sexual relations (*to theion khrēma* of line 10); hence the lesser *terpsis* enjoyed at the poem's close. The mature Archilochus' assumption of the narrating persona of a young man (note that Neoboule is too old for him) would be an artifice imposed by the performance situation, most likely a banquet of young men where coarse and invective verse flourished. The traditional disguises offered by the use of names taken from Lykambes' family (following West's theory) would allow audacious allusions while protecting the identities of persons alluded to. All this adds up to an interesting theory, at least well constructed and argued if not plausible to all readers. Aloni naively presents it, as he does his other theories, as if undeniable fact.

It should be evident by now that this is a stimulating but frustrating book, a surprising mixture of good and bad scholarship. It could have been much

improved by serious editorial criticism before publication. As it stands, all enthusiasts of Archilochus should read it, first affixing the label "use with caution."

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WILLIAM M. A. GRIMALDI, S. J. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I. A Commentary. New York, Fordham University Press, 1981. Pp. viii + 362.

A new commentary on *Rhetoric* I, 104 years after that of E. M. Cope, might be expected to reap the fruit of a century of textual and grammatical studies, and Grimaldi does this very well. He consistently explains the significance of manuscript variants or scholarly conjectures and demonstrates excellent overall judgment in his choice of readings. His grammatical notes are fewer, but valuable. In citing parallels in other authors he exercises good sense and restraint. His references to the Attic orators are especially helpful, though I miss any reference to Isocrates' use of *antistrophos* (on 1354a1) or that orator's identification of rhetoric with politics (on 1356a27). On Aristotle's silence, Grimaldi is silent: he does not explain why Aristotle has much to say about the similarities of rhetoric to dialectic, but never explains how they differ, nor why the celebrated definition of rhetoric (1355b25-26) does not limit it to speech, a fault in the eyes of many later rhetoricians. Nor is he concerned with later criticisms of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric: thus, he does not note Richard Whately's objection to the Aristotelian distinction between artificial and inartificial proof (*Elements of Rhetoric*, pp. 39-40) as "strangely unphilosophical." Grimaldi ignores much of the scholarship on the *Rhetoric*, and his reason is clear: he has a particular interpretation to advance which he does not wish to clutter with refutation of conflicting theories. His aim is to read the text without the prejudices of the past.

This approach is in many ways laudable. Study of the *Rhetoric* suffered from the anti-rhetorical bias of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is even occasionally implicit in Cope's commentary. Grimaldi respects his author and his text, and that respect is worthy of respect. Perhaps his critical position would have been stronger if, like many contemporary critics, he had explicitly rejected authorial intent. As it is, he wants to tell us both what the text says and what Aristotle meant; he is more successful in the first aim than in the second. Grimaldi regards *Rhetoric* I as a unified text, even going so far as to treat the chapter divisions as Aristotelian and seeing in each chapter an orderly introduction, development, and conclusion. He struggles manfully to construct a theory of rhetoric in the text without resorting to the hypothesis of the development of Aristotle's thought, which is never mentioned, but the resulting construct is attributed to Aristotle, rather than to a reading of the text as we have it.

The central problem in a unified interpretation is the meaning of *pistis* and the various parts of *pistis*. Grimaldi deals with this repeatedly in the com-

mentary (see especially the distinction of different meanings in the note on 1355a4) and in an appendix which puts together a well-argued view. I agree that the prevailing sense includes not only logical argument, but also ethos and pathos. (See my position in *Classical Rhetoric*, pp. 68-69.) Grimaldi cannot, however, entirely resolve some inconsistencies and is forced to assume changes in meaning as the work unfolds (see especially his note on 1354a4). When he does try to resolve an inconsistency, as in 1354a16, it seems to me that he labors. How can Aristotle say here that pity is not a part of artistic persuasion and then devote an entire chapter to it as an apparently legitimate part of pathos in Book II? At least, how can he do so without explicitly explaining that there are appropriate and inappropriate uses of pity, which is Grimaldi's reasonable view?

The developmental theory of Jaeger and Solmsen has always been open to the criticism that it leaves unexplained why Aristotle, working on different parts of the treatise at different times, left unchanged those inconsistencies which are taken as keys to his development. Grimaldi's interpretation, largely implicit, that an understanding of rhetoric unfolds within the treatise as we have it and ends by providing a systematic picture, is open to a similar objection: why would Aristotle adopt this shifting vision of his subject?

An approach which Grimaldi and others moved to establish the unity of the *Rhetoric* might consider is to attribute to it a "rhetoric." This rhetoric would not be unlike that seen in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates' outrageous definition of rhetoric as a form of flattery analogous to cookery is somewhat modified later in the dialogue to admit the possibility of a valid philosophical rhetoric, later developed in the *Phaedrus* and perhaps already planned. It is usually believed that the Aristotelian treatises originated in lectures in Aristotle's school, or even in the Academy. Oral presentation is linear and some inconsistencies easily overlooked in the dynamics of the continuing lecture. We know little about Aristotle's audiences, but it is at least possible that lectures on rhetoric were attended by a somewhat different mix of people than would attend lectures on physics or metaphysics. If Aristotle really said of his initial lecture on rhetoric, "It is shameful to keep silent and allow Isocrates to speak" (Diogenes Laertius 5.3, as traditionally emended), it is tempting to believe that his outrage might have produced the view found in the beginning of the course as we have it where he seems to reject practically the entire contents of existing handbooks and proclaims, if only for tactical purposes, that rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic, that it dresses itself up as politics, and that its true "body" is the enthymeme. In a less argumentative mood in *Eth. Nic.* 1094b5, he can regard rhetoric as a part of politics. For those in the audience who did not leave in disgust, Aristotle, like the Platonic Socrates, would eventually make adjustment after adjustment, finally including even the parts of an oration so central to the organization of the handbooks.

Such a rhetorical view of the *Rhetoric* does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis of the development of Aristotle's thought, but it does help to explain why he may have left apparent contradictions in the text. The claims made for rhetoric as dialectic and enthymeme in the opening sections thus may represent deliberate exaggeration. Once that point is grasped, the audience can be allowed to realize that there is inductive argument as well as deductive, that ethos

and pathos can be legitimate forms of proof, and that there is even a place for style and theories of arrangement in effective public speaking. The approach is certainly appropriate to this particular treatise, but the rhetoric of other Aristotelian treatises ought to be studied as well as its possible relation to the development and exposition of Aristotelian thought.

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GIULIANO BONFANTE and LARISSA BONFANTE. *The Etruscan Language*. An Introduction. New York, New York University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 174.

It is interesting to consider why the English-speaking world has been so much more inhospitable to the study of the Etruscan language than Etruscan archaeology or even the non-Latin Indo-European languages of ancient Italy. This question, however, belongs to the sociology of our *Altertumswissenschaft* and is broached here only as a preface to stating that this little book, by a distinguished team of daughter and father, has no competition in English. The book is divided into three parts: a sketch of the historical and archaeological background, a sketch of the writing system, phonology, and morphology, and a (nicely illustrated) selection of inscriptions along with a chart comparing some Etruscan basic vocabulary with Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit (to prove that Etruscan is genetically non-Indo-European) and selective glossaries. There follow a bibliography and an index. Unfortunately, there is no index of inscriptions cited or discussed.

Etruscan brings to mind a nest of typological peculiarities which seem, from a cross-linguistic point of view, congruent with its overall appearance of agglutinative structure. The most famous are: (1) *Gruppenflexion*, or case-marking on only one of several constituents of a phrase in the same syntactic case (e.g., TLE 324, CIE 754); (2) productive hypostasis, e.g., *papa-l* "of the grandfather" → *papa-l-s* (nom.) "the one of the grandfather, grandson," or in the locative *uni-al-θi* (TLE 2) "in the temple of Uni"; (3) *rideterminazione morfologica*, e.g., *hinθial teriasals* "shade of Teiresias" (TLE 88), cf. *hinθial teriasas* (TLE 30) and *hinθial patrucles* "shade of Patroclus" (TLE 295); (4) definite and indefinite accusatives (if definiteness is really the difference), e.g., *spure-ni lucairce* (TLE 131), but *cn* (acc.) *śuθi(-θ) cerixunce* (SE 39.344.14) and *sa śuθi cerixunce* (TLE 882). While all of these traits continue to be debated, they and the problems they pose for morphological analysis should have been explicitly addressed. More disappointing is the inadequate treatment of the morphological expression of semantic roles and syntactic functions. Neither previous work nor this book has considered adequately the valence structure of verbs (like Lat. *dare* versus *donare*) as a determinant in the selection of the *-s/-l* allomorphs ("genetivus dedicatorius") as opposed to the *-si/-le* allomorphs (often, as in this book, misleadingly called dative) for the recipient in dedications and gifts. *-si/-le* never occurs with *turce*, *-s/-l* never with *muluvanice* or *alice* (p

= .0007 for the *TLE* data). There is probably also a difference in case-marking between the first person pronoun and the deictic (*eca*, *ca*, *ta*, etc.): in my sample of direct objects of verbs in *-ce*, the "nom." *mi* is 9.5% of *mi* + acc. *mini*, but only accusative forms of the deictic (*ecn*, *cn*, etc.), and never nominatives, occur as direct objects ($p = .053$). Yet in the paradigms on pp. 74-75 *mi* is labeled only "nominative" and *eca*, *ca*, etc. "nominative or accusative." In regard to word order, there is a difference as well: occurrence of a deictic, but not first person pronoun, direct object in the first position in dedicatory inscriptions implies the occurrence of the verb in the second position immediately after it.

The extreme brevity of presentation sometimes results in misleading formulations. Consider the following on the aspirates (p. 66): "The voiceless stops *k*, *t*, *p* sometimes alternate with *ch*, *th*, *ph* for no apparent reason. . . . But after liquids (*sic*), *l*, *r*, *m*, *n*, we find only *ch*.⁵⁰ [Fn. 50, p. 100: "For *p* and *t* we have no examples, perhaps because none has been found (*sic*).] . . . After vowels the sounds *ch* and *c* are evidently interchangeable. . . ." All of this is difficult to square with the following data. *larce* (25x) is regular, **larχe* never occurs. The Latin transcription is *large* (CIE 2108), which, in view of the strong association of Latin *mediae* with Etruscan *tenuis* spellings, points to a phonetic value of [-asp] in this word. Furthermore, the rate of T/T^h alternation varies from word to word, e.g., *ceχa* 100%, *seχ/seχ* 34%, *anχar*- 14%. The alternation *t/θ* is also well attested, even after *r*: *larθ* 88%, *lart* 12% (and note *lartθ* at CIE 4693), *arnθ* 90%, *arni* 10%. The Latin transcription evidence should not be ignored: *Arcna*, *Vercna*, and *Carcna* are latinized as *Arginna*, *Verginna*, and *Gargennius*, but *Tarχna* is always transcribed *tarcna* never **targna*. The discussion of syncope (p. 68) should have noted the problematic cases of vowel deletion in initial syllables, e.g., *pmpu* (CIE 2626), *trce* (TLE 737), *θnχvilus* (CIE 5323), *mnrva* (CII 1062) < *Minerva*, latinized *Ptroni* (CIE 3453). It should be recognized that Etruscan syncope is a process of lexical diffusion, affecting different words at different rates, rare in many words, regular in, e.g., *atrs*. In addition to stress, there are segmental conditions: the rate of RVT/TVR > RT/TR is probably higher than TVT > TT. Morphological factors are also involved, and syncope is subject to sociolinguistic conditioning: *lautni* inscriptions appear to show a higher rate.

In the section on morphology there are similar problems. "A special ending *-sa* or *-isa* is sometimes found replacing the word 'son' and therefore indicates a patronymic, 'son of' " (p. 72). "A special double genitive indicated the grandfather . . . the special ending *-sa* or *-sla*" (p. 73). *-sa/ša* is probably best analyzed as a possessive/relational suffix added onto the genitive and *-sla* as the genitive of the resulting adjective: *-s-la*, with the same *-la* as seen in the genitive of the deictic pronoun. Forms in *-sa/ša* are not restricted to patronymics: for metonymics see TLE 105, CIE 1358, CIE 1451, for gamonymics CIE 1388, cf. CIE 1390 and 1392 for husband and son, respectively. Note also TLE 16 *casieša mi*, which cannot possibly mean *ego Caesi filius*, but is parallel to TLE 344 *puteresias kaišies* with the PN *c/kaišie* in the genitive. In fact *-sa/ša* does not always "replace" *clan*, e.g., *vel arnti aθalisa clan* (CIE 1753) and probably CIE 5405. The *-sla* ending appears only when the entire onomastic formula is genitive dependent on another word, and, furthermore, is not limited to indicating the grandfather, e.g., TLE 681 *mi cana arnθal prastnaš lavcisla* (< nom. *arnθ*

prastna laucisa). The hypothesis that *-sla* forms are papponymic apparently leads to the mistranslation (p. 136) of *TLE* 428 *mi capra calisnaś larθal śepus arnθalisla cursnialχ*: "I (am) the urn of Calisna (the son) of Larth Sepu, (grandson) of Arnth and Cursni." We actually have a complex onomastic formula: GN+PN+CN+Patr.+Metr. *calisna* is a *nomen gentile* formed with usual suffix *-na*, cf. *TLE* 191 where *calisnial* (fem.) appears after the *praenomen*. Similarly, *cursnial* is a feminine *nomen gentile* in the genitive. (Women's onomastic formulae sometimes omit the *praenomen*—Latin influence?) For confirmation note very nearly the same onomastic formula in the nominative but with the order PN+GN: *larθ calisna cursnialisa śepu* (*NRIE* 251). A similar mistranslation is given for *TLE* 126 *velθur partunas larisaliśa clan ramθas cuclnial*: "Velthur Patrunus, son of the son of Laris son of Ramtha Cuclni. . . ." The correct analysis is PN+GN+Patr.+Metr. The use of the enclitic conjunction *-c* is not obligatory with conjoined patronymic and metronymic, cf. *TLE* 797. The position of *clan* between the father's and the mother's names is not infrequent, e.g., *larisal clan cuclnial* (*CIE* 5246), and see above on *-sa/śa + clan*.

The failure to recognize the fairly frequent (particularly in the second century B.C.) inversion of the order PN+GN > GN+PN seems responsible for the mistranslation (p. 133) of *TLE* 888 *metli arnθi puia amce spitus larθal*: "Metli Arnthi was the wife of Larth's son Spitu." That *spitus larθal* must be GN+PN is proved by *TLE* 887 *spitus larθ larθal* from the same tomb; this latter Larth Spitus is either Arnthi Metli's husband or father-in-law.

It is regrettable that this book suffers from the sorts of inadequacies I have pointed out here. Nevertheless, we may hope that it might stimulate some interest in Etruscan language studies.

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WALTER MOSKALEW. *Formular Language and Poetic Design in the Aeneid*. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982 (*Mnemosyne*, Suppl. 73). Pp. xi + 273.

Repetitions in the *Aeneid* have occupied the attention of scholars from earliest times, whether they were considered as a natural and necessary imitation of the formulaic nature of Homeric verse ("epic coloration") or as evidence for the unfinished state of Vergil's epic. Since it is well known that the *Aeneid* exhibits far greater repetition than the *Eclogues* or *Georgics*, these assertions have generally been tacitly accepted.

Starting with the assumption that the high frequency of repetition in the *Aeneid* may well be the result of a difference in genre and style, Moskalew also attacks the view that repetition is merely a simple imitation of oral poetry. At times it may be, of course, or a *tibicen*, or an unconscious or necessary repetition due, for example, to similarity of action; but Moskalew has cogently argued that, in an overwhelming number of instances, repetition is a conscious, artistic endeavor to establish thematic associations via formulaic patterns on both a large and small scale. To dismiss these repetitions as insignificant or,

worse, as evidence for lack of revision is to overlook an important aspect of the *Aeneid's* artistry.

Concerning the fact that there are more repetitions in the *Aeneid* than in Vergil's other works, Moskalew concludes via a series of carefully defined, though at times complicated, statistical charts that the types of repetition within the three works are conspicuously different. There is, for example, a considerably lower ratio of longer repetitions (i.e., 5 to 6 feet) in the *Aeneid* than elsewhere, while, conversely, there is a higher ratio of shorter ones in the *Aeneid* than in the *Georgics*, but a lower one than in the *Eclogues*. Again, for example, the *Eclogues* exhibit a higher frequency of word repetition at the beginning of lines (*homoeokatarkton*) than elsewhere. This, together with a higher frequency of *homoeoteleuton*, would appear to indicate the influence of a literary tradition (e.g., the amoebaeon song and priamel of bucolic) and serve as an indication that repetition in epic need not have the same function as in bucolic, which shows a tendency from Theocritus on toward symmetry and parallelism.

On the other hand, the frequency of syllabic repetition within a short passage culminates in the *Aeneid*. This is especially effective in narrative for a variety of reasons. A good example occurs in the "Treachery of Sinon (2.229-270)," where some 18 compounds of words beginning with *in-* occur within 42 lines, which "suggests a preoccupation with that sound, as if . . . to mark the inexorable progression towards doom (p. 31)." In other words, by objective criteria Moskalew has attempted to prove as conclusively as one can in matters of literary criticism a deliberate transformation of style in Vergil's use of repetition.

In a section entitled "Repetition and the Epic Genre," Moskalew concludes that Vergil may well have been influenced by Lucretius' use of repetition to drive home crucial points and to link certain concepts, a stylistic device he terms "associative repetition." Although Apollonius seems almost anti-Homeric in his avoidance of repetition, his frequent use of variation in those that he does use implies that he was attempting to suggest Homer's style while avoiding his excess. Although Vergil doubtless benefited from his predecessors, in the intensity of his *agōn* with Homer it would be "very surprising," as Moskalew aptly notes, "if Vergil had used repetition sparingly or not at all."

Chapter Three, "Design and Texture," begins the study of the types of repetition that abound in the *Aeneid*. These are divided into two main groups, the purely decorative, or those that help "create the impression of a formulaic texture that marks the poem as epic in style," and the "referential," or "associative," which depends on the reader to recall its origin and hence to see the repetition as a part of a thematic or structural design. This type may be, for example, foreshadowing or serve to intimate contrasts as well as similarities.

The enumeration of purely decorative repetitions such as epithets, descriptions of characters, prayers, battles, sacrifices, and the like is not always particularly enlightening. It does on the whole, however, reveal that many of them are carefully constructed and not merely translations piled up to give the poem a Homeric flavor.

Repeated sound patterns also have their effectiveness, as, for example, the *homoeoteleuton* used to express the universal grief felt over the death of

Pallas, first of Acoetes (11.86):

pectora nunc foedáns pugnís, nunc unguibus óra,

and then of the horse, Aethon (11.90):

it lacrimáns guttísque umectat grandibus óra,

Whole lines repeated achieve a similar effect, such as 6.429:

abstulit atra dies et funere mersit acerbo;

used first of infants wailing at the Styx and then in Aeneas' lament over the young, slain Pallas (11.28). This is a fine example of the many cited in this section which correlate various characters or events. The abundance of meaningful repetitions cannot easily be dismissed as fortuitous.

The chapter concludes with examples of repetition serving as frames (ring composition), and with those emphasizing thematic associations (e.g., foreshadowing). A few of these at first glance seem merely formulaic and insignificant, such as 3.471:

remigium supplet, socios simul instruit armis.

and 8.80:

remigioque aptat, socios simul instruit armis.

The first is used after Helenus gives his prophecy of the sow and sends Aeneas to the Sibyl; the second, after the Tiber repeats the same prophecy (3.390-93 = 8.43-46) and sends Aeneas to Evander. As Moskalew notes, verbal repetition often occurs in analogous scenes in order to reinforce their similarities or differences.

The final chapter, "Patterns of Association," concerns Aeneas and Dido and their relationships with various other figures. One example of his approach should suffice. The formulaic phrase *stans celsa in puppi* is powerfully used to describe Augustus at Actium on Aeneas' shield, where he is pictured driving on the Italians with his gods and Penates while flames pour forth around his head (8.678 ff.). The association of Augustus with the Penates and *di magni*, of course, recalls not only Aeneas' departure from Troy (3.11 f.), but also *stans celsa in puppi*, describing Anchises as he pours a libation upon the sighting of Italy (3.525). It is no doubt significant, too, that on the eve of his departure from Carthage, Aeneas with all in readiness sleeps *celsa in puppi* (4.554), but even more so when "standing on the towering stern," Aeneas sights the beleaguered Trojan camp and lifts high his blazing shield, on whose center is emblazoned the figure of Augustus at Actium (10.260 ff.). "Thus an apparently formulaic phrase not only reinforces the links between Augustus, Aeneas, and Anchises, but by recalling the victory at Actium, it also foreshadows the victory of Aeneas in the present war" (p. 137).

The book is replete with an appendix of repetitions in all Vergil's works (an indispensable aid), a full bibliography, and an *index locorum*. Moskalew

modestly asserts that his approach in Chapter Three ("Texture and Design") "is not particularly new (p. 78)," and he dutifully acknowledges his debts on nearly every page. Far from vitiating the results of his efforts, this serves only to underscore the meticulousness of his research in this, the first general treatment of Vergil's repetitions. While not everyone will always concur with the significance of individual examples, it would be difficult to deny the importance of his research, which sheds a bright light on an aspect of Vergil's "poetic design" too long neglected and too often misunderstood.

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ROLAND MAYER. *Lucan: Civil War VIII* (edited with commentary). Warminster, England, Aris & Phillips, 1981.

The serious student and scholar of Lucan will not want to forego the excellent commentaries of Haskins (1887) and Postgate (1917) in favor of Mayer, but neither should they attempt a close, intelligent reading of Lucan's eighth book without him. Mayer, known to me for some time as an astute critic of Tacitus, brings a new and refreshing viewpoint to this book. The many quotations from Syme show his critical-historical training, as do his long introductions to the sections within the eighth book. These, along with his admirable grasp of grammar and tropes, many of which are listed in his index, are the strengths of this revised Cambridge thesis. He has indeed stayed true to his promise in the preface to address the needs and interests of the reader.

His book, however, does not seem to focus on a specific audience. Since he prints Housman's 1927 text and J. D. Duff's 1928 Loeb translation on facing pages, it is perhaps not suited to the classroom; scholars can be expected to own both Housman and Duff and so would not need them repeated. One also notes briefly that page viii must be missing since the bibliography starts with "Francken," and thus omits, very obviously, works of major importance by Ahl, Bourget, Brisset, Ehlers, Endt, and Fraenkel, among others.

The inscription from *Die Zauberflöte* is masterfully appropriate in a benevolent sense to his dedicatees, but certainly is no less appropriate, *sens. mal.*, to the subject of Book Eight, the ignominious death of Pompey:

Nur der Freundschaft Harmonie
Mildert die Beschwerden;
Ohne diese Sympathie
Ist kein Glück auf Erden.

The contrast is too good not to have been intended, and worthy of Lucan himself.

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MAURICE SARTRE. *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie*, Tome XIII, Fascicule 1: Bostra. Institut français d'archéologie du Proche-Orient, Bibliothèque archéologique et historique, tome CXIII. Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1982. Pp. 441 + 80 plates.

Bostra, the modern Busra eski-Sham in southern Syria, was the most important city of the Nabataean kingdom after Petra, and it served subsequently as the capital of the Roman province of Arabia. The city stood at the head of the inner route from the Arabian peninsula along the Wadi Sirhan. From Bostra travelers proceeded north to Damascus or west, through the Hawran, to the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean coast. The arches and the theater that survived from ancient times have long proclaimed the former splendor of the city, and visitors to the Hawran since the nineteenth century have taken due note of this major Nabataean and Roman site. The first attempt to catalogue its inscriptions was made by W. H. Waddington in his corpus entitled, like the series of which the present volume is a part, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie* (1870). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Bostra was repeatedly subjected to scholarly scrutiny, as can be seen in the accounts of its monuments and inscriptions in a succession of major publications. The most significant are R. E. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Die Provincia Arabia*, vol. 3 (1909), recording a visit in 1898; H. C. Butler, W. K. Prentice, and others, *Publications of an American Archaeological Expedition to Syria 1899-1900* (four volumes, 1903-1914), and *Publications of the Princeton University Archaeological Expedition to Syria in 1904-1905 and 1909*, produced in many confusingly numbered fascicles over a long period down to 1949.

The current series of volumes, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie*, had its origins in that same period of intense exploration in Syria at the beginning of the century. It was the outcome of a proposal by Louis Jalabert in 1905, and the first five volumes were largely the work of Jalabert himself together with René Mouterde. The presentation of this corpus was highly unsatisfactory from the beginning, and not even the fifth volume (*Émésène*), published in 1959 by Mouterde with the aid of Claude Mondésert, approached the proper epigraphical standard (cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. épig.* 1961.779). But things changed dramatically for the better with *IGLS* volumes 6 and 7, on Baalbek and Arados respectively (published in 1967 and 1970), admirably edited by J.-P. Rey-Coquais (*Bull. épig.* 1968.555; 1971.1). The lemmata, transcriptions in minuscule, apparatus, and commentary, together with introductory material on geography and history (not neglecting the reports of early travelers) were supplemented by excellent plates, indexes, and maps. In preparing his volume on Bostra, Maurice Sartre has clearly aspired to maintain the high standards set for *IGLS* by his immediate predecessor in the series. Despite all the attention lavished on this site at the turn of the century, a corpus of the inscriptions in Greek and Latin is a very welcome addition. As Sartre observes in his preface, when he began work on the project in 1969, scholars had access to only 211 of the 472 texts that now stand in the new corpus. It is important to signal here the role of the Institut Fernand-Courby at Lyons in the continuation of *IGLS* by Rey-Coquais and Sartre, and the personal encouragement of Jean Pouilloux, explicitly acknowledged by both scholars.

Sartre's corpus formed a part of a doctoral thesis, presented at Lyons in 1978, on the overall theme of Bostra and Arabia before the Islamic conquest. It proved necessary, for practical reasons, to publish the thesis in three separate parts, of which two have already appeared: the volume of *IGLS* under review and the monograph *Trois études sur l'Arabie romaine et byzantine* (Collection Latomus, 1982). The third publication will be a comprehensive history of Bostra, and this work is, according to the author, integrally connected to the corpus of inscriptions: "Ces deux volumes sont indissolublement liés et ont été conçus comme un tout" (p. 7). It is presumably because of this connection that the corpus of inscriptions lacks maps and illustrations of the site as well as a summary account of its history. In the meantime the scholarly resources for the study of Bostra have already been augmented by A. Kindler's *The Coinage of Bostra*, which appeared in 1983.

The present corpus does, however, serve the reader well in its review of archaeological and epigraphical explorations in the Hawran. The author goes astray only at the end in his treatment of the publications of the Princeton Archaeological Expedition to Syria. Since those publications were contemporaneous with the launching of the *IGLS* project and actually shared one scholar (Brünnnow), it is desirable to get the chronology straight. Sartre (pp. 25 and 28) was under the impression that the Princeton publications began in 1914 with Littmann's edition of the Nabataean inscriptions (IV.A). He also believed that the Greek and Latin inscriptions of southern Syria did not appear until 1921 (III.A). Since Jalabert and Brünnnow had agreed in 1906 to collaborate on the new corpus of Greek and Latin inscriptions of Syria, Sartre was inclined to think that Littmann deliberately confined himself to the publication of the Princeton material—instead of preparing a corpus—in deference to Jalabert and Brünnnow: "Il est probable qu'Enno Littmann ne voulut pas leur couper l'herbe sous le pied" (p. 25). That may be, but Littmann wasted no time. He brought out the first fascicle of the Greek and Latin texts (III.A.1, Ammonitis) in 1907, and subsequent fascicles appeared in rapid succession. The Bostra material (III.A.4) was in print in 1913. We learn from the preface by Magie and Stuart to III.A.2, published in 1910, that Littmann himself did not work directly on any of the Greek and Latin fascicles after the first (although his field notes were the basis of those subsequent publications). Moreover, the same preface of 1910 establishes that Brünnnow himself, then resident in Princeton, was actively participating in the preparation of the Princeton epigraphical publications. Brünnnow's work for Jalabert was, as Sartre knows, well ahead of that of his colleague, to whom he wrote in 1910 that he expected everything to be ready for publication within a year (p. 28). It is apparent that Brünnnow was helping the Princeton scholars with their work at the same time as bringing his own material for Jalabert's *IGLS* to completion.

There is therefore no reason to suppose, as Sartre does (p. 28), that Brünnnow ultimately gave up the *IGLS* project in anticipation of a forthcoming publication from Princeton. The two publications were undertaken simultaneously from 1906. Littmann's preface in III.A.1 shows that he had finished work on that fascicle by May 1907. There was evidently full cooperation on both sides through Brünnnow as a shared collaborator. The lapse of the *IGLS* enterprise must have been due to Jalabert's falling behind in the work. Meanwhile, as

Sartre points out, Brünnow kept his files up to date until his death in 1917. His *fichier* passed to the Library of Princeton University, which then sent it, after negotiation (and presumably compensation), to René Cagnat, the perpetual secretary of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Cagnat turned it over to Jalabert, who kept it in his desk for years without even looking into it. Thanks to the efforts of Mondésert, the Brünnow archive was transferred to the offices of the *Sources Chrétiennes* in Lyons after the Second World War, and in 1969 Mondésert placed the material in the care of the Institut Fernand-Courby, where Sartre was able to study it.

Anyone who has ever worked with ancient inscriptions on basalt will know what a formidable task confronted Sartre in preparing his corpus for Bostra. In more than doubling the number of known texts he has had to devote immense labor to the often frustrating work of deciphering faint letters on basalt blocks, and he deserves the gratitude of every scholar of the Roman Near East. He has provided excellent photographs of most of the texts he has published, whether known before or not. The Greek texts are clearly presented in majuscule and, whenever possible, in minuscule. It would have been helpful to have diplomatic transcripts of the Latin texts too. The absence of a majuscule text can sometimes cause confusion: for example, nos. 9017 and 9018 are printed, without a photograph, as *Vict(oria) | Aug[ug(ustorum duorum)]*. It would be helpful to be told explicitly that the stone reads VICT | AVGG with the second G erased, instead of having to infer this. *Damnatio* by erasing one letter is an interesting phenomenon, on which Sartre is silent. (Cf. *ILS* 434-36 [one G deleted in AVGGG]).

The commentary on the Bostra texts is consistently helpful and concise. But there are occasional problems in the area of Roman institutions and history. For example, in elucidating the AVGG of nos. 9017 and 9018, Sartre says that Commodus took the title of Augustus only at the death of Marcus, but this is not true (cf. *ILS* 375, 376, 1326, 1494). The same error occurs on page 123 in the commentary on no. 9051. There is no note anywhere on *officialis* as a title in Greek, despite its appearance in nos. 9046 (ll. 25-26), 9083, and 9088. The famous inscription, now lost, of Flavius Maximus, a soldier of the III Cyrenaica who died in Mesopotamia, does not receive the attention it requires. This text, published by Waddington after a copy by Berggren as no. 1927 (it is no. 9396 in Sartre), is shown as dated to the year 215, which in the era of Bostra comes out to A.D. 320/1. Sartre observes that the circumstances on the Euphrates at that time are unknown. But the reader needs to be told that the letters providing the numeral for the year have been read as yielding either 115 or 215. Waddington (p. 465) did not choose between the possibilities. The option 115 produces, by the Bostran era, the far more plausible date of A.D. 220/1, as Ritterling emphasized in *RE* 12.2.1513. The III Cyrenaica may be supposed to have fought in the Parthian War of Caracalla and Macrinus. The inscription explicitly states that Maximus' bones lie in Bostra, and hence they must have been brought back from the Euphrates.

In the area of onomastics, the new Bostra corpus provides a rich harvest, and one could wish that Sartre showed as much interest in names as Littmann had in publishing the Princeton material. We may hope, however, that the forthcoming book on Bostra will include a treatment of the names. No. 9022

reveals a Salmos, for which compare *CIS* II.3970. Two of the names in no. 9028 deserve some analysis: Ambreilis and Ouaros. Ambreilis is the same name as Amreilios in nos. 9084, 9104, 9234, and 9411. The reduction of an -ios termination to -is is well attested (although apparently unfamiliar to Sartre, who treats Ioulis and Ioulios as different on p. 75). The Semitic name behind Amreilios/Ambreilis is ^cmr² l (cf. Jaussen-Savignac, *Mission archéologique en Arabie*, vol. II [1914] 202, no. 265). Likewise, the name appears in F. V. Winnett and G. Lankester Harding, *Inscriptions from Fifty Safaitic Cairns* (1978), nos. 69, 521, 671. It might also be noted that Ouaros is not the Roman Varus, but Semitic w^cr (Winnett and Lankester Harding, op. cit., nos. 1274, 1277, 2642, 3593 [cf. Waddington, no. 2114]). There is much to be said about Raoua in no. 9244. This is Semitic rwḥ (cf. *CIS* 5.4169 and Winnett and Lankester Harding, nos. 1111, 1118, 1139, 1142, 1151). In Nabataean it appears as rwḥw, read by Littmann as Rawāḥ (*Princeton Arch. Exp. Syria* IV.A, no. 43, pp. 41-42). The names in no. 9110 are particularly notable: Authos, Zaggos, Moaieros, and Go-saimos. For Authos, see Waddington, nos. 2019 and 2024, as well as no. 9321 in the present collection. The Semitic name is ^cwt (^cwtw in Nabataean), and the lengthened form with ²l occurs in Greek as Authallos (cf. Milik, *Syria* 35 [1958] 227, and no. 9296 in Sartre). Zaggos is ṣg²: Winnett and Lankester Harding, nos. 2145 and 2400 (cf. Greek forms in Waddington, nos. 226 and 2511). For Moaieros see Waddington, nos. 1920 and 2366, representing m^cyr(w). Go-saimos is more difficult but seems to be ^csm (cf. forms Asemos and Asimos in Cantineau, *Le nabatéen* II [1932] 134).

In several places it must be said that Sartre has succeeded in improving the readings of Littmann, especially in nos. 9027 and 9430. Sartre's presentations of the verses in 9434 and 9435 are a superb lesson in the folly of the wholesale restoration of metrical texts. No. 9434 (a new text) is an almost complete copy of a dactylic epitaph known only in part before (the text of no. 9435). The efforts of earlier writers, notably W. Peek, to complete the partial text are shown to have been totally in vain (Cf. *Bull. épig.* 1973.501).

On no. 9179 and the problem of legions in Arabia and surrounding provinces in the early second century, an important discussion, superseding all others, was not yet available to Sartre in preparing his commentary. This is D. L. Kennedy's paper, "*Legio VI Ferrata: The Annexation and Early Garrison of Arabia*," *HSPh* 84 (1980) 283-309. Errors in transcription are, as far as I can see, very rare. In no. 9024 the masculine definite article has been dropped accidentally before *ke*, as the photograph shows. In no. 9412 the majuscule text omits the omicron at the beginning of line 2, and in the Nabataean of this bilingual text, *nyh* should be *nyh²* and *dmtryt* should be *dmtrys*. But these are inconsequential slips in a work of immense complexity. Sartre's corpus of Bostra inscriptions will be indispensable for all serious study of the Roman East, and we may be grateful, as we examine such rich but difficult material, that the indexes are so full and reliable. This is overall an achievement of lasting value.

G. W. BOWERSOCK

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
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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

POLYBIUS ON ROMAN WOMEN AND PROPERTY

... the major defects of many early codes ... indeed of much written law altogether, for they try to reduce complex transactions to simple sentences, turning the intricate rites and processes of marriage or death into a terse and partial statement of a limited range of legal rights and duties. The anthropologist would happily exchange a detailed description of a marriage, particularly of a trouble case, for the sketchy formulations of enquiring scribes.

—J. R. Goody¹

As far as Roman women were concerned, the laws governing their access to property altered little from the institution of the Twelve Tables in the mid-fifth century B.C. to the end of the Republic. It is, however, soon apparent to the reader of late Republican literature—notably the letters and speeches of Cicero—that the upper class Roman matron enjoyed considerable independence in practice in the later period. Some fundamental change in the intervening centuries is indicated, but the concentration of evidence at the later end of the spectrum makes it difficult to trace a development which might well have been gradual and reflected more in changing economic circumstances or unrecorded notions of family obligation than in formal law.

The essence of the woman's position in Roman law was that she could never technically become a free agent.² In his account of the de-

¹J. R. Goody, *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe* (Cambridge 1983) 247.

²That is, until Augustus' legislation granting freedom from *tutela* to women who gained the *ius liberorum*. See note 12 below. For a summary of law on the subject, see B. Kübler, "Das Intestaterbrecht der Frauen im alten Rom," *ZSS* 41 (1920) 15-43; S. Pomeroy, "The Relationship of the Married Woman to her Blood Relatives in Rome," *Ancient Society* 7 (1976) 215-27; J. A. Crook, "Women in Roman Succession," in B. Rawson (ed.), *The Family in Ancient Rome: Select Studies* (in press).

More general treatments are to be found in J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome* (London 1967) ch. 4; J. LeGall, "Un critère de différenciation sociale. La situation de la

bate in 195 B.C. about restrictions on female luxury, Livy has Cato, as consul, say:

maiores nostri nullam ne privatam quidem rem agere feminas sine tutore auctore voluerunt, in manu esse parentium, fratrum, virorum.³

This is a reference, in suitably rhetorical form, to the institutions of *patria potestas*, *tutela agnatorum*, and *manus mariti*.

Apart from the unusual procedure of emancipation, Roman males remained in *patria potestate* until the death of their fathers, when they became *sui iuris*, able to own and dispose of property in their own right.⁴ Daughters, too, became *sui iuris* in these circumstances, but they acquired a *tutor* whose permission (*auctoritas*) was required for major pledges or transfers of property, such as the promise of dowry or making a will. Male children were subject to such a restriction until the age of fourteen, but women *sui iuris* required a *tutor* (or *tutores*) for life. They remained in *tutela perpetua*, unless they were Vestal priestesses.⁵ If a woman underwent the ceremonial marriage of *confarreatio*, the "imaginary sale" of *coemptio*, or the customary procedure of *usus*, she passed into the *manus* of her husband or father-in-law. This placed her legally on the same footing as her own daughter.⁶ The husband's death would render her *sui iuris*, but subject again to a *tutor*.

The Roman notion of family-based property ownership underpins this system.⁷ The *paterfamilias* was the only person in his immediate family with full legal rights to own and dispose of property. At the same time, there is a sense in which he was always viewed as the lifelong trustee of a continuing concern. His children, like his wife *in manu*, were termed *sui heredes* and inherited equally on his intestate death, which rendered them all *sui iuris*.⁸ Within this rather static, land-based

femme," *Recherches sur les structures sociales dans l'antiquité classique* (Paris 1970) 276-77; A. Chastagnol, "Les femmes dans l'ordre sénatorial. Titulature et rang social à Rome," *Revue Historique* 103 (1979) 3-28.

³ Liv. 34.2.11.

⁴ Gai. 1.55, 127 (= *Inst.* 1.12 *pr.*) and compare Aul. Gell. *NA* 2.12; Dion. Halic. 2.26.

⁵ Gai. 1.144-45. Vestals were also freed from *patria potestas*, *NA* 1.12.18.

⁶ Gai. 1.109-13, 3.3.

⁷ On this in general, see Crook (note 2 above, 1967) and H. F. Jolowicz, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge 1932-65) ch. 14.

⁸ Gai. 3.3. The principle was extrapolated much later by the jurist Paul: "etiam vivo patre quodammodo domini existimantur . . . itaque post mortem patris non hereditatem percipere videntur sed magis liberam bonorum administrationem consequuntur," in *Dig.* 28.2.11.

view of property and ownership, women represented a dangerously dynamic element, for on marriage they took part of the family holding with them in the form of dowry. If they passed into the *manus* of a husband or father-in-law, as was apparently usual until the second century B.C.,⁹ they virtually changed families, transferring membership to a different inheritance network. The *tutor* or *tutores* assigned an orphaned daughter or widow *sui iuris* were originally the intestate heir(s) of the woman in question.¹⁰ They provided a safeguard against the deterioration of what was still seen as "family" property.

The institution of *tutela mulierum perpetua* continued its "legal" existence until the late third century A.D.,¹¹ although legislative emendations and praetorian practice reduced even its formal importance long before its disappearance from desuetude.¹² Again, it is evident from the later literature that the *tutor mulieris* ceased at some point to exercise effective control over female disposition of property.¹³ Livy's account of the controversial rescission in 195 B.C. of the wartime austerity measure limiting female access to luxury goods, and references to the passing of the *lex Voconia* in 169–68 B.C.,¹⁴ suggest that second century B.C. feelings ran high on the subject of women's access to property.

⁹ See, e.g., A. Watson, *The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic* (Oxford 1967) 25.

¹⁰ *Dig.* 50.17.73 *pr.* (Q. Mucius Scaevola); Gai. 1.155, 165; Ulpian 11.3–6; *Dig.* 26.4.1 *pr.* (Ulpian).

¹¹ Longer in Roman Egypt. See J. Modrzejewski, "A propos de la tutelle dative des femmes dans l'Égypte romaine," *Akten d. XIII Intern. Papyrologenkongresses* (Munich 1974) 263–93. The last recorded example elsewhere is in *Vat. Frag.* 325 (A.D. 293–94). It is not mentioned in the Theodosian code. See E. Sachers *RE* 2¹ vol. 7a.2 on *tutela*, esp. cols. 1598–99.

¹² The first recorded instance of *optio tutoris* is Liv. 39.19.5 (186 B.C.). This could be granted a wife *in manu* by her husband's testament. By Gaius' day, it could be a single choice of *tutor* for life or the right to change *tutores* at will. A reluctant *tutor* could also be taken before the praetor and ordered to grant *auctoritas* (Gai. 1.190, 150–54). Augustus introduced the *ius liberorum*, freeing mothers of three or four children from *tutela* (Gai. 1.145, 194). Claudius abolished the agnatic *tutela* of women (Gai. 1.171, 157; Ulpian 11.8). After this, the stricter form of *tutela*—*tutela legitima*—applied only to *libertae* in the *tutela* of a patron or *ingenuae* in the *tutela* of an emancipating father or grandfather. They could be released even from this by the *ius liberorum* (Gai. 1.192).

¹³ Consider Cic. *Mur.* 27: "mulieres omnis propter infirmitatem consilii maiores in tutorum potestate voluerunt; hi invenerunt genera tutorum quae potestate mulierum continerentur."

¹⁴ Liv. 34.1–8 (the rescission of the *lex Oppia*); Liv. *per.* 41; Aul. Gell *NA* 17.6.1 (the passing of the *l. Voconia*).



Tantalizingly, though, we are given little hard information for this transitional period.

Polybius' account (31.26-28¹⁵) of the dispositions of Scipio Aemilianus and his family connections is therefore invaluable. It is, to be sure, concerned with a small circle and somewhat colored by the aim of highlighting Aemilianus' extraordinary generosity.¹⁶ It nonetheless gives us that rarity, the concrete example, for Polybius specifies figures for dowries and inheritances. His narrative throws some light on contemporary Roman notions of "proper" family obligation and the machinery of dotal payments and repayments, the type of subject normally excluded by historians because of its mundane character¹⁷ and the universal tendency to assume that stock social practices are too familiar to the audience to require elucidation.

Polybius, though, had an interest in explaining the Romans to the Greek world¹⁸ and firsthand or close knowledge of the people and events he describes in these passages.¹⁹ G. Boyer has reviewed their yield for the laws of succession.²⁰ They are equally valuable for other aspects of property transmission and throw some light on the relationship between legal definition and social norms. They help us plot the change over time in the capacity of Roman women to dispose of property, and to place the development in the context of the increased luxury and relative concentration of wealth in the hands of heiresses, which followed the Second Punic War and the ensuing lucrative warfare in the eastern Mediterranean.

¹⁵ = 32.12-14. The text cited throughout is that of T. Büttner-Wobst (Leipzig 1904).

¹⁶ Consider Polyb. 31.25.9.

¹⁷ Livy virtually apologizes for interrupting his account of serious business—wars—with the trivial affair of the *l. Oppia* debate 34.1.1: "inter bellorum magnorum aut vixdum finitorum aut imminentium curas intercessit res parva dictu." And witness Pliny's contrast of the proper subjects of history and oratory respectively *Ep.* 5.8.9. Tac. *Ann.* 13.31 is on the same lines.

¹⁸ Consider 31.26.9 and 31.27.10 (quoted below), where he explains the usual Roman practice, to throw into relief Scipio's generosity.

¹⁹ He points out (31.22.8) that many readers would be in a position to expose gross distortions in the narrative.

²⁰ G. Boyer, "Le droit successoral romain dans les oeuvres de Polybe," *RIDA* 4 (1950) 169-87.

Honourable Debts and Dispositions

In 162 B.C. the elder Aemilia, widow of Scipio Africanus maior, died, leaving her adoptive grandson,²¹ Scipio Aemilianus, a "sizable fortune."²² This must mean that his adoptive father had died, for if the "father" had still been alive, Scipio Aemilianus would have been a *filius familias* (i.e., *in patria potestate*), and the fortune, even if left to him, would have been subsumed in that of his *paterfamilias*, Scipio Africanus. He would not then have been legally able to determine its use in the independent way described.

Immediately after Aemilia's funeral, Aemilianus bestowed on his natural mother, Papiria, the opulent religious equipage which had belonged to his adoptive grandmother. As wife, then widow of Scipio Africanus maior, Aemilia must have been one of the wealthiest women in Rome. She attended the women's religious processions arrayed in costly clothes, in an ostentatiously decorated carriage, and attended by the great number of slaves required to carry her many religious implements, which were all of gold and silver.²³ Henceforth Scipio's own mother, Papiria, was able to enjoy being the center of the display, which thus became a parade not merely of wealth but of filial piety.

The gift was made the more memorable by the fact that Papiria, divorced from her distinguished husband and living in relatively straitened circumstances, had until now absented herself from such occasions because of her inability to cut a figure in keeping with her rank.²⁴ The other women celebrants were impressed by Scipio's gesture, and his fame accordingly spread quickly because, says Polybius, of the well-known feminine penchant for gossip.²⁵ The historian also stresses

²¹ P. Scipio Aemilianus was the son of L. Aemilius Paullus, the hero of Pydna, and of one Papiria. Paullus divorced her some time before 181 B.C. and had two sons by a subsequent marriage. He then allowed the sons of the first marriage to be adopted: the elder, Quintus, into the family of the Fabii Maximi, the other by his (Paullus') first cousin P. Cornelius Scipio. In the event, his younger sons died in 167 B.C. Scipio Aemilianus was thus the nephew by birth of Aemilia, wife of Scipio Africanus maior, and became her grandson by adoption before the series of incidents examined in this paper. See A. E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967) ch. 2.

²² οὐσία μεγάλη (31.26).

²³ 31.26.3.

²⁴ 31.26.6-7.

²⁵ . . . , ἄτε τοῦ τῶν γυναικῶν γένους καὶ λόλου καὶ κατακοροῦς ὄντος, ἐφ' ὃ τι ἂν ὀρμήσῃ (31.26.10). Polybius sees no irony in making this observation while himself passing on the tale.

that such munificence, notable anywhere, made a particularly striking impression on the stingy Romans, who never gave anything away if they could help it—even, one gathers, to their own mothers.²⁶

On his death in ca. 184 B.C., Scipio Africanus maior had apparently left his widow, Aemilia, and possibly his sons, as his heirs. That he had made a will is indicated by his distinct provision for his two daughters, that each should take fifty talents with her into her marriage.²⁷ If there had been no will, the daughters would have inherited equally with their mother and brothers according to the rules of intestate succession.²⁸

In due course, the elder Cornelia married P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, and the younger sister married Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. Aemilia had paid out twenty-five talents to each son-in-law at the time of marriage but had left the remainder owing at the time of her death. Scipio Aemilianus, as her heir, became responsible for its payment, some twenty-two years after the death of Scipio Africanus maior.

Aemilia's part in the arrangements is interesting, and throws some light on the capacity of women of the period to conduct business. Unfortunately, the whole matter of the betrothal of the two Corneliae is a source of some confusion. Romantic stories later circulated to the effect that both were voted dowries at state expense,²⁹ that the Senate refused to allow Africanus to return to Rome from Spain during the Second Punic War to arrange his elder daughter's marriage, which was therefore determined instead by his wife and his male relations in council,³⁰ and that the younger Cornelia was betrothed on the insistence of fellow-senators in appreciation of the dramatic reconciliation of Gracchus and

²⁶ 31.26.9. . . . , ἐν δὲ Ῥώμῃ καὶ θαυμαστόν· ἀπλῶς γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ δίδωσι τῶν ἰδίων ὑπαρχόντων ἑκὼν οὐδέν.

²⁷ 31.27. Polybius here equates the drachma with the denarius. Thus, each portion was worth HS 1,200,000 in cash. See F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 3 (Oxford 1979) 506. The provision could have taken the form either of a *legatum per damnationem*, a legally enforceable charge on the estate, or of the less formal *fideicommissum*, that is, an instruction to one or all heirs to pay out the sum when the time came. See discussion below and note 37. Boyer argued that it was a *legatum per damnationem*, i.e., a debt charged to the heir of the estate.

²⁸ As *sui heredes*. See, for example, Just. *Inst.* 3.1.1-2; Gai. 3.3. One daughter might have been married and *in manu mariti* at the time of his death; see discussion below.

²⁹ E.g., Sen. *Contr.* 5.2.3; Sen. (younger) *Cons. ad Helv.* 12.6; *NA* 12.8.1-4.

³⁰ Val. Max. 4.4.10.

Scipio Africanus.³¹ That the daughters were dowered from the public treasury is a late fabrication which may be discounted. The tale of the elder Cornelia's betrothal could contain some element of truth; it might have been arranged in Africanus' absence with the family *consilium* following his guidelines.

When the more fantastic flights of fancy are overlooked, there remains the question of whether Africanus himself betrothed both daughters and agreed to the dowry. The question continues to be debated,³² and, though the distinction between the date of marriage and betrothal has not always been given its due, the weight of opinion has been that the elder daughter was betrothed shortly before Africanus' death, and the younger soon after it. As I have observed, this need not preclude Aemilia's part in the former compact. Even if Africanus was in Rome and responsible legally for the betrothal, Aemilia might well have been party to it. The anecdote about the second betrothal, which represents Aemilia's offended fury at her exclusion from the decision, does at least suggest that a wife expected to play an active part in the business,³³ while Scipio's testamentary dispositions bound her to the disbursement of huge sums from her inheritance, so it is plausible that she was consulted as to the financial provisions for the match, as well as the simple choice of partner.

Plutarch claims to have Polybius' authority for the view that the younger Cornelia was betrothed by her family after Africanus' death:

³¹ Liv. 38.57; Plut. *Tib. Gr.* 4.2 ff. tells the story of the younger Tiberius' betrothal in the following generation to the daughter of Appius Claudius, though he knows the version Livy imparts.

³² For earlier discussions, see Th. Mommsen, "Die Skipionenprozess," *Römische Forschungen* 2 (Berlin 1864) 417-510; J. Carcopino, "Le mariage de Corneille," *Autour des Gracques* (Paris 1928) 47-83, esp. 62 ff., and F. Münzer, s.v. "Cornelia" *RE* 2¹, vol. 4.1 (1901-1958) cols. 1592-95. The controversy has been revived in recent years and has attracted the attention of Boyer (note 20 above) 173; Walbank (note 27 above) (1967) vol. 2, 508; A. H. Bernstein, *Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus: Tradition and Apostasy* (Ithaca 1978) 29-30; D. Earl, *Tiberius Gracchus: A Study in Politics* (Brussels-Berchem 1963) 54-58; and K. M. Moir, "Pliny *HN* 7.57 and the Marriage of Tiberius Gracchus," *CQ* 33.1 (1983) 136-45.

³³ See the discussion in J. E. Phillips, "Roman Mothers and the Lives of Their Adult Daughters," *Helios* n.s. 6.1 (1978) 69-80, esp. 70, and S. Dixon, "A Family Business: Women's Role in Patronage and Politics at Rome 80-44 B.C.," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 34 (1983) 105.

καὶ Πολύβιος μετὰ τὴν Σκηπίωνος Ἀφρικανοῦ τελευτὴν τοὺς οἰκείους
φησὶν ἐκ πάντων προκρίσαντας τὸν Τιβέριον δοῦναι τὴν Κορνηλίαν, ὡς
ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνέκδοτον καὶ ἀνέγγυον ἀπολειφθεῖσαν. (*Tib. Gr.* 4.3)

But no such passage has come down to us. This raises the question of whether a man would make provision in his will for his daughter's dowry without knowing the identity of her future husband. Though some modern scholars might balk at the idea,³⁴ Boyer cites examples (necessarily from a much later period) of just such bequests, made in the form of a *legatum per damnationem*, that is, a legacy incumbent on the heir.³⁵ In the case of daughters, who, if *in patria potestate* at the time of the testator's death, were *sui heredes*, this would require prior exheredation, a form which Boyer shows to have been employed elsewhere.³⁶ Such a legacy would name the daughter herself as legatee, since an unidentified prospective son-in-law, being an *incerta persona*, could not formally be the beneficiary, although he would take possession of the sum and have full *dominium* of it in the course of the projected marriage.

An alternative possibility would have been the less formal *fideicommissum*, whereby Africanus enjoined Aemilia personally or in his will to pass on the agreed amount. A *fideicommissum* was not legally enforceable, but a moral charge on the good faith (*fides*) of the heir.³⁷ Further, it should be pointed out that, if Africanus had (as seems almost certain) made a promise of dowry (*dotis promissio* or *dicio*), this constituted an enforceable debt at law, which was a charge on the estate even if he had made no specific provision in the will. On the whole, Boyer's suggestion that the daughters were exheredated and then named as legatees seems the best. A legacy should, strictly speaking, be paid out when the will had been approved and the estate valued, but the legacy of a dowry could be subject to a separate dotal pact, which might impose other conditions of payment.

³⁴ E.g., Bernstein (note 32 above) 30.

³⁵ Boyer (note 20 above) 175 and note.

³⁶ E.g., *Dig.* 31.77.9. A daughter, as a *sua heres* (*Inst.* III.1.1-2), must formally be disinherited if she were not named as heir (*Inst.* II.13)—though daughters, unlike sons, need not be exheredated by name.

³⁷ See Just. *Inst.* II.23.1 for Republican practice (and cf. Cic. *de fin.* II.xvii.54 ff.). From the time of Augustus, the *fideicommissum* became enforceable at law. On this, see D. Daube, *Roman Law: Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects* (Edinburgh 1969) 96-102.

The dates of the two subsequent marriages, though also subject to argument, can be determined approximately by working back from the later careers of the sons born to the unions. Scipio Nasica Serapio, son of the elder Cornelia and Nasica Corculum, held the consulship in 138 B.C.³⁸ Assuming a minimum age of 42 for this office,³⁹ the latest date of the marriage must be 180 B.C.

The younger Cornelia's marriage is less easy to date. Tiberius Gracchus, her son, was not quite 30 years old when he was killed in 133 B.C.⁴⁰ It was general, if not rigid, practice for the oldest son to be given his father's *praenomen*.⁴¹ The testimony of Pliny the Elder—

item alii aliaque feminas tantum generant aut mares, plerumque et alternant, sicut Gracchorum mater duodeciens. . . . (HN 7.57)

—has in the past been taken to mean that Cornelia had had a child a year, alternating the sexes each time, for twelve years. This interpretation, taken with the birth date of Tiberius, supports Mommsen's favored marriage date of 165 B.C.⁴² It has, however, been established by Moir that *alternant* in this context is more likely to mean that Cornelia produced daughters first, then sons. By careful reconstruction of the elder Tiberius' absences abroad, she has shown that the marriage must have taken place in 183–180 B.C., 178/7 B.C., or late in 176 B.C.⁴³

The situation, then, was that Scipio's elder daughter had been betrothed in his lifetime, and probably at his instigation, to Tib. Sempronius Gracchus. Aemilia might have played a part in the decision, but the formal promise of dowry, and therefore the debt, was Scipio's. On his death, Aemilia became liable for its payment. She subsequently joined with relations to arrange the betrothal of her younger daughter. The amount of dowry had already been set by Scipio's will, but the method of payment could have been settled by Aemilia by means of a

³⁸ S.v. "Cornelius," *RE* 2¹ vol. 12.2 (1900–1958).

³⁹ After A. E. Astin, *The Lex Annalis Before Sulla* (Brussels 1958) *Collection Latomus* 32.

⁴⁰ Plu. *Gai. Gr.* 1.2. In 147 B.C. when Tiberius, then about 16, went to Carthage, one sister was already married to Scipio Aemilianus Plu. *Tib. Gr.* 4.4.

⁴¹ Walbank (note 27 above) 508 and Earl (note 32 above) 57–58 point out that other sons could have preceded him, but died before he was born.

⁴² Mommsen (note 32 above)

⁴³ K. M. Moir (note 32 above) esp. 137 on *alternant*, and 139 on the possible dates of marriage. I am very grateful to Ms. Moir for drawing her article to my attention before it reached Australian libraries.

dotal pact with Sempronius Gracchus. By the time of her death ca. 162 B.C., she had paid the same sum — half of the agreed total — to each son-in-law.⁴⁴ If, as Mommsen argued, the younger Cornelia was married ca. 165 B.C., it would not be remarkable that half the dowry was still outstanding. A marriage date of 178–76 B.C. makes it more surprising. If both daughters were married by 181 B.C. — and the elder Cornelia certainly was — the delay is extraordinary. It is also noteworthy that the two husbands expected to be paid at the same time, and under the same conditions, although they were married at different times.

The conclusion is inescapable that the original compact stipulated that half of the dowry should be paid, not in any fixed number of years, but on the death of Aemilia the elder, whenever that might take place.⁴⁵ If the original agreement with Nasica Corculum had been concluded by Scipio Africanus, the condition might well have been laid down by him. It represents, in effect, the guarantee that a sum of money — fifty talents in all — should be held by Aemilia for her lifelong use, then passed on to her daughters, or, strictly speaking, for her daughters. If the sum were not so great, I would suspect it of being Aemilia's own dowry, but if her brother left only sixty talents,⁴⁶ even after his lucrative military campaigns, it is highly improbable that Aemilia, married at a time when fortunes were generally less, should have had such a large portion.⁴⁷ The sum represents, instead, a rather involved form of mother-daughter succession.

From Manus Mariti to Merry Widowhood?

It is generally conceded that Roman matrons of the early Republic tended to be *in manu mariti* (or *soceris*): the Twelve Tables rules of intestate succession presuppose that women normally changed status on marriage. It is also a commonplace that it had by the early imperial period become usual for women to retain their former status and family membership after marriage, though the question of just when this

⁴⁴ 32.13.3.

⁴⁵ Vid. also Walbank (note 27 above) 507 on 31.27.5.

⁴⁶ 31.28.3; Plut. Aem. P. 39.5.

⁴⁷ Especially in view of the death of her father at Cannae 216 B.C., a time of economic hardship at Rome (Polyb. 3.107–17); Liv. 22.38–50; Hor. Carm. 1.12.38; and see *Kleine Pauly* (1964) entry no. 23, col. 93.

change became general continues to be debated.⁴⁸ The development tends to be associated with the greater independence displayed by the women of the very late Republic and early Empire in financial affairs and the decline of *tutela mulierum perpetua*.⁴⁹

It is, therefore, notable that in his account of the family fortunes of the Aemilii Paulli and the Cornelia Scipiones, Polybius apparently assumes that both generations of women were *in manu mariti*. Witness his statement that the elder Aemilia had shared in her husband's wealth,⁵⁰ and her succession to his estate—suggestive, if not conclusive. Aemilianus' sisters, the younger Aemiliae, both lived after marriage in the homes of their fathers-in-law.⁵¹ Polybius' insistence that the younger Aemiliae had no claim at law on their mother's estate⁵² implies that they had passed formally into a different family grouping on marriage.

It is difficult to reconstruct the practical effects, for the wife, of being *in manu mariti*. Cato (maior)'s complaint about wifely independence—preserved for its philological interest from his speech in support of the *l. Voconia* 169–68 B.C.⁵³—suggests that women could lend money at will and become their husbands' creditors. This presumably refers to wives not *in manu mariti*, but it does raise the possibility that even the “merged” matrimonial regime was less one-sided than the bare legal rules suggest.

It is evident that, once her husband's death rendered her *sui iuris*, a woman owned property, made wills, and created obligations. The great difference between Aemilia, wife of Scipio Africanus maior, and Terentia, wife of Cicero, was Aemilia's widowed status. Perhaps a second century B.C. noble matron had to wait until her husband died before achieving the independence that a late Republican matron gained on the death of her father. In neither period does the *tutor* seem to have presented any effective bar to the woman's activities.

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Pomeroy (note 2 above) 222; Watson (note 9 above) 25; Corbett, *The Roman Law of Marriage* (1930) 90–91; Crook (note 2 above, 1967) 103–4.

⁴⁹ Although, as Crook (note 2 above, 1967) 103–4 points out, the trend does not necessarily imply greater female independence. Cf. F. Schulz, *Classical Roman Law* (Oxford 1951) par. 200.

⁵⁰ 31.26.2, where the reference to her οὐσία μεγάλη and her splendid equipage is soon followed by the explanation ὅτε συνηκμακυῖαν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ τῇ Σκιπίωνος.

⁵¹ E.g., Pol. 31.26; Val. Max. 4.4.8; Plut. *Aem.* 5; *Cato mai.* 24.

⁵² ... ἀπέδωκε ταῖς ἀδελφαῖς, ἥς οὐδὲν αὐταῖς προσῆκε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (31.28.8).

⁵³ By Aulus Gellius *NA* 17.6, on *servus recepticius*. Cato's speech survived for several centuries—Liv. *per.* 41.

If the women of the earlier period were not as actively engaged during marriage in property and financial dealings,⁵⁴ they might have leaned more on the advice of male relations when they became *sui iuris* as widows in later life. Much would presumably depend on the standing and character of the woman in question, and perhaps on her age. Cato maior allegedly told his son that it was the act of a widow to live off income without improving capital.⁵⁵ His moral, that a man should aim at increasing (preferably doubling) his patrimony, was probably eccentric in his own day and class, but the example of the widow who ran down her inheritance might have represented a contemporary notion of characteristic female behavior.

The information we have is limited. It tells us, in effect, that Aemilia (maior) chose her own means of displaying her wealth and of disposing of it by testament, in addition to observing her duty to her daughters in accordance with custom and their father's wishes. She acted, in short, much as a man of her station might have done, in incurring, honoring, or passing on by testament fairly routine obligations—inadequate material on which to base any generalizations about the operation of *tutela mulierum* at the time. She does not seem in practice to have had any difficulty in doing exactly as she wished with her fortune, but then her age and distinction might well have placed her in a special category, while her financial dispositions were so conventional that they could scarcely have aroused the opposition of the most conservative *tutor*. It would have been more suggestive if she had left her fortune to a handsome gladiator. As it is, her example is fairly neutral.

Dowry and Daughters' Inheritance

Aemilianus' subsequent discharge of the honorable debt inherited from Aemilia appears in a new light in view of the fact that at least one

⁵⁴ As their later equivalents, that is. Cicero's wife, Terentia, owned woodlands (*Att.* 2.4.5), a source of quick profit, and rented pasturage (*Att.* 2.15.4). She sold a *vicus* during Cicero's exile, and against his advice (*Fam.* 14.1.5). Pliny's mother-in-law, Pompeia Celerina, owned profitable estates in various districts (*Plin. Ep.* 1.4.1; 6.10.1) and appears to have had complete control over them.

⁵⁵ *Plut. Cat. mai.* 21.8: προτρέπων δὲ τὸν υἱὸν ἐπὶ ταῦτα φησιν οὐκ ἄνδρός, ἀλλὰ χήρας γυναικὸς εἶναι τὸ μειῶσαι τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων. ἐκεῖνο δ' ἤδη σφοδρότερον τοῦ Κάτωνος, ὅτι θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα καὶ θεῖον εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησε πρὸς δόξαν, ὃς ἀπολείπει πλέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὃ προσέθηκεν οὐ παρέλαβεν. Plutarch felt this was going too far, whether because of the vulgarity of the notion or the blasphemy of the expression is not clear.

marriage had preceded the final payment of the dowry by some twenty years. Intent on highlighting Scipio's generosity, Polybius spells out for the reader the usual Roman method of payment, whereby τὰ ἐπίπλα⁵⁶ were handed over within ten months of the marriage, but the monetary portion of the dowry was paid in three annual installments:

κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους, δέον ἐν τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα χρήματα τῆς φερνῆς ταῖς γυναιξί, προδοθέντων πρώτων τῶν ἐπίπλων εἰς δέκα μῆνας κατὰ τὸ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔθος. (31.27.5)

Interestingly, this statement of contemporary Roman custom accords with evidence for much later practice. Cicero's payment of Tullia's dowry to Dolabella (49–47 B.C.) was made in three annual installments, and Ulpian laid down the rule in the second century A.D. that in case of divorce, dotal moneys should be repaid in two or three annual installments, while real property should be handed over immediately, unless some other method had been stipulated.⁵⁷

It is true, then, that it was probably *usual* to pay the cash constituent of dowry in annual sections, but there was always the possibility of making a separate arrangement—even Ulpian's rule merely set an outside limit on repayment, and the conditions were neither uniform nor binding. Rather like wills, dowry agreement might follow common patterns, but there was a great deal of room for individual variation. This particular dowry payment represents an eccentric variation in the time which elapsed between the earlier payment or payments, certainly the result of a prior agreement. The "rule" was thus the merest guiding principle, quite without legal force, and its invocation by Polybius is misleading in its specific implications.

Polybius exploited the dramatic potential of the situation. He depicts Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica Corculum arriving simultaneously at Aemilianus' banker's to collect an initial payment, only to be presented with the full amount owing. Unable to believe that the banker was acting on instruction, they then sought out Aemilianus. Even when Aemilianus himself assured them that there had been no error and that this was his particular wish, they insisted that he should exercise his right to make use of the sum for as long as possible; but

⁵⁶ In papyri, this usually signifies such personal items as clothing and jewelry. It may here be Polybius' rendering of the Roman distinction between money and *res mancipi*, a category which could include real property and slaves, and might be considerable.

⁵⁷ E.g., *Att.* 11.25.3, 11.23.3; Ulpian *Tit.* 6.8.

Scipio Aemilianus stood firm in his determination to show exceptional liberality to his friends and relations.⁵⁸

The incident makes for good reading, but probably does not represent events quite as they occurred. Whatever had been decided by Scipio Africanus maior or his widow at the time of betrothal, it is more than likely that after Aemilia's death, Aemilianus, as heir to her estate and her debt (of the remaining portion of the dowry) and executor of her wishes, should have consulted his relations by marriage as to the details of payment. It seems plausible enough that Aemilianus, Corculum, and Gracchus did conduct a session much as Polybius describes, with each side politely insisting on the other's advantage, before settling on the final arrangement, which was in the immediate material interest of the husbands but gave the advantage to Aemilianus in terms of reputation and the general obligation thus imposed on Corculum and Gracchus within the finely balanced scheme of *officium/beneficium* which governed Roman patronage.⁵⁹

I question the setting of the negotiation. It would have been churlish of Aemilianus to allow the two men to visit the banker under such a misapprehension. If the arrangement was as extraordinary as Polybius suggests, Aemilianus must have realized the embarrassment it would cause. Far more likely is the expected sequence: consultation and agreement, followed by collection on the appointed day. It is easy to see how this could quickly have been converted in gossip to the more colorful picture which Polybius might have passed on in good faith, or seen as a legitimate artistic presentation of the events, of a piece with a general's reconstructed speech before battle.

I cannot, however, accept that his repetitive stress on law and custom was disingenuous.⁶⁰ It has been put to me⁶¹ that it might at least have been conventional to pay out dowry in three installments whenever it fell due, but the unconventional character of this dowry argues a specific prior arrangement. The greatest oddity would have been the fail-

⁵⁸ 31.27.13.

⁵⁹ And compare Walbank (note 27 above) 509: "The two men had no reason for embarrassment about their behaviour—on the contrary, they had resisted Scipio's gesture, which given the nature of Roman aristocratic tradition was calculated to place them at a disadvantage." See also R. P. Sallers, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge 1982) 15–21, and J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République* (Paris 1963) 152–63.

⁶⁰ 31.27.8 virtually repeats 27.5 to drive the point home; and compare 27.13, quoted above.

⁶¹ In a private communication from Mr. M. Crawford.

ture to review the arrangement, along with other aspects of the disposition of Aemilia's estate, on her death.

Certainly the arrangement was generous, as Aemilianus' gifts to his mother had been generous. Doubtless, too, Romans were, as Polybius suggests, less open-handed in general and more obsessive about fore-closure dates than his Greek readers,⁶² but, just as Scipio had carefully publicized both incidents when they occurred, so Polybius aims at extracting the greatest possible credit for his patron from their re-telling. Another point of interest in the account is the provenance of dowry, once paid. It is clear from the narrative that the husbands were the recipients of dowry, whether land, movables, or cash and whether conveyed on one occasion or by the more usual method of installment.

Polybius' repeated use of the dative in these passages is therefore notable:

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ταῖς ἑκμιλίωσις μὲν τοῦ μεγάρου θυγατρῶσι, ἀδελφαῖς δὲ τοῦ κατὰ θεοῖν πατρὸς, * * * ἁγρόντος, αὐτὸν εἰδὲν τὴν ἡμίσειαν ἀποδοῦναι τῆς φερῆς. ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ συνέβητο μὲν ἑκατέρῃ τῶν θυγατέρων πεντήκοντα τάλαντα δώσειν, τοῦτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμίονο παρὰ ῥῆμα τοῖς ἀνδράσι εἶδωκεν ἢ μῆτρῃ, τὸ δ' ἡμίονο κατὰ ἐκμίσιν ἀποβήσκειν ἀποδοφείδμενον, ὅθεν εἰδὲν τὸν ἑκμιλίωα διαλέγειν τοῦτο τὸ χρεὸς ταῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀδελφαῖς, κατὰ δὲ τοῦς ῥωμαίων νόμους, δέον ἐν ῥησίᾳ ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προσοφείδμενα χρημάτων τῆς φερῆς ταῖς γυναιξί, προσδοθέντων πρῶτων τῶν ἐπιτήλων εἰς δέκα μῆνας κατὰ τὸ παρ' ἑκείνοις ἔθος, εὐθέως ὁ ἑκμιλίω συνέταξε τῷ πατρὶ τῶν εἰκόσι καὶ πέντε τάλαντων ἑκατέρῃ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ἐν τοῖς δέκα μηνί. (31.27.1-5)

The debt is seen as owed to the women (ταῖς ἑκμιλίωσις . . . θυγατρῶσι . . . αὐτὸν εἰδὲν τὴν ἡμίσειαν ἀποδοῦναι τῆς φερῆς); their father had left fifty talents to each of them (. . . συνέβητο . . . ἑκατέρῃ τῶν θυγατέρων πεντήκοντα τάλαντα δώσειν). The mother is spoken of as having paid half to the husbands (. . . τοῖς ἀνδράσι εἶδωκεν ἢ μῆτρῃ), leaving Scipio on her death with the obligation to pay the remainder to his aunts/cousins (ὅθεν εἰδὲν τὸν ἑκμιλίωα διαλέγειν τοῦτο χρεὸς ταῖς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀδελφαῖς). Generalizing,⁶³ Polybius remarks that it was usual to pay the outstanding amount in annual install-

⁶² In 27.10 Polybius tells us of Roman punctiliousness in hanging on to cash until the last possible moment to gain the greatest interest, to show that Corculum and Gracchus were reasonable in their expectations although well known for their own generosity. ⁶³ In this one respect, I prefer Carcopino's view (note 32 above, 61) to that of Walbank (note 27 above, 508).

ments to the women (... δέον ... ἀποδοῦναι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα χρήματα τῆς φερνῆς ταῖς γυναῖξί ...). Scipio gave his banker instructions to pay the whole amount *due to each woman* at the end of ten months (... συνέταξε τῷ τραπεζίτῃ ... ἐκατέρᾳ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν ...).

Only twice, then, are the husbands spoken of as the recipients: in the matter of Aemilia's actual payment to them and, a little beyond the passage I have quoted, in the account of the visits by the two men to the banker to collect the cash. In other words, when Polybius describes the actual transaction, the men are termed the recipients—as they are, physically—but in discussing the arrangement in general terms, he speaks of the money as due the two women. It would be straining the Greek to insist that the dative carries the sense of “for” or “on behalf of” in each instance, in the absence of a preposition: ἀποδοῦναι with the dative, δῶσειν with the dative, διαλύειν with the dative, and ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν (equivalent to ἀνταποδώσασθαι) with the dative, would all be read as meaning “to” in any other context. It is only the disturbing fact that the money is, as we learn, paid to men and the legal point that dowry under Roman law was the property of the husband (or his father)⁶⁴ for the duration of the marriage which could make us want to force some other meaning from these common enough constructions.

It is moot whether Polybius understood the fact of the Roman husband's legal status as owner. In Greek states, the dowry was generally deemed the wife's property⁶⁵ and he may unthinkingly have assumed that it was the same at Rome. Alternatively, his own language might have been a reflection of that employed by his Roman acquaintance in normal conversation. Aemilia, like Africanus before her, saw her settlement as going to the daughters, just as Aemilianus later saw himself as enriching his sisters by passing on Papiria's possessions to them. That the husband received the dowries and the fathers-in-law became the legal owners of Papiria's estate⁶⁶ is secondary to the commonsense assumption that in all cases the women were the beneficiaries.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Gai. 2.63.

⁶⁵ E.g., Demos. *Onet.* 1.12, but A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* vol. 1 (Oxford 1968) 52–54, discusses the finer points of this; and see D. M. Schaps, *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh 1979) 20, 68, 88.

⁶⁶ Both Aemiliae lived in the same home as their fathers-in-law and were almost certainly *in manu soceri*. See below on these households. This meant that the women themselves, like their husbands, were unable *stricto iure* to own personal property.

The status at law of a dowry was straightforward: it belonged from the moment of its receipt to the husband (or his *paterfamilias*), who had full power to use, improve, alienate, or lend it—in short, *dominium*. His ownership was subject to only one condition, but that one highly significant—its return.⁶⁷ From at least 230 B.C.,⁶⁸ an action (*actio rei uxoriae*) lay to the woman and her father for the whole or partial recovery of the dowry in case of divorce, even where no such condition had been attached to the original agreement to pay.⁶⁹ It was, however, customary to agree to certain conditions on both sides. These were probably of a fairly standard type, conforming to notions of what was due, much as wills tended to be. Our limited knowledge of praetorian decisions in cases *de re uxoria* suggests that the courts followed conventional wisdom in determining what constituted appropriate grounds for reducing the amount of dowry due the divorced/divorcing wife—maintenance of children, or penalties for marital offence, for example.⁷⁰ The praetorian policy presumably reflected the principles embodied in *pacta dotalia*, but few such pacts survive,⁷¹ and none at all from this early period, so this speculation cannot be substantiated.

Whatever the legal details of constitution and restitution, the point is that *dos* was, in essence, recoverable, which would have put some check on its reckless dissipation, for the husband or his heirs could be obliged to repay it (or its cash value) virtually at any time. Other, socially imposed checks might also have operated: good relations between the families of husband and wife might be eroded by conspicuous

⁶⁷ Or the return of its monetary value. See Schulz (note 49 above) 122-24 for a summary of the classical law, and Watson (note 9 above) ch. 7 for an investigation of earlier practice.

⁶⁸ I.e., the case of Sp. Carvilius Ruga—*NA* 4.3.2, 17.21.44. On the significance of the case, see especially A. Watson, "The Divorce of Carvilius Ruga," *RHD* 33 (1965) 38-50.

⁶⁹ Though it seems to have been the custom, at least from the late third century B.C., to make arrangements (*pacta dotalia*) about the amount and payment of dowry to the intended husband. Probably conditions of return were also included; they were a feature of later pacts.

⁷⁰ See Ulpian *Tit.* 6.9-10; *Vat. Frag.* 120.

⁷¹ That is, from Italy. *Pacta* are cited in later, imperial compilations of the law to illustrate earlier interpretation: not only does this mean the preservation is very slight, and partial, but it tends to emphasize the more contentious—and, therefore, presumably, less conventional—conditions. Marriage contracts from Roman Egypt are more numerous, but since these seem to follow the same general form from Ptolemaic to Severan times, they might not have reflected contemporary Italian practice, and it was surely this which determined the direction of Roman Republican law.

abuse of the dowry. The real component, at least, was distinguishable from that of the husband. It would not, therefore, be surprising if people continued to speak of "Aemilia's houses" or "Cornelia's farm" in spite of the fact that the property was not legally the woman's for the duration of the marriage.

The provenance of dowry is necessarily an equivocal thing; precise legal definition could not eliminate this duality, any more than *conventio in manum* and the practice of calling her father-in-law *pater*⁷² caused a woman to disregard her ties with her natural parents. More than a century later, Cicero, fearing confiscation, spoke of the arrangements he was making to safeguard his own and "Terentia's" slaves,⁷³ by which he probably meant her dotal slaves, since he would have had no power to make such arrangements on her behalf.⁷⁴ It was many centuries more before the voice of authority would characterize the husband's ownership as a legal quibble (*legum subtilitas*),⁷⁵ but it could be that *sermo quotidianus* had always expressed that view, casually and unthinkingly. At the banker's or before a praetor a man might, quite properly, designate "his" the property he elsewhere termed "my wife's."

On the death of a woman's husband the dowry reverted to her.⁷⁶ When Aemilius Paullus (Macedonicus) died in 160 B.C., his heirs were the two sons whom he had given up for adoption after his second marriage. From an estate worth more than sixty talents (HS. 1,440,000), the sons had to repay his second wife's dowry of twenty-five talents (HS. 600,000).⁷⁷ Polybius tells us that they were compelled to sell off furniture, slaves, and land to meet the debt.⁷⁸ When Q. Aelius Tubero died,

⁷² Consider the example Pliny (the elder) gives of Q. Metellus Macedonicus, with his six children: *XI nepotes reliquit, nurus vero generosque et omnes qui se patris appellatione salutarent XXVII* (NH VII.13 (59)).

⁷³ *Tuis ita promissum est*—Fam. 14.4.4.3.

⁷⁴ On this, see my paper, "Family Finances: Tullia and Terentia," *Antichthon* 18 (1984) 78–101.

⁷⁵ In Justinian's name in 529 A.D., in relation to the priority of the wife's claim on a deceased husband's estate: *cum eadem res (= res uxoriae) . . . et ab initio uxoris fuerant et naturaliter in eius permanserunt dominio. non enim quod legum subtilitate transitus earum in mariti patrimonium videtur fieri. ideo rei veritas deleta vel confusa est* (Dig. 5.12.30 pr.).

⁷⁶ That is, assuming the prior decease of her father-in-law. We are not told whether Cato Licinianus' widow, Aemilia, continued to live in her father-in-law's home with her son after her husband's death, for the elderly father survived him (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.70). She might well have remained there with her young son, presumably still *in manu soceri*.

⁷⁷ 18.35.6.

⁷⁸ 18.35, 31.26.

his widow Aemilia was reimbursed for the great silver bowl (one of the spoils of her father's victory in Macedon) that she had brought to his family. According to Valerius Maximus, they sold part of his small farm to do so.⁷⁹ This return of dowry seems to mark the change in legal status to that of a widow *sui iuris*.

The two sisters Aemiliae, though excluded from their father's will, benefited on the death of their mother Papiria in 159-58 B.C. Scipio Aemilianus was named as her sole heir, but he passed on the whole inheritance to his sisters. This included the famous equipage he had given his mother in 162 B.C. Polybius' familiar insistence on the fact that the women had no legal claim to the property⁸⁰ is again designed to highlight Scipio Aemilianus' generosity.

The emphasis seems rather labored in this instance. He is presumably referring to their status as married women, connected more closely *stricto iure* with their families by marriage than with their natural relations. Yet the adopted Scipio had no more right than his sisters to succeed to Papiria by the laws of intestate succession. Her divorce would in any case have rendered Papiria a cognate of her own children, even if they had all been still in Paullus' *potestas* and become *sui iuris* on his death. The right of intestate succession between mother and child was based solely on her being *in manu mariti* (or *soceri*).⁸¹ Papiria must have instituted Aemilianus sole heir, for he did not consult Fabius about making over the inheritance to his sisters, the two Aemiliae.

We have seen that both sisters were very likely *in manu* at the time of Scipio's gift. Boyer argues that the donation signifies the women's independent status,⁸² but it seems to me to be another instance of Polybius' language reflecting everyday observation rather than legal precision. Aemilianus saw himself as bestowing the equipage, which his sisters would certainly use themselves on the appropriate occasions, with the rest of his mother's property, on the women, even though they would not be classified at law as owners. In Cicero's day, all property belong-

⁷⁹ Val. Max. 4.4.9.

⁸⁰ 31.28.8, quoted above, note 52.

⁸¹ Just. Inst. 3.3: *lex duodecim tabularum ita stricto iure utebatur et praeponere masculorum progeniem et eos, qui per femini sexus necessitudinem sibi iunguntur, adeo expellebat, ut ne quidem inter matrem et filium filiamve ultro citroque hereditatis capiendae ius daret. . . .*

Coll. 16.2 (*vid.* also Inst. 3.1.2 ff.): *Gaius Institutionum libro III legitimas sic ordinat successiones: 1. Intestatorum hereditates lege duodecim tabularum primum ad suos heredes pertinent. 2. Sui autem heredes existimantur liberi qui in potestate morientis fuerunt, veluti filius filiae, nepos neptisve ex filio.* See also Gai. 3.3 (= Coll. 16.2.3).

⁸² Boyer (note 20 above) 181.

ing to a wife *in manu* was counted as *dos*⁸³ and therefore subject to the same rules of return on divorce or the death of the husband. We cannot determine whether this rule was law by the second century B.C., but it would seem that the Aemilia who regained the cash equivalent of her dotal silver on her husband's death also took with her her maternal portion and the half-share of her paternal aunt's equipage, which her brother had bestowed on her after marriage. Unlike the dowry determined by a prior compact, these objects were probably given directly to the women, and only a legal pedant would have thought to specify that they were given to the husband or father-in-law.

If the stress on the daughters' lack of any claim on the estate is specious, the insistence on Aemilianus' spontaneous generosity must again be questioned. It is conceivable that Papiria had entrusted her son with the task of passing on her estate, which included his gift, to her daughters. This possibility raises the whole question of how female inheritance is to be viewed and which dispositions are to be included under that heading.

The Roman rules of intestate succession, as we have seen, made no distinction between the children of a deceased *pater* on grounds of sex or order of birth.⁸⁴ Yet the dispositions of Aemilia (the elder), her brother L. Aemilius Paullus, and Papiria reveal a general bias in favor of males. Scipio Aemilianus seems to have received more from his adoptive grandmother than the fifty talents due his aunts; Papiria left her whole estate to him; Aemilius Paullus left his whole estate to his two sons. Aemilianus' actions, however, demonstrate the presumption that men would look to the interests of their female relations. The question of differential male/female inheritance is complicated by such "executive" brotherly behavior and by dowry. Married daughters might have been left less in general than sons because they had already taken part of their patrimony with them on marriage and were subsequently in the line of succession of a new family. Or the bias might reflect the practical requirements of senatorial males at a time when the expenses of the *cur-sus* were increasing.

If some of Scipio Aemilianus' magnanimous actions are instead viewed as modes of female succession in which his role was that of responsible mediator rather than donor, the emphasis shifts. In passing

⁸³ Cic. *Top.* 4.23.

⁸⁴ All inherited equally if they were *in patria potestate* at the time of his death. Just. *Inst.* 2.3.5; Paul *Sent.* 4.8.20.

on the "dowry" payments to his adoptive aunts, he was, in effect, handing over their maternal inheritance. The similarity of his "gift" to his sisters is apparent, for he might have been carrying out his mother's express wishes. The distribution of wealth between the sexes in a given generation appears less weighted, if seen in this light.

Boyer calculates the extent of the wealth of the Corneliae from the size of their dowries.⁸⁵ The widow of Cato Licinianus might have benefited from Cato censor's devotion to profit, as well as from her brother's "generosity." By the time of his death in 149 B.C., she and her sister had recovered their original dowries and had each a share of their aunt's valuable religious equipment and their mother's estate. They had attained a position akin to their aunt's former standing: daughters, widows, nieces, and sisters of the most distinguished men in Rome, they were subject only to their *tutores* and their own taste in the use of their wealth.

Thus could daughters succeed—eventually—to substantial, if unequal, portions of their parents' fortunes by dowry, gift, or inheritance. The occasionally indirect character of the transmission is curious, though it has parallels in other cultures.⁸⁶ Pomeroy⁸⁷ has proposed evasion of the *l. Voconia* as a possible explanation. The law, passed in 169–68 B.C., forbade members of the top census group to institute women heirs⁸⁸ and could have encouraged the use of *fideicommissum*⁸⁹ as an easier means of passing on a whole estate. Yet this is not a wholly satisfying explanation, for *legatum partitionis hereditatis*, whereby daughters could share equally with a male heir, would have served as well. And the arrangement made by Scipio Africanus before his death in 182 B.C. for the subsequent payment of his daughters' dowries cannot have been influenced by the later law.

It might have been deemed appropriate for men to handle the necessary transfers of property for the benefit of their female relations.

⁸⁵ Boyer (note 20 above) 176, n. 16.

⁸⁶ See esp. J. R. Goody and S. J. Tambiah, *Bridewealth and Dowry* (Cambridge 1975), and J. R. Goody, "Marriage Prestations, Inheritance and Descent in Pre-Industrial Societies," *Journal of Comparative Studies* 1 (1970) 37–54.

⁸⁷ Pomeroy (note 2 above) 223.

⁸⁸ They were still eligible for legacies of up to one-quarter of the estate, Gai. 2.226, 274, and see also Cic. *Rep.* 3.10; Gai. 1.130, 3.114; Ulpian 10.15; *NA* 1.12; Cic. *Verr.* 2.1, 41–45.

⁸⁹ See earlier discussion and note 37. Cic. *de fin.* 2.17 (54–55) has an example of a rascal who broke such an agreement.

Even this cannot have been general, for Scipio Africanus apparently enjoined his widow (and heir) to pass on enormous dowries to their daughters, and she was able to execute his wish by concluding a compact which *her* heir in his turn was obliged to honor after her death. Aemilia's age might have been an important factor in the assignment of such a responsibility, or the fact that widowhood would render her *sui iuris*. Her daughters, like the Aemiliae, were matrons *in manu* at the time of their mothers' deaths.

We have, after all, established that a woman could benefit directly in certain areas and exercise independence. She received her dowry on the dissolution of her marriage by death (of the husband) or divorce; she could apparently receive substantial assets (Aemilia's equipage, half of Papiria's estate) by gift or *in iure cessio hereditatis*,⁹⁰ even when she was not *sui iuris*. There was no limitation on her succession to the estate of a relation who died intestate, save that agnatic relationship was not interpreted as generously in the case of women.⁹¹ She could also receive a substantial legacy, within the requirements of the *l. Voconia*.

Conclusion

In the past, it was common to point to the Roman woman as a paradigm of oppression. That this view was perfectly upheld by a bare reading of the law and quite contradicted by literary and documentary evidence is a salutary reminder of the dangers of taking unadorned legal formulae as descriptions of practice. The rules governing the transmission of property within families tend to be embedded in generally recognized conventions as much as in formal law.

⁹⁰ As the Aemiliae had done from their brother.

⁹¹ The Twelve Tables provision that the estate of anyone who died intestate without a *suus heres* should go to the nearest agnate was interpreted to mean only *consanguineae* in the case of women: that is, paternal uncles or fraternal nephews were eligible but fraternal aunts were not. This rule was, according to Paul, based on a literal interpretation of the expression *proximus agnatus*, which had been used in the Twelve Tables. *Pauli Sent.* 4.8.20. The original rule is quoted by Ulpian (*Reg.* 26.1), but Gaius 3.23 has it that the discrimination was a feature of the Twelve Tables from the outset. B. Kübler (note 2 above) has the most useful discussion of this, although some highly imaginative articles on the subject appeared between 1921 and 1931, to support a theoretical model of the primitive Indo-European family.

Divorce, marriage, and adoption extinguished the formal ties of relationship (*agnatio*) which were the basis of the Roman system of inheritance and *tutela*. The instances related by Polybius (31.26–28)—like those which can be culled from later sources—demonstrate that technical change made little difference to the Roman conception of the obligations imposed by “blood” relationship (*cognatio*).⁹² Scipio Aemilianus’ mother merited distinction notwithstanding her divorce from his father and his own adoption; Aemilius Paullus favored his surviving sons as a matter of course, regardless of their adoption; while Papiria left her estate to her son rather than any other friend or relation. Tib. Sempronius Gracchus and Scipio Nasica Corculum, husbands of the Corneliae, showed a concern for Scipio Aemilianus’ interests based on their connection by marriage. That is, marriage and even adoption tended to extend the ties of kinship rather than to divert them, as a bare reading of the law might suggest.

The study of Roman women and property ought ideally to comprise a combination of evidence and should be viewed against the background of more general changes in views of property, the family, and marriage. Cicero provides the earliest evidence for the obligatory return of the dowry of a widow or divorcee even if she had been *in manu mariti*, yet Polybius’ account makes it clear that the practice was normal by the mid-second century B.C. Indeed, the implication of Polybius’ account is that convention already made it the preferred charge on a deceased man’s estate which later law would proclaim it.⁹³

Many important questions remain unanswered: when and why did it become more usual for women to retain their former civil status⁹⁴ after marriage? Given that both forms remained in use, it would be very interesting to know the basis on which the choice was made and who made it in each family. Was it common in this period for women to have an “agnatic” *tutor*, and, if so, did this represent an effective limitation on their financial activities? Was *some* differential between the inheritance of sons and daughters the rule? Was dowry viewed as part of a woman’s inheritance on long loan to the husband, or did most husbands treat it as their own?

⁹² On the distinction, see Gai. 3.21, but note on 3.27 the praetor’s qualified recognition of the “blood” relationship in matters of succession, which reveals the common-sense acknowledgment.

⁹³ Cf. Just. *Inst.* 4.6.28–29.

⁹⁴ That is to say, *in patria potestate* or *sui iuris*, rather than passing *in manum mariti*.

Not all the findings are so inconclusive. It is evident, for example, from its casual mention that it was usual for women of the propertied classes to make wills. The general expectation that a mother should regard her children as her proper beneficiaries is likewise established, whatever her legal relation to them by the rules of *agnatio*. Most interestingly, we find that the wishes of a propertied widow as to the disposition of her estate after death were honored as those of an authoritative and rational person. Livy's rhetorical categorization of the Roman woman as perpetually subject to male authority⁹⁵ is not supported by Polybius' narrative, where men are represented as agents rather than determinants of female property transmission. Within the framework of apparently restrictive institutions such as *patria potestas*, *manus mariti*, and *tutela perpetua*, there was scope for autonomous, if conventional action, particularly for a widow with the advantages of age and station.

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DEATHS IN THE PAN-HELLENIC GAMES II: ALL COMBATIVE SPORTS*

This paper examines the other known fatalities in all combative events at the pan-Hellenic games, as our earlier article studied the death and posthumous victory of Arrachion and Creugas.¹ Again, we reconstruct the fatal move and give the most probable medical cause of

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death. Of known fatal injuries, leaving aside sudden collapses for future study, we have one in wrestling, three in boxing besides Creugas, and none in pancratium except for Arrachion and a peculiar anecdote in Philo. We shall deal with that last. From these known incidents, we can speak with near-certainty of the *nomoi*, the unwritten rules and traditions governing Hellenic combative events, and correct a few scholarly errors on them. First, fatally injuring an opponent did *not* automatically cost the athlete his victory, as some scholars have asserted. Second, the rules of Greek boxing allowed only blows to the head and neck, forbidding all body blows as are blows "below the belt" in modern boxing.

Every known fatality (except Creugas' death) occurred at Olympia, oddly. We know athletes exerted themselves more there than in other games, since it was the supreme Hellenic contest, so more fights "to the death" may have occurred.² It is equally likely, however, that these were more famous incidents, and so were preserved for us, but fatalities at minor games were not (see Philo, below).

The wrestling fatality occurred in the fifth century B.C., in Telemachus of Pharsalus' victory over an unnamed "Tyrrhenian," recorded on the base of a statue of Telemachus dedicated, and found, at Delphi. There are lacunae in all four lines, but only two are really uncertain. Each has two main restorations. The fragmented statue itself is part of a group dedicated in the later fourth century (338-332 B.C.) by Daochus, son of Sisyphus. He commemorated the important figures in his aristo-

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R. T. Woodburne, *Essentials of Human Anatomy* (New York, Oxford 1965³). As Brophy (365, note 5) said, our expertise comes from two decades (1966-) under Headmaster D. K. Son, and a Third Dan black belt in Tae Kwon Do, Korean karate (for R. H. Brophy), and a Second Dan black belt and PhD in human anatomy (for M. O. Brophy).

²Finley and Pleket (63-65, 76-77), *Philos. Gymn.* 45, Jüthner (172-73, 278-80), Robinson (228-29), Robert (198-201).

cratic Thessalian family, especially Olympic victors: Hagias (his great-grandfather) and his brothers, Telemachus and Agelaus.³ Hagias is hailed as "first of the land of Thessaly" to win an Olympic crown in pancratium; then his thirteen other victories in the Great Games (five at Nemea, three at Pythia, five at Isthmia) and his "unbeaten" championship career are mentioned:⁴

Πρῶτος Ὀλύμπια παγκράτιον, Φαρσάλιε, νικᾷς,
 Ἀγία Ἀκνονίου, γῆς ἀπὸ Θεσσαλίας,
 πεντάκις ἐν Νεμέαι, τρίς Πύθια, πεντάκις Ἰσθμοῖ·
 καὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς πω στήσε τρόπαια χερῶν.

Next to his statue was Telemachus'. Homolle, the discoverer, published the inscription thus:⁵

Κάγῳ τοῦδε ὁμᾶδελφοῦ ἐ]φυν, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν
 ἤμασι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐχφ[έρ]ομαι στεφάνων
 νικῶν μουνοπάλ[η]ν· Τ[ι]υρσηνῶν δὲ ἄνδρα κράτιστον
 κτεῖνα, ἐθέλοντο[ς ἐοῦ]· Τηλέμαχος δὲ ὄνομα.

And I was born a full brother of this man, and I carried off the same number of victory-wreaths in the same time-span (or: at the same Festivals?), winning in wrestling. But I killed a very powerful man of the Tyrrhenians, as he was willing (to fight to the death). Telemachus is my name.⁶

³On Acnonius' sons, the family statue-group, and Daochus' motives, see the discoverer, Th. Homolle, "*Ex-voto* trouvés à Delphes. — 33 Statues du Thessalien Daochos et de sa famille," *BCH* 21 (1897) 592-98, "Lysippe et l'*ex-voto* de Daochos," *BCH* 23 (1899) 421-85; *SIG* I, 483-85; P. Foucart, "Démosthènes et les Hiéromnémones Thessaliens," *RPh* 23 (1899) 105-11; E. M. Gardiner and K. K. Smith, "The Group Dedicated by Daochus at Delphi," *AJA* 19 (1909) 447-75; Ebert (137-45); Moretti (*IAG* 68-75), *O* no. 190, 192. Th. Homolle, "La date de l'*ex voto* des Thessaliens," *BCH* 22 (1898) 633, dates his discovery to 338-34 B.C.; *SIG* I, 484-85 to 337-35; Ebert (137) and Moretti (*IAG* 68) to 336-32. Harris (*GAA* 105) wrongly assumed from the first person used in Telemachus' epigram that the brothers set up their statues.

⁴Homolle (*BCH* 23 [note 3 above] 438-41; Ebert (137-42); Moretti (*IAG* 68-71) discuss the "alternate" version of the epigram, found at Pharsalia (*IG* 9.2.249), and the proposed restoration of it: [πε]ντάκις ἐν Νε[μέ]αι . . . τῖ[σ]α Πύθια, κτλ. (3), an error which would give Hagias five Nemean, Pythian and Isthmian crowns each. Homolle (*BCH* 23 at 456, n. 1), Moretti (*IAG* 68) quotes Soph. *Trach.* 1102 as a close parallel and probable original for v. 4: κούδεις τροπαῖ' ἔστησε τῶν ἐμῶν χερῶν.

⁵Homolle (*BCH* 21 [note 3 above] 593); cf. *SIG* I, 483-84, which includes the inscriber's error τοῦ<ο>δε (1), not given by Homolle.

⁶Cf. the trans. in Ebert (142). On μο(υ)νοπάλη and μο(υ)νοπάλης (3), see LSJ, Moretti (*IAG* 50); but Frazer (*IV*, 15 and 34-35) is more correct that the nouns mean the

Rejecting Etruscan *Tyrsēnoi* as entrants in the pan-Hellenic games, where every contestant must swear that he is a freeborn Greek, son of free Greek parents and citizen of a Greek city,⁷ some scholars proposed Τ[αρ]σινῶν.⁸ Yet this is open to the same objection, for Tarsus was not yet a Hellenized city in the fifth century.⁹ Actually, a non-Greek from Etruria or Tarsus could have competed at Olympia by then. As Finley and Pleket make clear, the fifth century Alexander of Macedon and the third century official of Sidon, Diotimus, and the Roman Emperors and other officials crowned, had no trouble entering for the Olympics.¹⁰ The case for Τυρσηνῶν is very strong, moreover. "Tyrrhenian" could have been an insulting term for all Western Greeks, including the dead opponent.¹¹ He may have been Etruscan or Greek, but most probably was from one city: Caere, called by its Greek name, Agylla. It was at least partly a Greek city, with a Greek population. Caere-Agylla had a treasury at Delphi (Herodotus 1.167, Strabo 5.2.3) and mythic Hellenic founders, Pelasgians from Thessaly (Strabo).¹²

separate event of, or a competitor in, upright wrestling *alone*, not as part of pancratium or pentathlon. Ebert (143) discusses Homolle's restoration of the lacuna in 4 (in *BCH* 21 [note 3 above] 593). Ebert notes that *ethelein* does not equal *ouk apeipein*, "to refuse to surrender, to resolve to fight on." He cites Rudolph (15, 33, 65), Moretti (*LAG* 73-74) that boxing and pancratium, but never wrestling, ended in a knockout or surrender. Greek wrestling was decided by three clean throws; see also Finley and Pleket (38); Drees (80-81 and 172, n. 106), citing Philo. *Gymn.* 9, Sen. *Ben.* 5.3, who gave this as the Spartans' reason for entering only wrestling, of the three pan-Hellenic combative events. In it alone a Spartan need never surrender. On which statue was Telemachus', and originally stood above this inscription, we are not competent to choose between the views of Homolle (*BCH* 21 at 598, *BCH* 23 at 426-41, 459-62), and Gardiner and Smith (note 3 above) 450-51, 456-57, 459-62, 470-75, though the later arguments seem cogent.

⁷On the Olympic oath, see Finley and Pleket (61-62); Drees (43, 43, 68 and 169, notes 1, 2, 23), citing Herodotus 5.22, Paus. 5.24.9, Philo. *Gymn.* 25.

⁸Moretti (*LAG* 71-72), discussed by Ebert (143).

⁹Cf. Ebert (143), *RE*, and the other sources he cites on Tarsus.

¹⁰Finley and Pleket (58, 62), Drees (41), Herodotus 5.22.

¹¹H. A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool 1924) 127-30, 152-54, explains that Tyrrhenian in the fifth to third centuries B.C. meant "pirate" or "corsair" from every part of Italy, not just Etruria, including Latin-Italic tribesmen (e.g., Postumius in Diod. Sic. 16.82) and Magna Graecia. Cf. notes 12-13.

¹²So J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas: The Archaeology of Their Early Colonies and Trade* (Harmondsworth [England] 1973²) 199; T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks: The History of Sicily and South Italy from the Foundation of the Greek Colonies to 480 B.C.* (Oxford 1948) 335; L. Banti, *The Etruscan Cities and Their Culture*, trans. E. Bizzarri (London 1973) 4; M. Pallottino, *The Etruscans*, rev. ed., trans. J. Cremona,

Modern scholars' objection that Etruscans must have been barred from the Games as "barbarians" and as "pirates"¹³ is precisely answered by Strabo: that the Greeks honored Caere "for its manliness and justice, for it restrained from piracy, although very powerful," διὰ τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην· τῶν τε γὰρ ληστηρίων ἀπέσχετο, καίπερ δυναμένη πλεῖστον (5.2.3). Telemachus' family would naturally record the killing of a Caeretan as a "Tyrrhenian's" rather than a full-blooded fellow Greek's death.

The other key lacuna is in line 4: not "he was willing (to fight to the death)," but "I killed him though I did not want that, unintentionally, without meaning to" (Ebert's ἔθελον τὸ [μὲν οὐ] or Moretti's τό [γε δ' οὐ]).¹⁴ Ebert's seems less strained. This gives a more plausible sense, for wrestling was never—unlike boxing or pancratium—meant to be a "victory or death" contest.

When and how was this Caeretan (?) "Etruscan" accidentally killed? The open dates for the brothers' simultaneous victories, Hagias in pancratium, Telemachus in wrestling, are Ol. 73–74 (488–484 B.C.) and 85–86 (440–436). The latter had been favored by Moretti¹⁵ and Knab,¹⁶ but Moretti rightly abandoned 440 as much too late for Hagias, whose grown son Daochus I was tetrarch of Thessaly in 431–404 B.C. Ol.

ed. D. Ridgway (Bloomington 1975) 90. The "Pelagian" foundation of Agylla-Caere was mythical, but was precisely what a competitor from Caere, like Telemachus' opponent, needed to enter Olympia in good faith. The treasury at Delphi and the Games Caere instituted to atone for murdering the Phocaeans, on orders of Delphi, were two more "proofs" it was a Greek polis at this time: ἡ δὲ Πυθίη σφέας ἐκέλευσε ποιέειν τὰ καὶ νῦν οἱ Ἀγυλλαῖοι ἔτι ἐπιτελέουσι . . . καὶ γὰρ ἐναγίζουσι σφί μεγάλως καὶ ἀγῶνα . . . ἐπιστάδι (Herodotus 1.167). Paus. 5.12.5 calls a gold throne from Arimnestus, "king of the Tyrrhenians," the very first offering from a barbarian placed in the *pronaos* of Zeus at Olympia, among (other?) Olympic victor-offerings. This leaves open the possibility that Arimnestus was a "barbarian, Tyrrhenian" Olympic victor. We know of him from no other source. Arimnestus is a good Greek name (see *RE*), but may be hellenized for Arimna, whom Pallottino (above) 93 accepts as a historical person.

¹³Ebert (143); Moretti (*IAG* 71). Both cite Ormerod (note 11 above) 127–30, but he supports our view, as note 11 shows.

¹⁴Ebert (142, discussed 143–44); Moretti (*IAG* 71, discussed 72–74) and by Ebert (143–44), who justifies his own restoration, μὲν οὐ, the μὲν "konfirmativ." See note 6 on why they are right that willingness to fight "to the death" simply does not fit Greek wrestling.

¹⁵Moretti (*IAG* 70–71), citing *P. Oxy.* 222, the Olympic victor-list for Ol. 75–78, 81–83 (480–68, 456–48 B.C.), and Paus. 6.9.3 for Ol. 84 (444).

¹⁶R. Knab, *Die Periodoniken* (Diss. Giessen 1934) 27–28.

74 (484 B.C.) is early enough for the brothers' victories in young manhood.¹⁷

Since Telemachus won upright wrestling, where the object was to throw the opponent's body (knees or above) to the ground three times,¹⁸ this "very powerful Etruscan" heavyweight probably broke his neck when thrown by Telemachus, or was suddenly wrenched by an immobilizing grip and instantaneous twist. The grip would not have been the "ladder," *klimax* or *klimakismos*, that killed Arrachion, for choke-holds were not useful in Greek wrestling, only pancratium, but the cause of death was probably the same. He fractured the cervical vertebrae, the dens of the axis bone in particular.¹⁹ A throw onto any area except the neck would not be fatal on the soft sand of the "dug-up" wrestling area (*skamma*).²⁰ A broken neck, severing the vertebrae, undoubtedly

¹⁷Moretti (*O* no. 190, 192); cf. *SIG* 1 (483-84); Ebert (138-39); Homolle (*BCH* 21 [note 3 above] 594-95), Gardiner and Smith (note 3 above) 449 and note 4 wrongly place "Agias" as victor in Ol. 80 (460 B.C.), forgetting the brothers won simultaneous victories and Amesinas of Barce won the wrestling crown then: Moretti (*O* no. 261); Jüthner (168-69, 267-68); Philos. *Gymn.* 43; Afric. in Euseb. *Chron.* p. 204 Schoene; Rutgers (44-45). Moretti (*O* no. 313, 317) now assigns Ol. 85-86 (440-36 B.C.) as the probable years of Theopompus II's consecutive wrestling victories: Paus. 6.10.4; cf. Jones (III, 60/61) with Frazer (I, 297).

¹⁸See Rudolph (29-34, 36-39); Gardiner (*GASF* 377-81, *AAW* 181-85); Drees (80). Harris (*GAA* 102) is misleading: a wrestling match was *not* "for the best of three falls," but a full three—clean throws or takedowns: Lucill. *AP* 11.361; Robert (246-54).

¹⁹See Brophy (378, n. 17), and the sources cited there, on *klimakismos*; 381, n. 23, and sources cited, esp. D. S. Lamb, "Medico-Legal Consideration of Death by Mechanical Suffocation" in Witthaus and Becker (705-91 at 736-39, 770-74) on fatal fractures of the top cervical vertebrae, atlas and axis, severing the spinal cord so high that the organs of respiration are paralyzed, resulting in sudden death. Add Gelber (64-65), Bowden (208, and 216-18):

The cervical vertebrae may be fractured by blows . . . forcing the head suddenly backwards or forwards, or by downward force on the head, or even by suddenly throwing the head backwards. . . . Haemorrhage within the spinal canal may be sufficient to bring about death as a result of pressure, without any original damage to the cord. Even without demonstrable cord injury the shock sustained, if severe enough, is sufficient to cause immediate death.

²⁰See Gardiner (*GASF* 376, *AAW* 182); Harris (*GAA* 104): the *skamma* was softened and sand-covered to lessen shocks to jumpers (pentathletes), wrestlers, and pancratiasts. The occasional summer rain would make the *skamma* "a sea of mud," and even softer. We picture the fatal move as something like the one illustrated on a Panathenaic amphora (Gardiner [*GASF* 390 Fig. 120]) or those on red-figure and black-figure vases in *AAW* (189-91 Fig. 159-60, 162-63): "cross-buttock" pivot after immobilizing neck-hold.

caused this death, unless Telemachus went outside the rules of Greek wrestling.

We can be certain that he did not. He was not disqualified, but won (or went on to win) the crown. The Olympic judges, Hellanodikai, obviously decided no foul was involved and did not consider accidental homicide grounds to expel a competitor in wrestling—or boxing, as we shall show.

Earlier this same century, the first fatality in boxing, the oldest known aside from Arrachion's death in pancratium (564 B.C.), occurred at Ol. 71 or 72 (496 or 492 B.C.). The disputed date depends on how one understands Paus. 6.9.6:

Τῇ δὲ ὀλυμπιάδι τῇ πρὸ ταύτης Κλεομήδην φασὶν Ἀστυπαλαίᾳ ὡς Ἰκκῷ πυκτεύων ἀνδρὶ Ἐπίδauρίῳ τὸν Ἰκκὸν ἀποκτείνειεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ, καταγνωσθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλανοδικῶν ἄδικα εἶργασθαι καὶ ἀφηρημένος τὴν νίκην ἐκφρων ἐγένετο ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης.

At the Festival previous to this it is said that Cleomedes of Astypalaea killed Iccus of Epidaurus during a boxing-match. On being convicted by the umpires of foul play and being deprived of the prize he became mad through grief. (Jones trans.)²¹


Paus. 6.9.4–5 discusses the Olympic victory-dedication of a chariot by Gelon, son of Deinomenes, at Ol. 73 (488 B.C.), then makes a parenthetical remark about Gelon's seizure of Syracuse "in the second year of the seventy-second Olympiad" (6.9.4), and wrongly concludes that this was a different Gelon from the Olympic victor whose chariot- and portrait-statues Glaucias made (6.9.5). If we are completely out of the parenthesis, then Iccus died at Ol. 72, "the Festival previous to this" one (73), where Gelon won.²² If not, Pausanias still has in mind his aside about the second year of Ol. 72, and Cleomedes killed Iccus at Ol. 71, the "previous Festival" of 496 B.C.²³ Certainty is impossible, but the consensus is that Pausanias fixed his real attention on Gelon's votive dedications as victor of Ol. 73, then remarked on how Cleomedes won the contest but lost the crown in boxing in the preceding Olympiad, 72 (492 B.C.).²⁴

²¹Jones (III, 56/57); cf. Brophy (388, n. 43 at 389), quoting Frazer (I, 296).

²²Jones (III, 57), Moretti (*O* no. 174), Finley and Pleket (39), Drees (52).

²³Rutgers (30, n. 3), Forbes (56), W. W. Hyde, *Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art* (Washington 1921) 35; cf. note 32 below.

²⁴See note 22 above; only Harris (*GAA* 100) says "496 or 492 B.C." Ol. 72 for Cleomedes (492), 73 for Gelon (488), is not weakened by the error Moretti (*O* no. 185) and Frazer (IV, 35) point out in Paus. 6.9.4, taking the date of Gelon's capture of Gela (Ol. 72.2, 491 B.C.) and transferring it to his capture of Syracuse (Ol. 73.4, 485 B.C.).



There are numerous ancient references to Cleomedes' insanity, homicidal actions, death or apotheosis, and final worship as a hero, sanctioned by Delphi.²⁵ Our detailed accounts of the boxing fatality are often erroneously rejected by scholars. Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 5.34 B-C quotes Oenomaus of Gadara, the Cynic philosopher (*fl. ca.* 120 A.D.), for his attacks on the Delphic oracle:

Κλεομήδην πύκτην Ἀστυπαλαίᾳ, . . . Διὰ τί γάρ, . . . ἐθέωσας τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον; Ἥ ὅτι Ὀλυμπίᾳσι πληγῇ μιᾷ πατάξας τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἀνέφξε τὴν πλευρὰν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐμβαλὼν τὴν χεῖρα ἐλάβετο τοῦ πνεύμονος;

Cleomedes boxer of Astypalaea, . . . For what then, . . . didst thou deify this man? Was it because at the Olympic games he struck his antagonist a single blow and laid open his side, and thrust in his hand and seized his lung? (Gifford ed., trans.)²⁶

Gifford overstates the similarity to Paus. 6.9.6,²⁷ but Frazer is more incorrect to dismiss this tale as Oenomaus' "confused doublet" of Paus. 8.40.3-5, Damoxenus' killing of Creugas at Nemea a century later.²⁸ Oenomaus was over half a century closer to the events than Pausanias.²⁹ The details he gives do not merely duplicate, and are actually more plausible than, Paus. 8.40.3-5, omitting the impossibility, "razor-sharp nails," in 8.40.4. When Paus. 6.4.1-3 gives identical accounts of two champions' Olympic victories a century apart, Frazer and all scholars

²⁵ Moretti (*O* no. 174) and Frazer (IV, 35) cite Paus. 6.9.6-8, copied by the *Suda*; Plut., *Rom.* 28; Orig. *c. Cels.* 3.3, 25, 33; Cyril. Alex. *c. Iul.* 6, p. 204; Oenom. in Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 5.34; Theodoret *Graec. affect. cur.* 8, p. 115.

²⁶ E. H. Gifford, *Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri XV* (Oxford 1903), text, trans. and commentary, I (text, Books 1-9) 296-97; III, Part I (trans. 1-9) 248; quoted by Brophy (388, n. 43 at 389).

²⁷ Gifford (note 26 above) IV (notes) 200, quoted by Brophy (388, n. 43 at 389): "told almost exactly as here by Pausanias."

²⁸ Frazer (IV, 392), quoted by Brophy (388, n. 43 at 389); also Forbes (56, n. 50): "Oenomaus of Gadara . . . confused this story with that of Damoxenus . . . , and stated that Cleomedes ripped out the viscera of his opponent." Brophy (375-76, 382) puts Creugas' death a little early: *not* "around 400" but 4 c. B.C., before 336; see below, and notes 45 and 65.

²⁹ Oenomaus *fl. ca.* 120 A.D., Paus. *ca.* 150, but he wrote Book VI in 175 A.D.: see *RE*; Brophy (365, n. 4), citing Frazer (I, xv-xix). Paus. wrote the books in order, as we have them, between 160 and 180 A.D. Frazer (I, xvii) adds that Book V was written in 1974, VIII "in or after 176," with VI thus in 175.

rightly accept both stories as accurate. Leontiscus won two crowns for wrestling, Ol. 81–82 (456–452 B.C.), Sostratus three in a row for pancratium at Ol. 104–06 (364–356 B.C.), with the identical technique of seizing and bending back the opponent's fingers.³⁰

³⁰See Frazer (I, 287–88; IV, 10–11); Jones (III, 22/23–24/25):

Σικωνῖος Σώστρατος παγκρατιαστής ἀνὴρ, ἐπὶ κλήσις δὲ ἦν Ἀκροχερσίτης αὐτῷ· παραλαμβανόμενος γὰρ ἄκρων τοῦ ἀνταγωνιζομένου τῶν χειρῶν ἔκλα, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἀνίει πρὶν ἢ αἰσθοίτο ἀπαγορεύσαντος.

[A] man of Sicyon who was a pancratiast, Sostratus surnamed Acrochersites. For he used to grip his antagonist by the fingers and bend them, and would not let go until he saw that his opponent had given in.

... παρὰ δὲ τὸν Σώστρατον παλαιστής ἀνὴρ πεποιήται Λεοντίσκος, ... ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ πορθμῷ Μεσσηνίας· ... αὐτῷ λέγεται τὴν πάλην καθὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ παγκράτιον τῷ Σικωνίῳ Σωστράτῳ· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Λεοντίσκον καταβαλεῖν μὲν οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς παλαίοντας, νικᾶν δὲ αὐτὸν κλῶντα τοὺς δακτύλους.

... Besides Sostratus is a statue of Leontiscus, a man wrestler, ... from Messene on the Strait. ... [H]is mode of wrestling was similar to the pancratium of Sostratus the Sicyonian. For they say that Leontiscus did not know how to throw his opponents, but won by bending their fingers.

Jones mistakes *anēr* twice: not "a man" but "an adult" pancratium or wrestling (as opposed to junior) victor—a "real man" is implied. See below, and note 60. Moretti (*O* no. 271, 285), Drees (81), Finley and Pleket (39, 41), Gardiner (*GASF* 373, 386), Forbes (56), Harris (*GAA* 103, 107–08) accept Pausanias' tale of Leontiscus fully. Rudolph (39–40, 69–70) and Hyde (note 23 above) 62, 178–83, 248–49 doubt all details but Leontiscus' "finger" trick, even calling him a pancratiast, not a wrestler. All—Moretti (*O* no. 420, 425, 433, *IAG* 62–64), Rudolph, Hyde (155, 248–49, 300), Harris, Finley and Pleket, Drees, Gardiner (*GASF* 148, 447, *AAW* 105), Knab (note 16 above) 30, 59, and Forbes—closely follow Paus. on Sostratus. (B. Haussoullier, "Inscriptions de Delphes," *BCH* 6 [1882] 445–66 discovered his statue-base and six-line elegiac inscription recording his victories.) Brophy (369, n. 8 at 370) and Rudolph (40, n. 2) show that κλάω and ἐκκλάω regularly mean "fracture," "dislocate," or "fracture and dislocate," as Jones (IV, 103) and Frazer (I, 426) translate Paus. 8.40.2. Here the identical technique may have been put to different uses. Sostratus bent the fingers back to force opponents to yield or collapse from the severe pain or incapacitating fractures: such a knockout or surrender was the aim in pancratium. Leontiscus may not have been crippling his opponents to throw them easily, despite Paus. 6.4.3, but rather may have used a skillful takedown known to Oriental martial arts. He seized and bent his opponent's fingers not straight back but sideways, back and over with a clockwise or reverse twist: Son and Clark (138–39, 254, 257–58) discuss and illustrate this technique. Aside from a quick counter-blow (not permissible in Greek wrestling), the only chance the adversary has to avoid a broken wrist is to flip himself over in the direction of the twist—and three such throws would make Leontiscus a clean winner. A. Westbrook and O. Ratti, *Aikido and the Dynamic Sphere* (Tokyo 1971) 165–223, explain and illustrate the seven basic "immobilizations" of this

Cleomedes' story is much better attested than the unique tale of Damoxenus in Paus. 8.40.3-5.³¹ Theodoret, *Graec. affect.* 8: *de Martyribus* (Migne 83, 1017/18), reports Cleomedes' deification or heroization by Delphi, quotes the Pythian oracle on him, and gives a detailed account of his Olympic "victory," expulsion and insanity:

Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πύθιος μάντις Κλεομήδην τὸν Ἀστυπαλαιέα τὸν πύκτην θείου γέρως ἀπολαύειν ἐκέλευσε, καὶ τόνδε ἀνείλε τὸν χρησμὸν ἡ Πυθία·

"Υστατος ἡρώων Κλεομήδης Ἀστυπαλαιεύς·

"Ὀν θυσίαις τιμᾷθ', ὥς οὐκέτι θνητὸν ἐόντα.

... Οὗτος τὸν ἀνταγωνιστὴν μιᾷ πατάξας πληγῇ ἀνέωξε μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν πλευράν, ἐμβαλὼν δὲ εἴσω τὴν χεῖρα τῶν ἐγκάτων ἐλάβετο, εἶτα τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν διὰ τὴν τῆς ὠμότητος χαλεπηνάντων ὑπερβολὴν καὶ τίμημα ἐπιθέντων, ἀνεχώρησε μὲν βαρυθυμῶν...

In fact, the Pythian prophet ordered that Cleomedes of Astypalaea, the boxer, receive divine honors, and the Pythia gave out this oracle:

Last of heroes, Cleomedes of Astypalaea:

Honor him with sacrifices, as being no longer mortal.

... This man struck his opponent a single blow, opened up his side, then thrust his hand inside and seized his internal organs. Thereupon the presiding judges were outraged at the excessiveness of his savagery and laid a penalty on him. He withdrew (from Olympia) cut to the heart... (R. Brophy, trans.)

Cyril of Alexandria, *c. Iulian.* 6 (Migne 76, 811/12-813/14) quotes and comments more briefly on the oracle to Cleomedes:

καὶ τὸν Κλεομήδην, ὃν ἐν τῷ πυκτεύειν φασὶν ὥς ὠμός τε ἦν καὶ ἀπηνής, καὶ θηρσὶν ἀγρίοις ὀλίγα παραχωρῶν· καὶ ταύτης ἔνεκα τῆς

Zen art. The seventh, "*kote gaeshi* (wrist turn-out)," is most probably what Leontiscus and Sostratus used:

[Grip the opponent's right.] Your left thumb will apply pressure upon his knuckles between the fourth ... and the little finger. Your other fingers will close around his thumb and palm. From that position ... extend his hand back and over his forearm; ... the angle of wrist torsion ... [if] too wide ... may cause dislocation.... [K]eep his right hand low ... and he will ... slide down sideways.... Otherwise ... he may be forced to perform a high somersault over his own outstretched, turning arm. In either case, however, he will fall onto his back. (216-17)

³¹So Brophy (383, n. 26) quotes P. Levi, S. J., *Pausanias: Guide to Greece* (Harmondsworth 1971), Penguin trans., II, 472, n. 295: "We know about this revolting story from no other source."

αἰτίας ἐπαινέσας αὐτὸν ὁ Πύθιος, . . . Λαμπρὰ τῆς ἀπανθρωπίας χαρίζη τὰ γέρα τοῖς ἀθλοῦσι, ὦ Πύθιε. "Ὡ τῆς ἡμερότητος τῶν θεῶν. "Ὡ τῆς ἀφθονίας. ἐγγράφεται δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ὁ μιαιφόνος τε καὶ μαιφόνος.

Cleomedes also, of whom they tell how savage and cruel he was in boxing, differing little from wild beasts; and for this reason the Pythian honored him, . . . You bestow brilliant rewards for inhumanity on athletes, O Pythian. Oh, the mildness of the gods! Oh, their generosity! There is enrolled among the gods the blood-stained murderer. (R. Brophy trans.)

Origen, *c. Cels.* 3.3, 25, 33 has three brief references to Cleomedes.³²

The fighters wore the "soft thongs" (*meilichai*, *himantes leptoî*) of Greek boxing, which left the fingers free to deliver a "spear-hand" finger thrust, a "knife-hand," chop or other open-hand blow, as well as to close into a fist, as Paus. 8.40.3 makes clear.³³ So Cleomedes, like Damoxenus, used a single open-hand blow, which struck Iccus on the ribs (μῖα πληγὴ πατάξας . . . τὴν πλευράν). He too may have followed it up immediately, as we said of Damoxenus,

. . . by grabbing and pulling back hard on the part of the opponent's body struck . . . this combined technique *could* break the skin . . . ; it *might* result in tearing loose or exposing the opponent's internal organs. This is part of the hearsay of the martial arts . . . medically . . . the lethal nature of this blow comes almost entirely from the damage done on impact to the internal organs, especially . . .

Iccus' lung, in this case (*pneumōn*, Oenomaus).³⁴ As for penetrating within the ribs to the body cavity, Oenomaus and our patristic sources repeat this improbable detail. Yet the story's basic credibility is unaffected by accepting or rejecting it, as we saw with Paus. 8.40.3-5.³⁵ They do omit this one impossible detail therein, the "razor-sharp nails" Pausanias wrongly gives Damoxenus, which neither he, Cleomedes, nor any boxer of any period could have had.³⁶ We can confidently accept

³²See H. Chadwick, trans., *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge 1965) 130 (3.3), 143 (3.25), 149-50 (3.33), and 149, ns. 1 and 7, which begins with one error: "Cleomedes killed his boxing opponent at the Olympic Festival, 486 [*sic*] B.C." — clearly a misprint for 496, Ol. 71: see note 23 above.

³³See Philos. *Gymn.* 10, Paus. 8.40.3; Brophy (369-70 quoting Jones IV, 101/2-104/5, 369, n. 8 at 370, 375-76, and 376, n. 11).

³⁴Brophy (386). On the lungs, see Grant (fig. 414-27), Woodburne (370-79); on a fatal collapsed lung, see Adams (68, 70), Bowden (219-20, 222), and notes 37-38 below.

³⁵See Brophy (382-83, n. 25).

³⁶See Brophy (383, n. 29), correcting Paus. 8.40.4; add: *New York Daily News* Aug. 6, 1978, sec. 1, p. 89, quoting former world heavyweight boxing champion Joe Frazier: "Now that I don't fight anymore [*sic*], I can let my nails grow."

the story they tell and say something more about the blow that killed Iccus and the medical cause of death.

The ribs and intercostal muscles are strong and hard enough that it seems certain no spear-hand struck Iccus, but a knife-edge attack or a chop—that is, not Cleomedes' fingertips but the outer edge of his palm, striking Iccus' ribs horizontally, palm down (a knife-edge) or palm up (a "karate chop").³⁷ The fracture of a single rib, and its impulsion inward to puncture and collapse a lung, are the probable effects of such a well-focused blow. The punctured lung caused immediate collapse and death.³⁸ But this fatal outcome, or rather, the fact that this was a body-blow, and a fatal, "brutal" one (as our patristic sources censure it), cost Cleomedes his crown.³⁹

³⁷On the ribs and thorax, see Grant (fig. 391-407), Woodburne (328-34); on fractured ribs, puncturing a lung, see Bowden (219-20), Adams (67-70), Gelber (60-61), G. Woolsey, "Medico-Legal Consideration of Wounds," in Witthaus and Becker (457-590 at 574-75). On the knife-edge attack, palm down, see Nishiyama and Brown (91), Son and Clark (68-69, 207-09, 243, 262-63); on the "karate chop" or knife-edge attack palm up, see Nishiyama and Brown (90, 159-60, 177, 224, 232), Adams (54-57), Son and Clark (156, 158, 223-24, 250-52, 265).

³⁸On "focus" of one's mind, power and energy on a single point, as in breaking wood, or striking a small spot on the body fatally, see Brophy (385, n. 34); Harris (*SGR* 71) translates Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 2.23.56:

exclamant quam maxime possunt; faciunt idem, cum exercentur, athletae; pugiles vero, etiam cum feriunt adversarium, in jactandis caestibus ingemescent, non quod doleant animove succumbant, sed quia profundenda voce omne corpus intenditur venitque plaga vehementior.

... shout at the top of their voices. Athletes do the same in training; boxers when striking an opponent grunt as they deliver the blow, not because they are in pain or their courage is failing, but because making the noise concentrates all their powers and the blow lands with greater violence.

This is a perfect explanation of the "shout" or "bark," *kiai*, *utz*, in Oriental martial arts, as in Son and Clark (15):

The loud bark . . . the exhalation of breath . . . accompany and thereby facilitate the . . . maximum concentration of physical output.

On a fatal collapsed lung, see Adams (68, 70) and Bowden (219-20, 222); on a less likely (here), but possible, fatal "fracture of the ribs with lacerations of the diaphragm," see Adams (77, with 71-74, 82) and Woolsey in Witthaus and Becker (at 579-80); on the diaphragm and ribs, see Woodburne (475-77) and Grant (fig. 189-91, 431).

³⁹Brophy (388, n. 43 at 389) was too cautious: Gardiner (*GASF* 432 and 432, n. 4) is right that the foul was not the "fatal injury inflicted," but "some unlawful and inten-

Something very similar occurred a little later at Olympia when Diognetus of Crete killed a certain Heracles, thereby "won" the boxing crown, but was expelled by the Hellanodikai. Photius *Bibl.* 190 (p. 151 Bekker) summarizes Ptolemy Chennus' work, in which he read:

Ὡς Διόγνητος, ὁ Κρής, ὁ πύκτης, νικήσας οὐ λάβοι τὸν στέφανον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐλαθείη ὑπὸ Ἡλείων, διότι ὁ νικηθεὶς καὶ ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ Ἡρακλῆς ἐκαλεῖτο ὁμωνυμῶν τῷ ἥρωϊ· τοῦτον τὸν Διόγνητον ὡς ἥρωα Κρήτες τιμῶσιν.

How Diognetus the Cretan, the boxer, after winning (at Olympia) did not receive the crown, but was even expelled by the Eleans, because the man defeated and killed by him was called Heracles, having the same name as the hero. This Diognetus (some) Cretans honor as a hero. (R. Brophy trans.)⁴⁰

Scholars agree it is obviously not the name of the deceased, Heracles, but the fatal injury to him, or the violation of some rule which caused the fatality, that cost Diognetus his crown.⁴¹ Photius does not specify when he "won" but lost it. Moretti rightly argues that he must have been contemporary to other "divinized" Olympic champions, Cleomedes himself (492 B.C.) and other boxers, Euthymus (484, 476, 472 B.C.) and Theogenes (480, 476 in pancratiun), the pentathlete Euthycles (488), and the honored then disgraced runner, Astylus (488-480 B.C.). The only open spot for his boxing "victory" is 488 B.C., Ol. 73.⁴²

What cost him the crown was definitely not the fatality itself, or Telemachus (above) and the unnamed boxer who killed Agathus Daemon (below) could not have gone on to win. Nor were Heracles, Iccus, or Agathus Daemon (below) crowned in death, as Creugas was.

tional act of violence. Fatal accidents were . . . no[t] . . . frequent, nor . . . punished." This contradicts Drees's mistaken generalization from Arrachion and Creugas (on 52): "[W]e can say with certainty . . . that the competitors were not allowed to carry the contest to the point of endangering their opponent's life." And Drees (83): "As usual the dead man was proclaimed victor." For our argument that the body-blow was the foul, see below, and notes 44-58.

⁴⁰Cf. the French trans. of the Budé ed., R. Henry, *Photius: Bibliothèque* (Paris 1959-74), III (1962), 65.

⁴¹See Henry (note 40 above) III, 65 n. 5, citing Kirchner, *Diognetos* no. 10, *RE V* (1905) col. 785; Drees (52); Forbes (55-56). Moretti (*O* no. 181) lists Diognetus as "victor," however, like Cleomedes.

⁴²Moretti (*O* no. 181) also discussing Cleomedes, no. 174; Euthymus, no. 191, 214, 227; Theogenes, no. 201, 205; Euthycles, no. 180; Astylus, no. 178-79, 196-98, 219. Paus.; scholia, *P. O.*; *P. Oxy.* 222 date all the other boxing victors.

He had proved almost unbeatable to Damoxenus. They had to resort to trading one blow each to settle the championship. Damoxenus' body-blow, a defiance of the *nomoi* of Greek boxing, and its fatal result, combined with what Paus. 8.40.5 reports as the judges' reason—that his finger-thrust counted as several blows and so broke the solemn agreement with Creugas—to win the bout but lose the crown. The Nemean judges crowned the hard-fought, nearly invincible Creugas, but the Olympic Hellanodikai did no such thing for the (presumably) less skilled or resolute Iccus and Heracles, leaving Cleomedes and Diognétus their empty "victory" but expelling them from the stadium.⁴³

The common "illegal" factor in all three cases, we argue, was the use of a (fatal) body-blow. This is the *only* common factor aside from the fatal injury itself, which did *not* automatically bring expulsion, or the open-hand blow. Gardiner called banning this "a reasonable prohibition."⁴⁴ But we have so many illustrations of open-hand blows from vase painting, and literary testimony, that the scholarly consensus, and Gardiner later, considered them a permissible, even essential, part of the Greek boxer's repertoire, until the change to "sharp" or "heavy thongs" (*himantes oxeis*) in the fourth century B.C.⁴⁵ The vase painters would never have repeatedly chosen to portray an impossible or forbidden "knockout" blow, nor could they have depicted these highly effective techniques from ancient and modern fighting arts so accurately if they never saw them used.⁴⁶

⁴³On Creugas' resoluteness, see Brophy (367) and Harris (*GAA* 100). Robert (198–201, 254–59, 288–89) might have added Creugas to his list of athletes who fought "to the death" or "all day till dark" for victory. Brophy (383, n. 27) points out the irony of generalizing from Creugas that the man who went first in an agreed-upon exchange of single blows (*klimax*) had a real advantage—as Gardiner (*GASF* 432) and Frost (224, n. 30) did. Creugas won by his *death*, not his first blow.

⁴⁴Gardiner (*GASF* 433) (quoted, discussed by Brophy [388]). He wondered if "hitting in the stomach was prohibited?" (433), or "intentional blows on the body" (421). Brophy (388, n. 42) cites sources agreeing with this argument.

⁴⁵Gardiner (*GASF* 422–23, *AAW* 203–06, 213); Harris (*GAA* 103): "If the evidence of the paintings is to be trusted, Greek boxers often delivered a blow with the heel of the hand unclenched." Brophy (375–76) discusses the Greek boxing "gloves" or thongs and (376, n. 11) cites ancient and modern sources on the change to "sharp thongs" (see below, and note 65) in the fourth century B.C.: 339–36 is the *terminus ante quem*.

⁴⁶Cf. Gardiner (*AAW* fig. 182) with Nishiyama and Brown (154–55, 160–61), Son and Clark (147, 150–52); Gardiner (*AAW* fig. 183, 195) (left boxer) with Nishiyama and Brown (76, 94, 218), Son and Clark (226, 229–30) (palm-heel strike); Gardiner (*AAW* fig. 184) with Nishiyama and Brown (159–60), Son and Clark (158, 160); Gardiner (*AAW* fig. 185) with Nishiyama and Brown (49, 77), Son and Clark (115, 137, 226–30, 233, 236–39, 254–55, 258–59, 262, 264) ("spear-hand" attack or "finger-thrust").

We have other evidence that only blows to the head and neck were permitted in Greek boxing, that intentional body-blows counted as a “foul,” and so were the common illicit factor in these three fatal contests. From vase painting again, we repeatedly see pairs of boxers “on guard” in a way that must, in reality, have protected (and well protected) only the head and neck.⁴⁷ Gardiner draws a good composite from sixth and fifth century vases:

The boxer's position as he first “puts up his hands” is excellent, his body upright, head erect, and left foot advanced . . . the right . . . sometimes at right angles to it, the correct position for a lunge. The left arm, . . . used for guarding, is extended almost straight, the hand sometimes clenched, more often open . . . right . . . drawn back for striking . . . This sideways position with the left arm extended was an effective guard for the head, but left the body exposed in a manner that would be fatal . . . [unless] the Greek boxer . . . confined his attention to his adversary's head and made no use of body blows, whether . . . thought . . . bad form, or . . . actually prohibited.⁴⁸

This was still true in the third and late fourth centuries A.D. Philostratus *Gymn.* 34 makes the ludicrous-sounding statement about “big-bellied” boxers:

ἔστι δ' ὁμως τι καὶ παρὰ τῆς γαστρὸς ὄφελος τῷ πυκτεύοντι, τὰς γὰρ τοῦ προσώπου πληγὰς ἢ τοιάδε γαστῆρ ἐρύκει προσεμβάλλουσα τῇ φορᾷ τοῦ πλήττοντος.

Nevertheless, the man who boxes gets some benefit from his stomach, for such a [protruding] stomach wards off blows to the face, by projecting out into the striker's line of attack. (R. Brophy trans.)⁴⁹

A sagging, protruding belly is never an asset to a boxer, whether our unathletic sophist viewed it as punched instead of the face when it projected into the path of the opponent's uppercuts, or as shoving against him whenever he rushed in with an attack to the face.⁵⁰ But Philostratus can argue that way if he and his audience visualized boxers as only going for the head and as not being allowed to use the body punches of the

⁴⁷See Gardiner (*AAW* 199–205, fig. 173, 188 [on 213], *GASF* 419–24, fig. 143–44). Both black-figure and red-figure vases (sixth–fifth centuries) depict this stance.

⁴⁸Gardiner (*AAW* 204); 204, n. 1, cites Philostratus *Gymn.* 10, 23—for 9, 34.

⁴⁹Cf. Jüthner (160/61–162/3), Robinson (223).

⁵⁰See Gardiner (*GASF* 421), Robert (264–65, 270), Harris (*GAA* 176–77).

pancratium or modern boxing. This same view appears in *Gymn.* 10, when he explains the Spartan "invention" of pan-Hellenic boxing:

Πυγμή δὲ Λακωνικὸν εὖρημα . . . ἐπύκτευσον δὲ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ τὰδε· κράνη Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἦν οὐδ' ἐγχώριον ἡγούντο τὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῖς μάχην, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀσπίς ἀντὶ κράνους τῷ μετ' ἐπιστήμης φέροντι. ὥς οὖν φυλάττειντο μὲν τὰς κατὰ τοῦ προσώπου πληγὰς, πληττόμενοι δὲ ἀνέχοντο, πυγμὴν ἐπήσκησαν καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα οὕτως ἐξεγυμνάζοντο.

Boxing was a Spartan invention . . . And the Spartans of old used to box for the following reasons: the Spartans did not have helmets, nor did they think fighting in them proper for their homeland, but a shield substituted for the helmet, for the man who used it with skill. In order, therefore, that they could ward off blows to the face, or endure being hit there, they practiced boxing and so toughened their faces. (R. Brophy trans.)⁵¹

St. John Chrysostom believed Greek boxing allowed no body-blows. Three times he compares all the afflictions the Christian should face willingly with the injuries the pan-Hellenic boxer risked voluntarily. The latter is always limited to blows to the head, face, or "head and face," never to the body or "head and body," which he certainly would have mentioned if permissible in Greek boxing in his own day (347?-408 A.D.) or any period he knew. For he was trying to capture vividly the full gamut of sufferings the boxer faced resolutely, as the Christian should also.

First, in *ad Stag. a diab. vex.* I (Migne 47.446), he compares surprise that the devil waits to attack Christians until after they totally dedicate themselves to God with foolish wonder that the pan-Hellenic boxer attacks only his well-trained opponent with his full range of blows, not the spectators:

παραπλήσιον ποιεῖς ὡς περ ἂν εἰ ἐθαύμαζες, τί δήποτε τοῖς μὲν θεαταῖς οὐδεὶς ἐνοχλεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἀπογραφεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ πυκτεύειν, καὶ γυμνασθέντι, καὶ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα καθέντι, τούτῳ μόνῳ πάντων ἐπεισιν ὁ ἀνταγωνιστής, πατάσων τὴν κεφαλὴν, καὶ κόπτων τὸ πρόσωπον. . . . οὗτος γὰρ τῶν πυκτευόντων ὁ νόμος.

You are doing practically the same thing as if you were wondering why in the world no one bothers the spectators, but the individual who has registered and trained for the boxing, and entered the arena, this man alone of all men the opponent rushes to attack, striking his head and punching

⁵¹ Cf. Jüthner (138/9-140/1), Robinson (215).

his face. . . . For this is the rule covering those who box. (R. Brophy trans.)⁵²

The balanced pair of phrases meant to cover all-out attacks in boxing, comparable to all demonic assaults and temptations, has no mention of body-blows.

Next, to urge long-suffering under blows of all kinds, physical and verbal, Chrysostom *Serm. in Acta Apost. XXXI* (Migne 60.231) compares Christian meekness to the quiet resolve of boxers taking blows on the head and gritting their teeth to endure the pain silently:

Οὐχ ὁρᾶτε τοὺς πυκτεύοντας, οἱ διατετρωμένοι τὰς κεφαλὰς, τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐνδακόντες, οὕτως ἡμέρως φέρουσι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας;

Don't you see boxers who have been hit and hurt on the head, gritting their teeth (?), and thus enduring the pains calmly? (R. Brophy trans.)⁵³

Finally, in *frag. in Job* (Migne 64.553), Chrysostom contrasts the boxer who wins by "smashing his head in" or "knocking his head off" the opponent, with the Devil, who smashed down and battered Job's body with countless sores, but then lost (the contest with Job and the "wager" with God), and retreated in shame:

οἱ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἀγώνων πύκται, ἐπειδὴν κατακόψωσι τὰς κεφαλὰς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, τότε νικῶσι, καὶ στεφανοῦνται· οὗτος δέ, ὅτε κατέκοψε τὸ σῶμα τοῦ δικαίου παντοδαποῖς ἔλκεσιν αὐτὸ διατρήσας, καὶ ἀσθενέστερον ἐποίησε, τότε ἐνίκηθη καὶ ἀνεχώρησε.

The boxers in the contests of the pagan festivals, whenever they smash the heads of their opponents, conquer at that moment, and are crowned; but

⁵²Cf. J. A. Sawhill, *Athletic Metaphors in the Biblical Homilies of St. John Chrysostom* (Diss. Princeton 1928) 66, with minor mistranslation. *Patassein* = "strike with an open-hand blow," *koptein* = "punch, hit with the closed fist," throughout Greek usage.

⁵³Cf. Sawhill (note 52 above) 69, taking *endakontes* as "bite their teeth into their lips," perhaps rightly. He could have added a Classical parallel (or original), from Aeschylus watching the boxing at the Isthmian Games, commenting that when a boxer's face is hit, the spectators shout, the boxer is silent:

Αἰσχύλος Ἰσθμοῖ πύκτου πληγέντος εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ κραυγῆς γενομένης, "οἶον" εἶπεν "ἢ ἀσκήσις ἐστίν. οἱ θεώμενοι βοῶσιν, ὁ δὲ πληγείς σιωπᾷ."

Plut. *Moralia* 29F/*Quom. adol. poet. aud. deb.* 10, repeated in *Mor.* 79E/*quom. in virt. sent. prof.* 8, which adds he said it "nudging (νύξας) Ion of Chios." This anecdote also shows that the face was the regular target of Hellenic boxing. Cf. *Tusc. Disp.* 2.17.40 merely says: "pugiles caestibus contusi ne ingemescent quidem."

this opponent [Satan], when he smashed the body of the just man [Job], by piercing it with all sorts of ulcerous sores, and made it quite weak, was conquered at that moment, and retreated. (R. Brophy trans.)⁵⁴

The pointed contrast of the loser's battered head with Job's battered but triumphant body, is effective. But surely, if John Chrysostom knew of any period when the *nomoi* of Hellenic boxing allowed body-blows, he would have added that detail here, or in one of the other two comparisons, to get a perfectly exact parallel: the body punishment a boxer takes (as today) with the bodily pains diabolically inflicted on Job and on the good Christian.⁵⁵

One counter-argument points to the definite body-blows mentioned in epic boxing matches, and to Theoc. 22 above all.⁵⁶ This is an epic confrontation between the champion of order and civilization (= Hellenism), Polydeuces, and the barbaric leader of dehumanized brutes, Amycus of the Bebrycians. The laws of civilized men include the *nomoi* of Olympia, of Hellenic boxing specifically. By the poet's intent, they do *not* apply to Amycus, while Polydeuces embodies the most "scientific" and legitimate boxing style. Thus, our skilled, "law-abiding" champion only uses blows to the head, the "best" and the only permissible target. Polydeuces punches Amycus' chin (22.88-91), mouth (100, 126), both cheeks and jawbones (95-100), eyes (101), nose (102-05), teeth (126), temple (123-25), and the whole face (110-11, 127-

⁵⁴Cf. Sawhill (note 52 above) 69; 70-71 on *καὶρία πληγὴ* = "a knockout blow" (not in LSJ); 12, n. 1, on *τῶν ἐξωθεν*: "a common ecclesiastical expression denoting those without the pale of the Church." Chrysostom is playing on several senses of *kata-koptein*, lit. "strike/cut/beat down; cut/break/smash in pieces; smash/break/pierce into/through."

⁵⁵Even if Sawhill (note 52 above) and Harris (*GAA* 129-35) are not right that St. Paul, St. John Chrysostom, and all the patristic fathers reflect the reality of contemporary athletics in their imagery, but only the long Hellenistic tradition of the *agon* and athletic metaphors—the view of V. C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in the Pauline Literature* (Leyden 1967), *N.T. Suppl.* 16—this is still evidence that the speakers and their audience believed or accepted that the head was the sole target of boxers. They would not accept body-blows as a normal part of Hellenic boxing.

⁵⁶Frost (217-18, 222 and 217, n. 19) and Harris (*SGR* 23-24) believe body-blows were a regular part of the Greek boxer's attack, though earlier, Harris (*GAA* 54, 100-01) was not so sure. Gardiner (*GASF* 421, 428-30) interprets Theoc. 22.109-11 exactly as we do, contrasting Polydeuces' "well-aimed blows on the face" with Amycus' "unscientific . . . body blows" (421), "short and wild, falling without effect on the chest, or outside the neck" (429).

28).⁵⁷ Amycus' body-blows (22.109-10) are one more example of his brute strength and lack of genuine skill. Some he failed to aim at his best target, Polydeuces' head; others fell short or went wild and missed. They also betray, like a punch "below the belt" today, his brutal disregard of all civilized rules—including the *nomoi* of boxing—exactly like his seizure of Polydeuces' hand to pull him into his clumsy uppercut (118-24) and his prototypical lack of all *xenia* (44-74). This applies to boxing matches in other epics also (as we shall show in a future study). Blows to the head win most of them, but Theocritus deliberately depicts Polydeuces with the style closest to the best pan-Hellenic boxing.

In short, the Hellanodikai expelled Diognetus not for the fatality per se, but for killing Heracles while "fouling" him with a body-blow: a knife-hand (like Cleomedes), a spear-hand (like Damoxenus), or a very hard punch to the solar plexus.⁵⁸

The last boxing fatality now known occurred in the later second

⁵⁷Frost (217), Gardiner (*GASF* 428), Robinson (143-46, 260), and Harris (*GAA* 54) agree this fight reflects the best pan-Hellenic style—on Polydeuces' part. Frost (218) cites "frequent references in literature," Harris (*GAA* 24) "a few unmistakable references to [body blows]," without specifying them. We are at work on a study of every boxing match in Greco-Roman epic. Briefly, all (the few) body-blows are like Amycus'—brutal or clumsy moves by the hero's opponent, or missed punches to the face falling short. In *Od.* 18.25-109, Irus leads off with a clumsy left that hits Odysseus' right shoulder; in *Apoll. Rhod. Argon.* 2.5-97, Amycus (again) swings a downward blow from on tiptoe that Polydeuces blocks on his forearm; in *Val. Flacc.* 4.252-314, Amycus and Pollux pummel one another, back and chest, though Pollux wins with lethal blows to the head; in *Verg. Aen.* 5.365-484, Dares and Entellus use the Roman *caestus* (not found at Olympia or the pan-Hellenic festivals) to pummel each other's ribs and chest, ears, temples, chin, and jaw; in *Nonnus* 37.389-545, Melisseus and Eurymedon violate a few known pan-Hellenic rules, punching each other on the chest, one missing the face, one deliberately countering to the heart, and both clinching in close. *Plut. Mor.* 68E/*Symp.* 2.4 reports the latter was forbidden in pan-Hellenic boxing. The former, we argue, deliberate body-blows, cost Damoxenus and Cleomedes (and Diognetus) their crown. These are the only literary evidence for body-blows. The Greek poets even more than the Roman make them illicit or inept moves, or both.

⁵⁸For a fatal kick to the solar plexus, see Adams (62-66, 71-74) for a hammer-fist strike on the diaphragm. See Son and Clark (35-37, 68, 71, 208-09, 228, 234) for different punches to the solar plexus, and Son and Clark (112, 115, 137) for "finger-thrust" or "spear-hand." Woolsey, in Witthaus and Becker (at 471-72), states: "Blows on the abdomen are sometimes quickly followed by death without visible lesion to account for it," giving two case histories, both "a kick in the stomach."

century A.D. We learn of it from the epitaph of the deceased, Agathus Daemon, discovered at Olympia:⁵⁹

Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων ὁ καὶ | Κάμηλος Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, | ἀνὴρ πύκτης νεμεο |
νείκης,
ἐνθάδε πυκτεύ | ὡν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἔτε | λεύτα,
εὐξάμενος | Ζηνὶ ἢ στέφος ἢ | θάνατον,
ἐτῶν | ΛΕ. χαῖρε.

Agathus Daemon (Good Guardian Spirit), also known as "the Camel," an Alexandrian, a *man* (= an adult-class) boxer, a Nemean victor, here (at Olympia) passed away while fighting in the stadium, having prayed to Zeus for either a (victory-)wreath or death; thirty-five years old. Farewell. (R. Brophy trans.)⁶⁰

Agathus Daemon is a common Egyptian-Alexandrian Greek "theophoric" proper name.⁶¹ Jeanne and Louis Robert are undoubtedly right about his professional "nickname" or sobriquet, "the Camel," an indication of his obstinacy and stubborn, brute courage, exactly like that

⁵⁹Published by G.-J. M.-J. te Riele, "Inscriptions conservées au Musée d'Olympie," *BCH* 88 (1964) 169-95 at 186-87, "Remarques Additionnelles sur la Collection Épigraphique du Musée d'Olympie," *BCH* 89 (1965) 584-89 at 585-86, who mentions G. Spanos discovered the plaque at Miraka, about four km. east of Olympia proper. Robert (199) dates it after the first century, 288 to just before the oracle to Eudaemon quoted in *Philos. Her.* 678-79, a boxer of the late second or early third century. Finley and Pleket (124) say: "late in the second century."

⁶⁰Robert (199) and Ebert (143) print the epitaph this way to bring out the elegiac couplet, which te Riele (note 59 above) *BCH* 89, 585, credits J. Bousquet with noting. Cf. trans. of Finley and Pleket (124), Ebert (143), te Riele (*BCH* 88, 186): they all supply the definite article, "either the victory-wreath or death." Ebert (143) does not find ἀνὴρ redundant with giving his age, thirty-five. It connotes "a real man," but denotes an adult-class boxer, a mature heavyweight; contra, Robert (200) sees Agathus Daemon as a desperate, aging contender, making his final effort, after winning only a "minor" contest, Nemea. Finley and Pleket (124) infer he was "victor in the Nemean Games and elsewhere," more probably. Robert (200) is right that *eteleuta* is a euphemism, like Eng. "passed away," which adds the idea: "he brought his life to completion"—"ran the race, fought the good fight, finished the course" in St. Paul's phrases (2 Tim. 4.7)—by getting as close as he could in this life to Olympic victory.

⁶¹Preisigke's *Namenbuch* and D. Foraboschi, *Onomastikon Alterum Papyrologicum* (Milan 1971) I, 17, have both Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων ὁ καὶ κτλ. and Σοῦχος, Αὐρήλιος Σαραπίων, κτλ. ὁ καὶ Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων. Cf. L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown [CN] 1931, repr. New York 1975), APA Monograph No. I, 9-10, 18, 20, 31, n. 85, 151-53, 252, n. 20, 259-59, 261-62, 265-66. It was most common in Hellenistic Egypt, Alexandria specifically, where surnames "originated": Paus. 5.21.12.

animal.⁶² They also rightly conclude that this mature (35-year-old) professional (Nemean victor) died in the final championship bout at Olympia. Either he and his opponent were "allowed" to get to the final by competitors who "bowed out" of the compulsory month's training at Olympia when they saw the competition, or these two champions, Agathus Daemon and his killer, were sure to last to the final round. An indicator is the "victory or death" phrase in the epitaph. It clearly implies "the Camel" died with the olive wreath as his only other alternative—namely, as a finalist.⁶³

⁶²J. and L. Robert, "Bulletin Epigraphique," *REG* 78 (1965) 70-204 at 110-11, speak of the camel's "obstination brutale et courageuse," citing parallels in Ti. Claudius Rufus' inscription at Olympia, *SIG* III, 226-29, no. 1073, Moretti (*O* no. 808); Lucilius *A.P.* 11.81, and Philo, *Omnis Probus Liber Sit* 17.110-13, discussed below. Robert (200-01 and 200, n. 2) add Galen 6.664 K., *Alim. fac.*:

καθάπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἵππων τε καὶ καμήλων, ὧν καὶ αὐτῶν ἐσθίουσι οἱ ὄνῳδες τε καὶ καμηλώδεις ἄνθρωποι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα.

⁶³On the compulsory month of training at Elis, see Finley and Pleket (61, 63-65, 71), Harris (*GAA* 176), and Gardiner (*GASF* 202, *AAW* 224). Withdrawal during this month was allowed, but not after the Games began. M. Aurelius Asclepiades, pancratiast crowned at Ol. 240 (181 A.D.), boasted that in other games some opponents withdrew as soon as he registered, others in the first or second round of the draw: *IG* 14.1102-04 = *IGR* 1.152-54; Moretti (*O* no. 884, *IAG* 228-35); Robinson (197-99). Paus. 5.21.18 states that Sarapion of Alexandria was the *only* man to withdraw during the Olympic games—from pancratium, the night before the fighting events, Ol. 201 (25 A.D.). Sarapion was fined and expelled. C. A. Forbes, "Crime and Punishment in Greek Athletics," *CJ* 47 (1951-52) 169-73, 202-03 at 172, quotes Epict. 3.22.52 that such athletes were flogged for cowardice. Yet Theogenes, who won the boxing at Ol. 76 (480 B.C.), but was so exhausted he had to withdraw from the pancratium, was fined, like Sarapion. So was Apollonius, who came late to Ol. 218 (93 A.D.) with lying excuses, after spending the required month of training in collecting cash prizes from minor games. His fellow-Alexandrian, Heraclides, proved he was lying, and won the boxing crown *akoniti*, "without the dust" of combat (Paus. 5.21.12-14), as Dromeus won pancratium in 480 B.C. Paus. 6.11.4 says this was the first time that happened at Olympia, though it was the second. Acmatidas of Sparta won pentathlon *akoniti* at Ol. 70 (500 B.C.): *I. Olympia Bericht* (1936-37) 82 ff.; Moretti (*IAG* 15-19). Paus. 5.21.15 reports that Didas agreed to a bribe from Sarapammon to throw the boxing, but the Hellanodikai found out and fined both men, yet allowed Didas to keep the crown for Ol. 226 (125 A.D.). Thus, in the two generations before Agathus Daemon (93, 125 A.D.), there were only two boxers at an Olympiad, as in pancratium in 480 B.C. (thanks to Xerxes' invasion). In Ol. 98 (388 B.C.), there were just four boxers: Eupolus bribed the other three entrants to let him win and was found out and fined (Paus. 5.21.2-4). The number of entrants actually fighting at Olympia was low (Finley and Pleket [63-65]). This helped keep the number of fatalities low: see notes 64, 73 below.

We know Agathus Daemon did not win the olive wreath merely for dying while trying for it. His epitaph would have said exactly that, if he were another posthumous victor like Arrachion, or Creugas at Nemea. It would also have indicated clearly if his death cost his unnamed opponent the crown, as Heracles' death did Diognetus, and Iccus' Cleomedes. Rather, Agathus Daemon's unnamed killer must have won the boxing crown *despite* the fatal injury, just as Telemachus did in wrestling. He stayed completely within the rules, as the Hellenodikai saw it, so the accidentally fatal outcome was no reason in itself to strip him of his hard-won victory over the fierce, tenacious "Camel."

Thus, we have strong grounds for saying Agathus Daemon died of a head wound, or the combined effect of several blows to the head, or of fresh damage and old reopened wounds. We have numerous modern examples of each, the death of the Korean boxer Koo Kim being the latest. From forensic medicine we know that:

Following severe head injury death can take place with great rapidity. It is surprising how little obvious naked-eye damage occurs in some of these cases. On the other hand, enormous damage may be suffered. . . . The condition of punch-drunk has been explained on the basis of petechial haemorrhages occurring in the substance of the brain, but the condition is not satisfactorily accounted for on a pathological basis. In those boxers who succumb in the ring or shortly afterwards, death is usually due to overlying haemorrhage.⁶⁴

Visible trauma and traumatic hemorrhage in the brain were quite common once the Greek boxer began using the "sharp thongs," *himantes oxeis*, in the fourth century B.C. The knuckles were covered by a band of hard, stiff leather an inch wide and half an inch thick, with sharp, projecting edges. Three to five thin, cutting strips, bound together tightly by thongs, made up the band. Hellenistic and Roman statues show us the surface lacerations and underlying damage done by

⁶⁴Bowden (212, 214): petechiae are small hemorrhagic spots on the skin, mucus membrane, or brain tissue; Bowden (218) has a case close to Agathus Daemon in age: a man of forty had minor abrasions on the forehead from a fight, and no skull fracture; he died of extensive intracranial (subdural and subarachnoid) hemorrhage. Duk Koo Kim was the 438th boxer between 1914 and 1982 known to die of immediate injuries in the ring, an appallingly high number. Pan-Hellenic fatalities were absolutely low: see note 73.

this cruel ring of leather "brass knuckles," including fractured cheek-bones and jaws.⁶⁵ Where that much damage is common, skull fractures are not impossible, and concussive injury to the brain probably frequent.⁶⁶

Concussion, and cerebral hemorrhage, killed Agathus Daemon, if the fatal blow hit him anywhere on the skull. A straight or hooked punch to the temple in particular would fracture the temporal bone and cause severe internal and external bleeding and fatal brain damage.⁶⁷ A straight hit on the nose might drive the nasal bone up into the brain; on the point of the chin, the mentum, it can fracture the mandible, but

⁶⁵See Gardiner (*AAW* 108 and fig. 72, 176) and Finley and Pleket (38-39 and plate 29): the first century B.C. statue of a boxer now in the Terme Museum, Rome. He has a broken nose, scars on cheek and forehead, and cauliflower ears; he wears the *himantes oxeis* or *sphairai*. On these "hard thongs," see Brophy (376, n. 11, 382, n. 24) and the sources cited, esp. Frost (214); Gardiner (*GASF* 206-11 and fig. 135-37); Harris (*GAA* 98-100), which place the change from "soft thongs" early in the fourth century B.C.; Gardiner (*AAW* 200) dates it to 339-36 B.C. (?a *terminus ante quem*). Gardiner (*AAW* fig. 74) shows four mosaics from the baths of Caracalla, now in the Lateran Museum. One boxer wears the spiked *caestus*; all four men, including the trainer who is a retired champion, have broken noses, facial scars, cauliflower ears, and one a crushed cheek and facial nerve damage. Finley and Pleket (139) and Robert (181-201, 202-09) quote mocking epigrams of Lucilius (*A.P.* 11.75, 77, 81) on boxers who lost an eye, an ear, a nose, a jawbone, and became totally unrecognizable, even to themselves.

⁶⁶On concussion, see Simpson (109-13), Bowden (212-14), Woolsey, in Witthaus and Becker (at 472-73, 561), Adams (22). See Grant (fig. 458-64, 507-08, 569-71); Woodburne (38, 284-93) on the skull; Grant (fig. 506) on the cranial nerves, on the posterior cranial fossa (496-97), on the dura mater (502-94), the membrane surrounding the brain; id. 499 and Woodburne (293-304) on the cranium. See Gelber (94-100) and Bowden (201-11) on cranial injury and hemorrhage; Bowden (198) notes that "fatal intracranial damage is common . . . without . . . fracture of the skull." Woolsey (at 565) distinguishes this "the commonest" extra- or subdural hemorrhage, due to "rupture of the middle meningeal artery," from subdural hemorrhage in "depressed fracture" of the skull, where the larger vessel ruptured "is most often the middle cerebral" artery.

⁶⁷See Grant (fig. 510) on the temporal bone; Adams (27-30) discusses the damage done, temporal fracture and hemorrhage of the middle meningeal artery; Bowden (211) adds that contre-coup contusions often show up worse on the opposite temporo-sphenoidal, subfrontal and subtemporal regions. Frost (218-21) states that Greek boxers used roundhouse and hook punches frequently, attacking the temple, their best target in Oriental martial arts also: Nishiyama and Brown (48, 76, 80, 84); Son and Clark (226, 231).

might rather cause fatal *contre-coup* concussions in the brain.⁶⁸ In this way Agathus Daemon died.⁶⁹

We cannot say precisely when, at what Olympiad, he died, nor which victor killed him. Known Olympic boxing champions from the second century are few. Moretti lists them, but in each case we can say that victor did not kill his opponent, because our sources do not mention such a striking fact.⁷⁰ The best we can say is that Agathus Daemon died sometime in Ols. 232-37 (149-169 A.D.), 239-41 (177-185), or 243 (193 A.D.).

We have to date the odd incident in Philo two centuries earlier, at least. We have seen no detailed study of the anecdote for its factual content, not even to reject it.⁷¹ Philo (*Quod omnis probus liber sit* 17.110-13) relates:

Παλαιστὰς οἶδα καὶ παγκρατιαστὰς πολλὰκις ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας . . . ἐγκαρτεροῦσιν ἄχρι τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς. . . ἐν ἀγωνί φασιν ἱερῷ δύο ἀθλητὰς ἰσορρόπῳ κεκρημένους ἀλκῇ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἀντιδρῶντάς τε καὶ ἀντιπάσχοντάς, μὴ πρότερον ἀπειπεῖν ἢ ἐκότερον τελευτῆσαι . . . κοτίων χάριν καὶ σελίνων εὐκλεῆς ἀγωνισταῖς ἢ τελευτῇ.

I know many cases of wrestlers and pancratiasts so full of ambition . . . they persevere to their last gasp. . . . It is told of two athletes in a sacred contest how possessed of equal strength, each offensive taken by the one

⁶⁸On the nasion and other nasal bones, see Grant (fig. 460-61, 468, 605, 608-10); Woodburne (254-61). Adams (34-38) and Son and Clark (260-64) show how a fatal blow fracturing the nasion can also fracture the orbital socket and cribriform plate of the ethmoid bone, encasing the brain; or (Bowden [216]) it can cause inhalation of blood and asphyxia. Adams (19-22) discusses a fatal blow to the spot just above the nose and eyes, between the frontal sinus cavities. On the mandible, see Grant (fig. 553-55); Bowden (216) on fracture of the mandible, concussion and (rarely) "the condyle . . . driven up through the base of the skull," by one hard blow on the mentum. For such a blow, cf. Frost (220-21 and fig. 2) and Gardiner (*GASF* 421-25 and fig. 145, 147) with Son and Clark: (220, 222) a straight punch, (143, 148) a roundhouse punch, (105-07, 156-59, 180, 228, 235) uppercuts, (138, 142-43) a back-fist, (226, 229) a heel-hand strike. See Simpson (111-12), Bowden (202-03, 211-13), and Woolsey, in Witthaus and Becker (at 559, 611) on fatal *contre-coup* concussions.

⁶⁹Unless Agathus Daemon collapsed from severe heat-prostration or over-exertion, as Melancomas the boxer died in 74 A.D.: Dio Chrys. 28, 29; Harris (*GAA* 99); Gardiner (*GASF* 428); Finley and Pleket (113). But his epitaph clearly says he died fighting, and implies it was from a (head) wound.

⁷⁰See Moretti (*O* no. 857, 859), M. Tullius (141-45 A.D.); 877, Photion (173 A.D.); 890, Claudius Apollonius and 892, M. Aurelius Philosebastus (189); 899, 901, an unknown boxer (*GIBM* 615) who tied at Ol. 244 (197 A.D.) and won the next (201 A.D.).

⁷¹Robert (199, n. 1, 200-01) accepts the story as factual.

returned in equal measure by the other, they never flagged until both fell dead. . . . to die for a garland of wild olive or parsley is a glory to the rivals in the arena. (Colson trans.)⁷²

Philo's generalization, that he "knows" many—or several (*pollakis*)—wrestlers and pancratiasts fought to the death, is odd in light of the ancient and modern consensus that boxing was most, pancratium less, and wrestling least dangerous of pan-Hellenic combative sports.⁷³ The number of known fatalities, four in boxing, one (? plus Philo's pair) in pancratium, one in wrestling, bear this out. Philo himself does not fully vouch for the specific tale (*phasin*, 17.112), or else is reporting it took place before his own lifetime ("It is said" as opposed to "I saw," εἶδον ἐν ἀγῶνι παγκρατιαστῶν, 5.26). Assuming this unknown pair are specific examples of his generality, they must be pancratiasts rather than wrestlers, who battled to a clean takedown, not a knockout or surrender, let alone death (see notes 6, 14 above). They fought at Olympia ("wild olive") or Nemea (wild celery or "parsley," 17.113). Colson, in his Loeb translation, has their *hieros agōn*, "sacred contest," half right. They competed in "sacred" games only for the sacred wreath, but a contest was also "sacred" when the wreath was given to the god (Zeus at Olympia and Nemea), because it ended in "a tie," the other, almost more common technical meaning of *hieros* (*agōn*, *nikē*, etc.).⁷⁴ Philo is punning rhetorically, as if saying "dead even," or "a dead heat."

⁷²F. H. Colson, *Philo* (London 1929-62) IX (1941), 72/3-74/5, the Loeb ed.

⁷³See Forbes (55-56), Finley and Pleket (39, 41, 44), Harris (*GAA* 102), Gardiner (*GASF* 432), Drees (52, 80-81), Frazer (I, 305-07; IV, 46). Paus. 6.15.3-5, 10 reports that Clitomachus of Thebes asked that the pancratium of Ol. 142 (212 B.C.) be moved before the boxing, to allow him to compete in the less dangerous sport first. Forbes (58) rejects or is unaware of Philo's story: "existing records" credit pancratium "with bringing about the death of only one man[,] Arrachion." Forbes (56, n. 9) rightly rejects "a baseless assumption of a late scholiast on Pindar (*Ol.* VII.94)" that Diagoras "killed an opponent in boxing prior to his Olympic victory." 464 B.C.

⁷⁴*Hieros agōn* in the first sense not in LSJ, but *stephanitēs agōn* is, cited in X. *Mem.* 3.7.1; Isoc. 15.301; D. 20.141; Lycurg. 51; Ister 60b; Lync. in Ath. 13.584E; *SIG* 577.55; *OGI* 231.14; Plu. 820D; *IG* 12(8).190.41. *Hieronikēs* LSJ cites from: *OGI* 332.34 (Elea, 2 c. B.C.); *SIG* 1073.4, Rufus' inscription, second century A.D.; Phld. *Mus.* p. 105 K.; Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 30; *IG* 5(1).668 (Laconia). *Hieros* = "tied" is cited by LSJ with *stephos* (*I. Magnesia* 180-81 = Moretti [*IAG* no. 71]) and *stephanos* (*IG* 9[2].525; Polyb. 1.58.5, 29.8.5); with *pangkraton* (*IG* 9[2].527); *athlēmata* (*I. Olympia* 56); and with *agōn* (*IG* 7.2727.19, 24) and *nikē* (*SIG* 1073.48; J. T. Wood, *Discoveries at Ephesus* [London 1977] App. VI, p. 70) understood—add: Moretti (*IAG* no. 86: 7, 12). See Gardiner (35-37) and Robinson (58-61).

No combative sport can be more even than when both competitors kill one another. But is this possible? Philo earlier reported a furious pancratium battle he witnessed in person (εἶδον, 5.26). The pair punched, chopped, and kicked each other (τὰς πληγὰς καὶ χερσὶ καὶ ποσὶ καὶ πάσας εὐσκόπως, 5.26), but not to the death. These finalists did as much, and took as much punishment, using every attack (τὰ αὐτὰ ἀντιδρῶντάς τε καὶ ἀντιπάσχοντας, 17.112). Either they struck a last lethal blow simultaneously—very unlikely, but not impossible—or one, (more) gravely injured, struck a fatal blow and died with that final effort. This has happened in every war. It is far more likely of armed than bare-handed men. The Irish rebel Hugh McGuire died killing Lacy, the English knight who killed him, on New Year's, 1599/1600. We have a Japanese tale parallel to Hellenic stories of dying athletic victors which points to a possible explanation. Two legendary sumo champions, Narimura and Tsuneyo, wrestled in a finals match (c. 1025 A.D.):

Narimura bent over and with all his might shoved his head against Tsuneyo's chest; the latter, however, managed to pull Narimura in and throw him to the ground. Narimura fell, and Tsuneyo collapsed on top of him. For a while neither could get up, for they had fallen with tremendous force. Narimura . . . had to be assisted by others because Tsuneyo still had not revived. At length Tsuneyo came to his senses, and Narimura walked over to ask how he felt. "Like an ox!" was the response. As the winner of the tournament, Tsuneyo was given cloth, silver, and gold, all piled in a large mound. He only saw his reward that one time, however, for his ribs had been broken by Narimura, and it is said that he died in Harima Province on his way home.⁷⁵

Again, it was only "said" to be fatal. Philo's anecdote may be a fictional *exemplum*. It is primarily part of his *exhortatio* to "live free or die," showing how athletes suffer and die for lesser gains. The generalization that "many times" wrestlers and pancratiasts "endured to the death" must be exaggeration, based on Telemachus' opponent and Arrachion,

⁷⁵ P. Cuyler, *Sumo: From Rite to Sport* (Tokyo 1979) 41, from the *Ujishui monogatari*, "Tales of the Uji Clan," of the early thirteenth century A.D. The incident is set in the reign of Goichijo (1016-36 A.D.). Tales of these athletes are very much like those of Olympic heroes from Paus., Philos., and other Greek writers: fact embellished by legend and fiction, but not ahistoric myth. See notes 34, 37-38 above on fatal fractured ribs. In the softened earth and sand of the *shamma* (note 20 above), a throw, or even the opponent's deliberate slamming down of his own weight with maximum force, would be unlikely to cause death. Two blows, or kicks, were far more probably the fatal moves.

unless numerous fatal incidents are totally lost to us. One scholium on Pindar *O.* 5.34 reports, "very many athletes died in the contests," καὶ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνταγωνιζομένων ἀπέθανον ἐν τῷ σταδῖῳ.⁷⁶

Are these both from rhetorical *topoi*? Patristic and medical sources—Galen above all—hostile to athletics do not mention numerous fatalities. Yet tombs of athletes dying young, and epitaphs like Agathus Daemon's, are found.⁷⁷ We know of no concrete examples from minor festivals. Were there none, or were such fatalities not celebrated? If we read Philo right, the pair he mentions died at Olympia (like all others known) or at Nemea (where Creugas died).

⁷⁶Quoted but rejected by Forbes (50, n. 1) as an "obviously exaggerated statement," rebutting "ill-informed modern writers" for following it.

⁷⁷Harris (*SGR* plate 9) is the grave stele of Sostratus, fourth century B.C. Attic athlete who died young (from the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York: misnumbered as plate "10" in the "List of Illustrations," *SGR* 7; "Sources" and "Museum Locations," *SGR* 274). Galen, *Protr. ad Artes Addisc.* 10–14, ends condemning athletics—not exercise—for ruining the mind and the health and beauty of the body. *Protr.* 11 says some athletes do not live long *after they cease practicing*, others live past their prime, but not even they live to grow old:

Καταλύσασι δὲ πολὺ δὴ τι χειρόν. Ἐνιοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετ' ὀλίγον ἀποθνήσκουσι, ἔνιοι δ' ἐπὶ πλεόν ἡκουσιν ἡλικίας, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτοὶ γηροῦσιν. (I.30 K.)

This would be the perfect place to mention numerous deaths in competition, but neither Galen nor the hostile sources he quotes (*Hipp. frag.*, Eurip. *Autol./frag.* 282 N., Xenophanes *frag.* 2 D.)—nor Plato *Rep.* 3.404A, X. *Symp.* 2.17, Arist. *Pol.* 1339A, or our patristic sources (above)—say contests were often deadly. See Forbes (50, 55–58), Finley and Pleket (114–23), Gardiner (*AAW* 99–103, 114–15, 214–15), Robinson (90–91, 116–17, 184–91). Galen *Parva Pila* 5 ends with the lethal effects of: *sprints*—bursting a major blood-vessel—and *horseback-riding*—if the rider is thrown suddenly—and their severe, nonlethal injuries. "So also are the jump, discus and bending exercises"—meaning harmful, or fatal? "What need to speak of the exercises in the palaestra?" Galen concludes: the combative events. The worst he can specifically say is that they cause lameness, dislocations, fractures, and mutilated features—again, not death:

δρόμοι μὲν γὰρ ὡκεῖς πολλοὺς ἤδη διέφθειραν, ἀγγεῖον ἐπικαίρων ῥήξαντες . . . καὶ ἵππασίαι σύντονοι, . . . δι' ὧν πολλάκις ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἔδρας οἱ ἵπποι παραχρῆμα διεφθάρσαν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλμα, καὶ ὁ δίσκος, καὶ τὰ διὰ τοῦ κάμπτειν γυμνάσια. τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; ὥς ἅπαντες λελώβηνται . . . οὕτω τοὺς ἐκ τῆς παλαίστρας ἴδοις ἂν ἢ χλωλούς, ἢ διεστραμμένους, ἢ τεθλασμένους, ἢ πάντως γέ τι μέρος πεπηρωμένους. (5.909–10 K.)

The argument *ex silentio* is not the strongest, but when many "hostile witnesses" are silent, it is better proof the lethal allegations are not true.

To recapitulate, we can reconstruct the probable medical cause of death in every fatal athletic contest reported in our ancient sources. The *nomos* of Greek boxing violated in three of the fatalities is nearly certain. The judges stripped Diognetus and Cleomedes of their Olympic crowns, and Damoxenus was the actual loser at Nemea, for a combined reason: they inflicted a fatal injury through a forbidden blow to the body. They broke one clear rule and violated the spirit of all the pan-Hellenic games, killing a fellow-Greek and fellow-athlete. A "foul" or illicit move which causes death is perhaps the strongest grounds for dismissal from any true sport in any period. But Telemachus and Agathus Daemon's opponent caused an unintended fatal injury while staying within the rules of their event, and so won their Olympic crown. The accidental killing of an opponent did not disbar boxer or wrestler (or pancratiast) from victory, at least not in the fifth century B.C. or second century A.D. Given the famous conservatism of the Olympic officials,⁷⁸ it probably never did.

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⁷⁸See Finley and Pleket (43[-46]) on "the astonishing conservatism of Olympia"; Harris (*GAA* 176), Gardiner (*GASF* 194), and Frost (213) that Hellenic boxing specifically was "surprisingly conservative: during historical times it changed in detail . . . of equipment, but . . . adhered to the same principles throughout."

MESSAGES TO THE UNDERWORLD:
AN ASPECT OF POETIC IMMORTALIZATION IN PINDAR

In memoriam

Alison Goddard Elliott

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In a dithyramb for Thebes, Pindar calls himself an "outstanding herald of skilled verses" appointed by the Muse (ἐξαίρετον κάρυκα σοφῶν ἐπέων, frag. 61.18–20 Bo = 70b.23–25 Sn). At the end of the Fourth *Pythian*, he claims Homer's authority for his role as a "noble messenger" (ἄγγελον ἐσθλόν) through whose "upright" skill the Muse gains in honor (αὔξεται καὶ Μοῖσα δι' ἀγγελίας ὀρθῆς, *Pyth.* 4.276–79).¹ One of the tasks of a "messenger of song" is to establish communication: communication between the mortal victor and the timeless realm of the gods, between the present and the past (both actual and mythical), between the individual *laudandus* and the community as a whole, between his native city and the place of the victory.² Pindar frequently uses concrete spatial metaphors to express this act of mediation. In *Ol.* 6.22 f. he yokes the victor's chariot to travel into the land of myth. In *Pyth.* 2.67 f. and *Nem.* 5.2 ff. he sends his message of song like cargo across the sea. Frequently he makes a journey, real or imagined, to his patron's home city, even though this is as far as Sicily or Libya (*Nem.* 1.19 f.; *Pyth.* 4.1 f.).³

¹The scholion ad loc. (493 Drachmann), followed by many commentators, suggests that Pindar is referring to *Il.* 15.207, ἐσθλόν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὅτ' ἄγγελος αἰσιμα εἰδῆ.

²For the motif of poet as "messenger" in the Epinicia, see also *Ol.* 7.20 f., 9.25–29; *Pyth.* 2.3 f., 9.1–4; *Nem.* 6.57–59; cf. too *Ol.* 6.90 f. and *Pyth.* 6.15–19. See also Theognis 769 f. and Giuliana Lanata ad loc. in *Poetica Preplatonica* (Florence 1963) 64 f.

³In the latter poem, there is also a corresponding visit of *xenia* between the exiled Damophilus at Thebes, *Pyth.* 4.299, whose return journey Pindar hopes to effect, 293 ff. On the motif of the *nostos* in the ode, see R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 167 f. On the motif of *philia* and *xenia* generally, see W. Schadewaldt, "Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion," *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft* 5,3 (Halle 1928) 314 f.; Hermann Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt 1935) 35 f., 39, 41; W. J. Verdenius, "Pindar's Fourteenth Olympian Ode," *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 32.

In establishing communication between realms separated by time and space, the poet also may send a message to the Underworld. The motif occurs several times in the Epinicia but has not received from interpreters the attention that it deserves.⁴ This message to Hades is symmetrical with the more familiar poetic task of suffusing mortal life with the radiance of Olympian eternity.⁵ When the poet addresses the deceased kinsmen of the victor, he momentarily illuminates even the realm of death with the light of song. At the end of *Nemean* 8, for example, he speaks directly to the victor's deceased father of the impossibility of bringing back his life: ὦ Μέγα, τὸ δ' αὖτις τεὰν ψυχὰν κομίζαι / οὐ μοι δυνατόν (44 f.). By contrast, he can easily raise a "stone of the Muses" to memorialize the family's athletic prowess (46-48).

This sending of messages between living and dead is an important theme in classical literature. Plato's Er is to be a "messenger to men" of the things in Hades (ἄγγελον γενέσθαι ἀνθρώποις τῶν ἐκεῖ, *Rep.* 10.614d). In a later development of the poetic tradition, Virgil's Neoptolemus brutally sends Priam to Hades as a "messenger" of his deeds (*Aen.* 2.547-49):

referes ergo haec et nuntius ibis
Pelidae genitori. illi mea tristia facta
degeneremque Neoptolemu[m] narrare memento.

This establishment of continuity between the separate spheres of existence is one of the gifts of the goddess Memory, Mnemosyne. As Jean-Pierre Vernant remarks, she confers on the poet "le privilège . . . d'un contact avec l'autre monde, la possibilité d'y entrer et d'en revenir librement."⁶ This motif is another form of the poetic Ἀλήθεια, the commemorative praise that bridges the gap between past and future and overcomes the power of time's oblivion to efface mortal achieve-

⁴Burton (note 3 above) 148 and C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 37 f., mention the motif, but without discussion of details. A. W. Miller, "*Thalia Erasimolpos*: Consolation in Pindar's *Fourteenth Olympian*," *TAPA* 107 (1977) 234, n. 35, lists a number of passages where Pindar refers to dead kinsmen of the victor. See also Verdenius (note 3 above) 34.

⁵E.g., *Ol.* 6.1-4, *Pyth.* 9.89 f., *Nem.* 7.12-16. The "Zeus-given gleam" of *Pyth.* 8.96 may possibly also imply the radiance of honor in poetry. For the interaction of both life and death as motifs of praise in the Epinicia, see Jacqueline Duchemin, *Pindare poète et prophète* (Paris 1955) 282 ff.

⁶J.-P. Vernant, "Aspects mythiques de la mémoire et du temps," in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, ed. 3 (Paris 1974) 1.87. Cf. Virgil's *memento* in *Aen.* 6.549, cited above.

ment. Song enlists the positive value of time as preserver, instead of time as destroyer, to keep great deeds alive for future generations.⁷ Bacchylides provides a lucid statement of how the "truth" of this poetry of praise will defeat the darkness of blame and envy and overcome the "forgetfulness" or λήθη associated with them (13.202-7):⁸

βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος
πάντεσσι μὲν ἔστιν ἐπ' ἔργοις·
ἃ δ' ἀλαθεία φιλεῖ
νικᾶν, ὃ τε πανδ[α]μάτωρ
χρόνος τὸ καλῶς
ἐργμένον αἰὲν ἀέξει. . .

On the whole, Pindar remains more concerned with death than Bacchylides. This insistent consciousness of death — as in his address to deceased kinsmen — results in the mixture of both funerary and triumphal imagery throughout the Epinicia.⁹

The wish to span the distance between the living and the dead (as the poetic ἀλήθεια seeks to do) is typical of most societies' interest in reaching the departed and communicating to them the concern that the living still have for them.¹⁰ In archaic and classical Greece, an important duty of the men of the household is to attend to the funeral offerings for departed ancestors. Communication with the dead takes place particularly at the tombs, often through the pouring of ritual liba-

⁷The best statement of this view of time in connection with Pindaric "truth" is *Ol.* 10.53-55; cf. also *Nem.* 4.43 and *Pae.* 6.5. For recent discussion see Marcel Detienne, *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque* (Paris 1967) ch. 2, esp. 13 ff., 18 ff.; Gretchen Kromer, "The Value of Time in Pindar's Olympian 10," *Hermes* 104 (1976) 420-36, esp. 425 ff.; Paolo Vivante, "On Time in Pindar," *Arethusa* 5 (1972) 107-31; Anna M. Komornicka, "Quelques remarques sur la notion d'*Alatheia* et *Pseudos* chez Pindare," *Eos* 60 (1972) 235-53; G. F. Gianotti, *Per una poetica pindarica* (Torino 1975) 63 ff.; P. Vidal-Naquet, "Temps des dieux et temps des hommes," *Le chasseur noir* (Paris 1981) 69-94, esp. 76.

⁸On the contrast of Truth and Blame, memory and the "darkness" of forgetting in archaic poetry generally see Detienne (note 7 above) 24 ff.; Gregory Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979) ch. 12, citing also G. Dumézil, *Servius et la fortune* (Paris 1943).

⁹See Duchemin (note 5 above) 271 ff., 301 ff.

¹⁰See Emily Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry*, Sather Classical Lectures 46 (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1979) 7. Cf. Herodotus' account of the "messenger" that the Getae send to the dead, 4.94.2 f., with the ethnographic parallels cited by W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1912) ad loc., and by Georges Devereux, "Les blessures d'Hektor et les messagers vers l'autre monde," *L'Homme* 23 (1983) 136 f.

tions.¹¹ The aural dimension of this communication also receives particular stress.¹² We may recall, for example, Orestes' emphatically repetitive κλύειν ἀκοῦσαι in the prologue of the *Choephoroe* (τύμβου δ' ἐπ' ὄχθῳ τῷδε κηρύσσω πατρί / κλύειν ἀκοῦσαι), a verse for which Euripides takes Aeschylus to task in the *Frogs* (1173 f.).

From the other side, the dead can be presumed to have a continuing interest in the affairs of the living. Despite the shadowy existence of the souls in the Homeric *nekyliai*, popular belief continued to endow them with some kind of vague sentience about the world above.¹³ The most influential literary paradigm is Achilles' meeting with Odysseus in *Odyssey* 11.¹⁴ The dead hero is eager for news about his father, which Odysseus cannot supply, but he strides off with joy at Odysseus' report of his son Neoptolemus (11.492-540).¹⁵ The great literary figures, of course, have special privileges; but even for ordinary mortals the rites of the dead and the cult of heroes probably contributed to the feeling that the deceased were somehow reachable beyond the grave. I have already mentioned Pindar's frequent address to dead ancestors; and throughout the *Epinicia* he also shows much interest in cult-heroes (e.g., *Ol.* 1.90 ff.; *Pyth.* 8.56 ff., *Nem.* 7.85 ff.). A recent article by Jeffrey Rusten reminds us of the poet's concern to stress his personal ties to local heroes, particularly through the proximity of their graves.¹⁶

Ancestors are obviously not heroes, and the degree of their vitality in the Underworld is more obscure and more precarious. But several contexts in the *Epinicia* suggest that Pindar associates the figurative libations of song with the cult practice of pouring libations on the graves

¹¹See in general Vermeule (note 10 above) 28 ff. In *Il.* 23.218-21, Achilles pours libations all night long at the pyre of Patroclus. Cf. also *Il.* 24.791 f. For the archeological evidence, see D. C. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (Ithaca 1971) 103, 205-10.

¹²See Vermeule (note 10 above) 14 f.

¹³See Erwin Rohde, *Psyche*, ed. 8, trans. W. B. Hillis (London 1925) 414. In note 24, p. 441, Rohde cites the three passages from the Odes on which I comment below (*Ol.* 14, *Pyth.* 5, *Ol.* 8), but without discussion and only as examples of the soul's consciousness of the world of the living.

¹⁴For recent discussion and bibliography, see Vermeule (note 10 above) 28-30, with n. 49 on p. 218; also Jan Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton 1983) 88 f.

¹⁵Compare Virgil's projection of this motif into the future in Dido's threat to Aeneas, *Aen.* 4.385-87; *et, cum frigida mors anima seduxerit artus, / omnibus umbra locis adero. dabis improbe, poenas. / audiam et haec Manis ueniet mihi fama sub imos.*

¹⁶Jeffrey S. Rusten, "ΓΕΙΤΩΝ ἩΡΩΩΣ: Pindar's Prayer to Heracles (*N.* 7.86-101) and Greek Popular Religion," *HSCP* 87 (1983) 289-97, esp. 291 ff.

of the departed and that in both cases the poet is functioning as a "messenger" between the upper world and Hades. The associations, both in Pindar and elsewhere, between athletes and heroes perhaps also tended to strengthen the connection between the poet's offerings of song to departed kinsmen of the victor and the cult offerings to heroes.¹⁷ In a number of legends, analyzed by Joseph Fontenrose in an important article, athletes gain the status of cult heroes.¹⁸ From the eighth to the early fifth centuries B.C., these figures follow a remarkably consistent pattern: they display extraordinary athletic prowess at the panhellenic festivals, meet a violent and mysterious death often attended by homicidal madness, and after their mortal end roam the land as potent but ambiguous divinities, jealous and irascible, requiring honors, cult, and propitiation to end plague, barrenness, or famine that their wrath has brought upon the city. We are here far away from the luminous Olympian world which Pindar brings into association with the glory of the athletes celebrated in his odes; but it is clear that in the popular imagination and religious attitudes of his time it was easy to assimilate the victorious athlete's capacity for superhuman-appearing feats of physical strength to the aura of supernatural power that surrounds the hero and reaches out beyond the grave.¹⁹

II

The best known of these Pindaric messages to the Underworld is the end of *Olympian* 14 (20-24):

μελαντειχέα νῦν δόμον
 Φερσεφόνας ἴθι, Ἀχοῖ, πατρὶ κλυτὰν φέροις' ἀγγελίαν,
 Κλεῖδομον ὄφρ' ἰδοῖς, υἱὸν εἰπῆς ὅτι οἱ νέαν
 κόλποις παρ' εὐδόξοις Πίσας
 ἔστεφάνωσε κυδῖμων ἀέθλων πτεροῖσι χαίταν.

¹⁷For the close affinities between hero cult and ancestor worship, see Rohde (note 13 above) 125.

¹⁸Joseph Fontenrose, "The Hero as Athlete," *CSCA* 1 (1968) 73-104. In Pindar's own time the case of Cleomedes of Astypalaea is a celebrated example (Paus. 6.9.6 f.): for further references see Fontenrose, p. 74, n. 1. See also Rohde (note 13 above) 129 f.; B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper*, Sather Classical Lectures 35 (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1964) 56 ff.

¹⁹For the process of historicizing the cult hero as the athletic victor at a specific contest or festival, see Fontenrose (note 18 above) 83, 85 ff. We should recall too that victorious athletes at Olympia often received the extraordinary honor of having statues of themselves erected in the sacred precinct: cf. Paus. 6.1.

Through the vivid personification of the sound itself, Acho, song crosses the barrier between life and death.²⁰ But this oral/aural message also renews the sense of "sight" (ἰδοῖσθαι) in Persephone's "black-walled" house.²¹ The lasting fame through song implied in κλυτὰν and εὐδόξοις can, for a moment, penetrate the blackness and enclosure (μελαν-τειχέα δόμον, 20) of Hades. The bold metaphor of "wings" or "feathers," πτερὰ, for the olive wreath with which the victorious son crowns his "young hair" also keeps in the foreground the upward movement toward the gods and Olympus.²² The end of the first strophe describes the Charites as the "stewards of all deeds in the heavens" οὐρανός (9 f.). The "wings" at the very end of the ode recall this skyward movement of eternizing song, in contrast to the subterranean gloom of Hades.²³

As the ode's opening lines tell us, this locale of Orchomenos is also the site of the Charites, who preside over the waters of the Cephissus. They are worshipped here as divinities of the fecundating, nurturing, and life-giving power of water.²⁴ These Καφίσια ὕδατα (1), like the waters of Castalia, Dirce, or Tilphussa elsewhere in Pindar, are associated with birth and the immortalizing power of poetry.²⁵ Here they strike an initial mood of vital energy, over against Hades at the end.

²⁰The striking quality of the personification of Acho in *Ol.* 14, as of Angelia in *Ol.* 8, is noted by Verdenius (note 3 above) 34. *Ol.* 14 contains the first personification of Echo in Greek literature: see L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* 2 (London 1932) ad loc.

²¹Along with the "seeing" there is also the "hearing," explicit or implied, in the compounds of -μολπος and in ἐπακούετε in 14-15. Cf. also κλυτὰν ἀγγελίαν in 21. Similarly in *Nem.* 4.79-88, the poet's memorial to the victor's dead uncle combines the visual brightness of the white Parian marble (81) with the aural resonance of his songful tongue (γλώσσαν εὐρέτω κελαδῆτιν, 86).

²²The same metaphor of the wreath as "wings" occurs at *Pyth.* 9.125, πολλὰ δὲ πρόσθεν πτερὰ δέξατο νικᾶν. Cf. Verdenius (note 3 above) 36 f.

²³Pindar does not say explicitly that Acho's journey to Hades is a downward journey: his verb is the noncommittal ἴθι (21). But if Echo is conceived of as a daimon of some sort associated with Orchomenos, she would in fact be descending from earth to underworld as the bearer of the poet's message from living to dead.

²⁴Gundert (note 3 above) 30 describes them as "die nährenden und spendenden 'Lebenskräfte des Bodens.'" See also Duchemin (note 5 above) 72-80, esp. 73 f.; Gordon Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar*, APA Textbook Series 7 (Chico, Calif. 1982) 119 f., who, following Gilbert Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1945) 100, notes the connection of water, life, and honor in ἀέναον in 12. B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) ad loc. suggests that Echo too may have local associations, although none of these are attested before Hellenistic literature.

²⁵E.g., *Ol.* 6.85 f.; *Pyth.* 4.299; *Isth.* 6.62 ff. and 74 f.; *Paean.* 6.7 ff.; frag. 188 Bo = 198b Sn; cf. also *Nem.* 7.11 f. and 79. The symbolism of the immortalizing water of song has been much commented on, e.g., A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterweihe und ihre Symbolik* (Heidelberg 1965) esp. 26 ff.; Gianotti (note 7 above) 110 ff.

Pindar has prepared an elaborate foil to the subterranean darkness. The intricate word-order of his opening lines associates Orchomenos with both the radiance and the liquid vitality of poetry: the Charites who dwell there are the *songful* queens of *bright* Orchomenos (3 f.): ὦ λιπαρᾶς ἀοίδιμοι βασιλειαί / Χάριτες Ἴρχομενοῦ.²⁶ The reference to the "Minyans of ancient race" in the next phrase stresses the continuity of local habitation and the association between the people and their divinities, the Charites (παλαιγόνων Μινυᾶν ἐπίσκοποι, 4). The "hearing" that takes place here (κλυτε, 5) establishes an upward communication between the mortal realm (the singer and the Minyan ancestors) and the goddesses who also dwell on Olympus (9-12). The second strophe begins with another request for "hearing" and repeats the first strophe's association of radiance, song, and "hearing" (Ἀγλαῖα φιλησίμολπε τ' Ἐυφροσύνα . . . ἔπακοοῖτε νῦν, 14 f.). We may note that all three of the imperatives in the ode are requests for hearing (5, 15) or telling (21).

This "hearing" between mortal and divinity, via the mediation of the poet's song, is symmetrical with the "hearing" that takes place in Hades in the ode's last lines (κλυτὰν ἀγγελίαν, 21). Hence the "ever-flowing glory of the Olympian father" (12) that the Charites honor in the heavens (10) contrasts sharply with the dead "father" underground who receives Echo's "message of glorious hearing" (21, slightly over-translating κλυτάν).

The communicative power of song operates on a vertical (and temporal) axis that runs between Olympus, Orchomenos, and Hades and between past and present (παλαιγόνων, 4, and ἔπακοοῖτε νῦν, 15). It also operates on a horizontal (and spatial) axis, between Orchomenos and Olympia. The Minyans at the beginning are first mentioned in close association with their local setting (4); but when the name recurs, near the end, its modifier, "winning at Olympia," intertwines the "Minyan city" with the place of the victory (Ὀλυμπιόνικος ἃ Μινύεια, 19). Acho's literal journey to Hades' "black-walled house" follows almost at once (20 f.).

Several of these motifs in *Olympian* 14 are thematically akin to the closing section of *Isthmian* 6, where the poet again connects the Charites, water, poetry, and the family of the victor (62b-66):

ἀνὰ δ' ἄγαγον ἐς φάος οἶαν μοῖραν ὕμνων·
τὰν Ψαλυχιδᾶν δὲ πάτρην Χαρίτων

²⁶ Ἀοίδιμοι in 3 can mean "associated with song," "of song," and "famed in song."

ἄρδοντι καλλίστᾳ δρόσῳ,
τόν τε Θεμιστίου ὀρθώσαντες οἶκον τάνδε πόλιν
θεοφιλῇ ναίοισι.

By including the victor's clan of the Psalychidae, Pindar may imply that the "light" of song extends beyond the individual *celebrandus* to the whole family. The reference to the whole clan will presumably include its dead members, but Pindar says nothing of the dead explicitly, perhaps because the old patriarch, Themistius, is still living (65, cf. *Nem.* 5.50 f.). Hence his imagery here is all of upward movement: ἐς φάος, ὀρθώσαντες.

III

In the fifth *Pythian*, Pindar uses a different technique to interweave the motifs of dead ancestors, the locale of their burial, and the connection with the living through fame and the waters of poetic immortality. Praising the victory of King Arcesilaus of Cyrene, Pindar refers to his remote ancestor, Aristoteles or Battus I, who founded the kingdom (82 ff.). Battus' descendants, "coming forth as bearers of gifts, receive with sacrifices" the Trojan Antenoridae who reached Cyrene in the mythical past (85-88):

τὸ δ' ἐλάσιππον ἔθνος ἐνδυκέως
δέκονται θυσίαισιν ἄνδρες οἰχνέοντές σφε δωροφόροι,
τοὺς Ἀριστοτέλης ἄγαγε ναυσὶ θαῖς
ἄλός βαθεῖαν κέλευθον ἀνοίγων.

Coming to them as bearers of gifts, the men whom Aristoteles led in swift ships as he opened the sea's deep path receive with sacrifices the horse-driving race (of the Trojan Antenoridae).²⁷

Here Pindar links Cyrene's historical past to the great cycle of Trojan myths. The Cyreneans' sacrificial honors to these early Trojan set-

²⁷ I follow the scholia (113 Dr.) in understanding the passage to mean that the contemporary Cyrenaeans worship the Antenoridae who once came to their land from Troy (for the legend, see the schol. 110 Dr.). I differ from the scholia, however, in taking the ἐλάσιππον ἔθνος to mean the Trojans of old rather than the contemporary Cyrenaeans, although this point is not essential for my translation. The passage is much disputed. I follow the majority of interpreters (Farnell, Gildersleeve, Mezger). For different views see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 380, n. 1; W. Christ, *Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1896) ad loc. (with a different text and punctuation); J. Duchemin, *Pindare, Pythiques* (Paris 1967) ad loc. and 162-65. Her objection that θυσίαι in 86 cannot refer to offerings to the heroized figures of the past is refuted by passages like Hdt. 7.117: see Rohde (note 13 above) 140, n. 15.

tlers also parallel the rituals in which they honor their own Battus in his status as a cult-hero.²⁸ As a "founder" (κτίσεν, 89), Battus has his tomb "at the lower edge of the agora where he lies apart in death" (ἐνθα πρῦμοις ἀγορᾶς ἐπὶ δίχα κεῖται θανῶν, 93). The word "dead," θανῶν, the last word of the epode, leads into the reference to Battus as heroized founder in the following strophe.²⁹ Instead of viewing death in terms of ending and rupture, Pindar sets it into the continuity that is one of his main poetic goals. He incorporates Battus and the other "holy kings" of the remote past into the traditions of the city which the poet himself revivifies through the commemorative power of song.

In this passage, then, the opening of the fourth strophe, Pindar tells how Battus and the other "holy kings" of the past dwell in death "apart, before their homes" and hear the celebration of the great deeds of the present. They share in the χάρις that Pindar now bestows on the present king, Arcesilaus (94-103):

μάκαρ μὲν ἀνδρῶν μέτα
 ἔναιεν, ἥρωες δ' ἔπειτα λαοσεβής.
 ἄτερθε δὲ πρὸ δωμάτων ἕτεροι λαχόντες αἶδαν
 βασιλέες ἱεροὶ
 ἐντί, μεγάλην δ' ἀρετὰν
 δρόσῳ μαλθακᾷ
 ῥανθεῖσαν κώμων ὑπὸ χεύμασιν
 ἀκούοντί ποι χθονία φρενί,
 σφὸν ὄλβον υἱῷ τε κοινὰν χάριν
 ἐνδίκον τ' Ἀρκεσίλῳ.

Here, as in *Ol.* 14 and *Isth.* 6, the present celebration binds together the living and the dead generations. By reminding us of the heroized founder's presence beneath the soil of the agora and of the old kings' graves each before his own house (whether or not these are now outside the city walls),³⁰ Pindar evokes the favoring presence of the kindly dead in the earth, who now approximate the status of local divinities.³¹

²⁸See Farnell (note 20 above) 179, ad loc.

²⁹On the practice of worshiping the founder of a colony as a hero, see Rohde (note 13 above) 127 f. Lines 89 ff. speak of Battus' "founding" only the gods' "groves" (i.e., *temenos*) and processional Sacred Way, but it would be pedantry to exclude the implications of founding the city in general.

³⁰The scholiast ad loc. (129 Dr.) takes the reference to be to tombs outside the city gates, in contrast to the burial of Battus in the agora. For a different view, see Wilamowitz (note 27 above) 380, n. 2; Duchemin, *Pythiques* (note 27 above) ad loc. Both Christ (note 27 above) and Farnell (note 20 above) ad loc. take the phrase to mean "each before his own house," a view that would fit Rusten's material on heroes' shrines in close proximity to the private houses in the city: see note 16 above.

³¹See Rusten's article, note 16 above.

That communication with the past takes place through the aural resonance of the poet's song: the "holy kings" who "hear" (ἀκούοντι, 101) the good fortune" of their descendants in Hades are exactly parallel to the dead father who receives the message brought by Acho in *Ol.* 14. To complete the analogy, Arcesilaus is here called their "son" (υἱῶ, 102), as the victor of *Ol.* 14 is the "son" of the "father" who receives Acho's message (πατρὶ . . . υἱόν, *Ol.* 14.21 f.).

Though these remote kings have their φρένες beneath the earth, they are able to participate somehow (ποῖ) in the festive music of the present celebration (ἀκούοντί ποι χθονία φρενί, 101). The adjective κοινά in 102 and the filial bond between the remote founder and the living Arcesilaus in the next lines (103 ff.) explicitly link the glory conferred by song in the present and the glory won by his ancestors and celebrated with cult and sacrifice at the festivals (cf. 86). The poet's "soft dew of song" freshens the old *arete* of the ancestors; and simultaneously they, like Achilles in *Odyssey* 11, rejoice in the present *arete* made manifest in the victory of their descendant, King Arcesilaus.

The sequence of thought in 85–103 places the poet's present offerings of "libations of praise-songs" (κώμων ὑπὸ χεύμασιν, 100) in the context of the city's cult-offerings to its heroes and ancestors. These songs are themselves a kind of libation—one of Pindar's favorite metaphors (*Ol.* 6.91 and 7.1–10, *Isth.* 6.1–3 and 63 ff.). They are both a freshening "dew" and a "libation" that might be poured on a hero's grave.³²

Encomiastic song, like the communal rituals, participates in what Mircea Eliade calls the renewal of time: it makes the past part of the living present in the ever-renewable time of myth.³³ This renewal of time, time as continuity, stands out the more forcefully against the ravages of time in seasonal change and biological decay, the "wintry blast of winds" that brings withering and destruction at the end of the ode (120 f.).

³²See Friedrich Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880) 232, ad 100: "Der Ausdruck erinnert an die Grabespenden." See also my remarks on line 86, *supra*. The collocation of δρόσω μαλθάκα ῥανθείσαν and κώμων ὑπὸ χεύμασιν immediately thereafter in 99 f. (with κώμων going both with δρόσω and χεύμασιν) suggests another association between the figurative liquid of the song and the actual liquid poured out in libation. Cf. the similar phrasing of *Pyth.* 8.57. The notions of vitality and fertility in *drosos* are explored by Deborah Boedeker, *A Descent from Heaven*, American Class. Stud. 13 (Chico, Calif. 1984) 88 ff.

³³M. Eliade, *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, trans. W. Trask (Princeton 1954) esp. ch. 2.

Recently, Gregory Nagy has elaborated for the epic hero the implicit equation between hero-cult and the "fame imperishable" conferred by song.³⁴ A similar equation, far more explicit, pervades the *Epinicia*. Pindar's closest analogy between the cultic honor of heroes and the poet's encomium of the victor occurs in *Olympian* 1. Hieron's radiance (ἀγλαΐα) and "mingling" with the supremacy of victory (14, 22) corresponds to the "radiant sacrifices" with which the heroes at Olympia are "mingled" at Pelops' tomb and altar (ἐν αἵμακουρίαις ἀγλααῖσι μέμικται, 90 f.), where αἵμακουρία is the cult term for offerings to heroes.³⁵ We may recall also the legends of heroized athletes studied at length by Fontenrose.³⁶

IV

The finale of *Ol.* 8, like that of *Ol.* 14, deals with ordinary mortals rather than founding heroes or "sacred kings" (*Pyth.* 5.97). Here Pindar makes explicit the power of poetic Memory to overcome old age and death. The young victor's athletic success at Olympia "breathed into his father's father the spirit that can wrestle against old age" (γήραος ἀντίπαλον, 71). When Pindar remarks that success in itself brings a "forgetting" (λάθαι) of Hades, he is perhaps playing on the force of poetic ἀλήθεια, the negation of oblivion by the poetry of praise (72 f.): Ἀἶδα τοι λάθεται / ἄρμενα πράξαις ἀνὴρ. In the next verse he will "awaken Memory" (Μηamosuna) to preserve the achievements of the victor's family.

The poet then turns from the living to the dead (77-84):

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τι θανόντεσσιν μέρος
κἂν νόμον ἔρδομένων·
κατακρύπτει δ' οὐ κόνις
συγγόνων κεδνὰν χάριν.

Ἑρμᾶ δὲ θυγατρὸς ἀκούσαις Ἰφίων
Ἀγγελίας ἐνέποι κεν Καλλιμάχῳ λιπαρὸν
κόσμον Ὀλυμπία ὄν σφι Ζεὺς γένει
ᾧπασεν.

³⁴Nagy (note 8 above) chs. 6-10, esp. pp. 114-16.

³⁵See the scholion ad loc.; also my "God and Man in Pindar's First and Third *Olympian* Odes," *HSCP* 68 (1964) 218, with ns. 24 and 29, pp. 255 f.

³⁶See note 18 above.

Like Acho in *Ol.* 14, the agent of his message is personified (Angelia). Pindar makes Angelia the daughter of Hermes, appropriate enough in view of the latter's role as "messenger of the gods" (*Ol.* 6.78 f.). But may we also think of the mediating function of Hermes Psychopompos, the god who literally makes the passage between life and death and connects the two worlds? Nowhere do the Epinicia explicitly mention Hermes Psychopompos. The Hermes of the Odes is Hermes Enagonios.³⁷ The psychopomp is presumably out of place amid the joy of victory. And yet the emphatic placement of "Hermes" at the beginning of the epode, coming between the description of the dead in 77-80 and the deceased relative in Hades hearing news from the living, makes one wonder if the god's funereal role is not also in the background.

As in *Ol.* 14 too, the verbal component of the message is reinforced by a visual quality which helps counteract the darkness of the Underworld. The "brilliant adornment" (λιπαρὸν κόσμον that the dead kinsman Iphion will "hear" from Angelia and "tell" to his Underworld companion Callimachus contrasts with the "covering dust" (79) of burial. The ode's message will in fact prevent this concealing dust from doing its work of hiding the glory of the present victory: κατακρύπτει δ' οὐ κόνις / συγγόνων κεδνὰν χάριν (79 f.). What is not "hidden" is specifically the *charis*, the honor of the victory as a shared joy in the reciprocal relations of the family: hence κεδνὰν χάριν. The emphasis on family solidarity here parallels the motif of the "joy in common with their son" that the dead kings "hear of" in *Pyth.* 5.101 f. (υἱῷ τε κοινὰν χάριν).

The metaphor of 79 f. now marks the third defeat of the forces of oblivion: first the "wrestling" against old age (70 f.), then the "forgetting" of Hades (72 f.), and finally the dust's "not concealing." In these three instances the battle against time receives a negative formulation, and this negative statement is a foil to the positive statement of the poet's "awakening Memory" in 74.³⁸

In countering the darkness of death with this "radiant adornment" (82 f.) — a phrase that can refer both to the victory and to the poetry that celebrates it³⁹ — Pindar not only restores communication between living and dead kinsmen, but also reestablishes communication among the

³⁷*Ol.* 6.79; *Pyth.* 2.10; *Nem.* 10.53; *Isth.* 1.60.

³⁸Cf. the imagery of sleep and awakening to depict the immortal power of song in *Isth.* 4.24 f. and 7.16 f.

³⁹Cf. frag. 184.2 f. Bo = 194.2 f. Sn: ποικίλον κόσμον αὐδάεντα λόγων.

dead themselves. He restores to the inhabitants of that silent realm the "hearing" and "speaking" (81 f.) of animated family life.⁴⁰ One is reminded of the power of speech that the shades in Homer's Underworld regain when they drink the sacrificial blood poured out to them by living men (*Od.* 10.535-37).

The verb "speak," ἐννέπειν, in 82 occurs twice before in the ode. The victor "spoke forth" or "proclaimed" the name of his city in glory to living men at Olympia (20). Apollo "spoke" to Aeacus, a signal communication between god and mortal, in the mythical past (41). This emphasis on "speaking" builds up the communicative energy set into motion by the victory so that the reverberations may reach down to Hades and impel the shades to address one another.

Pindar frequently suggests analogies or parallels between the victor, the mythical hero, and the poet. The visit of the poet's song to the Underworld reflects one such parallelism. A journey to the realm of the dead to bring back knowledge of the Beyond is a common task of the hero, from Gilgamesh on to Odysseus, Aeneas, and Dante. Pindar and Bacchylides both describe such catabases of the hero Heracles, Pindar in a fragmentary Theban Dithyramb (61 Bo = 70b Sn), Bacchylides in his Fifth Ode.⁴¹ Pindar performs an equivalent journey, figuratively, and brings back consoling wisdom about the realm of death in his account of the Beyond in *Olympian* 2.

The passages that we have examined in *Ol.* 8, *Ol.* 14, and *Pyth.* 5 remain within the traditional "Homeric" conception of Hades: lifeless and bloodless ghosts moving feebly amid dim shadows. Pindar knew of happier possibilities in the hereafter: in a celebrated passage of *Olympian* 2 he describes the Isles of the Blest, with their soft winds, golden flowers, and radiant trees (70-77). But even in the three odes under discussion, the poet lightens the darkness of death through his privileged access to what is hidden or closed off from ordinary mortals. By penetrating both time and space through Memory and through the mobile power of his poetry's sound (Acho, Angelia), he too is able to bring

⁴⁰Cf. Odysseus' wish to embrace his mother in Hades and share the solace of lamentation with her, *Od.* 11.211 f.; also *Il.* 23.97 f.; cf. Anchises' desire *notas audire et reddere voces* with his son, *Aen.* 6.689.

⁴¹Relevant here too are Heracles' journey to the far West in Stesichorus' *Geryoneis* and particularly the (probably) Pindaric catabasis of Heracles, including initiation at Eleusis, in *P. Oxy.* 2622 and *P.S.I.* 1391, on which see H. Lloyd-Jones, "Heracles at Eleusis," *Maia* 19 (1967) 206-29, and R. J. Clark, *Catabasis: Vergil and the Wisdom-Tradition* (Amsterdam 1979) 89 ff. and 218 ff.

knowledge of the living to the Underworld, and vice versa. He makes the unforgotten dead participate once more in the fresh joy of the living, and thus he soothes the bleakness of Hades with the balm of consolation.⁴²

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⁴²For the motif of consolation, see Miller (note 4 above) 233 f. I thank the journal's anonymous reader for helpful criticism and Professor Diskin Clay both for specific suggestions and for interest and encouragement beyond the call of editorial duty.

CATULLUS TO CAECILIUS ON GOOD POETRY (C. 35)

A *Gelegenheitsgedicht* deserves to be included in a published book only if it is self-contained, that is to say if its meaning is made as clear to the general reader as it will have been to the person for whom it was originally conceived, and, no less important, if it conveys something that is not the narrow concern of a particular individual in a particular situation but is capable of impressing many kinds of men.

This judgment of Eduard Fraenkel¹ is certainly correct, with one qualification. The literary and general background which the contemporary reader of a Greek or Latin poem brought to it must be, as far as possible, recovered by us, removed from it by many centuries, by recourse to lexica, commentaries, and all other sources available to us. This having been said, it remains axiomatic that a poem should be understood as far as possible in terms of the information provided by it, and outside data should be adduced only to the extent that the poem itself requires it by reference or allusion.²

Catullus' poem 35 is a *Gelegenheitsgedicht* in form of a letter of invitation to his friend Caecilius to visit him in Verona. By the above criterion it may appear, on first appearance, a failure, and not worth publication. The *cogitationes* of Caecilius' and Catullus' mutual friend, though evidently important, are not identified. The relevance of the *candida puella* and her passion, though evidently also important, is not explained. And the reason for the poet's emphasis on Caecilius' poem as *incohata* is not made clear. Without answers to these questions, the poem would seem to be not a self-contained whole but, quite simply, incomprehensible, and a bagatelle not worth our attention.

In the attempt to provide satisfactory answers, scholars have proposed a number of divergent interpretations of the poem. The first systematic study was offered by F. O. Copley.³ Partly in reaction to Ellis' notion (comm. ad loc.) that the *cogitationes* were "political" in nature, Copley laid down the precept that answers to the questions raised by the

¹E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 313 f.

²Cf. the judicious remarks of K. Quinn, *Approaches to Catullus* (Cambridge, New York 1972) 103-10.

³F. O. Copley, "Catullus 35," *AJP* 74 (1953) 149-60.

poem must be provided by the evidence of the poem itself, and that on this basis a context for the poem must be reconstructed which accounts for the poem as a whole, for all of its parts, and for the relationship of these parts to one another. This postulate, of course, is entirely cogent, and the chief merit of Copley's paper is to have insisted on it.

In the actual interpretation of the poem, however, Copley is not altogether successful. He constructs a more complicated scenario for it than is warranted by the evidence, and which is not needed for a full understanding of it. Thus, he holds that Caecilius had originally sent Catullus a copy of his poem, which he considered finished, that Catullus judged it unfinished, that he therefore, to prevent premature publication, invited Caecilius to discuss the matter, that Caecilius declined, pleading a love affair, that Catullus now invites Caecilius for a second time, and in the process hyperbolizes his friend's love affair, to impress on him that he must come nevertheless.

J. M. Fisher⁴ has offered a simpler hypothesis. But he goes against the evidence of the poem when he claims that Caecilius has taken up the writing of love poetry, and that for this reason Catullus invites him to come to Verona, to urge him to finish his poem on Cybele. On the other hand, H. Akbar Khan⁵ has proposed that Catullus wishes to praise Caecilius' poem by comparing its effect on the *puella* to the effect on a person of a love charm. But by this perception Khan fails to recognize the thematic opposition in the poem between the principle of reason, which governs the making of a neoteric poem, and the motif of emotion, which is represented by the *puella*. Writing at about the same time as Khan, Sira Onetti and Gregor Maurach⁶ proposed that Catullus wishes primarily to celebrate the unanimity and harmony of the love of Caecilius and his girlfriend, and that for this purpose he praises him as a fine poet and her as *docta*. This interpretation, however, fails to account for the importance in the poem of the *cogitationes* and for the emphasis on *incohata*. Finally, R. Heine⁷ has argued that Catullus means primarily to praise Caecilius' poem about Cybele by suggesting that its effect on the *puella* was so intense as to arouse in her a passion which in its overpowering effect on Caecilius is comparable to that of

⁴J. M. Fisher, "Catullus 35," *CP* 66 (1971) 1-5.

⁵H. Akbar Khan, "Catullus 35, and the Things Poetry Can Do to You," *Hermes* 102 (1974) 475-90.

⁶S. Onetti and G. Maurach, "Catullus 35," *Gymnasium* 81 (1974) 481-84.

⁷R. Heine, "Zu Catull c. 35," in *Catull*, ed. R. Heine ("Wege der Forschung," vol. CCCVIII) (Darmstadt 1975) 62-84.

the love of the heroine of his poem, Cybele, on Attis. Alas, this perception, too, goes beyond the evidence of the poem, and it does not account adequately, I think, for the importance of the *cogitationes* and the stress on *incohata*.

No doubt, in some details these discussions have refined our understanding of the poem. But, as we have noted, misapprehensions and unnecessary differences of interpretation remain. Everything depends on the nuances, and the critic's task, and difficulty, is to get them exactly right. Another close reading of the poem may be desirable.

To begin, let us note that the poem divides cleanly into three parts of six lines each. In the first part, Catullus urges the poet Caecilius to visit him because he wishes to impart to him some "thoughts" (*cogitationes*) of a mutual friend. The leitmotif of this part, we shall see, is "poetry." In the second part, Catullus states that a lovely fair-haired girl (*candida puella*) will try to detain Caecilius because she is madly in love with him (*impotente amore*). This section may be labeled "love." In the third part, the two motifs are combined, and a key is provided for understanding the whole poem.

In the first line, Catullus introduces Caecilius not by name but by his designation as poet, and as Catullus' friend. In the second line, by the poetic fiction of addressing his letter to the *papyrus* on which he writes his hendecasyllables, Catullus emphasizes his own function in this *epistola* as poet. Thus, he addresses Caecilius as his fellow-poet and friend. The leading word *poetae* is qualified by *tenero*, "tender, delicate, refined." The word suggests both delicacy of sentiment in the poet and refinement of technique in his poetry,⁸ and as such it could also be applied to Catullus himself,⁹ and perhaps to that whole group of kindred spirits to which Catullus belonged, the so-called *poetae novi*, or *neoterici*.¹⁰ The word *sodali*, furthermore, suggests that Caecilius and Catullus are friends in the particular sense that they share common interests and concerns, which in this context can only mean poetry. Beyond this, the word often refers to membership in a coterie or society of like-minded friends, and this, too, points toward the *poetae novi*.¹¹

⁸Cf. Ov. *R. Am.* 757; *A. A.* 2.273, 3.329-40; *Am.* 2.1.4; Apollinaris Sidonius 23.18.

⁹As by Martial 7.14.3, 12.44.5.

¹⁰W. Kroll, comm. ad loc.: "*tener* . . . kann alle nach Feinheit der Technik strebenden Dichter, also namentlich auch Angehörige des neoterischen Kreises bezeichnen."

¹¹Cf. *Dig.* 47.12.4: *sodales sunt, qui ejusdem collegii sunt, quam Graeci ἐταίριον vocant*. Elsewhere Catullus uses the term for C. Helvius Cinna, 10.29 and 95.9 (supplement of the Aldine ed.); Fabullus, 12.13; Fabullus and Veranius, 47.6; Alfenus, 30.1.

Thus, the impression is conveyed that Catullus addresses Caecilius, most significantly, as a fellow neoteric poet.¹²

The thematic importance of this address is emphasized stylistically by the two nouns *poetae* and *sodali* framing the line, and enclosing in chiasmic order the two adjectives *tenero* and *meo*. The word order in the following line is similarly effective, as the two verbs in the subjunctive mood, *velim* and *dicas*, frame and focus on the addressee, *Caecilio*, and on the nominal addressee, *papyre*. Catullus here introduces the purpose (*velim*) of his *epistola*, to convey a message to Caecilius (*dicas*), and this he proceeds to state in the following two lines (3-4). Caecilius is to visit Catullus in Verona, and for this purpose to leave behind his own town of *Novum Comum*. A nuance is added by the imagery. The "city walls" (*moenia*) of New Comum and the "shores" of Lago di Como (*Larium litus*) project a picturesque, attractive scene,¹³ which suggests that Caecilius perhaps may not wish to leave. In particular, the *moenia* of the city suggest the notion of enclosure, and with it the possibility perhaps that Caecilius may be detained at his home. But these are the merest intimations, quite insubstantial, and more, for the moment, we cannot say.

In the next two lines (5-6) Catullus states the reason why he wants Caecilius to visit him: to take note of some thoughts, deliberations, of a mutual friend. The placement of *volo* in the line's center, with the assertive effect of the indicative mood, by contrast with the polite indirection of *velim* (l. 2), indicates that Catullus considers the message important. The *quasdam* leaves the *cogitationes* intriguingly and suitably vague. If they were spelled out, there would appear to be no need for Caecilius to make the journey, and he might perhaps not wish to make it. They are the "thoughts" of a "friend" of both Caecilius and Catullus. The *amici* complements the *sodali* of line 1, with that word's suggestion of the coterie of like-minded friends, the "new poets."¹⁴ Therefore, very possibly, this mutual friend is a fellow-neoteric poet,¹⁵ and his *cogitationes* have something to do with poetry, in particular, perhaps, with

¹²Caecilius is known only from this poem. For the various unsuccessful attempts at further identification, see C. L. Neudling, *A Prosopography to Catullus*, Iowa Studies in Classical Antiquity (Oxford 1955) 24-26.

¹³Cf. Cat. 31.

¹⁴In this light, to identify this "mutual friend" as Catullus himself is unconvincing, and unnecessary. But so, e.g., Merrill, comm. ad loc.; Quinn, comm. ad loc.; Copley (note 3 above) 159; Fisher (note 4 above) 2.

¹⁵Cf. W. Kroll, comm. ad loc.: "vielleicht ein Dichter des neoterischen Kreises."

poetic matters of a sort that would be of a mutual interest and concern to these poets. But again, more, for the moment, we cannot say.

In the second part of the poem (7-12), Catullus proceeds to say (l. 7) that "therefore" (that is, since he has some important communications for him, most likely of a poetical nature) "if Caecilius is wise," he will come to Catullus post haste. *Si sapiet* is a colloquial expression but here suggests some of its literal meaning.¹⁶ That is, since Catullus has important communications for him, Caecilius will indeed be wise, judicious, and, the suggestion is, judicious as a poet, to get to Verona quickly. The urgency of the appeal is also communicated, in a humorous vein, by the image of Caecilius "eating up the road" (*viam vorabit*), to make tracks for Verona as swiftly as possible. Catullus continues (l. 8). Caecilius should (in his own interest) hasten to visit Catullus "no matter how many (thousand) times (*quamvis . . . milies*) a beautiful fair-haired girl (*candida puella*)" may seek to detain him. This hypothesis is presented in an imaginative vignette. In response to Catullus' urgent summons, Caecilius is already leaving, on his way (*euntem*), when the girl calls him back (*revocet*) and then, coming up behind him, she throws her arms around him (*manus collo / ambas iniciens*) and begs him to stay (*roget morari*). Earlier (l. 4), the image of *Novi Comi moenia* placed Caecilius within the confines of his city walls. Now we see him confined, and detained, much more effectively, in the arms of a beautiful woman.¹⁷

Catullus then explains (11-12) why this beautiful girl does not want to let Caecilius go, "because she now, if the reports I get are true, loves him with an all-consuming passion." "Si mihi vera nuntiantur" (11) indicates not that Catullus doubts the report¹⁸ but that the situation is considered sufficiently important, probably by mutual friends, to be reported to him: "illum [puella] deperit impotente amore" (12).

We can see here the opposition of two conflicting appeals to Caecilius. One is that of his fellow-poets and friends, who wish to impart to

¹⁶Similarly Pl. *Trin.* 559; Ov. *Met.* 14.675; Mart. 2.41.1, 8.27.2. Cf. J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinische Umgangssprache*³ (Heidelberg 1951) 200 (where for Plautus *Truc.* 559 read *Trin.* 559).

¹⁷Onetti and Maurach (note 6 above) comment on the image (*manus collo / ambas iniciens*): "almost fettering him" (p. 483).

¹⁸Cf. J. Granarolo, *L'oeuvre de Catulle* (Paris 1967) 30: "Catulle recourt souvent à la conjonction *si* en tête d'une épigramme, avec l'indicatif présent dans la majorité des cas . . . aucun de ces *si* n'implique la moindre nuance de doute." The condition also is Catullus' tactful way of not asserting as fact something of which he does not have direct personal knowledge.



him deliberations of importance, evidently on something poetical; the other is the allure of a beautiful woman, who is passionately in love with him, and therefore does not want to let him out of her reach. The *cogitationes* of the men, as the word signifies, are rational, deliberations and reflections. In contrast the love of the woman is emotional, an ungovernable passion (*impotente amore*).¹⁹ The theme of "poetry" in the first part of the poem and that of "love" in the second are at odds.

In the third part of the poem (13-18), the two spheres come together, with interesting results. Having explained why the girl tries to detain Caecilius—because she loves him passionately—Catullus now reveals the cause of her love. Ever since she read some of Caecilius' poetry, "the poor darling" (*misellae*) has been consumed with the love of him. The "*misellae / ignes interiolem edunt medullam*" (14-15) in effect repeats the earlier "*deperit impotente amore*" (12). This repetition stresses the intensity of the woman's passion. The main focus now, however, is on the new information: her passion was caused by her reading the beginning of a poem by Caecilius on Cybele, "*quo tempore legit incohatam / Dindymi dominam*" (13-14). This was a theme which the *poetae novi* liked to treat in the form of miniature epics, *epyllia*, and Catullus himself dealt with it (albeit not in hexameters) in his poem 63.²⁰ Thus, the earlier indications are substantiated: Caecilius is one of the *poetae novi*. But we also note that Catullus does not say that the girl read Caecilius' poem on Cybele, but the *beginning* of it, *incohatam* (13). This detail, that the poem "has been begun but is not finished," receives emphasis from its position at the end of the line and the short pause in the reading that follows it. The point strikes the reader as a bit puzzling, perhaps. Why mention it? But, in the absence of explanation, he reads on. "Ignosco tibi," that is, "I understand and don't blame you," for falling in love with Caecilius through his poetry, and in this you have shown as much good taste and literary sophistication as mark

¹⁹The incompatibility of reason and amatory passion, of course, was a familiar topic in Roman (and Greek) literature. See A. W. Allen, "Elegy and the Classical Attitude toward Love: Propertius I, 1," *YCLS* 11 (1950) 255-77. But its use in this poem has, to my knowledge, not been noted before.

²⁰Cf. Cat. 64 (The Wedding of Peleus and Thetis), the *Zmyrna* of Helvius Cinna (Cat. 95) the *Io* of Licinius Calvus, the *Lydia* of Valerius Cato. A. L. Wheeler, *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1934) 80.

the poetry of Sappho herself: "Sapphica puella / musa doctior : est enim venuste / Magna Caecilio incohata Mater" (16-18).²¹

The position of *est* emphasizes the assertion that what there is of Caecilius' poem has been composed *venuste*, "in a lovely, charming way," so as to arouse love (*Venus, amor*) in the reader.²² *Venuste* recalls and complements the epithet *tenero* for Caecilius in the first line. Thus, Catullus acknowledges the charm and elegance of Caecilius' poem and justifies the girl's reaction to it.

But the last line adds the decisive touch. The alliterative "Magna . . . Mater" frames "Caecilio incohata" and gives the line a stately, even solemn effect. *Incohata* may be viewed as both participle and adjective. And it means both that the poem has been started by Caecilius (dative of agent) but not completed, and that it remains for Caecilius (dative of reference) in a state that is imperfect. With this pregnant force of *incohata*, the line gives the poem a stylistically satisfactory, impressive conclusion.

Conceptually, however, the *incohata* gives the line an open-ended provisional effect. The framing "Magna . . . Mater" presents the subject and title of the poem, and *Caecilio* the name of the author. Together, title and author, they in effect advertise the work, as on a tablet at a book stall. But the word *incohata* does not fit into this concept. As a repetition from line 13, it comes now, in the final line, as a surprise. When the girl first read Caecilius' poem, it was "unfinished." Since then, apparently, some time has elapsed, "quo tempore . . . ex eo," and now it is still "unfinished." This state of the poem, both "incomplete" and "imperfect,"²³ over an extended period of time, would be of con-

²¹The compliment of the *puella* as *docta* is enhanced by the fact that *doctrina* and *doctus* were Catullan and neoteric ideals. Cf., e.g., Wheeler (note 20 above) 84. The comparative degree was a traditional mode of compliment not to be taken seriously. Cf., e.g., *Anth. Gr.* 5.141, 148; 7.218, 413, 743; 12.54; Mart. 10.35.15.

²²On *venustum* as a Catullan and neoteric value, see S. Ford Wiltshire, "Catullus Venustus," *CW* 70 (1977) 319-26; R. Seager, "Venustus, Lepidus, Bellus, Salsus: Notes on the Language of Catullus," *Latomus* 33 (1974) 891-94; V. Buchheit, "Catulls Dichterkritik in c. 36," *Hermes* 87 (1959) 320-21. The question of how Catullus came by the information is irrelevant to the poem.

²³Surely the word here has both meanings. Copley (note 3 above), however, took it only in the sense of "imperfect": "Your poem is charming, but in its present form, it won't do: it needs additional work" (p. 154). Cf. already E. Baehrens, *Catulli Veronensis Liber II* (Leipzig 1885) 205. Fraenkel (note 1 above), on the other hand, took it only in the sense of "incomplete": "For many years Caecilius, when asked 'and what are you

cern to the poet-critics who are Caecilius' friends. One of the main principles to which the neoterics subscribed was the need for a poem to be finished, as far as possible, to perfection.²⁴ Catullus himself proudly dedicates his *libellum* as *expolitum*, "polished to perfection" (poem 1).²⁵ And elsewhere (95) he contrasts the perfect *parva monimenta* of his friend and fellow-poet Helvius Cinna with the lengthy unfinished effusions of the *Vielschreiber*. No doubt, Catullus and his friends would wish, if possible, to assist Caecilius to finish a poem which has been so "beautifully" begun. And this, we now realize, must be the main purpose of the *cogitationes* of the "mutual friend" which Catullus wishes to communicate to him, to help him to finish his "lovely" poem.²⁶

And what of the *candida puella* and her love? We infer that the love theme plays an important part in Caecilius' poetry (*tenero*, *venuste*), and so it did in that of other neoterics.²⁷ For Catullus himself poetry and love were largely inseparable. And love, the love of his *puella* (*Lesbia*), provided much inspiration for his poetry.²⁸ In this spirit, Catullus here pays a compliment to Caecilius' *puella*, for her literary appreciation and love of Caecilius. What is wrong, however, is that this love is *impotens*, it has gone to an extreme, by becoming an uncontrolled, all-consuming passion.²⁹ This passion has Caecilius in thrall, and instead of providing him with inspiration it has incapacitated him as a poet. Therefore, the *impotens amor* of the *puella* and its effect on Caecilius is to be counteracted and corrected, if possible, by the *cogita-*

doing?', would have answered 'I am working at my poem on the Great Mother.' This went on for so long that eventually none of his friends expected the *magnum opus* ever to get out of its embryonic stage" (p. 68, n. 1).

²⁴K. Quinn, *The Catullan Revolution* (London, New York 1959) 59, describes their best productions as "intensely cohering compositions . . . where every detail of word, sound and metre, and the organization of these into an integrated whole, are active constituents of the poetry."

²⁵It can be considered as certain that Catullus uses the expression in the metaphorical as well as the physical sense. See F. Cairns, "Catullus I," *Mnemosyne* 22 (1969) 115; J. P. Elder, "Catullus I, his Poetic Creed, and Nepos," *HSCP* 71 (1966) 147.

²⁶Cf. Copley (note 3 above) 158; J. M. Fisher (note 4 above) 2. *Contra*: Ellis ("possibly something political"); Schwabe (Catullus' own poetry); Merrill ("certain weighty matters"); Riese ("unbekannte Mitteilungen"); Fordyce ("there is no knowing and little use in guessing").

²⁷See G. Lieberg, *Puella Divina* (Amsterdam 1962) 48-82.

²⁸Cf. Lieberg (note 27 above) 89.

²⁹We note a hint of irony, perhaps, in the hyperbole of *Sapphica musa doctior*, and something faintly patronizing in the statement *ignosco tibi*.

*tion*es of Caecilius' friends and fellow-poets. Thus, the purpose of Catullus' exhortation to Caecilius to travel to Verona, well over a hundred miles, to consult with his friends, is to free him, if possible, from the bonds of passion so that, most importantly, his beautiful poem on the *Magna Mater* may be finished.³⁰

It is with the last and concluding line that all the elements of Catullus' poem have fallen into a coherent whole. The answers have been provided to the questions of the nature and purpose of the *cogitationes* of Catullus' and Caecilius' mutual friend, of the relevance of the *candida puella* and her *amor*, and of the emphasis on the incomplete state of Caecilius' poem. With these answers we are given the key to understanding the poem as a whole. We can appreciate that, unlike some insignificant little occasional piece, it deals with lasting concerns of friendship, love, and poetry. And, perhaps most significant, Catullus practices what he preaches, or rather what by indirection he advocates. For his own poem, far from *incohatum*, is a finished little masterpiece.³¹

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³⁰This is a variation on a traditional literary/philosophical motif: the endeavor of friends to free a man from the bonds of love and their advice, to this end, of travel and the diversion of his attention to other concerns. So, e.g., Cic. *Tusc.* 4.74: "Sic igitur adfecto [sc. amatori] haec adhibenda curatio est. . . . Abducendus . . . est non numquam ad alia studia, sollicitudines, curas, negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est."

³¹Note also the framing effect of the beginning and the end of the poem: the beginning introduces Caecilius as poet and as Catullus' friend ("poetae . . . sodali"), the end identifies his poem ("Magna . . . Mater") and a friend's concern that the poem is incomplete (*incohata*). The beginning introduces Caecilius by name (*Caecilio*), the end restates the name (*Caecilio*).

INTERPRETATIONS

SOME ARCHAIC GREEK COMPOUNDS

1. The Homeric compounds ἀελλόπος "storm-footed," ἀρτίπος "sure-footed, fit of foot," have been regarded, by Chantraine (*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* 932), for example, as containing -πος revocalized after πόδα etc.¹ This may be so, but we must ask why in the first place these nominatives have been revocalized. The answer is simple: They must have been anomalous by synchronic Greek standards.

Such final elements of compounds should have originally carried zero-grade;² therefore, underlyingly *-*pd*-. Now, after the seam of the compound this element was treated as if in initial position. Therefore

¹In the context of what is discussed here, and recognizing that -πους -πως is not found in these forms, the listing in Buck-Petersen, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives*, 433, 434 makes retrieval there nonobvious.

The instances, from G. L. Prendergast, *A Complete Concordance to the Iliad of Homer*, new rev. ed. by Benedetto Marzullo (Hildesheim: Ohms, 1962, from the London 1875 edition), in the *Iliad* are:

8.409 ὥς ἔφατ' ὥρτο δὲ Ἴρις ἀελλόπος ἀγγελέουσα.

the same line recurring at 24.77 and 159.

9.505 ἥ δ' Ἀτὴ σθεναρὴ τε καὶ ἀρτίπος οὐνεκα πάσας

To these may be added

22.164 ἥ τρίπος ἥδ' ἐ γυνή, ἀνδρὸς κατατεθνηῶτος·

I suggest that the spondaic end of this last line conceals an older history of the perfect of this much refashioned disyllabic base; see the complex legacy reflected in Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* I (1958) 431, and note that Prendergast reflects *ei*.

²See, for rich detail and examples, Wackernagel-Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik* (AiGr) II 25 ff. § 10ca etc., where our case is best paralleled by *aśva-yáj-*, *tri-vít-*, and especially (§ 10cy) *akṣā-náh-*, *pari-pád-* "Falle," and *-ṣad-/sad-* "sitzen." We are at this point concerned only with the configuration of formation; these cases are all nominalized complex predicates, and the question of the *bahuvrīhī*s, missing in Indic, must be raised below.

the sequence **+pd-*, equivalent to **#pd-*, was vocalized with **-e-*.³ Hence **-ped-s* → **-pets* > **-πες*.

Such a form in **-πες* being anomalous⁴ and not connected semantically with πέδον, or πέζα, or πεζός etc.,⁵ was refashioned to -πος while conserving the meter.⁶

I claim therefore that the observed anomaly, the known rules of vowel alternation and insertion in certain IE compounds, the semantics of the morpheme in its collocation, and the metrical constraints in the few attested instances—all taken together recover for us a paradigm which may be summarized: **ἄFeλλο-πές*, *ἄFeλλο-πέδος*, *ἄFeλλο-πέδει*, *ἄFeλλο-πέδα*; pl. *ἄFeλλο-πέδες*, etc.

Now it should be recalled that these Greek compounds are *bahuvrihis*. It is natural then to turn to the conservative Indic evidence for parallels. Here we find a striking difference: While there is no difficulty in finding Indic (Vedic) parallels for the athematic predicative type of compound adduced in footnote 2, and illustrated in Latin by *iūdex iūdicis*, *auceps aucupis*, *auspex auspicis*, the *bahuvrihis* of Indic do not normally occur as athematic for stems which lack a distinctive adjectival termination. Thus Indic *bahuvrihis* are either thematic (thematized) or, especially if *s-* or *n-* stems, in the adjectival vocalization (e.g., *-ās* < **-ēs* = the type *δυσμενής*), or supplied with a derivative suffix (e.g., *-ka-*, *-ín*). The athematic type just recovered for Greek is not found in Indic.⁷

³I have discussed this IE rule a number of times; for its application to the vocalisms of the root in question see *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie* 34 (1975) 20–29. Wackernagel (note 2 above) 27 § 10 cy is really speaking of this IE phonological rule, but fails to constrain it contextually.

⁴The instance **ἄρτίπες* in *Il.* 9.505, for example, risked appearing a neuter like *δυσμενές* or a vocative like *οἶνοβαρές* beside the feminine nominative Ἀτῆ. Cf. also in the *Odyssey* 8.310 οὔνεχ' ὁ μὲν καλός τε καὶ ἄρτίπος, αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ γε.

⁵Indeed the semantics in *Il.* 24.159 was easily accessible to later bards for retrieval in 24.188 ἦ μὲν ἄρ' ὥς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη πόδας ὠκέα Ἴρις.

⁶Note that in all attested instances in fn. 1 the syllable in question occurs before vowel, a position where *-πους* *-πως* would violate the meter.

⁷We must set aside here the type represented by RV *dvi-pād*, *tri-pād*, *cātuṣ-pād* nom. sg. (for the accentuation see *AiGr.* II, 1, 295–96 § 114c), since these compounds are obviously re-formed upon the simplex. Generally, and in detail on Indic compounding suffixation (*samāsānta-*), see *AiGr.* II, 1, 101 (§44)–124. There are only traces left of Indic athematic stems unextended by a suffix, and these are being phased out in the older literature; thus Ved. *saptā-svasṛ-* “having 7 sisters,” AV *hatā-māṛ-* “having one's

However, in the situations where there is opportunity to observe matters distinctively we find that the final member of a *bahuvrihi* carries zero-grade. So, for example, *an-udr-á-*, *urū-ṇas-á-* "broad-nosed," *tri-vats-á-* "3 years old," *jīva-pitr-ka-*. We may hypothesize, therefore, that these Indic formations are in origin of the same construction as the Greek, but extended (under some contextual conditions) by the thema or one of certain suffixes.

The few Greek examples seem to preserve indirectly, thanks to the constraints of meter, a very archaic state of affairs.

A vestige of this same ancient structure can be perceived in Old Irish *cethir ceithir* "quadruped," which Pedersen (*A Concise Comparative Celtic Grammar*, 27 §33) reconstructs as **k^wetuor-ped-s*. A better reconstruction would be **k^wetur-ped-s*,⁸ but the important point is that the palatal ("slender") final *-r* (assured by the graphic *-i-*) guarantees a final element **(p)e(d)s*.

In Indic by far the most productive *bahuvrihi* extension was the thematic *-a-*, and a similar development can be observed elsewhere. However, we may now view Greek ἑκατόμπεδος in a new light, and Indic *prá-pad-a*-⁹ "front of the foot"—and numerous other like instances—may have a similar direct history. Clearly the first element of the last Greek compound has been reshaped as if a delocutival formation of phrasal origin. The second element may now be taken as a simple thematization (in technical contexts?) of our final element

mother killed," TS. *tvát-pitr-* "having thee for a father" → *a-mātṛ-ka-* "motherless," and countless others.

In lieu of a surface suffix a final morphological modification may take the form of a vowel alternation. Thus, we have *dvi-jāni*, with *ā* < *o (*AiGr.* II, 1, 101); this solution is certainly by far the best of those there discussed by Wackernagel.

⁸**k^wetuor-ped-* would be ill-formed by IE rules, since **k^wetuor-* is the strong-case form. But **k^wetur-ped-s* should have given **k^wetures(s)* > **k^witures* > **cithuir*. We must derive *ce(i)thir* from a proximate **k^weteres*. Presumably **k^wetures* was reshaped to **k^weteres* once the form was no longer recognized as a compound, perhaps on the model of the vocalism of the feminine **k^wetesres* "4."

The fem. *iā*-stem collective *cethrae* "animals, flocks, herds" must be formed on *cethir* or on an *i*-stem case inflection thereof, after the elimination of the stem **k^wetered-*. We cannot have here a derivative **k^weteriā* since that would yield by syncope **ceithre*, with slender (palatalized) *thr*, and not *cethrae*.

⁹AV has *prá-pad* once. The Avestan *fra-bd-a* must be a prehistoric fresh formation, since the output of *-bd-* < **-pd-* treats the sequence as an internal, or medial, cluster, and not as one following the compounding seam; cf. footnote 3.

*-πεδ-. The pre-form of ἑκατόμ-πεδ-ος should therefore have been *ἑκατο-πες.

2. Compounds in -ωψ such as κύνωψ, μύωψ, whether recent or archaic, must rest largely on fresh combinations of the root noun ὦψ seen in ἐνῶπα etc. It is even possible that νώψ·ἀσθενῆς τῇ ὄψει represents $*n\text{-}H_0k^w\text{-}s = \tilde{n}k^ws$. But compounds in -οψ, such as αἶθοψ, οἶνοψ Myc. *wonoqoso* [woinok^ws], Αἰθίοψ Myc. *a₃tijoqo* [aithijok^ws], should represent a zero-grade, as we find in Lat. *uolup* (KZ 94 [1980] 158). Therefore, here -οψ must reflect $*\text{-}H_0k^w$ with syllabic H_0 . For the relevant forms see Chantraine, *DELG* 812.

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ARISTOPHANES *ECCLESIAZUSAE* 76 ff.

In the opening scene of the *Ecclesiazusae*, the women gather before Praxagora for their final briefing as they prepare to take over the assembly. Before giving them their instructions, Praxagora checks that the women have prepared their persons and dress in accordance with an earlier agreement (cf. 57 ff.). The preliminary discussion is brought to a close by a woman declaring in 76 ff. that she has come equipped with the stick of a certain Lamius. Though she does not say so, we can presume that she is also dressed in Lamius' *diphthera*, since Praxagora makes extended reference to it in 79 ff.:¹

νῇ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρ' ἐπιτήδειός γ' ἂν ᾦν
τὴν τοῦ πανόπτου διφθέραν ἐνημμένος
εἵπερ τις ἄλλος βουκολεῖν τὸν δῆμιον.

¹Furthermore, Praxagora's words in 74 f. show that the women have with them the masculine articles of clothing necessary for the masquerade. (Text of R. G. Ussher's edition [Oxford 1973].)

The precise point of the joke to which the *diphthera* gives rise awaits convincing explanation.

In his commentary on the lines in question, Ussher shows clearly that τοῦ πανόπτου must refer to Argus, the guardian of Io,² but he makes no suggestions as to why Argus' *diphthera* should be relevant here. He rules out the views of both J. Taillardat and P. Rau³ as far-fetched; Ussher himself simply notes "'διφθέραν ἐνημμένος': dressed, that is, in the goat-skin of the countryman." But this explains neither the reference to Argus nor the joke to which Aristophanes devoted three verses. The answer lies, I think, in a combination of Taillardat's explanation with that of Rau, in support of which I adduce a hitherto unnoticed passage.⁴

Taillardat's explanation shows — as Rau's does not — why the wearing of Argus' *diphthera* is appropriate to one with a watching brief: it will give him the vigilance he evidently lacks. This is based on the idea, by no means far-fetched in a comic context, that the garment of an individual invests the wearer with the individual's characteristics. Compare, for example, Dicaeopolis' eagerness in *Acharnians* to acquire Telephus' costume and note its immediate effect (l. 447): εὐ γ' οἶον ἤδη ῥηματίων ἐμπίμπλαμαι. The use of Heracles' accoutrement in *Frogs* is similar; note in particular Xanthias' ironic encouragement of his master in 462 f.: οὐ μὴ διατρίψεις, ἀλλὰ γεύσει τῆς θύρας, καθ' Ἡρακλέα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων.

But we still need to explain why the *diphthera* worn by the woman should bring Argus to mind. Rau suggests that the point of comparison is that the *diphthera* of each is full of holes: Aristophanes is comically linking Lamius' tattered garment with that of Argus, similarly perforated, but for a different reason.⁴ This interpretation can be supported by reference to Soph. fr. 35 Radt: ἀσπίς μὲν ἡμὴ λίγδος ὥς πυκνοματεῖ. The use of the word πυκνοματεῖ here in connection with the holes in the ἀσπίς/λίγδος shows that an accumulation of holes could be looked upon as a cluster of eyes. On Rau's interpretation of *Ecc.* 79 ff.,

²To the passages referred to by Ussher we can add Stephanus Byzantius *Ethnika*, ed. Meineke (Berlin 1849) s.v. "Ἀργούρα: ἔστι καὶ τόπος τῆς Εὐβοίας "Ἀργούρα, ὅπου δοκεῖ τὸν Πανόπτην Ἑρμῆς πεφονευκέναι. (I owe this reference to Mr. A. Treloar.)

³J. Taillardat, *RPh* 38 (1964) 41; P. Rau, *Paratragodia* (Munich 1967) 206.

⁴We are, of course, not told explicitly that the *diphthera* is full of holes, since this would spoil the point of the joke under discussion. The scholiast does tell us that Lamius was a poor man: πένης καὶ ἀπὸ ξυλοφορίας ζῶν (ΣR ad 77). This may be a mere guess, but the detail suggests otherwise.

we find a development of the same metaphor, which is made at once more concrete and more amusing by being related to a specific mythical figure. Praxagora is thus making a virtue of a necessity: the poor man's garment is well suited to his office and, incidentally, to the statesman-like intentions of the woman who now wears it. Praxagora's comic determination to stress the unexpected benefits of the worn-out *diphthera* finds a parallel in Carion's resourceful answer to his mistress in *Plutus* 714 f. On being asked how he could observe, though covered with his cloak, the ritual just described, he replies: διὰ τοῦ τριβωνίου ὅπως γὰρ εἶχεν οὐκ ὀλίγας μὰ τὸν Δία.

In conclusion I should add that, while I agree with Ussher's printing of τὸν δῆμιον in 81,⁵ I have also to share his puzzlement at the point of the reference to the executioner. This may rest, as he says, on *ad hominem* considerations no longer recoverable. Perhaps Aristophanes is tilting, as he so often does, at the sexual proclivities of the individual currently holding the office. If so, the joke arises from the suggestion that the man needs an Argus to protect him, like Io, from the advances of some latter-day Zeus.⁶

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⁵ It is also printed by Rogers. Taillardat (art. cit. 39) and most modern editors prefer Bothe's τὸ δῆμιον. But this, like the *scholium* which seems to support it, converts an obscure joke into a flat and commonplace remark.

⁶ For a blunt expression of the type of attention which may be in question, cf. the threat issued to Agathon and his servant by Euripides' relative in *Thes.* 59 ff.



SAYRE AND STYLOMETRICS

In his recent book, Kenneth Sayre includes an appendix on the stylometric dating of the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides* in which he restates the case against Lutoslawski and against stylometrics in general.¹

¹ Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved* (Princeton 1983) 256 ff. His criticism is directed at Wincenty Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (Longmans, Green 1897, reissued 1905).

Lutoslawski, it will be remembered, selected from previous stylistic analyses of Plato 500 criteria to which he assigned weights of 1, 2, 3, or 4 depending on their frequency or importance. These criteria, it was asserted, indicated stylistic (and chronological) affinity to the *Laws*, taken as Plato's final work. The dialogues were then ordered depending on the number and weight of the criteria they exemplified. Sayre ably summarizes Lutoslawski's procedures and properly refers to criticism of them (p. 258 ff.). At the same time he takes up a peculiar stance toward the matter which merits examination. Here is a crucial paragraph:

My purpose in this brief discussion is not to remake Lutoslawski's method into a reliable technique for detecting chronological differences among the dialogues. I doubt that this can be done at all, and surely am not prepared to undertake it myself. Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to assume that stylistic indicators are of *no* value with respect to chronology; and it would appear to be an interesting exercise in itself to approach Lutoslawski's data with a set of criteria that avoid the shortcomings so evident in his. (Sayre, p. 264)

Sayre then goes on to devise a new system for utilizing some of the 500 items amassed and listed by Lutoslawski. To be sure, Sayre has already exercised a sort of preemptive criticism. He is engaged only in "an interesting exercise." His conclusions as a result of this exercise are the following:

(1) On the basis of those measures that are not patently prejudicial against the *Parmenides* and that provide an unambiguous indication of relative lateness, weighted according to formulae less arbitrary in application and more responsive to differences in length than those of Lutoslawski, the data suggest that if the *Parmenides* was composed as a single work then it was written later than the *Timaeus*. (2) Measured and weighted in this manner, however, the data suggest that *Parmenides I* was written substantially before *Parmenides II*. (3) Under the assumption that the two parts of the *Parmenides* were composed at different times, the data suggest that the *Timaeus* was written after the earlier and during roughly the same time period as the later. These three conclusions are wholly consistent with the account of Plato's ontological development presented in this volume. (Sayre, p. 267)

Subsequent readers will be forgiven for concluding that stylometrics, unreliable as they are, support Sayre's relative positioning of the *Par-*

menides and *Timaeus*. In fact, a closer look shows that Sayre's conclusions are not justified.

Sayre's reformulation of Lutoslawski consists of three steps. First, he develops a new scheme of weighting the criteria that differs from that of Lutoslawski. Sayre's four classes depend on frequency and exclusivity. His class A (least significant) includes isolated features that are found more frequently in the later dialogues (i.e., *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Laws*). Class B refers to isolated features exclusive to the later dialogues. Class C refers to repeated features more frequent in the later dialogues but not necessarily in the *Laws*. Class D (most significant) contains repeated features exclusive to the later dialogues and appearing in the *Laws*. The scoring arithmetic for classes A and B includes allowance for length of dialogue (p. 264 f.). There is no quarrel with this scheme here, for it is not an unreasonable one even if it does not command assent. Second, Sayre eliminates a large number of criteria from consideration because he claims they "do not provide indications of relative lateness" (Sayre, p. 266). There is room for debate here, but for the present purpose these eliminations may stand. Third, Sayre eliminates Lutoslawski's criteria numbered 29-181 because "they are never applied to the *Parmenides* at all" and the effect of this omission is "strongly prejudicial" (Sayre, p. 263). Again, no opposition.

Sayre then classifies and weights the remaining 248 criteria according to his own scheme and lists them by identifying number and class on pp. 316-18. The identifying numbers of the criteria are necessarily uninformative unless one takes the trouble to check them against the descriptions given in Lutoslawski. It then becomes clear that while Sayre has eliminated those criteria patently prejudicial to the *Parmenides*, he has failed to eliminate at least one significant set of criteria which is patently prejudicial to the *Timaeus*. This is the set based on formulations of question and answer. If one can accept the figures in Lutoslawski's criterion 318 (Lutoslawski, p. 122, recording some of Ritter's most valuable data), there are only 13 responses to questions in the *Timaeus*, while the *Parmenides*, a shorter dialogue, has 486. No secret here. The *Timaeus* is almost totally straight narrative and necessarily omits those stylistic features that accompany question and answer. Consistency demands that such criteria also be eliminated from consideration. Sayre's Class C includes criteria 318, 342, 376, 385, 386, 387, 452, and 453. Class D includes 378, 448, 453, and 455. Reference to Lutoslawski shows that all of these deal only with question/answer for-

mulations.² These should be left out of consideration on Sayre's own principle that prejudicial criteria be omitted. With this elimination, Sayre's weighted sums may be recalculated as follows:

<i>Parmenides</i> I	77
<i>Parmenides</i> II	98
<i>Parmenides</i> entire	118
<i>Timaeus</i>	129

The conclusion to be drawn from these amended sums, for the little it is worth, is that the *Timaeus* is later than the *Parmenides* whether or not the latter is split. The impression should not be allowed to linger that Sayre's reworking of Lutoslawski's system as an interesting experiment, duly modified, suggests anything else.

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²Criterion 453 is listed three times: under Class C for *Parmenides* I, and Class D for *Parmenides* I and *Parmenides* II. All this for a feature which occurs in the dialogue only three times. It alone accounts for 11 points in Sayre's scores.



THE ART OF GLAUKOS (PLATO *PHAEDO* 108D4-9)

At the end of the *Phaedo* and its arguments for the immortality of the soul, and at the end of his life, Socrates turns to consider the consequences of the conviction that the soul is immortal. He contemplates the fate of souls after the death of the body and the journey from "here" to "there"—ἐνθ' ἐνδὲ ἐκεῖσε (107E2)—and those places that will receive the soul of a person who has lived a life of purity and moderation (107C1-108C8). The conception of these otherworldly places seems to bring him back to the science of the philosophers he had just described

in his "intellectual biography" (96A6-99D2). "There are," he says, "many and quite amazing regions in this earth and the earth itself is neither of the kind nor of the size that those who are devoted to speaking of the earth fancy it to be. So someone has persuaded me" (108D5-8). To which Simmias responds: "What do you mean by this Socrates? I too have heard a great deal about the earth, but not the account that persuades you. It would give me pleasure to hear it" (108D1-3).

Socrates' apology for his account of this anonymous description of the "true earth" is baffling in its reference to "the art of Glaukos": "Well now, Simmias, in my opinion it does not take the art of a Glaukos to describe merely what the theory is. But to show that it is actually the truth appears to me to be a more difficult task than what the art of Glaukos can attain. And then too it is possible that I myself would not be capable of it and, even if I were, my life does not seem sufficient to the length of the argument" (108D4-9). *Ars longa, vita brevis*.

In a dialogue whose smallest details have their place in the design of the whole, it is worth asking what Plato might have in mind by "the art of Glaukos." Curiosity over this art is ancient, and Eusebius and the Platonic scholia combine to give six explanations of a phrase that had become proverbial.¹ Indeed, Eusebius' interest is in the difficulty of the proverb and not the meaning of the phrase in Plato, and of the five explanations he cites for the phrase in his tract against Marcellus, only one coheres with the explanation of the Platonic scholia. The choices before us are easily reduced to two. The first is the first cited by Eusebius, and it is the most perplexing of the two: Glaukos possessed the knowledge of some marvelous art, but both Glaukos and his art were lost at sea, "for there was no longer anyone who had heard of it." This Glaukos would seem to leave us in the position of Simmias in the *Phaedo*—that of baffled curiosity. The second Glaukos in the second explanation offered by Eusebius is clearly the Glaukos appealed to by the scholia in Venetus T: He was the Glaukos who contrived a supremely sophisticated musical instrument out of four discs, which, when struck in unison, produced a harmony. The scholion to Plato is much more detailed than this and attributes the invention to Hippasos,

¹Five explanations are given by Eusebius in his *Contra Marcellum*, in *Eusebius Werke* 4², ed. Erich Klostermann (Berlin 1972) 15.5-21; the two explanations of the Platonic scholia are most easily consulted in John Burnet's short appendix on Γλαύκου τέχνη in his *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford 1911) 150; cf. *Scholia Platonica*, ed. William Chase Greene (Haverford 1938) 15.

its use to Glaukos, and gives the relative thickness of the four discs, all of which are equal in diameter.² There are two other possibilities given by Eusebius which are similar to this: one is Glaukos of Chios, who created an amazing *krater* and stand as a dedication for the Lydian dynasty at Delphi; and the other is this same craftsman who himself dedicated a bronze tripod at Delphi, which produced the sound of a lyre when struck.³ Glaukos 5 and 6 deserve a place only in a footnote.⁴

One can understand why Eusebius picked just this expression to illustrate the fiendish difficulty of even pagan proverbs, and one can appreciate why all this ancient lore has virtually disappeared from recent commentaries to the *Phaedo*. But the question remains: Who is the Glaukos whose art is not needed to rehearse an anonymous description of the true earth, but whose art, as great as it apparently is, cannot persuade of the truth of this description? Of Glaukos 1 in Eusebius' list, it would seem that there is nothing more to say; both he and his wonderful art have been lost at sea. But any version of the mechanical Glaukos, and especially that of the Platonic scholia, seems promising. In Glaukos 2 we would have a craftsman who created harmonies out of four bronze discs. He was known to Aristoxenus,⁵ and he sounds just the Pythagorean note that struck Burnet, the only commentator to speculate on the significance of Plato's strange allusion to "the art of Glaukos": "If this is a genuine tradition, as it appears to be, it is not without significance that Socrates should allude to a distinctively Pythagorean invention."⁶ Such an explanation could add to the conviction of those who discern in the myth of the "true earth" the hand of Plato the scientist and geogra-

²Eusebius *Contra Marcellum* 15.10-14, with the scholia of Venetus T reproduced by Burnet (note 1 above); cf. Zenobius *Cent.* II 91, in Leutsch-Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci* (Berlin 1839-1851) I 55.

³*Contra Marcellum* 15.14-20. For the art of this Glaukos, cf. Herodotus 1.25 and Pausanias 10.16.1. Libanios identified him explicitly as the source of the proverbial expression; he is cited by Leutsch in *Paroemiographi Graeci* II 153.

⁴Glaukos 5 comes last in Eusebius as someone who thought he could rival Glaukos of Chios, *Contra Marcellum* 15.20-21; Glaukos 6 comes as a second possibility in the Platonic scholia, where he is mentioned as a Samian and the discoverer of an art of writing and confused with Glaukos of Chios.

⁵On the authority of the Platonic scholia. This constitutes fragment 90 in Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles II: Aristoxenos* (Basel 1945) 32.

⁶Note 1 above, 150. In his note on the passage itself, Burnet comments that "the reference is to a working model of the 'harmony of the spheres' originally designed by Hippasus" (108).

pher.⁷ And it would suggest that the expression "the art of Glaukos" was already proverbial in Plato's time rather than the creation of Plato himself for this passage in the *Phaedo*.⁸ Yet, if the musical and mechanical skill of this Glaukos lies at the origin of this proverb it is remarkable that there is no hint of a craftsman, or his work, or of music in Socrates' description of the earth as it really is. To the contrary, there is an emphasis on *physis* (especially in 111C4 and 113D1).

There is another Glaukos who emerges from the depths of the sea, and he points away from Presocratic science and Plato "the geographer" (as Paul Friedländer called him) to Plato the transcendentalist. He is no other than our mysterious Glaukos 1 from Eusebius. Heindorf, in his inert digest of the possibilities given by Eusebius, noted finally that none of the ancient interpretations of the proverb had sighted Glaukos, the fisherman from Anthedon in Boeotia, who ate grass by the seashore and was transformed into a god and a prophet.⁹ Heindorf did

⁷First and most prominent is Aristotle, who engages in a serious discussion with the hydrography of *Phaedo* 111C4-113C8 in *Meteorology* 2.2.355b33-356a34; he is followed in his concern for Plato "the geographer" by Paul Friedländer, who devoted a chapter of the first volume of his *Plato* to our passage and Platon "als Geograph," *Plato an Introduction* I, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton 1958) 261-85; this is also the tendency of T. G. Rosenmeyer, "Phaedo 111C ff.," *CQ* 6 (1956) 193-97, and J. S. Morrison, "The Shape of the Earth in Plato's Phaedo," *Phronesis* 4 (1959) 101-19. It is resisted and with good reason by Percival Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon* (Paris 1930) 61-66, and R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge 1955) 172-75. Yet neither draw attention to the thematic connection between the discussion of the "true philosopher" at the beginning of the *Phaedo* (61C6 ff.) and Socrates' description of the "true earth" at its end. The connection between the two has been well established by Maria-Victoria V. Abricka in her dissertation, *Transcending the Mortal: The Philosopher in Plato's Phaedo* (Johns Hopkins University 1982) 66-80.

⁸Schneidewin knew whereof he spoke when he said that the Platonic dialogues are full of proverbial sayings, *Paroemiographi Graeci* I xiv. Aristophanes of Byzantium might have actually composed a book on the proverbs in Plato, *Paroemiographi Graeci* I xviii-xix, most of which are preserved in Zenobius. Yet there are examples of phrases in Plato which become proverbial, such as "a headless tale" (*Republic* 9.575C; *Laws* 6.752A; cf. Zenobius *Cent.* V 55; and for other examples, the Index to vol. II of Schneidewin-Leutsch [531] s.v. Plato). That this passage of the *Phaedo* might prove to be the origin of the proverb is indicated by the fact that it is sometimes cited under the lemma οὐχ (or οὐχί) ἢ Γλαύκου τέχνη, instead of in a positive formulation, as one might expect for a proverb describing an intricate and difficult rather than an easy task; cf. Julian *Oration* II 67C; Plutarch *Cent.* II 25, in *Paroemiographi Graeci* II 341.

⁹*De Glauco igitur marino, piscatore illo Anthedonio, qui herbae cuiusdam ope deum se fecerat, veterum certe in proverbio cogitavit nemo, Platonis Dialogi Tres: Phaedo, Sophistes, Protagoras* (Berlin 1810) 225.

not sight him in the Glaukos who possessed the knowledge of some marvelous art and was lost at sea, but Schneidewin did, and, since Wohlrab's school edition of 1884, Glaukos the seagod has survived in some commentaries to the *Phaedo* as an undercurrent as inexplicable as the tides of the Euripos.¹⁰ Artisan and creator of harmonies or a man who became a god of the sea and a prophet—which explains the Platonic allusion? The answer to this question can only come from Plato; it comes both from the immediate sequel in the *Phaedo* and from the *Republic*, where Socrates offers Glaukos "of the sea" as an image of the disfigurement of the incarnate soul. The immediate sequel of the *Phaedo* is closely connected with this image in the *Republic*: both passages treat the theme of the immortal soul, and both illustrate the possibility of transcendence within a hierarchical scheme of sea, earth, and heaven.

In the *Republic*, Socrates confronts Glaukon's urbane skepticism in face of the notion of an immortal soul by contrasting the soul in its purity with our earthbound vision of its earthbound condition: "Yet we have viewed it in the condition of those who catch sight of Glaukos of the sea; they now have difficulty in discerning his ancient form, for of the members which were once his body some have been broken, others have been worn away and completely disfigured by the waves; and other parts have become encrusted upon him, shells, seaweed, and stones, so that he looks like any kind of animal rather than the man he once was by nature. Such is the condition of the soul as it is visible to us, disfigured by countless evils. Yet, Glaukon, we must look over there." "Where, he asked." To understand Plato's allusion to the seagod Glaukos in the *Phaedo*, we must turn with Glaukon to the perspectives of the *Republic*, where the human eye is raised up from "the sea in which it now dwells" (10.611E5). Here Glaukos is seen in barely recognizable form from a world above; in the *Phaedo* the perspective is reversed. Here our world

¹⁰Cf. *Paroemiographi Graeci* I xxii. Martin Wohlrab, in his *Platons Phaedon für den Schulgebrauch* (Leipzig 1884) 133–34, went beyond his commentary of 1875, where he simply depended on Heindorf, to suggest that the origin of the proverb should be sought in Glaukos of Anthedon, who, in his help to fishermen, became proverbial for any task whose design and execution required a keenness of mind and insight just as its opposite, "sowie vom Gegenteil, sie gehöre nicht dazu" (134). In their interpretations of this "proverb," both Heindorf (note 9 above) 225 and Wohlrab fail to reckon with Socrates' return to a statement of the difficulty of his task in *Phaedo* 114C5–6. Some of the commentaries since Wohlrab mention Glaukos. The most notable is that of W. D. Geddes, *The Phaedo of Plato*² (London 1885) 161: "it is somewhat remarkable that the Scholiasts and *Paroemiographi* do not connect the proverb with the prophetic craft of the other Glaukos who was regarded as a wizard of the sea."

on the earth comes to be viewed as located on the bottom of the sea and the "true earth" which stretches above us in its clarity and light is what earthbound scientists call *aither*:

We who dwell in these hollows of the sea have no conception of it [the true earth] and we fancy that we live upon the earth above. It is very much as if a man who inhabited the depths in the middle of the sea were to believe that he lived on the surface of the sea and were to think, as he gazed up at the sun and other stars, that the sea was heaven, but because of his sluggishness and feebleness had never reached the upper surface of the sea, risen up, and emerged to this earth; nor seen how much purer and fairer it happens to be than his dwelling; nor had he heard of it from anyone who had seen it. Such precisely is our condition. (*Phaedo* 109C3-D5)

The hierarchical scheme of three levels which structures the world as it is viewed in this passage has its counterpart in the image of the cave in Book VII of the *Republic*, and its imagery of emergence connects with the central myth of the *Phaedrus*.¹¹ We are to the region that lies above us as fish are to humans dwelling above the sea (*Phaedo* 109E4); our eye catches sight of it as, trained by philosophy, it rises from the slime (cf. *Republic* 7.533C7-D4 and 518B4-519D2).

In the *Republic*, Glaukos is the image of the soul imprisoned and disfigured by its association with the body, of the higher transformed into the lower. We do not know what Plato's source for this image of Glaukos might have been, but the few fragments from Aeschylus' *Glaukos Pontios* render some details: he is described in the terms of the *Republic* as a beast with human form, covered with shells, mussels, and shellfish.¹² Yet, as Dante knew from his reading of Ovid, Glaukos is also an emblem for transcending the mortal:

Trasumanar significar *per verba*
non si poria; però l'esempio basti
a cui esperienza grazia serba.

¹¹Frutiger (note 7 above) 64-65 sets the texts of *Phaedo* 109B and *Republic* VII 514A-517B in parallel columns. The language of *Phaedrus* 246A2-249D3 suggests the same themes of transcendence as *Phaedo* 109C3-D5, especially 247B5-C2 and 248A1-8, where the souls incapable of breaking out into the region beyond heaven are called "submarine." Frutiger (66) is right to insist on the three-tiered hierarchies of the passages he is dealing with: in both *Phaedo* and *Republic* the earth is the middle term, but, by comparison with the realm above, it comes to seem subterranean or submarine.

¹²Fr. 26 in Nauck, *TGF*²; 57 in Hans Joachim Mette, *Die Fragmente des Aischylos* (Berlin 1959) 21, for which compare *Republic* 10.611D5-6. The description of Glaukos as covered with shells, seaweed, and stones (*Republic* 10.611D5) coheres with the three words from Aeschylus, "shells, mussels, and shell-fish," as Nauck saw, *TGF*² 34 (fr. 59 Mette).

Glaukos is also the human fisherman from Anthedon who ate of an everliving and imperishable grass and became immortal, a god of the sea, and a prophet.¹³

The marvelous art of Glaukos is that of passing beyond the mortal, *trasumanar*. Socrates returns to the difficulties of this art as he describes the dwellings beyond the world beyond: they are "not easy to describe, nor is there time enough at present" (114C2-6). The words "at present" return us to Socrates' original difficulties and why it is that even the art of Glaukos, who was among other things a prophet, cannot persuade the earthbound skeptic of the reality of the true earth and the dwellings that transcend the transcendent world beyond. There is no difficulty in repeating a tale one has heard. But to know the truth of this tale, the soul must be freed from the body and its earthly prison, purified by philosophy (114C1). This is why Socrates must confess that his life is not sufficient to the length of his argument (108D7-8) and conclude that no sensible person will maintain that it is a certainty (114D1-2; cf. *Meno* 86B). For Socrates, there can be no certainty "at present." He is still confined to his prison in Athens and to his body. As he concludes his final myth concerning final things, and after a last and significant bath, Socrates is summoned by his destiny to discover the truth of his conviction—*a cui esperienza grazia serba*, precisely as he had said (69D5-6).

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¹³The lines from Dante are from *Paradiso* 1.70-72, and they are preceded by Dante's description of his transformation as he looked on Beatrice, who herself was looking at the stars of heaven: "nel suo aspetto tal dentro me fei, / qual si fe Glauco nel gustar del herba" (lines 68-69); Dante's source was Ovid *Metamorphoses* 13.904-68, especially Glaukos' description of his loss of mortality and purification (lines 949-53), an element already present in Aeschylus' *Glaukos Pontios*, fr. 32 in Nauck, *TGF*² (fr. 64 Mette), and possibly relevant to Socrates' last bath, *Phaedo* 115A. Evidence for the rest of his career and his prophetic gift can be found digested in R. Gaedechen's article in Röscher's *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* I² (Leipzig 1886-1890) cols. 1682-83. The means to his immortality is grass, which Aeschylus describes as "everliving and imperishable," fr. 28 in Nauck, cf. fr. 29 (fr. 60 in Mette). None of the scant fragments from Aeschylus' satyr play refer to Glaukos' transformation into a prophet, but this is his role already in Euripides *Orestes* 362-65, and prophecy is a theme in the *Phaedo*, where all argument for an immortal soul is also a prediction; cf. 84D4-85B9.



HORACE *EPODE* 16.15-16

The Civil War is destroying a second generation of Romans, and soon the barbarian conqueror will scatter the bones of Romulus. Is there a remedy? Horace turns, agitated and uncertain, to his audience:

Forte, quid expediat, communiter aut melior pars
malis carere quaeritis laboribus.

Since at least the time of Lambinus, the syntax of *carere* has been questioned and disputed.¹ He proposed the following alternatives: either (1) *carere* is a consecutive infinitive, or (2) it is in apposition to, or parallel with, *quid expediat*. Modern opinion has been split: Chase, Currie, Smith, Orellius, Baiter and Hirshfelder, and Shorey and Laing prefer the former; Scaliger, Kiessling, and Fraenkel the latter.² The grammar deserves an explanation, but not just for philological reasons; there is something more at stake. Fraenkel points to the larger issue when, after concluding that the syntactic function of *malis carere laboribus* "cannot, so far as I see, be made out with certainty," he says: "Apparently it was only by degrees that Horace, in the structure of his sentences, attained that *lucidus ordo* which is characteristic of his masterpieces."³ And yet it is not just a matter of the poet's development. The second issue is the poet's voice: Is it difficult to understand and confusing? Is it a semi-Greek voice, twisting the norms of Latin syntax by analogy with Greek consecutive infinitives? Or is it a wholly Roman voice, colloquial and impassioned?

The correct grammatical explanation of *carere* was partly seen by Page in 1895. Perhaps he has not been heeded because he lumped together all of Horace's "bold uses of the infinitive . . . after adjectives and verbs." But when he said, "*Quid me impedit sequi?*" is found in prose; then why not *quid (vos) expedit carere?*," he was on the right track. *Carere* is the infinitive being treated, as it often is, as an indeclinable

¹ Following Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 53-55, I take it as agreed that *communiter aut melior pars* is the appositional subject of *quaeritis*, and that *forte* = *fortasse*.

² Some commentators like Bennett are not represented because they accept *quod* for *quid*. Fraenkel (note 1 above) offers a summary of other interpretations.

³ Fraenkel (note 1 above) 53-54.

neuter verbal noun. In the phrase *impedire sequi* (Cic. *Off.* 2.2.8),⁴ *sequi* is simply the object of the verb *impedire*. The same is true of *expedire carere*. The idea that the infinitive is consecutive is the result of confusing a lexical distinction with a grammatical one. For instance, in the phrase *aedem fecit*, the accusative *aedem* only denotes the result of *fecit* because of the meaning and tense of the verb, not because of any grammatical marking. The parallel Page suggested between *impedire* and *expedire* should, in itself, have been sufficient to explain *carere* here. Verbs in Latin that take the infinitive are grouped, as every beginner knows, in lists headed by phrases like "Verbs of hastening, continuing and their opposites." If *impedire* takes an infinitive, *expedire* may also take one.

More may be said to strengthen the case Page suggested. The flexibility of the infinitive in Latin as a neuter verbal noun is quite extensive. A discussion with many examples may be found in Kuehner-Stegman, I 664 ff. (see also Woodcock, p. 14 ff). The following examples may briefly suggest the ease with which the infinitive is used as a neuter noun in the nominative or accusative case. Cic. *Br.* 140, "ipsum Latine loqui"; *Id. de Or.* 2.24, "me hoc ipsum agere delectat"; Hor. *Sat.* 2.5.65, "inveniet nil sibi legatum praeter plorare"; Cic. *Att.* 9.13.8, "tene haec posse ferre." All of these examples, it will be noted, are colloquial. In fact, the infinitive as the object of a transitive verb is very common in Plautus⁵ and appears later in Mediaeval Latin.⁶ Its use in the nominative or accusative case is inherent to the language and predates our written records.⁷

It should be obvious that one may say in good Latin *timeo pugnare* just as one may say *timeo pugnam*.⁸ Turning to *expedire*, we may consider what kinds of objects the verb takes. Often the object is

⁴Cf. *Or.* 1.35.163; *Nat. D.* 1.87; *Lucr.* 3.222, 4.921; *Ovid ex Ponto* 1.1.21.

⁵See Kuehner-Stegmann, I 665 f.; all examples, except one from Ennius, are from Plautus.

⁶That the colloquial language maintained greater flexibility than literary Latin should be clear from an expression like *fecit poni* in Mediaeval Latin. Here, *poni* is no more an infinitive of result than *aedem* was an accusative of result in the example I offered above.

⁷"These developments had taken place before extant Latin literature begins, and from the beginning of our records the infinitive is treated as an indeclinable neuter verbal noun, which, with few exceptions, could be used substantivally only as subject or object in the nominative or accusative" (Woodcock, p. 17).

⁸See, for example, *Tib.* 1.4.21 *nec iurare time*. For examples in Horace, see *Carm.* 1.8.8, 3.24.56; *Sat.* 1.4.23; *Ep.* 1.5.2, 7.4, 2.1.114, 3.170, 197.

the problem one is to be disentangled from (e.g., Cic. *Rep.* 1.35.55), but it may also designate the state to be achieved by the disentangling. Perhaps the most famous example comes from Cicero, "expediendae salutis," *Mil.* 4.10 (so also "expediam exitum huius institutae orationis," *Fam.* 3.12.2⁹). It seems clear that there is no difficulty in making the result of *expedire* the object of *expedire* and, if *expedire salutem* is possible, then *expedire carere* should be possible as well.

In Horace's epode, not only does *carere* make good Latin sense as the object of *expediat*, but colorful infinitives appear elsewhere and characterize the immediate context. At verse 24 Horace writes, *occupare quid moramur*. This phrase has not occasioned much comment,¹⁰ perhaps because *moramur* so easily falls in with other verbs of "hastening, continuing and their opposites": *propero*, *festino*, *maturo*, *insto*, *persevero*, *pergo*, *cesso*, *dubito*. However, it should be pointed out that if *moror* is analogous to *cesso* and *propero*, then *expedio* should be considered analogous to *adiuvo*¹¹ and *prohibeo*.¹² At verse 23 we have another infinitive used as the object of a transitive verb in good Latin idiom: "an melius quis habet suadere?"¹³ In verse 21 we find *ire* in apposition to *hac* [*sententia*].

The two issues mentioned above, the grammar and the voice, are closely related. If my interpretation of *carere* is correct, the voice of *Epode* 16 is a good idiomatic Roman voice, impassioned and naming actions in vivid ways. This is, I think, what one would expect of the persona that is concerned with the immediate and particular problems of Roman history in the 30s. If the order of this couplet lacks *lucidus ordo*, as Fraenkel complains, that too may be assimilated to the poet's voice. In his mind's eye, he has just seen the bones of Quirinus scattered by a barbarian. *Forte, quid expediat*, uncertainty as to what to do, is interrupted by *communiter aut melior pars*, uncertainty as to who will

⁹One may add examples from early Latin, Pl. *Capt.* 40, and from Augustan Latin, Liv. 4.55.4, 38.2.14; Vitruv. 7.4.1.

¹⁰We have the evidence of Mark Antony ("nihil moror eos salvos esse," Cic. *Ph.* 13.17.35) and Plautus ("nil moror eum tibi esse amicum," *Trin.* 2.2.56) that this is again a good Latin idiom.

¹¹See Pliny 11.24, 29, 85 *adiuvat enim* (*pater*, the male) *incubare*.

¹²Kuehner-Stegmann, I 687 f., places *impedire* together with *cogo/-or*, *deterreo*, and other "Verben des Hinderns."

¹³It might be argued that the infinitive is adverbial and explanatory of *melius*, but there are too many examples that strain such an interpretation; see esp. Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 35, 100, *habeo etiam dicere* followed by an indirect question. See also LSJ s.v. II A 2 a.

do it. Similarly, in line 16, *malis carere* is interrupted by *quaeritis*.¹⁴ The rhetorical associations of the expression Horace has chosen (cf. Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.40: "sed vos fortasse . . . in hoc loco quaeritis. . .") exude confidence. That is inappropriate to his persona, and so he breaks up the *lucidus ordo* and uses syntax from a more colloquial level of Latin to make the voice immediate and concerned but not overconfident. His answer to the question he poses here follows with no small sense of urgency:

ire, pedes quocumque ferent, quocumque per undas
 Notus vocabit aut protervus Africus.
 sic placet? an melius quis habet suadere?

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¹⁴Note that in the previous couplet we find the same tendency to interrupt the normal, discursive flow of the thought: *nefas videre*!



EZEKIEL EXAGOGUE 208

(TGrF 1.128, p. 299 Snell)

The Egyptian messenger describes the arrival of the exhausted Hebrews at the Red Sea:

οἱ μὲν τέκνοισι νηπίοις δίδουν βορὰν
 ὁμοῦ τε καὶ δάμαρσιν, ἔμπονοι κόπῳ.

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Although the text of the excerpts from the *Exagoge* is riddled with corruption, these two lines are quoted by the mss. of Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 9.29 without any variant readings. Ezekiel's trimeters are often uncouth (cf. B. Snell, *Glotta* 44 [1966-67] 25 ff.), and his Greek is a curious mélange of Attic tragic diction and third century *Koine*; but he hardly deserves to be saddled with the solecism ἔμπονοι κόπῳ at v. 208. In normal Greek ἔμπονος means "able to sustain toil" (Hippocr. *Aēr.*

12; an anonymous poet cited by Σ Hephaestion, 286.6 Cons.) when applied to living creatures, and "wearisome," "laboured" (Aretaeus *SA* 1.9; LXX 3 Macc. 1.28) when applied to things; there is no parallel for its use here in the sense "tired," "weary" applied to people (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ἔμπονος; J. Wieneke, *Ezechielis Iudaei poetae Alexandrini fabulae quae inscribitur ΕΞΑΓΩΓΗ fragmenta* [Diss. Münster 1931] 97 f.; H. Jacobson, *The Exagoge of Ezekiel* [Cambridge 1983] 150). Jacobson consequently conjectured ἔγκοποι κόπῳ, which is half way to the solution; what Ezekiel is most likely to have written is ἔγκοποι πόνῳ, "wearyed by their efforts." For ἔγκοπος in this sense, cf. Maccius in *Anth. Pal.* 6.33 = 6 Gow-Page, and the phrase ἔγκοπον ποιεῖν twice in LXX, Job 19.2 and Is. 43.23. The type of manuscript error in which adjacent words switch stems while retaining their correct terminations is not uncommon: e.g., Hom. *Il.* 8.526, εὐχομαι ἐλπόμενος Aristarchus, ἔλπομαι εὐχόμενος Zenodotus; Hdt. 2.64.6, the mss. varying between ἐπιλέγοντες ποιεῦσι and ποιεῦντες ἐπιλέγουσι; Ar. *Ach.* 91, where the Ravennas corrupts ἄγοντες ἤκομεν unmetrically to ἤκοντες ἄγομεν; Pl. *Alcib.* 2, 138a, where προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ is corrupted by the Clarkeanus to πορευόμενος προσεύξῃ; Isaeus 11.21, where τὸν μὲν ἡττᾶσθαι, τὸν δὲ νικᾶν is corrupted in some mss. to τὸν μὲν νικᾶσθαι, τὸν δὲ ἡττᾶν. Cf. H. Richards, *CR* 19 (1905) 291 f., and 20 (1906) 228.

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REVIEWS

M. R. WRIGHT, Editor. *Empedocles: the Extant Fragments*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. vi + 364.

The following abbreviations are used in this review: *C.* = [Wright's] *Commentary*; *D.K.* = Diels-Kranz [= *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*]; *H.G.P.* = [W. K. C. Guthrie's] *A History of Greek Philosophy*; *K.* = *Katharmoi*; *P.* = *Physics*. Throughout I follow Wright's numbering of the fragments (those in parentheses are *D.K.*'s numbers). ~

Wright's interest in Empedocles goes at least as far back as her 1963 Oxford dissertation and note in *CR* 12 (1962) 109-11; she is one of our authorities on the subject. The book under review comprises: I. Introduction (pp. 1-89): 1. *Life and Writings* (= "Dating Empedocles' Life," "Politics, Rhetoric, and Medicine," "The Manner of Empedocles' Death," "Works Attributed to Empedocles"). 2. *P.* (= "Earth, Air, Fire, and Water," "Love and Strife," "Mixing and Separating," "The Plan of the *P.*," "Monsters and Men"). 3. *K.* and *P.* (= "Common Ground," "Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility," "Empedocles as Daimon"). 4. *The Allocation of the Fragments*. 5. *The Titles of the Poems*. 6. *Concordance of the Ordering of the Frs.* (= Wright's numbering of the fragments coordinated with the numbering of *D.K.* etc.). Parts 2 and 3 constitute the most interesting parts of the introduction, and of these 3 is the most ambitious piece. II. Text (pp. 91-151): (a) *περί φύσεως* (b) *καθαρμοί* (c) *Addenda* (= fragments of single words from Empedocles or occasionally lines but so corrupt that they offer little or no help in the study of Empedocles). The Greek text is accompanied by an up-to-date, informative *apparatus criticus* comprising inter alia some attractive conjectures by Wright herself. III. Translation and Commentary (pp. 153-298), pertaining to the *P.*, the *K.*, and the *Addenda*. In each case Wright translates only the words of Empedocles (not the whole testimonium) and then proceeds with her *C. variorum*, which concentrates more on philosophy than philology. The book closes with an extensive bibliography (pp. 299-309) and helpful indices (pp. 311-64 [= *Fontium, Verborum, Locorum, Nominum* (= only ancient names) *et Rerum*])—there is no index listing modern scholars. The book aims at being all-inclusive and would have succeeded all the more in this direction if Wright had added one more chapter with Empedocles as poet (= imagery and peculiarities in meter, language and style [summarizing and supplementing with her own observations the conclusions of J. Bennett, A. Traglia, and J. P. Hershbell, see Wright's bibliography]).

The good points of the book are many and will be obvious to the reader. Therefore this reviewer, in his effort to make the best use of the limited space granted to him for this review, decided to concentrate on some weaknesses (or at least so he thinks) of the book, which are neither obvious nor trivial.

Wright's change of the fragments' order cannot be shown as desirable, for it is doubtfully, if at all, correct and besides it is likely to produce confusion. She

should have expressed her own views on the order but preserved the *D.K.* order. Let us examine, for example, one instance *maioris momenti* in her changed order (*maioris* because the change here involves a transfer from one poem to the other). She prints as fr. 3 of the *P.* what is fr. 131 of the *K.* in the *D.K.* order. She takes ἡμετέρας μελέτας to mean ἡμῶν τῶν ποιητῶν (as a class) μελέτας. So Empedocles (p. 159) says to the Muse: "if in the past you helped poets (in general), help me now as well." But this disturbs parallelism and thereby the Muse's reactivation *sub specie iterationis*. We expect "if in the past you helped *poets*, help *poets* now as well," or "if in the past you helped *me*, help *me* now as well" rather than "if in the past you helped poets [myself one of them], help me now as well." Moreover, to have Empedocles in the past as merely one poet among many amounts to a strange depreciation of Empedocles by Empedocles himself. Is he trying to minimize the rhetoric which presents him as poet? Hardly so, considering not only the highly flattering picture that he paints of himself in his fragments (he poses there as a very special man, even as a god [cf. fr. 105 (113) *al.*]), but also that Greek tradition makes him the father of rhetoric (p. 5, n. 15 *al.*). The obvious answer must then be that ἡμετέρας μελέτας means ἐμὰς μελέτας (Empedocles appearing as *the* poet rather than as *a* poet). Note that Empedocles has used ἡμέτερος *pro* ἐμός in fr. 6 (4) line 2 and that the usage is attested since Homer (see LSJ s.v. ἡμέτερος II). What this poem(s) was which Empedocles composed in the past we are not told in fr. 3 (131), but his audience knew. If so, τινος in line 1 probably refers to the person(s) for whom he composed this poem(s) in the past. Empedocles compliments this person(s) by presenting the Muse inspiring him for the sake of this person(s). Since the *opinio communis* distributes the fragments almost entirely between *P.* and *K.*, it is reasonable to suppose that this fragment as well (nothing in it pointing to a different solution) belongs to one of these two compositions rather than to a third one. The singular τινος is likely to point to *one* person (= "someone," "a certain person [that we all know]") rather than to more than one person (where clarity would have normally demanded τινῶν). Now, if an identification of this τινος is to be ventured, on the basis of the extant evidence this person is likely to be Pausanias, the man addressed by Empedocles in the *P.* We may guess that Empedocles used τινος rather than Pausanias' very name because the present poem was not addressed to him, and therefore the mention of Pausanias by name would have detracted from the glory of the recipient(s) of the present composition. It becomes attractive then to suppose that the μελέται in the past refer to the *P.* and that the present composition is the *K.* dedicated to a group of people, the friends and compatriots of Empedocles (cf. fr. 102 [112]). Wright's treatment of ἡμετέρας μελέτας/ τινος is erratic; her decision to obscure the identity of τινος by rendering it "any one" is also unacceptable since (a) by definition, an individual (or individuals) in whom the Muse is interested must be thought of as *one* (or a *few exceptional* people), not as "any one," and (b) such broadening of τινος ("any one") detracts from those who are now to be honored by the present composition—by analogy they enter the "any one" class. Nor are Wright's other arguments in favor of assigning this fragment to the *P.* cogent: "Hippolytus' mention, in the context of the fr., of the κόσμοι brought about by Love and Strife makes the lines more suited to the *P.* than to the *K.*, and it is in the *P.* that the Muse is

addressed . . . and that an ἀγαθὸς λόγος about the gods is revealed" (p. 159). Nevertheless, the *K.*, too, presents "κόσμοι" — cf. the Ἰατρικῆς λειμῶν vis-à-vis the Ἀληθείας λειμῶν in fr. 113 (121), the ἀντρον ὑπόστεγον in fr. 115 (120) vis-à-vis the world of the ὁμέσσιοι αὐτοτράπεζοι in fr. 133 (147), in general the world where the daimon/ego (see below) lives without μετενσωματώσεις vis-à-vis the world which involves μετενσωματώσεις. Moreover, Strife/Love are found not only in the *P.* but also in the *K.* (cf. fr. 107 [115], 118 [128]). Now, leaving aside fr. 3 (131) whose *situs* is disputed by Wright, it is true that in the other fragments of the *K.* that we possess the Muse is not invoked. But since epic poets invoke the Muse as a matter of genre, and Empedocles is an epic poet, there is no good reason to suppose that he must not have invoked the Muse in the *K.* It may be argued that Empedocles, posing as mortal in the *P.*, requires there the services of the Muse more than he does in the *K.* where he poses as "god"; but this hardly shows that he was likely to opt for the elimination of the Muse in the *K.*, since he could still ask her to assist the "god" Empedocles, not by her imparting the truth in his λόγος but, say, by adding to this truth the "beauty" of poetry and even "persuasion." Above all, if Hippolytus is right in saying that here (= fr. 3 [131]) the Muse is addressed as a personification of the δίκαιος λόγος, "a principle described as an intermediary between Love and Strife but working with Love for unity" (p. 159), this intermediary becomes much more meaningful in the quasi-ethical ambience of the *K.* than in the mechanical patterns of the *P.* In a world of Strife/Love, how can we become and remain καθαροί since, for example, we have to eat, and we can hardly eat without some sort of "killing"? Here, we may suppose, comes the δίκαιος λόγος that would instruct us to eat, say, "wheat," but not "beans" (fr. 128 [141]). If so, the δίκαιος λόγος in the *K.* strikes a compromise between Strife and Love (favoring Love but not altogether dismissing Strife) and in so doing prescribes a life which, in terms of cosmic realities, is the only life that makes it possible for the fallen daimon/ego to regain his divine status. And, of course, the *K.* is an ἀγαθὸς λόγος about gods, and one all the more interesting to us since it reveals that we are fallen δαίμονες who through purification can recover our original divine status. Thus, we must insist that the arguments on the basis of which Wright transfers this fragment from its *D.K. situs* to a new one are not convincing.

The reviewer has admired throughout not only Wright's learning but also her ἀγχίνοια. Nevertheless, he has failed to convince himself that she always succeeds in keeping clear of λεπτολογίαι. Here are examples. Frs. 107 (115), 108 (117), 110 (126), and 132 (146) of the *K.* plus the testimony of the ancients make it reasonably certain that here Empedocles refers to μετεμψύχωσις. The overall picture is this: the daimon falls from his divine status which he shared with other daimons, lives as "plant," "animal," "man" in this world of birth/death, and ultimately is reinstated. The ἐγὼ in fr. 107 (115), line 13, and fr. 108 (117), line 1, stands for a continuous psychological unity which persists *throughout* the daimon's reincarnations, therefore, while he is not only "inside" the *boy*, the *girl*, the *bush*, the *bird*, the *fish*, etc. (cf. fr. 108 [117]) but also "outside" them (say, during the time between the death of the *bird* and the birth of the *fish*)—that is, not only while the daimon is wrapped up in some χιτῶν σαρκῶν or other but also while he is "naked" (cf. frs. 110 [126]). Without

such a continuity this ἐγὼ becomes meaningless. But Wright, instead of using this ἐγὼ as the δός μοι ποῦ στῶ for her understanding of reincarnation in the *K.*, postulates a sequence of rearrangements of the "roots" of daimon along the hylozoistic terms of the *P.* Compare her comments on fr. 107 (115), line 8 (p. 274): "The daimon exchanges one hard way of life for another *when the 'roots' of which he is constituted are rearranged* [*italics mine*] over a period of time to be parts of different forms of mortal life in different elements"; see also her comment on fr. 110 (126) (= p. 277), and further pp. 57-76. Yet, "ἐγὼ" is the focusing point of a psychological unity, the consciousness of "myself" as a living individual in distinction from other selves. There can be no *rearrangement* of the "roots" of the δαίμων as "ego." In fact there is not any guarantee that the daimon in the *K.* consists of "roots." Nor can we speak of "roots" of ego, let alone of "roots" of ego which rearranged preserve the identity of ego. It seems that Wright violates the text of the *K.* to make it conform to the hylozoism of the *P.* But why is conformity at all costs needed (for scholarly views on the degree of relation between *P.* and *K.*, see p. 57, n. 1). Probability points clearly into another direction: Empedocles is an epic poet composing with a set of philosophic concepts ("Strife," "Love," the "Four Elements," etc.), using them as quasi-formulae of thought and applying them differently in different compositions according to specific purposes. The *P.* pivots on *hylozoism*, and there an "ego" emerges from the aggregate of the elements which constitute the given *man, plant, or animal*. In the *P.* there can be no "ego" moving from plant to fish, to bird, etc.; but in the *K.*, which embraces reincarnation, there can be, for in reincarnation the ego need not emerge from the mortal body but enter into it just as an individual moving from Acragas enters Croton, and then exiting from Croton enters Syracuse. The *K.* is addressed to the πολλοί (just as the *P.* to the ὀλίγοι— to Pausanias and by implication a few others like him) and the poem speaks of *salvation*. How can salvation *appeal* to the masses unless it is "personal," a salvation of an "ego" that exists *uninterruptedly*? Empedocles, then, has all good reasons to "mute" hylozoism (attested in the *P.*) when he composes the *K.* In consequence of her interpreting fr. 108 (117) etc. of the *K.* in terms of the *P.*, Wright further argues (p. 59 and p. 276) that Empedocles does not "remember" that he was a "boy," a "girl," a "bush," etc. but that he infers it. The reviewer considers this improbable. Now, Homer (A. 70) presents Kalchas, the prophet, as one who "knows" present, future, and past. Similarly Empedocles as prophet (cf. 102 [112], line 10; 132 [146]) knows present, future, and past. To ask how exactly he does know the past invites speculation. Nevertheless, that this "knowing" is likely to result from "memory" is rhetorically a most attractive possibility for it sets the daimon/reincarnation business on a matter-of-fact basis (= I *remember* it as αὐτόπτης, I do not speculate about it). The fifth century Greeks very likely entertained the concept of a Pythagoras recollecting his past lives (see Guthrie, *H.G.P.*, vol. 1, pp. 164-65). If so, Empedocles himself, who lived in fifth century Greece, very likely knew of such a recollecting Pythagoras (especially since he grew on Pythagorean soil) and could very well exploit such a concept in the *K.* If X does not "remember" what he was before his ἐνσωμάτωσις as X, this is probably so because X's "ego" has not reached the end of its reincarnation cycle; we may reasonably postulate that the power of *complete* memory is activated at the end of a daimon's cycle. If so,

Empedocles knows the whole cycle of his reincarnation through "memory" for by now he is practically a reinstated daimon (cf. fr. 102 [112], line 4; fr. 105 [113]). Again, Wright in her efforts to reduce the *K.* to the *P.* takes the view that the daimon is a fragment from one divinity (see *C.* on fr. 108 [117] [= p. 275]). This seems also unlikely. The text of *K.* speaks of daimons *pluraliter* (cf. fr. 107 [115], lines 5, 13). Empedocles has good reason for that, for the *K.* is addressed to the everyday Greek of the fifth century who is merely concerned with "himself" and seeks "personal" results. Such concerns/personal results call for an "ego"/daimon that is neither confused nor fused with any "thou," "he," "she," "it," "we," "you," and "they." If so, the audience to which the *K.* is addressed and the interest of the poet to serve this audience would suggest that the δαίμονες/egos in the *K.* remain for ever *many* (there is no good reason for discontinuity of a daimonic "ego" at any time in the *K.*) which in popular terms means "John, Bob, and Charlie, you are daimons: therefore use my *katharmoi* to enjoy the blessings you are entitled to," rather than "John, Bob, and Charlie, you are fragments of *one* divinity; therefore use my *katharmoi* in order that you may get on the road that will eventually lead you back to that divine oneness" (a fusion into a *oneness* means elimination of the individuality of those fused—who would go for this?). Wright further argues that the daimon falls as a result of Strife (rather than because the daimon "sins" in terms of an action based on the daimon's own judgment/volition) and that the violation of the daimon's "oath" is only a technical violation on the part of the daimon (who nevertheless pays for it, see pp. 63–69). All this leaves the reviewer uneasy at best. If we allow the daimon a personal existence in the company of other daimons on the divine level (as frs. 107 [115] and 133 [147] require) and if we see these daimons in terms of popular religion (note the ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι αὐτοτράπεζοι in 133 [147], line 1), then we need nothing of what Wright postulates here. If read without preconceptions, the *K.* points to a daimon who *ex suo* pollutes himself, and in so doing violates his oath and thereby suffers the inevitable consequences. Consider the following: fr. 107 (115), line 14, presents the daimon describing himself as νεῖκεῖ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος. The word πίσυνος is etymologically connected with πείθω. We may reasonably assume that "Strife" convinces the daimon. This "conviction" need not imply "coercion" against the daimon's judgment/volition. For example, he who is πίσυνος τόξοισι (see LSJ s.v. πίσυνος) relies on his bow; but obviously, as regards this reliance, the bow does not "force" him against his own judgment/volition. He who trusts his bow could hardly argue that putting his trust in the bow was a matter irrelevant to his judgment/volition and therefore that the consequence of his trust is due to the bow rather than to him. And this is obviously the case with him who is πίσυνος ἡνορέῃ, κάρτει, ἐλπιδι, θεῷ . . . as well as νεῖκεῖ. After all, notice that in fr. 122 (136), Empedocles invites us to desist from slaughter, and he relates this slaughter to our careless way of thinking. This means that he believes that we can effectively resist "Strife." Why, then, should we assume that Empedocles believes that we could not resist Strife in the past (before our falling from the divine status) when he believes that we can now? Strife is not less powerful now than it used to be then (in fact the opposite must be true in terms of the *P.*, see p. 49), nor are we in our present status more capable of careful thinking and of resisting Strife than we were in our earlier, undiminished status. The falling of

the daimon then is likely to involve wrong thinking (cf. ἀμπλακίησι, fr. 107 [115], line 3) and wrong decisions on the daimon's part. Wright is off the track when she remarks "Strife 'had' to have control" (p. 69). If Empedocles believes that Strife "had" to have control then, he must believe that Strife "has" to have control now as well. In such case one wonders what was the purpose of his writing the *K*.

The *constitutio textus* may be pronounced as satisfactory overall. The book maintains sufficient clarity throughout. It is only in Wright's discussion of fr. 42 (48) that one is likely to get confused. In her text Wright has ὑφισταμένη (which she also maintains in the translation), but in the *C*. she speaks as if she has adopted Scaliger's ἐφισταμένη (commenting "As the sun goes under the earth, the imposition of the earth's bulk prevents its light from reaching our surface").

Reading through, the reviewer noticed several printing errors in the Greek (in most instances in accents) of which nevertheless only few will cause difficulty: We should read, for example, πόρον (*pro* πόρος) in fr. 47 (35), line 1; δύο (*pro* δύω) in 48 (96), line 2; we should add πάλιν between the comma and ἐκπνέει in fr. 91 (100), line 25. Regrettably the Yale Press has apparently abandoned the grammatical rules which control the division of Greek words at the end of lines, and so one finds a legion of such strange divisions as, for example, συναγων-ιζόμενον and παρ-ακαλεῖ (p. 94), ἀποκ-ατάστασιν (p. 96), ἐνδ-ελεχώς (p. 98), etc. There are some errors in references. We should read, for example, 7.29.13 (*pro* 7.92.13) in fr. 22 (29/28); 925b (*pro* 952b) in fr. 40 (46); 528.30 (*pro* 52.8.30) in fr. 47 (35); 16.29 (*pro* 16.299) in fr. 52 (61); 464b (*pro* 446b) in fr. 126 (144) *al*.

This then is a valuable book from which we can all learn about Empedocles and one which would be especially appreciated by the nonspecialist who wishes to obtain an up-to-date and all-encompassing knowledge of him from a single volume of moderate size. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the reviewer the book is not entirely free of unwarranted conclusions on several levels and of various degrees of importance. The reader is therefore advised to read the book with his critical faculties about him in order to profit all the more from it.

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MORRIS HENRY PARTEE. *Plato's Poetics*. Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1981.

Because Plato does not have a systematic theory of poetry, Partee has attempted to construct one for him from the comments about poetry scattered through the dialogues. He also hopes to explain "Plato's efforts to reconcile his magnificent poetic power and his love of poetry with his commitment to unyielding philosophical integrity" (p. x).

In order to see Plato as a friend of poetry, the negative evidence of his refusal to impose a total ban on poetry must be adduced. Partee sees Plato as responding to an unnecessary conflict between reason and emotion. Plato, according to Partee, views the "earthly beauty" of poetry as arousing the emotions adversely whereas only "absolute beauty" could arouse the rational aspect of the soul (p. 10). Partee strongly emphasizes that the social content of poetry and its ethical consequences is the basis of much of Plato's comments, rather than a consideration of poetic form. From the *Ion* to the *Laws*, poetry is to be evaluated by the knowledge or wisdom it proffers. Judged by that standard, both the *Ion* and the *Republic* refuse to recognize knowledge of any worth in poetry.

The *Republic*, especially Book X, is central, Partee argues, to an understanding of Plato's poetics. He rejects attempts to nullify the significance of Book X's rejection of the poets from the ideal commonwealth. Partee disputes those scholars who would explain away the rejection on the grounds that Plato is only considering an ideal commonwealth, not an actual society. He argues that Plato may have believed that the ideal state could have been achieved. Plato's attack on poetry is primarily from an ethical standpoint. If poetry were undesirable in an ideal society, it would be undesirable in an actual state. Partee also contends with those who believe that Plato bans only the bad poets. But he maintains that Plato excludes poetry because it is all imitation and not reality; to "examine an imitation when reality can be grasped is at best irrelevant and at worst damaging to the soul" (p. 20).

Partee thinks that much of the confusion about Plato's theory of poetry centers about his "ironic and often ambiguous" statements on poetic inspiration (p. 24). Some critics sense a Platonic distrust of poetic inspiration as a kind of madness, while other critics see the production of beauty as forging a link between the poet and the philosopher. Partee faults Plato for not establishing any link with poetic creation, and distinguishes two types of inspiration. In *Ion* and other dialogues, the poet's outpourings reveal him to be a conduit of the gods, merely passive in the grip of a divine afflatus. This passive inspiration Partee contrasts with the impassioned account of poetic madness in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. The passive inspiration of the *Ion* moves "downward" to humanity in its concern with "education and ethics," but the poetic madness of the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* moves the poet "silently and separately towards the divine" (p. 27).

Partee suggests that when some poets feel "a true and philosophical enthusiasm," they are more philosophical than the philosophers (p. 43). Partee also develops at some length the nature and criteria of the education in poetry and music found in Books II and X of the *Republic*. Poetry is like all education in that it must be judged by how well it serves the needs of the state. Its effects on the acquisition and retention of virtue in the soul must be considered. Partee stresses Plato's view that "Poetry must be true before we dare allow it to be beautiful" (p. 73).

Partee believes that prior to Book X of the *Republic*, Plato rejected all mimetic poetry and in Book X he regards all poetry as mimetic. Partee argues that even those brief didactic verses earlier found admissible are no longer welcome because they too are mimetic. The prototype of *mimesis* of this sort is analogous to holding up a mirror in order to copy all things within the visible

world. In acknowledging that there could be a "good" *mimesis* of the forms, Partee emphasizes that Plato never mentioned such a *mimesis*. Partee points out the similarity between the painter and the holder of the mirror. Because he is ignorant of the form of the bed, the painter copies the individual, physical bed as it appears to him. The carpenter who built the bed is second removed from the truth, the painter and poet are third removed. For both painter and poet the meaning of the painting or poetry can exist only on the surface. They have no knowledge or genuine art and their product has no utility. Because there is no art, poetry tends to deceive the rational element of human beings. Its beauty arouses the emotions and overcomes the balance within the soul. For Plato, the dubious pleasure that comes from mimetic poetry must give way to the need for truth and justice.

Partee completes his study by attempting to show that poetry "embodies all the dangers of any verbal discourse," since language is an imitation of what is real (p. 141). Although words can suggest the truth, the mind may become so involved with words as to ignore the reality behind them. Because knowledge precedes language, it is necessary to look through language to grasp the reality it imitates. Poetry, apparently, is twice cursed. Not only is its content an imitation of reality, but the very words it uses further deter us from grasping reality. Partee contends that poetry's value is even more depreciated by Plato's favoring oral over written discourse. The written poetry that was popular in Athens in Plato's time was frozen in a mold, and handed down as a repository of social consciousness. The language of this written poetry would "have the property of fixing the *Logos*, of establishing the idea" instead of allowing the fluidity of living thought (p. 177). Plato believes it is impossible to write about the highest matters. They can only be spoken of in philosophical discourse, but even then human language is "an inferior teacher to the true and wordless poetry of knowledge" (p. 199).

There really is no new ground broken in Partee's study of Plato's poetics: One wishes he had been more venturesome in his analyses. On the whole the substance of his argument is fairly sound in its main lines of interpretation, but there are some significant weaknesses. His treatment of *mimesis* could have benefited from a more precise analysis of the term to bring out its connotation of representation rather than mere copying of an original. This would allow consideration of the possibility that there could be a non-imitative *mimesis* that was not of the forms.

Another area of weakness is his account of the poet's relation to the philosopher in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. Only in a metaphorical sense can Plato's philosopher be a poet. Neither dialogue supports Partee's claim that the "poet is infused with a love of wisdom" or that he is "only slightly inferior to the philosopher in his access to absolute knowledge" (p. 27).

Partee overdoes the opposition between reason and emotion in Plato's thought. Although in the *Phaedo* there may be some basis for this opposition, in the *Republic* and later dialogues Plato emphasizes not the repression of the emotional side of man, but its full and appropriate satisfaction under the guidance of reason. The emotions in this way are in harmony with the rational part of the soul.

Partee has a florid and allusive style that obscures his argumentation.

Consider this typical passage where, speaking of Plato's view of poetry, Partee observes:

Plato himself seems to make several attempts to defend her honor; his doctrines of inspiration, love, and beauty testify to this Siren's charm. But these lustrous philosophic gems only emphasize the dialogue's view of art as a dark temptation. The brazen voice of poetry speaks with unwarranted authority, seducing the entire soul by an appeal to the emotions. The larger subject of poetry is man, a particular artisan in action. (p. 197)

Because much of Partee's book appeared earlier in articles published at various times, there is no overall unity and coherence in the work as a whole. The bibliography has surprising omissions of recent scholarship, which may possibly be attributed to the different publication dates for these largely unrevised various pieces that have been arranged into book form. There are a number of times when unnecessary detail, repetition, or a diffuseness of argument seem directly attributable to Partee's lack of revision of his original articles. His lengthy chapter entitled "Language and the Imitation of Reality" is interesting as a study of the *Cratylus* but does not significantly advance the argument of his book as a whole.

Although flawed, Partee's study does range widely over important topics in Plato's aesthetics. While largely traditional, this book has the merit of placing the consideration of Plato's poets within the context of his philosophy as a whole, and especially within the context of his moral and political thought.

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G. CHRYSASFIS. *A Textual and Stylistic Commentary on Theocritus' Idyll XXV*. Amsterdam, J. C. Gieben, 1981. Pp. 289. Distributed in the USA by Humanities Press Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716. \$51.50.

This attractively produced book (a revised Southampton dissertation) consists of an introduction, text, commentary, bibliography, index verborum, and index rerum.

The introduction is very brief (3 pp.). We are given a sketch of the poem and its style. It is disappointing to learn that Chryssafis intends to ignore the problem of the poet's identity. It is not a matter of expecting him to prove or disprove Theocritean authorship;¹ rather one hoped to encounter in just such a work as this an encompassing examination of the internal evidence. Lexical and metrical features foreign to the other *Idylls* are often noted in the commentary,

¹See now A. Kurz, *Le Corpus Theocriteum et Homère, un problème d'authenticité* (*Idylle* 25) (Bern 1982).

but they are not even listed in the index rerum. The author is primarily interested in the constitution of the text, and here (p. 12) he announces the theory he intends to follow. Previous editors have, in general, preferred the readings of ms. D over those of W Tr (La.) and M. For Chryssafis the opposite is true: "in many cases it is argued that the writer of D regularizes or epicizes the text (cleverly and consistently in most of his interventions)." Conversely, "where the text (sc. of WTrM) seems at first sight to be altered by copyists' mechanical errors, a more careful examination shows that these mss. do not exhibit such a differentiation in any other poem of the bucolic corpus. It seems more likely, therefore, that D trivializes the text than that the other mss. give constantly erroneous readings exclusively in this *Idyll*."²

Two comments are in order: (1) in XXII, the only other *Idyll* with a similarly constituted text, D differs regularly from WTrM; (2) it is misleading to speak of "the other mss." Where WTrM or any two of them agree against D, they too count as a single witness. Since variant readings are discussed in the commentary, Chryssafis prints his text³ without an apparatus. This sounds reasonable, but in practice it makes work with the commentary very clumsy. The reader will naturally avail himself of Gow's text.

This is a large commentary. It gives ample testimony to Chryssafis' work with concordances, indices, and lexica. We are told something about a great many single words: often their metrical position in Homer, also their distribution in the epics, and their use by later poets (some clearly a good deal later than the author of this poem). This kind of information is either given for its own sake or within arguments defending the text adopted by the author. The relevance of at least some of this seems questionable.

As I have indicated above, the purpose of the commentary is to demonstrate the methods of textual criticism associated with Birbeck College, London. According to this view, A. S. F. Gow and others were repeatedly "puzzled" by the text of WTrM and have adopted the text of D⁴ because they failed to take into account the sophistication of Hellenistic poets and their oblique manner of allusion. There must be particular instances where such considerations can help to choose the right variant, but the mechanical application of these ideas at almost every turn as practiced by Chryssafis and some others of his school brings the ideas themselves in disrepute.

Since Chryssafis' text differs from Gow's in 63 verses (by my count), the following discussion is necessarily limited to a few examples.

A particularly unfortunate but in many ways typical case is v. 62, ὧς εἰπὼν ἤγεῖτο, νόψ δέ τοι πολλ' ἔμενοινα WTrM, νόψ δ' ὄγε D (Gow). Chrys-

²This argument is repeated in the commentary on v. 252.

³Here I noticed the following misprints: 38 εἴποιμι, read εἴποιμι; 115 verse-number missing; 136 ἦσαν (printed ἦσαν on p. 287 and assigned to v. 135); 180, 210, 215, lack of punctuation at end of verse; 182 Νενέης, read Νεμέης. The book as a whole contains a number of misprints. A particularly glaring example is found on p. 166, where four lines of commentary are disfigured on the left-hand margin.

⁴There are a number of places where Chryssafis himself grudgingly accepts the reading of D, e.g., 58, 65, 160, 179, 180, 182, 183, 197, 201, 254, 268, 273.

safis blithely discusses the rareness of δέ τοι (*Il.* 9.654, 12.412) and Homer's exclusive use of μενοίνα (D). He argues that both readings have been regularized by D. He concludes: "Most editors print δ' ὄγε πολλά μενοίνα. . . . The version of WTrM must be retained; . . . examples of 'imitatio cum variatione' of epic rarities." Of course δέ τοι is metrically impossible. This is not the only place where Chryssafis slips on the meter. At v. 38 the text of WTr ἐπεὶ σε (not adopted by Chryssafis) is said to avoid "the hiatus of the conventional text (ἐπεὶ οὐ)." This is epic correction, and the text printed by Chryssafis here, εἵπομι instead of εἵπομι', is unmetrical. At 80, εἴ οἱ, he again invokes hiatus. On v. 20, κείνη ὄθι πλατάνιστοι, he writes: "the lengthening in the second arsis is common in this poem; cf. *Il.* 2, 69, 73." True, but irrelevant here. At 15, he prints Πηνειοῦ ἄμ μέγα τίφος WTrM (Μηνίου D). "Πηνειοῦ scans either with the correction of the two successive diphthongs or with synzezeis." For the former he refers to γυῖαι καί (v. 30) and χροῖήν (v. 130), readings adopted independently by himself. For the latter we are referred to *Il.* 13.777, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμέ and Pind. O.9.18, Ἄλφειοῦ τε ῥέεθρον, v.l. Ἀλφειοῦ. None of these cases are apposite. He should have cited *Il.* 11.380, βέβληαι, οὐδ'. On 160 v.l. D Αὐγείω φίλος, Chryssafis remarks: "metrically possible (for the correction of the diphthong in the middle of the word see l. 130 n.); it is probably intended to remove the doric gen. from this line." Normal -εω synzezeis and Αὐγείω, if correct, is merely another way of writing Αὐγείω (cf. Αἰνείω v.l. *Il.* 5.534 and εὐμμελίω), not a Doric genitive, though it might have been falsely formed as one by the source of WTrM.

One often notes the tendency (already indicated) to cite evidence which upon examination proves to be unsatisfactory. At v. 27 μιν (WM) is adopted over Gow's μῆν (TrD). Here Chryssafis claims μιν is dative, which indicates that the poet "sides with those critics who maintained that Homer used μιν 'pro οἱ' (cf. Ebeling s.v. μιν, p. 1108, end of heading). . . . there is no doubt that μιν is intended to be dative." This is far from being the case, especially since such a form would be both metrically and semantically superfluous, as well as confusing. The instances cited in Ebeling (*Il.* 6.159, 21.409) do not, in my opinion, bear this out, and they were probably not intended to do so. Chryssafis notes that his source for Zenodotus, Düntzer (*de Zenod. Stud. Homer.* p. 73 on *Il.* 10.127), does "not appear to understand that Zen. intended μιν to be dative." The cases cited from Q. Smyrnaeus (1.341, 6.250, 7.449) are, I believe, also falsely appraised; cf. G. Popella, *Index in Q. S.* (Hildesheim 1981). Similarly at v. 276 Chryssafis finds another case of datival μιν (WTr) preferable to Gow's μοι (DM). Heracles is narrating. According to Chryssafis, "he switches from the first to the third person when talking about himself. . . ." Despite good references to literature on this phenomenon, this interpretation is completely unconvincing here. At 159 he takes μιν ἄρα (WTrM, here acc.) over μὲν (D), "... a rare Homeric construction . . . 'per prolepsim,' cf. N315f." But he adduces no Homeric examples of μιν ἄρα. The only parallel he could have found is a case of μὲν ῥα at *Od.* 7.71. Here Chryssafis missed a great opportunity for discovering "imitatio cum variatione" of an epic rarity.

At v. 200, Gow prints D's Φορωνήσσειν *Argives* (from Phoroneus). Chryssafis sees in this one of D's "clever corrections." He argues: "φέρω νήσσειν (WTr), can be read as Φερωνήσσειν, which represents an equivalent spelling

... given the existence of the alternative forms Φερωνία—Φορωνία (see Pape-Benseler s.v.).” Pape-Benseler tell us only that Φερωνία was a more recent name for the ancient Italian goddess Φορωνία. On v. 267, Chryssafis defends ὑποδρύψη (WTrM) against ἀποδρύψη (D): “for the meaning cf. ὑποδέρω: ‘strip down’ ... e.g. Galen 2.700.2 (LSJ⁹ s.v.).” In fact LSJ translate: “strip off the flesh a little, or below”; Chryssafis needs κατα-. On 275 we read: “It follows that, since iron and stone are specifically mentioned in this passage (σιδήρῳ, λίθοις), the third substance mentioned in the passage, i.e. ὕλη, must denote bronze, χαλκός. Now, a rarer meaning of the word ὕλη, is ‘metal.’” A look at LSJ reveals that in the Plutarch passage, at any rate, ὕλη, while applied to metal, means *material*. “Note that this is a typically Hellenistic lexical trap. . . .” At v. 270, he “tentatively” proposes that we regard βραχίονα “as the lion’s neck.” The basis for this is that “βραχίονα is glossed by Hsch. as τὸν τράχηλον and it can be understood as neck or shoulders rather than ‘arms.’” He neglects to mention that this lemma was emended by Schmidt and obelized by Latte. Perhaps he thought they were merely “puzzled.”

Finally, two more examples illustrating sensitivity to context. At v. 6 the mss. are united εἰ κεν ὁδοῦ ζαχρεῖον ἀνήνηταί τις ὁδίτην. Gow translates: “(Beyond other gods he is wroth, men say,) if one refuse a traveller that craves direction.” On the basis of a “forthcoming” article⁵ by one of Chryssafis’ mentors, we are offered a new interpretation, one which “removes the difficulties which puzzled successive commentators. . . . Since ἀχρεῖον means ‘ἄσθενώς,’ in Homer . . . ζαχρεῖον has the opposite meaning, i.e. synonymous with . . . στερέως. . . .” Reference is made to *Il.* 9.510 ὃς δέ κ’ ἀνήνηται καὶ τε στερέως ἀποείη, translated: “but when a man has *spurned* them and *rudely* said no to them.” Premises,⁶ translations, and conclusion are very hard to accept, especially since, if this interpretation were true, then according to Chryssafis ὁδοῦ must be “a gen. of place . . . meaning ‘whilst he is on his way’ as in Aristoph. *Pax.* 1155 and Opp. *H.* 2.445.” Thus, it seems we are to translate: “if one rudely spurns a wayfarer whilst he is on his way.” This is redundant (cf. the readings adopted by Chryssafis at 252 ἄλμενος ἄλτο and 264 ἔφθασα προφθάς and at 63, see below) and pointless, since the rustic’s entire monologue is most naturally understood as the answer to Heracles’ request for directions (cf. Gow ad loc.). Next v. 63: Gow translates 62–64 as follows: “So saying he led the way, yet much he wondered in his heart, as he eyed the lion skin and ponderous club, whence the stranger came.” Gow and most editors print the reading of D: δέρμα τε θηρὸς ὀρῶν χειροπληθῆ τε κορύνην; Chryssafis sticks with WTrM δέρμα δὲ χειρὸς ἐλών. He again refers to the article mentioned above: “The sense is that the old man ‘seized the skin by its paw as he wanted to touch the two implements carried by Heracles, i.e. the skin and the club.’” One wonders whether Chryssafis translates ἐλών as prior or concomitant? But, this aside, what is the motivation? The rustic was not blind. From what follows it is clear that he was so intimidated that he did not dare even to ask Heracles’ name. Can we imagine him risking annoying the hero in this way?

⁵AC 48 (1979) 612.

⁶See vv. 44 χρεῖω, 50 ἐπιδευέα, 53 χρέος, and cf. J. S. Clay, *AJP* 105 (1984) 73–76.

On the brighter side, Chryssafis' unswerving devotion to WTrM sometimes leads him to side with them at places where they may be right, especially where he rejects conjectures adopted by Gow and retains the reading of the mss., for example: 19 πᾶσα, 31 ἀκρωρεί(ης), 36 ἡέ τοι, 64 μέμονε, 103 κωλοπέδιλ', 123 αἰεί, 236 ὥς. The text of WTrM appears preferable at 48 ἐπ' ἀγρωτῶν γεραρώτατος and 135 προτεράων; in other places it deserves a hearing: 65 ὄκνος, 104 ὑπὸ + dat., 122 καταφθίνουσι. There are good observations on *Wortmalerei* at 92-93, 109, 229.

The bibliography is, for the most part, restricted to items cited in the commentary. For other works we are referred to Gow (*Theocritus* II 563 ff.) and Serrao (*Il Carme XXV del Corpus Teocriteo* [Rome 1962] 5 ff.).

The index verborum is potentially useful. The same is true of the index rerum, though here caution is advised. I am "puzzled" because it contains "oppositio in imitando" and "Selbstvariation" but neither "imitatio cum variatione" nor "usus auctoris."

In sum, despite his evident industry and enthusiasm, Chryssafis has succeeded mainly in supplying future editors with a sometimes entertaining but usually futile *advocatus diaboli*. Nor can one accept his brave claim (p. 9) to sole responsibility.⁷

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⁷See now *LCM* 10.2 (1985) 23-24.

CHARLES WILLIAM FORNARA. *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 218. \$22.00.

This book is a volume in the series *Eidos, Studies in Classical Kinds*, edited by Thomas Rosenmeyer. The task set before authors in this series (as stated on the dust cover) is formidable: "To test the power and productiveness of the major Greek and Roman genre concepts against the ancient and modern evidence." Each author has to interpret these instructions in his own way. Fornara's chapter headings give an indication of his intentions: I. History and related genres. II. Research, orientation, and explanation in the Greek and Latin historians. III. The theoretical foundations of Greco-Roman historiography and their application. IV. The speech in Greek and Roman historiography. V. Points of contact between historiography and other genres and modes of thought. VI. Modern historiography—An epilogue.

While the author is anxious to identify and define the genre of history and to describe how different writers understood what it demanded of them, there remains nevertheless a certain confusion between history as a study and history as a branch of literature. "Inquiry" was the original meaning of ἱστορία, a

branch of Ionian "inquiry" that studied man rather than *physis*, with surely no pretensions at first to be considered as any kind of literature or *poiesis* (there was no other word for literature, and until the fifth century it had been taken for granted that a "maker" of literature wrote in verse). But by Aristotle's time, the word has come to mean what the inquirer produces in the form of historical narrative. When *Historiai* is used as a book title, as in *Rhetoric* 1.1360a, it is of no consequence whether one translates it as "inquiries" (cf. Fornara p. 98) or "accounts" (cf. LSJ), except that English grammar demands the latter when the word is used with an objective genitive, as in the *Διαδόχων ἱστορίαι* attributed to Hieronymus of Cardia (Diod. 18.12.1). And when the Romans take *historia* into their vocabulary, it has lost the sense of "inquiry" altogether.

Fornara spends as much time discussing the historians' inquiries, their opportunities for research, their need to travel, and their various qualifications (everything that Polybius thinks so important) as in discussing their finished work. In a book that was presented as a discussion of the study of history in antiquity this would be admirable. But the emphasis should perhaps be different in a book about the literary genre.

The related genres which are the subject of the first chapter are those which the early Greek prose writers are supposed to exemplify. Fornara does not call them logographers, since the term is now out of fashion. He tells us something of their work in mythography, how they rearranged myths and reorganized heroic genealogies, how they wrote about strange customs and countries (ethnography), how they presented chronicles of individual cities (horography) and tried to establish systems of chronology. He thinks of this as work related to history rather than as part of the work that the Greeks called history. The only writers that he will recognize as historians are those that wrote *Hellenica* and particularly those that wrote about recent history, collecting their information by travel and inquiry (although Thucydides says no one except Hellanicus had given any account of the Pentecontaetia).

Fornara tries to present some account of the early writers whose names are known, but both here and elsewhere, in writing about lost historical work, he seems to take too little account of the warning that Jacoby issues more than once to readers of *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*—that not everything that is known about these lost works is to be found in the pages of *FGrHist*, that there is more to be learned from the surviving works of those authors who had read and used and exploited the books that we cannot read. The way to learn something about mythographers and ethnographers and about the popular historians of the fourth and third centuries is to read Plutarch and Diodorus and Strabo, Quintus Curtius and Justin's *Epitome* of Trogus, Apollodorus' *Bibliotheca*, the paradoxographers, and the Hellenistic poets, especially Lycophron and Apollonius.

There is some good discussion of familiar themes throughout the book. For example, the Homeric qualities of Herodotus are convincingly set forth (some readers today are unwilling to recognize them). Fornara also points out that the definition of history that became conventional among Greeks and Romans, "recording the deeds of famous men," echoes the Homeric theme of epic poetry, "the glories of men." But when he goes on to say that by these deeds it is preeminently exploits in war that are meant and that civil war was considered a

subject unfit for history (p. 63), he seems to forget that one of the recurring themes in ancient historiography is the struggle between tyranny and free government. Tacitus in the opening sentence of the *Agricola* laments the difficulty of writing history under an oppressive government, unless a writer stooped to flattery and chose his subject matter very tactfully. I was surprised to find no mention of this sentence in the list of important passages at the end of the book.

Greek writers thought that history should reveal "the truth." Even the speeches were supposed to be "true," though readers must have known very well that they were often pure fiction. If we are to pass judgment, we must read the speeches instead of listening to what Greek critics say about them. The discussion of speeches in Chapter IV would be more convincing if Fornara had paid some attention to the speeches reported in Diodorus 13.20-32 and 14.65-69, and considered them as speeches written by Diodorus' Hellenistic source. But he is content to quote Diodorus' remarks in the proem to Book XX (the belief that Diodorus was following Duris here seems very strange to me).

Ancient critics regarded oratory rather than history as the master genre of prose, and they applied the standards of oratory to historiography. An orator's narrative was intended to prove a point, to justify himself or show how badly his opponent had behaved. The ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν passage in *On the Crown* is an admirable historical account of what happened that evening, but when Demosthenes comes to the next morning, the purpose of his narrative is clear: to show how he, and no one else, was ready to take the steps that the situation demanded. In a litigant's speech, praise and blame played an important part, and critics assumed that they should be equally important in historiography. The discussion in Chapter V of the relation between history and other genres takes too little account of oratory.

The book contains no Greek quotations, and some of the English translations that are offered are open to criticism. Some snatches of "Roman Greek" are offered, but it seems unnecessary to confuse the reader by throwing Greek notions at him in oblique cases, as in this translation of Thucydides 1.22.1: "I have given the speeches in the manner in which it seemed to me that each of the speakers would best express what needed to be said about the ever-prevailing situation, but I have kept as close as possible to the total opinion expressed by the actual words (*tes xympases gnomes ton alethos lechithenton*)." Fornara (p. 144) seems to find his own translation rather puzzling. Crawley's version is more correct and easier to understand.

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KEITH HOPKINS. *Death and Renewal. Sociological Studies in Roman History*, volume 2. New York, Cambridge, London, Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. xxiii + 276. \$39.50.

After the actors in the drama of imperialism, *Conquerors and Slaves*, two great abstractions. "This book is about death and social renewal. It is about the social institutions which regulated the transfer of power and property in the

Roman political elite" (p. ix). The second part of this description is a loose fit for the first chapter, but gives an accurate account of the preoccupation which informs the rest of the book. Like its predecessor, it is a collection of essays. The first and fourth essays concentrate on "empathetic reconstruction" of "how some Romans perceived and coped with death." The central two, the solid core of the book, rest on statistical data, but also incorporate wide-ranging discussion of *mentalité*.

The first essay, "Murderous Games," is largely descriptive, though its section titles—"Gladiatorial shows: Origins and developments," "Gladiatorial shows as political theatre," and "Gladiators as heroes"—reflect its preoccupation with the political purposes of the givers of games and with the reactions of the audience. The theme of death runs through it. The empire was paid for by the blood of Romans and enemies: ill-disciplined Roman units might face decimation, captured enemy soldiers might be publicly executed. The great amphitheaters were "artificial battlefields" (p. 2), the games could be addictive. Hopkins makes the traditional point that gladiatorial shows originate in funeral games given for aristocrats. Extravagance grew: in 264 B.C. three pairs of gladiators were enough for games given by the consular D. Iunius Brutus Pera and his brother in honor of their father; in 65, Caesar's games for his father displayed 320 pairs. (But it might be noted that Caesar's example was unprecedented and inflationary.) Private funerary games die out and the emperor and magistrates take over. Gladiatorial shows in Rome were rarer than is often imagined—perhaps only two regular shows per year after 22 B.C. (p. 6). But this does not mean they were insignificant; they "suffused Roman life" (p. 7). The cost was considerable. Wild beasts were imported at vast expense and then slaughtered; criminals condemned to death had to be scrounged from provincial governors; the death rate for gladiators might be high. After brief remarks on the importance of the arena and theater as the places where the electorate could express their opinions of republican politicians, Hopkins describes the interaction between crowd and emperor in the theater, amphitheater, and circus. Finally, he reviews the aberrant behavior of emperors and senators or *equites* who descended into the arena and fought "occasionally but repeatedly" and links this with the hero worship of gladiators and their status as sex symbols, which was in sharp contrast with their low juridical status as slaves, condemned criminals, or *auctorati*. (It would be interesting to know if the free men who contracted to fight as gladiators were more likely to attract fans.) Hopkins concludes that Rome was a cruel society, where violence, within certain limits, was endemic. "Gladiatorial shows and the accompanying executions provided opportunities for the reaffirmation of the moral order through the sacrifice of criminal victims, of slave gladiators, of Christian outcasts and wild animals. The enthusiastic participation by spectators, rich and poor, raised and then released collective tensions, in a society which traditionally idealised impassivity (*gravitas*)" (p. 29).

In this chapter, Hopkins is working a traditional vein in a traditional way. This chapter and chapter 4 are "heavily dependent on direct citation of classical sources, and present in effect a collage of quotation and interpretation, in the hope of arousing the reader's empathetic imagination. Another objective is to place Roman feelings and perceptions in a social and political context" (p. xiv). As an introduction to the subject and the sketch of answers to some

central moral problems in Roman history, it succeeds very well. But as a piece of collage, it does not stand comparison with the fuller canvas and subtler chiar-oscuro produced by J. P. V. D. Balsdon in *Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome* (not cited here). Hopkins is less skeptical in his use of sources which are likely to be slanted or imaginative. Thus, Tacitus' version of Cassius' speech on the slaves of Pedanius Secundus is (as often) assumed to give a factual statement that 400 were under threat of execution (p. 28). Every rhetorical trick in Seneca's anecdote (*de ira* 3.40) of how Augustus was powerful enough to coerce the angry Vedius Pollio is taken as literal truth. Seneca pretends that Pollio had a pond full of lampreys, not for gourmet taste but for cruelty ("Quis non hoc illum putaret luxuriae causa facere? saevitia erat."). When he ordered the unfortunate slave boy to be thrown to the lampreys, Augustus is imagined as saying, "e convivio rapi homines imperas et novi generis poenis lancinari?" The frightened boy is supposed to have appealed to Augustus in the hope of ending his life is some way other than as bait. Hopkins' version, presumably picking up these remarks, makes Pollio into a villain out of Ian Fleming: he "had a fish-pond stocked with huge lampreys which he fattened on the flesh of slaves who offended him in any way" (p. 28). An old-fashioned credence seems to be given to Festus' note on the *caelibaris hasta*: "It was customary for a new bride to have her hair parted with a spear, at best one which had been dipped 'in the body of a defeated and killed gladiator'" (p. 22). The reader is likely to assume that this ritual was observed by nearly all brides. He may also be seriously misled by p. 5, where, between a statement that the Romans associated the games with sacrifice but did not eat the victims of the games, and a footnote mentioning ritual slaughter and eating of prisoners by the Aztecs, we are told that the audience was attracted by "the splendour of the show and by the distribution of meat." Livy 41.28.11 mentions that T. Flamininus' games were notable because accompanied by stage plays, an (animal) sacrifice followed by a communal meat-dinner (*visceratio*, cf. Cicero *Off.* 2.55) and a feast. Similar caution needs to be observed about the interpretation of Dio 66.25, where it is not clear that 9,000 animals were slaughtered in a single day at the inauguration of the Colosseum: this figure is surely a grand total over the 100 days, comparable with the 11,000 cited for Trajan over 123 days (p. 9). The truth is horrific enough and needs no exaggeration. The physical remains of the amphitheaters, the graffiti and epitaphs which suggest the chances of survival, and the policies of emperors give a grim picture. Anecdotes and rhetorical tirades by moralists must be treated with caution. A model for the analysis of what Colin Wells in his recent book (*The Roman Empire*, p. 278) called institutionalized terror is provided by Alan Watson's article, "Roman Slave Law and Romanist Ideology" (*Phoenix* 37 [1983] 53-65), an exploration of the most objective available sources, which (though he does not entirely convince me on some points) is far more persuasive than the old style (exemplified neatly by Paul Allard, *Les esclaves chrétiens*), which threw every available moralizing anecdote into the balance.

The central chapters are the result of an ambitious research project in which Graham Burton collaborated. In "Political Succession in the Late Republic (249-50 B.C.)," Hopkins and Burton argue against the modern conclusion "that Rome in the Republic was ruled by a stable, hereditary nobility stretching back for many generations into antiquity" (p. 32). Their method is to

estimate what proportion of members of the Senate were (a) sons of senators, (b) descendants of men who had been senators in a previous generation, and (c) new men, that is, men without senatorial antecedents. Their research focuses on the 364 men elected consul between 249 and 50 B.C. (including 12 suffects) (pp. 45–46). They compiled information on three generations in the male line before and after each of these men, using standard prosopographical works, chiefly *RE*. The only complete list of praetors, which lacks information on their families, comes from Livy, who covers 218 to 166 B.C. For the rest of the period studied, less than a fifth of the praetors who never became consuls (18 men) are known from the period 165–141 B.C., less than a third (68 men) are known from 139–80 B.C., and about two-thirds (117+) from 79–50 B.C. (n. 23). Before 81 B.C., the Senate had about 300 members. Supposing that members usually entered at 30, about 12 entrants per year were needed. About one-sixth of the entrants would have died before becoming eligible for the praetorship at 39, so about 10 candidates of the original cohort would be eligible to compete for six posts. After Sulla, there were 20 quaestorian entrants per year, of whom about 17 survived to compete for eight praetorships. (This schema is a rough one, for not everyone would compete *anno suo* or at all.)

The kernel of the results is summed up in a series of tables with accompanying analysis (pp. 55–69). Only the most important conclusions can be summarized here. In the last two centuries of the Republic, only two-fifths of consuls had a consular father, and only one-third of consuls had a consular son. These patterns are relatively constant. Only 4 percent of consuls came from families which produced a consul in each of six successive generations: the Metelli and Claudii Pulchri are exceptional. A quarter of the consuls are the sole representatives of their families over six generations, a fifth have a father but no other ascendant or descendant in the same office. So 47 percent of consular families flourished briefly within the time studied. (Caesar or Scaurus are examples, cited elsewhere.) Of 364 consuls, 116 had no immediate consular ancestor, though 18 of these are known to have had praetorian fathers (p. 56). On the other hand, more than half the consuls did have a consular father or grandfather: they were more likely to win than were the sons of praetors. A sample shows 38 percent of consuls producing consular sons, 32 percent sons who got as far as the praetorship, praetors having a 22 percent chance of a son finishing as consul, 24 percent as praetor (p. 60). These figures show that people whose immediate ascendants had not held the top offices had a good chance of rising. The authors then calculate how well consuls and praetors replaced themselves politically with their sons. The “inner core” of consuls whose father and grandfather were also consuls had a higher chance of being succeeded by consular descendants (an 83 percent chance 249–195 B.C. and a 52 percent chance 139–80 B.C.). From 249 to 140 B.C., 35 consuls from the core had 34 consular sons (p. 63). Other consuls and praetors show a much weaker succession rate. But supposing that they were biologically similar to the inner core, they must have had sons who survived to 40 but did not hold high office. The authors then speculate, with elegant diagrams to illustrate what happens when the succession rate is below par, on the degree to which their data suggest continual upward and downward mobility within the Senate over generations, so that a steady influx of sons of non-senators is necessary to replace the sons of senators who do

not succeed their fathers in the same or a higher rank. Their views must then be tested against demographic considerations. To do this, they assume an expectation of life at birth of about 30 for the aristocracy (similar to that found for British ducal families in the seventeenth century) and tabulate the effects of life expectancy of 25, 30, and 35. If life expectancy was 25, then 472 boys per 1,000 born would reach 20, and 318 would reach 40. To reproduce itself biologically, the elite needed on average 5 or 6 children born, but this would imply that about one-third of all families (it would be better to say fathers in this context) had no son surviving to 40, one-third had one such son, and slightly less than one-third had two or more. The authors show that a high rate of fertility—similar to that which L. Henry demonstrated for the bourgeois of Geneva born c. 1700—5.7 children born, on average, would be needed to support the political success of the core elite. But even the core elite did not usually have two sons who followed father's political success: only 25 percent had more than one consular or known praetorian son, although some may have had other sons among the *pedarii*. This high fertility was not sustained by the aristocracy after c. 140 B.C. The authors support this view by consideration of the literary evidence and by figures showing a decline in the social replacement of consuls and praetors by their sons (Table 2.7). The figures are not discussed in detail; the rest of the argument depends on problematic discussion of four factors that are thought to have become important in the late Republic: increased competition for status, "individuation," secularization, and the higher status of women. Much of this discussion follows a familiar though judicious path. It does not add up to proof that, for social reasons, Romans were more likely to attempt to limit their fertility after c. 140 than before. At least one argument for the practice of contraception or early abortion is made no better by having had a long run since antiquity: that women increasingly wanted to keep their figures. Considering the inefficiency of most contraceptive methods known to the upper class (I take the *bon mot* attributed to Julia by Macrobius as good evidence of what was familiar) and the risks of abortion, it is more convincing to argue that *expositio* (on which see now J. E. Boswell, "*Expositio* and *Oblatio*, the Abandonment of Children and the Ancient and Medieval Family," *AHR* 89 [1984] 10–33) would be the preferred mode of removing the necessity to bring up upper-class children in the station to which they were born. More consideration might be given to the length of time during which an upper-class man was unmarried in the late Republic and to what he was doing during a marriage. Had imperialism changed the life pattern since c. 140? Were men marrying late, spending more time abroad, and leaving longer intervals between marriages?

"Ambition and Withdrawal: The Senatorial Aristocracy under the Emperors" continues the theme. The authors begin with the traditional perception of the erosion of the aristocracy by the emperors and the replacement of Roman and Italian families among the senatorial elite by successive waves of provincials. Despite the growth in suffect consulships (which meant that about half of senators who survived to consular age became consul), succession rates dropped. Three-quarters of all consuls A.D. 18–235 are not known to have had a single consular descendant in the next three generations. From 30 B.C. to A.D. 235, more than 1,800 held the consulship; about 1,400 names are known. But their family connections are harder to unravel than in the Republic. Excluding

emperors, their expected heirs and men who held the office a second or subsequent time, the authors work with 1,201 dated consuls. They selected four periods—A.D. 18–54, 70–96, 131–160, and 193–235—and within each period took a sample, a method which they show to be sufficiently rigorous.

Over the whole period, A.D. 18–235, one quarter of all consuls had a consular father or son, only one-third any consular ancestor in the previous three generations or consular descendant in the next three. Moreover, 65 percent are not known to have had any senatorial descendant in the next three generations. Succession is higher for *ordinarii*: 30 percent of *ordinarii* A.D. 18–36 had a son who reached the same rank. The other figures are 24 percent 70–96, 42 percent 131–160, and 24 percent 193–235. *Suffecti* are in striking contrast: more than three-fifths have no traceable ascendant or descendant in the three generations before or after. Seneca, Tacitus, and Pliny are familiar examples. The authors follow with useful discussion of traditional topics, ambition and career patterns, and the recruitment of provincials, and consider the literary evidence for the less documented theme of withdrawal from a senatorial career and for the existence of a practical distinction between the grand set (well-born senators making a splash in Roman society and wasting their fortunes) and the power set (*virī militares*, equestrian procurators, imperial freedmen: the men who did the work). In conclusion, the authors postulate that sons of consuls who did not achieve their fathers' positions were not hidden among the *pedarii* but rather opted out of a senatorial career, provincials being even more likely than Italians to be satisfied with one family success. Senatorial membership was not only expensive but potentially dangerous ("saevi proximis ingruunt") and increasingly failed to lead to real power. Declining fertility also increased the number of fathers with no son who reached consular age. The modern view that the Senate was a hereditary aristocracy must be abandoned.

The final chapter, "Death in Rome," written in collaboration with Melinda Letts, sketches social rituals and tries to understand feelings. On the former, it provides a useful guide to more detailed modern work and is memorable for its vivid description of the burial of the poor, particularly of the Equiline *puticuli* and of a possible plague pit reported by Lanciani but not usually disinterred in English books. Feelings of the survivors about the dead and attempts to commemorate oneself through monuments and foundations are represented by a judicious collection of literary and epigraphic evidence. There is also a short section on wills and legacy hunting, which complements the core chapters, since it highlights the tendency to leave legacies to non-kin and so to disperse family property. The whole chapter is stimulating and particularly useful for the unilingual undergraduate.

The book is clearly meant for scholars from other disciplines as well as for ancient historians, and it is to be hoped that it will get the wide readership that it deserves. (It was well received by my undergraduate classes.) Professor Hopkins' practice of collaboration in research and publication might well be emulated.

The statistical study which forms the core of the book must provoke reappraisal of central problems in both political and social history. The core elite, Syme's oligarchy of the late Republic, survives unscathed; Wiseman's new men stand up well. But a great deal of new thinking will need to be done about the

close interrelationship between the senatorial and equestrian orders, about mobility between them, and about mobility into the equestrian order from below and down from the upper class into lower social groups. Often the evidence will simply be lacking. Disaster in the courts might demote a senator, so that his enemies could say he had gone into the boat trade on the Bay of Naples (Caelius of Q. Pompeius in Cic. *Fam.* 8.1.4), but we are rarely told. Tacitus attests the debating-point that freedmen/women occurred in the family trees of senators and *equites* (*Ann.* 13.27); more can be done with recruitment into the equestrian and senatorial class via military service under the principate. *Maternum genus*, which becomes more evident and more important as the tidy republican nomenclature goes out of fashion, deserves study. There are problems in empathizing with those who dropped out of a senatorial career: apart from Ovid they are inarticulate, and we hear from the successful, men like Tacitus, who thought it was preposterous to aim at an equestrian career instead, men like Cicero, who think only the learned or the sick are excused from public service (*Off.* 1.71). The shame of failure, "*repulsa sordida*," is attested throughout Latin literature. Hopkins points the way to further research, noting, for instance, the poverty of scholarship on infanticide. (His own brief remarks, pp. 225 f., concentrate on one instance of the abandonment of an alleged bastard at her mother's door and on moralizing generalizations.) There is a fascinating range of reference to modern literature on other cultures and citation of some recondite ancient material, although on the whole the treatment of examples from ancient literature is sketchy and even sometimes uncritical. This is not the place to revert to the salutary controversy about how literary sources should be exploited. Rather, let us welcome not only Hopkins' brilliant contribution to demography but also his attempt to get into the skins of the Romans and to bring the dead to life.

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JOYCE REYNOLDS. *Aphrodisias and Rome: Documents from the Excavation of the Theatre at Aphrodisias conducted by Professor Kenan T. Erim, together with some related texts.* London, Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies Monograph No. 1, 1982. Pp. xviii + 214, 9 text-figures, 32 plates.

Aphrodisias in Caria has been notable for its inscriptions from the time of the first western visitor, William Sherard, in 1705. Since 1961 Kenan Erim has conducted yearly excavations under the auspices of the National Geographic Society and New York University. In 1966 he began excavation of the theater, and word quickly spread of an extraordinary find: one of the walls of the north parodos was covered by inscriptions relating to Aphrodisias' privileged status in the Roman organization of the province of Asia. These documents form the

core of Joyce Reynolds' eagerly awaited book, though she has added a number of other important ones on the same theme. To note only the unpublished material, there are two texts relating to Q. Oppius, the proconsul taken prisoner by Mithradates in 88; the restoration to Octavian of a letter long attributed to Antonius, as well as letters and a subscript of the same author; a much augmented text of the *senatus consultum de Aphrodisiensibus* of 39; a subscript of Trajan to Smyrna; letters to Aphrodisias from Hadrian, Commodus, Severus and Caracalla, Severus Alexander and Gordian III.

Technically Reynolds presents her exciting material with care and competence. The lemmata are full and clearly arranged; the measurements and descriptions look accurate; a particularly notable achievement is her study of Sherard's autograph copies in the British Library, which is not only interesting for the methods of an eighteenth century antiquarian but gives more accurate knowledge of stones now lost. The illustration is less satisfactory. The line drawings—for example, figure 2 showing inscription no. 4—are confusing. The photographs are sometimes excellent, sometimes scarcely legible (thus Plate XVIII, no. 3). There are unmentioned omissions, for instance the right-hand part of the first column of no. 2. The greatest defect is in the illustration of the main wall. The "hypothetical reconstruction" on pages 34–35 shows the placing of only a few fragments, and the photographs are too small in scale for the readings to be checked with any ease. As a result, the reader has to work out the disposition of the inscriptions on the wall for himself, and as will be seen below the results are not reassuring.

Reynolds acknowledges that much remains to be done with these texts, and to give some idea of the quality of the commentary, I discuss below one central question, that of the "two archives" which, as the first sentence announces, are the core of the book; I then comment briefly on two inscriptions.

The "two archives" are a series of documents carved principally on the parodos wall already mentioned, but also nearby: two face into the cavea, others were cut on different walls of the same parodos. It is immediately apparent, however, that these are not archives, but documents relating to a single theme which have been extracted from archives and inscribed, not without editorial interference, in one of the most visible buildings of the city: Aphrodisias' archives were elsewhere, in the *grammatophylakion* (Robert, *L'Antiquité Classique* 35 [1966] 393–94; on the distinction between archives and inscribed copies, J. and L. Robert, *Bull. épigr.* 1961.154 = *REG* 74 [1961] 140–41). A literary parallel is provided by the documents which Josephus sets out in *AJ* 14.186–267 to show "all the honors and alliances accorded by the Romans and their *imperatores* to our people."

A more fundamental question concerns Reynolds' postulate of two archives. The argument is complicated, and I indicate only the outlines here. Reynolds distinguishes the main archive, containing mostly rescripts of *imperatores* from Octavian on, from a minor one, which consists of three documents, a decree of Aphrodisias expressing support for Q. Oppius in 88, a letter of Oppius written to the city in 85 or 84, and a letter which she tentatively ascribes to Nicomedes IV of Bithynia (nos. 2–4). Several considerations tell against this division. (1) The three documents are in immediate proximity to the other ones, and in fact no. 4 forms the last column on the main wall. (2) The writing is

indistinguishable in style from that of the "main archive": Reynolds professes to see a difference, but the photographs do not bear her out (nor did a personal inspection which I made in June 1984). (3) The subject matter of two of the three documents, the loyalty of Aphrodisias to Rome, is identical to that of the other series. In brief, Reynolds' "two archives" are neither two nor archives, but a single dossier.

Pp. 16–20 no. 3. G. W. Bowersock (*Gnomon* 56 [1984] 51) has already pointed out that Reynolds' disposition of this text, which is carved in two columns, does not correspond to its layout on the stone and that a line is missing after her line 33. In addition, the stone clearly does not show φροντίζω in line 35 (Reynolds' 34) but ΦΡΟΝΤΙ, followed by what looks like a delta, and the trace which she reads as beta in line 36 (her 35) looks like a single vertical. For the top of this column I would suggest:

[?πᾶσαν ποιήσομαι]
φροντίδ[α καὶ ἐν ἁρ-]
χῇ καὶ ἰδιωτ[ῆς ὧν ὁ-]
περ ἄν, κτλ.

Pp. 113–15, no. 14. Trajan writes to the city of Smyrna, which has tried to compel a citizen of Aphrodisias to serve as high-priest in its temple of the imperial cult, "I wish no-one from the free cities to be forced into your service (λειτουργίαν)." The letter is dated by the proconsulate of Julius Balbus, for which Reynolds follows *PIR*², "either in 98 or, more probably, in 100": but *PIR*² failed to note a new reading of the crucial inscription which produces a date of 100/101 or 101/102 (W. Eck, *Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian* [1970] 156, n. 189; cf. now Eck, *Chiron* 12 [1982] 335, n. 214). As Reynolds observes, Trajan's ruling bears on the dispute over *inuiti* in Pliny *Ep.* 10.113, and the date at which cities began to exercise compulsion to fill their offices; but she suggests that the issue was "the restricted one of the liability of non-citizen residents to liturgies." That may be right, but the fact remains that the inscription shows compulsion being used by a Greek city in the reign of Trajan, some ten years before Pliny found men unwilling, if the transmitted *inuiti* is correct, to become decurions in Bithynia. Another literary text is relevant. Dio Chrysostom in a speech usually dated to 100 or 101 talks of Smyrna being permitted "thousands of councillors" in a context of Trajan's largesse to the city (*Or.* 40.14): this suggests that these councillors were to be enrolled for their wealth as much as for civic prestige (cf. *Phoenix* 22 [1968] 138). The new inscription shows another of Smyrna's maneuvers about the same time, whereby it also attempted to enroll noncitizens into one of its most expensive liturgies.

To edit and comment upon so large and multifarious a collection of texts must have been very difficult. Reynolds names dozens of colleagues whose advice she has used. Perhaps a better method would have been to follow the example of the Austrian excavations in Ephesos, to take only a nearby example, and to publish the texts briefly in a journal nearer the time of discovery: in that way publication in book form might have been more final.

C. P. JONES

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
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
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
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THE PINDAR SCHOLIA

References to scholars like Aristarchus, Chaeris, Chrysippus, Aristodemus, and Didymus indicate that the Pindar scholia are based, however remotely, on Alexandrian *hypomnemata*. At some point, or more likely, at several different points, scholarly opinions on individual words and phrases were compiled and paraphrases (sometimes in duplicate and triplicate) recorded into a large book, from which the marginal notes in our manuscripts are derived. The scholia in the Vatican recension (V), which cover in various manuscripts all four books of the odes, offer the kind of information provided by scholia to other poetic texts for use in Byzantine schools, prose paraphrases, background information, and summaries of opposing views on disputed interpretations. The scholia to the Ambrosian manuscript (A), which are preserved only for the first twelve Olympian odes, tend to cite more authorities than the scholia to the mss. of the V tradition, which often reproduces opinions only, without individual names; but I have not distinguished here between the two traditions, because the A scholia, despite their greater detail, do not seem to represent more accurately than the V scholia the substance of the original commentaries.¹

¹ On the sources of the scholia, see esp. H. T. Deas, "The Scholia Vetera to Pindar," *HSCP* 42 (1931) 1-78; on their format and chronology, N. G. Wilson, "A Chapter in the History of Scholia," *CQ* 17 (1967) 244-56. Citations in this chapter refer to A. B. Drachmann, *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1904), C. Wendel, *Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium Vetera* (Berlin 1935), H. Erbse, *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem* (Berlin 1969-77), B. Snell and H. Maehler, *Pindari Carmina* (Leipzig 1971).

The scholia to *Ol.* 10.45 give an impression of what has been lost in both traditions in the course of compilation and condensation:

A (55b: I 324)

Aristodemus and Leptines and Dionysius [Thrax] write Altis, on the grounds that it is not appropriate to say that Elis, which had just been sacked, was sacred to Zeus. And it stands to reason that Zeus' temple was built in Pisa, since people who come to the Festival do not hold their celebrations in Elis, but in Pisa. Pisa is located three stades from Olympia; the land round the temple is occupied by lodging houses. Thus it is correct to write "Altis," since that is what they call the place near Olympia.

V (55c: I 324)

Aristodemus writes Altis instead of Elis. That is what the vicinity of Olympia is called, and Zeus has the epithet "Altius." For it does not stand to reason that he [Heracles] would make a place holy and pure that had been sacked by him. There is no temple of Zeus in Elis, but rather it is in Pisa. Pisa is six stades from Olympia. Didymus, keeping the reading of the manuscript, says that Pindar calls Pisa Elis because after the Eleians made the inhabitants of Pisa subject to them, they changed the name of Pisa to Elis. And since Pisa has been changed, why hesitate to write Elis? Callimachus also says that Zeus' habitation is Elis rather than Pisa, "he left Elis, Zeus' habitation, to be ruled by Phyleus" (fr. 77 Pf), calling Elis holy rather than Pisa. Callimachus also calls Zeus in Pisa Eleian, "Eleian Zeus" (fr. 196.1 Pf).

The A scholia preserve a summary of the arguments for the clearly preferable reading "Altis," which all editors since have retained. They make no mention of Didymus, and by lumping together the names of Aristodemus, Leptines, and Dionysius, they invite the inference that these scholars were members of a school of interpretation or were somehow coordinated, whereas all they had in common was being post-Aristarchean; Leptines and Dionysius are cited in disagreement in the V scholia to *Isthm.* 1.79c: III 208-9. The V scholia, meanwhile, preserve a summary of both sides of the controversy, though they mention only Aristodemus among those who read "Altis" and make no explicit observation about why Didymus' arguments must be rejected—namely, that Pisa was not annexed by Elis until 346 B.C. Notions of geography in both sets of scholia are hazy (Elis is in fact two days' march from Pisa, 58 km), and measurements inconsistent: 3 stades in A and 6 in V. Each tradition

offers only a distorted and partially obstructed view of what the Hellenistic commentators said.²

But even though the Pindar scholia preserve in content if not by name much information from Alexandrian commentaries, they cannot for that reason be regarded as reliable guides to the interpretation of his poetry. On the contrary, it could be argued that no other scholia leave such a confused impression of the poetry that they were meant to explain. Pindar's lyrics, because of their density and complexity, apparently elicited from their Alexandrian commentators more guesswork (εἰκασία) than the texts of the epic poets.³ By contrast, the scholia to Homer and to Apollonius tend to provide supplementary information and to paraphrase lines without radically reinterpreting them. In a restatement of a phrase, an ordinary word might replace a term characteristic of epic, for instance, εἰπέ for ἔννεπε in *Od.* 1.1. When Homer says in *Iliad* 2 that he depends on the Muses, the commentators understood his words sympathetically, as a form of *captatio benevolentiae* (485-86a); they remark that it is indeed difficult to remember so many different names (488a). The Apollonius scholia correctly observe that in the poem's first line ἀρχόμενος recalls traditional usage, and their "translation," though inaccurate, at least suggests that the way in which Apollonius phrases the line gives a new importance to the poet: ἀρχαιρεσιασθεῖς ὑπὸ σοῦ, "elected by you, Apollo" (1.1-4b).

But ancient commentators on Pindar, in the course of paraphrasing the text, often manage seriously to misinterpret its meaning. Apparently they were misled by the poet himself, because they took him at his word. The content of Homer's invocation to the Muses in *Iliad* 2 might be accurately represented by a prose summary, but in victory odes the poet makes more elaborate statements about himself and his art. In particular Pindar's first-person statements contain complex metaphors whose immediate function, as in the case of the passage from *Iliad* 2, commentators felt obliged to restate, by simplifying the content of the

²Cf. esp. Deas' detailed comparison of the two recensions (note 1 above, 57-65); also U. v. Wilamowitz, *Herakles*⁴ (Darmstadt 1959) I 185-87. Deas' list of instances where B supplies different names from A does not include the *Ol.* 10.55 scholia. The Homeric scholia do not give a very good impression of Leptines' interpretative powers (*Il.* 6.320, 23.397, 731); see K. Latte, "Leptines nr. 7," *RE Supp.* 7 (1940) 375. On Didymus' inaccuracy, see esp. S. West, "Chalcenteric Negligence," *CQ* 20 (1970) 288-96.

³On the use of historical conjecture to explain obscure passages, see esp. M. R. Lefkowitz, "The Influential Fictions in the Scholia to Pindar's *Pythian* 8," *CP* 70 (1975) 173-85; H. Fränkel, "Schrullen in den Scholien zu Pindars Nemeen 7 und Olympien 3," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 385-97.

original, identifying inferences, and by making general allusions specific. When in order to express his superiority Pindar uses a familiar comparison of an eagle to lesser birds, the ancient commentators sought to identify the poet's rivals. In *Ol.* 2.86 ff. a pair of crows, perhaps because the poet had in mind parent birds defending their nest in mating season, "hint at" (αἰνίττεται) Bacchylides and Simonides (158d, cf. 158c: I 99).⁴ In *Nem.* 3, lines about noisy jackdaws "seem to refer" (τείνειν) to Bacchylides (143: III 62). In *Nemean* 4, when Pindar, after making an allusion to the achievements of the hero Telamon, explains that he must move on to other topics, and describes himself as if he too were involved in a life-and-death struggle (36-38), the ancient commentators on the passage gloss "plots" (ἐπιβουλίαις) as "plotters" (ἐπιβουλεύουσιν), "hostile craftsmen (ἀντιτέχνοις) and lampooners," "hostile poets" (ἀντιδιδοσκάλων). Finally, they identify Pindar's general, plural "plots" as a specific individual: "these lines seem to refer (τείνειν) to Simonides, since he liked to use digressions" (*Nem.* 4.60b: III 74-75). The information about Simonides' fondness for digressions can be found nowhere else in the biographical tradition; evidently, it is based solely on inference from and interpretation of this passage in *Nemean* 4.⁵

In my article "Pindar's Lives," I tried to show how such simplification of Pindar's metaphors results in a characterization of the poet as combative and defensive—that is, as the very opposite of what the poet himself meant to convey by his statements about competition. The commentators may have understood that the victory odes, unlike other poems, were intended to praise athletic achievement,⁶ but they appear to have had only a limited appreciation of the qualities that enable the poetry of these odes to transcend being routinely encomiastic or occasional. Pindar characteristically raises all specific accomplishment to the level of the generic by merging present with past and describing, often through metaphor, the most archetypal aspects of particular events. But the commentators often failed to see the relevance of Pindar's more abstract statements, or at least said nothing positive about them. For example, the closing lines of *Pythian* 8 are now much ad-

⁴G. M. Kirkwood, "Pindar's Ravens," *CQ* 31 (1981) 240-43; G. Arrighetti, *Stud. Class. ed. Or.* 25 (1976) 290-304.

⁵See esp. M. R. Lefkowitz, "Pindar's Lives," *Classica et Iberica* (Festschrift Marique, Worcester, Mass. 1975) 79-81; "Autobiographical Fiction in Pindar," *HSCP* 84 (1980) 37-38.

⁶See esp. P. Wilson, "Pindar and his Reputation in Antiquity," *PCPS* 26 (1980) 107; cf. D. Young, *Pindar Isthmian 7, Myth and Exempla* (Leiden 1971) 30, n. 99.

mired: "creatures of a day, what is someone, what is no one, man is a dream of a shadow" (95-96).⁷ But the ancient commentators give explicit approval only to the phrase "man is a dream of a shadow": "he employs the emphasis well, as if to indicate something weaker than weak" (*Pyth.* 8.135a: II 218). Other commentators (τινες) apparently criticized the lines on the grounds that a lament for the human condition was out of place in a victory ode (136c: II 219).⁸

In addition to their restricted notions of relevance, the ancient commentators, when describing Pindar's techniques of composition, seem to assume that poetry is an irrational or extra-rational process, a concept that in fact originated only in the latter part of the fifth century.⁹ As a result, when Pindar calls attention to himself and his control over his subject matter, his metaphors are rephrased in a negative and literal manner that makes him appear to have lost control. For example, Pindar says in *Pythian* 10, "hold the oar still, throw the anchor from the prow to the ground as guard against the rock of the reef, for excellence in songs of praise rushes like a bee from one song to another" (51-54). The helmsman metaphor is meant to express mastery, but the scholia comment instead: "Pindar rebukes himself for having made a long digression and says so metaphorically" (*Pyth.* 10.79b: II 249). Or in *Pythian* 11, when Pindar says, "but now, friends, I have been whirled down the crossroad where ways divide, though I first set off down a straight path" (38 ff.), the scholia explain: "Pindar had written the victory ode very well but in what follows he employs an extraordinarily inappropriate (ἄκαιρος) digression (παρέκβασις)" (*Pyth.* 11.23b: II 257); "he realizes himself that he is employing an inappropriate digression and says so" (58a: II 259).

In oratory throughout antiquity, "apologies" for digression were used to underline the importance of preceding material and to testify to the speaker's sincerity and enthusiasm.¹⁰ But evidently in lyric the func-

⁷M. R. Lefkowitz, "Pindar's *Pythian* 8," *CJ* 72 (1977) 216; M. Dickie, "On the Meaning of ἐφήμερος," *ICS* 1 (1975) 7-14.

⁸Wilson (note 6 above) 111.

⁹E.g., Democritus 68 B 17, 18 D-K; cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 82; R. Harriott, *Poetry and Criticism before Plato* (London 1969) 83-88.

¹⁰W. H. Race, "Some Digressions and Returns in Greek Authors," *CJ* 76 (1980) 1-8. Cf. to Pindar's metaphors the poet-rhetorician Licymnius' notions of ἐπούρωσις ("inspiration" ?), ἀποπλάνησις ("diversion"), and ὄζοι ("ramifications"), ridiculed by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 3.13.1414b; only the term ἀποπλάνησις survived in rhetorical terminology (e.g., Hermagoras, cited in Cic., *de Inv.* 1.97).

tion of these devices ceased to be recognized, especially after the fifth century, when poetry increasingly came to be regarded as the product of emotion rather than of reason. In Plato's *Ion* a poet is like a bee, "a light and winged thing and holy, and never able to compose until he has become inspired, and is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him."¹¹ Pindar's break-off formulae could thus be understood as representing a struggle between possession and attention to duty: "Pindar interrupts himself so that he will not make a further digression about Cinyras" (*Nem.* 8.32a: III 143); "he wants to end his digression about Neoptolemus" (*Nem.* 7.76: III 127).¹² He wins approval from the commentators for his efforts to regain control of his song: "convincingly, since he has digressed about the Aeacidae in the course of praising their fame, he wants to get back to the praise of the athlete by making this not irrelevant diversion" οὐκ ἀπρόσλογον ἀπόσπασμα, *Nem.* 3:114b: III 58).

The poet's own words appeared to lend support to the remarkable notion that allusions to myths were "digressions" or "excursions" rather than integral or inevitable facets of a victory ode. The commentators' notion of relevance seems to have been much more narrowly defined than the poet's. According to the scholia, *Pythian* 5 was "more appropriate" (οἰκειότερα) in its ideas and organization (οἰκονομία) than *Pythian* 4, which "employs a historical digression" about the founding of Cyrene (*Pyth.* 4 inscr. a: II 92);¹³ this judgment suggests that the commentators were using as their standard Pindar's own statements about the need for brief and controlled narration, and that they preferred narratives directly connected to the event celebrated. Some commentators even questioned the relevance of the myths of Heracles' birth in *Nemean* 1 (49d: III 20) or of Neoptolemus in *Nemean* 7 (1a: III 116). They questioned why *Olympian* 3 begins with an invocation to the Dioscuri instead of to Heracles, who founded the Olympic games (1a: I 105). They suggest that he switches "imperceptibly" (λεληθότως) from an invocation to Poseidon to praise of the victor (*Isthm.* 1.76b: III 208), and

¹¹ *Ion* 553e-34c, tr. L. Cooper. Cf. also *Phaedr.* 245a, *Apol.* 22b-c. The tragic poet Phrynichus is compared to a bee in Ar. *Av.* 748-50 (cf. *Ran.* 1299-30). Cf. also Wilson (note 6 above) 110.

¹² Cf. also *Ol.* 13.133b: I 383; *Nem.* 3.39b: II 47-48; *Nem.* 6.94a: III 113; *Nem.* 10.35: III 170.

¹³ Cf. Wilson (note 6 above) 107-8.

"imperceptibly" initiates the long catalogue of glories at the beginning of *Isthmian* 7 (1a: III 261).¹⁴

In the case of Pindar's exposition, the commentators seem to have preferred the traditional and straightforward. They applauded literal accuracy in description—for example, epithets like "delighting-in-horses" (of Hieron, *Ol.* 1.35b: I 28) or "of flashing lightning" (of Zeus, *Ol.* 9.64a: I 282). They approve of sustained metaphors, like the *krater* of song in *Isthmian* 6 (10b: III 252). But an unusual metaphor, like a thundercloud's "army" instead of "rain," is considered "difficult" and "in the dithyrambic manner" (*Pyth.* 6.11: II 195).¹⁵ They like new ideas to follow an established pattern, as when Pindar calls Hesychia, "Peace," the daughter of Justice (*Pyth.* 8.1a: II 206) or when Angelia takes a message to the dead (*Ol.* 8.106e: I 262). In consequence they often appear to have found the sequence of Pindar's ideas confusing. In *Olympian* 9, for example, when Pindar speaks of the Dioscuri and Helen before he mentions the victor's city Acragas, a scholium observes: "the order is reversed and appears to cause obscurity (ἀσάφεια) by its confusion, since the run of the sense is as follows, 'honoring famous Acragas, directing an Olympic victory for Theron, the prize of his horses with tireless feet, I pray that I may please the hospitable Tyndaridae and fair Helen'" (*Ol.* 9.1b: I 106). When in the beginning of *Olympian* 1 Pindar says, "if you wish to speak of games, my heart, do not look for a shining star hotter by day than the sun," a scholium states: "it is characteristic of Pindar when he begins with a comparison, not to bring in at once the thing which is being compared, but to insert in the middle another model of excellence, and thus to complete the comparison—that is the work of someone who is passionate (θερμός) and profound

¹⁴ Cf. also *Nem.* 10.6: III 166 and *Ol.* 9.40: I 276. I cannot see how these passages reveal an ability on the part of the scholia "to see beyond the surface meaning of Pindar's words to the immediate encomiastic point" (Wilson [note 6 above] 110).

¹⁵ Also praised are *Ol.* 6.44 f.: I 164; *Pyth.* 4.154b: II 120; Wilson (note 6 above) 105. But various interpretive problems prevent the scholia from praising the effectiveness of the opening lines of *Pyth.* 1: for example, one cannot properly refer to fire as "flowing" (9a: II 10). They praise the accuracy, not the poetry of Pindar's picture of Zeus' sleeping eagle: "he has sketched it very clearly" (πάνυ διετύπωνεν, 10a: II 10), "he has sketched it very like an artist" (γραφικώτατα ὑπετύπωνεν, 17a: II 11); cf. Wilson (note 6 above) 106. Other metaphors criticized are: *Ol.* 13.97a: I 377, Wilson 104; *Pyth.* 1.167a: II 27; *Pyth.* 2.97: II 47; *Isthm.* 4.110: III 238; *Ol.* 6.78a, f: I 171, and quite absurdly, *Pyth.* 2.12.45b: II 269; *Isthm.* 8.93c: III 276; *Nem.* 1.104: III 27.

(πολύνους) in regard to ideas" (*Ol.* 1.5g: i 20-21). Apparently the commentator admired the effect, but he implies that it was achieved by passion instead of through an established or, at least to its original audience, recognizable convention. In any case, the charge of obscurity could be confirmed by the poet's own words: "and so in other respects also Pindar writes obscurely (ἄσφῶς), in general to need interpreters, as he himself says [*Ol.* 2.85]" (Eustathius, ¶10: III 289).¹⁶

Once it was assumed that poets did not try to abide by the same rules as writers of prose, and that the standards of exposition in prose constituted the norm, any perceived departure from standard accounts of myth or history could be regarded as anomalous (ἄλογος) or idiosyncratic (ἰδιος)—for instance, when Pindar says that Heracles was crowned as victor at Nemea, when the games were ordinarily said to have been established a generation later in honor of Archemorus (*Nem.* 6.71c: III 110), or when Pindar speaks of funeral games for Thoas on Lemnos, when presumably Thoas should have died in exile (*Ol.* 4.31a: I 136): "how could he say that [Thoas] was buried on Lemnos and that Hypsipyle held a contest in his honor? Because it is possible for poets to invent what they wish." They approve of Pindar's consciously omitting an irrational detail, like the tattletale crow in *Pythian* 3 (43d: II 69), or of an emphasis that makes a heroic deed seem still more glorious (*Isthm.* 1.15b: III 200), but they disapprove of what appear to be unjustified deviations: Pindar is being "idiosyncratic" when he calls Orestes' nurse Arsinoe, because according to Pherecydes (*FGrHist* 3F 134) she was Laodameia (*Pyth.* 11.25n: II 257),¹⁷ or when he says Zeus rained gold on Alcmena rather than on Danae (*Isthm.* 7.5a: III 262). Because Pindar speaks of seven pyres at Thebes when technically there ought to have been five, Aristarchus was able to observe "that Pindar is being idiosyncratic (ἰδιόζῃ) here as in other cases," even though other scholars cited the Theban place name "Seven Pyres" in support of Pindar's version (*Ol.* 6.23a: I 158-59).¹⁸ They never observe that in the vast corpus of epic several versions of a myth might be current simultane-

¹⁶ Eustathius follows the common Alexandrian interpretation of the passage, taking τὸ πᾶν to mean "for the unchosen many," rather than "in everything" (which it must mean); see W. H. Ræce, "The End of *Olympia* 2," *CSCA* 12 (1979) 252. On Eustathius' essay, see N. G. Wilson, *The Scholars of Byzantium* (London 1983) 203.

¹⁷ Also cf. Stesichorus, *PMG* 218=Σ Aesch. *Cho.* 733.

¹⁸ E.g., Armenidas, presumably in his *Thebaica* (*FGrHist* 378F6). Cf. *Nem.* 9.24, where the inconsistency is not remarked. As Farnell suggests, "the number 'seven' was embedded in tradition"; *Critical Commentary to the Works of Pindar* (London 1932) 42. Cf. Wilson (note 6 above) 103.

ously. Apollonius, on the other hand, who says nothing about poetic control (or lack of it) in his few first-person statements, is sometimes praised for departing from religious tradition, as, for instance, when he has Phineus swear by his own blindness (*Argon.* 2.259a).¹⁹

The commentators considered historical or geographical treatises and Hellenistic authors like Apollonius to be more authoritative than Pindar. The passages they cite from these authorities, when we can check them ourselves, sometimes offer only tangential confirmation of the scholiasts' assertions and, on occasion, actually contradict them. The scholia state that Pindar employs "poetic license" (ποιητική ἄδεια) when he says that Adrastus rather than Cleisthenes founded the Pythian games at Sicyon (*Nem.* 9.20: III 152).²⁰ The scholia claim that their information is based on Herodotus (5.67; *Nem.* 9 inscr.: III 149), but their summary reveals that they (or some intermediate source) did not understand that Cleisthenes was in fact reconstituting a contest that had originally been held in honor of Adrastus.²¹ It is significant that the scholia are willing to call attention to alleged deviations like Pindar's accounts of the contests on Lemnos or at Sicyon, but remain silent about the deliberate planning involved in Pindar's brilliantly innovative reworking of the myth of Tantalus and Pelops in *Olympian* 1,²² where they merely relate alternate versions of the stories. By commenting primarily on alleged "eccentricities," the commentators inexorably suggest that the poet, whatever his text says or the nature of the traditions he relates, composes imprecisely and irrationally.²³

¹⁹But Apollonius is criticized for including details felt to be inappropriate for epic, such as Hylas' carrying a bucket (cf. N. G. Wilson [note 16 above]), or the erotic mode of Hylas' death, 1.1297b: cf. Didymus' criticism of Pindar's portrayal of the jack-asses in *Pyth.* 10.51b: II 246; Wilson (note 6 above) 104.

²⁰Cf. also the comment that Pindar "in a poetic manner" says Evadne's baby was sent rather than taken away (*Ol.* 6.52 f.: I 167).

²¹Cf. the schol. to *Ol.* 7.146a: I 229, which, apparently on the authority of Ister (146b: I 129) misconstrues what Pindar says about the founding of the Heliæan games in Rhodes, while a correct interpretation is given on 146c: I 230. On the *Nem.* 9 passage, cf. Wilson (note 6 above) 105. Similarly, on *Ol.* 6.55a: I 167, Didymus cited Ister against Pindar about the location of the town Phaesane, but the right explanation is given in 55d: I 168.

²²See esp. A. Köhnken, "Pindar as Innovator," *CQ* 24 (1974) 199-206. "Time and Event in Pindar O. 1.25-53," *CA* 2 (1983) 66-76.

²³Chrysippus even suggested, absurdly in the judgment of the compiler of the scholia, that in one exceptional instance (*Isthm.* 4.47c: III 229-30), Pindar meant the opposite of what he said. On the identity of this Chrysippus, see Deas (note 2 above) 14-15.

Rather than contribute to an understanding of the rationale of an ode, these allegations of eccentricity and irrelevance, however unjustified, work against the text. At their most destructive, they offer, instead of elucidation, provocation for misreadings that support the notion of poetic incoherence. A striking example of the process is, of course, the critical notion of interjection by a choral speaker. When in *Nemean* 7 Pindar refers to Aeacus as "guardian of my famous clan," namely the aristocratic Aegidae, the commentators, failing to understand the phrase as an expression of the poet's kinship with the victor, suggest that the chorus must be speaking:²⁴ "in his idiosyncratic way (ἰδιῶς) Pindar appears to be reversing himself in this ode, for at one time he speaks in his own person about those who have criticized him about Neoptolemus, and at another time he makes the chorus of Aeginetans say [of Aeacus] 'he was guardian of my [clan]' since Pindar was not an Aeginetan" (*Nem.* 7.123a: III 134).²⁵ The same sort of critical fiction spoils the effect of the closing lines of *Pythian* 8, where the poet addresses Aegina, the city for which he celebrated more victories than for any other, as "dear mother" (100).²⁶ A scholium observes "this might be spoken by the chorus, to say that Aegina was the mother of the chorus members" (140a: II 219). Some commentators had suggested that the chorus spoke "acting the role of the victor" earlier in the poem, in order to account for a sudden reference to the hero Alcmaeon as "my neighbor" (*Pyth.* 8.78a: II 214–15). When Pindar, after referring to Aegina as "dear mother," prays that she "guide this city in a free procession," the scholia gloss "guard the city named for you and protect her with freedom" (140b) and explain "procession" (στόλω) as "a course (στάλσει) or stance (στάσει) or perhaps formation (σχήματι), not subordinate to others" (140d: II 219), again emphasizing the presence of political disorder at the time of the victory (1a: II 206).²⁷ The scholia on the previous lines, about man being a dream of a shadow, as we have seen,

²⁴ But cf. the schol. on *Pyth.* 5.101a: II 185, which records accurately that there was a clan (φρατρία) of Aegidae in Thebes. In the schol. to *Nem.* 7.123a: III 134, πάτρα may have been understood as equivalent to πατρίς ("fatherland," as, e.g., in *Pyth.* 9.74, *Pyth.* 11.23), but on *Pyth.* 8.53a: II 211 it is correctly understood as φρατρία, "clan."

²⁵ ἀναστρέφομαι in this sense, cf. the schol. to *Nem.* 5.10a: II 90, where ἀναστροφή designates a kind of prolepsis.

²⁶ See also Lefkowitz, "Influential Fictions" (note 3 above) 181–82.

²⁷ στόλω is glossed by στάλσει in *Nem.* 3.27a: III 46, referring to the course of the pankration (cf. 27b, ὀρμη).

noted that "some [scholars] criticized Pindar because he laments human life in the context of a victory ode" (136c: II 219). Penelope Wilson has recently argued that many scholia, although often critical of Pindar, at least preserve a sense of the rhetorical purpose of the original.²⁸ I am not convinced. If occasionally the commentators appear to have summarized Pindar's intention accurately, it is because he has expressed it in relatively explicit terms,²⁹ or because what he says can be made to fit the preconceptions of post-classical rhetorical theory.³⁰ But in most cases, especially if one reads consecutively through the scholia of a single ode, the cumulative effect, as I have suggested in the case of *Pythian* 8, is that Pindar had several conflicting intentions and methodologies, and at best he expressed himself obscurely, and in a disjointed manner.

Further confusion was introduced by the commentators' assumption that Pindar's obscurity was deliberate, like the Poet's in Aristophanes' *Birds* (936), who garbles lines of Pindar (fr. 105a,b) in the hope of getting a new chiton. The point of the joke is that the poet's elevated language thinly conceals a demand for payment. Simonides, too, in Aristophanes' *Peace*, is described as an old man willing to do anything in order to make money (*Pax* 965 ff.).³¹ Avarice became Simonides' distinguishing characteristic in the biographical tradition: his advice on money was cited by Aristotle and circulated on papyrus in the third century B.C.³² The Pindar scholia likewise construe references to gold and silver in the odes as hints about the size of the poet's fees. For example, in the opening lines of *Isthmian* 5, the statement "men consider gold superior to other things" (2-3) elicits the comment: "we know that Pindar was in all respects greedy for gold. He indicates his own interest in money when he praises wealth and hints that those who are praised should repay Pindar with gold" (*Isthm.* 5.2a: III 242).³³ When Pindar observes in *Nemean* 7 that avarice does not distort the judgment

²⁸ Wilson (note 6 above) 107, 111.

²⁹ E.g., *Nem.* 4.53a: III 73.

³⁰ E.g., *Nem.* 4.10a: III 65, 66b III 75, Wilson (note 6 above) 103, cf. 101; *Ol.* 1.174a: I 54, Wilson 111.

³¹ Aristophanes' characterization may have been based on Xenophanes 21 B 21 D-K; M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London and Baltimore 1981) 52.

³² *Rhet.* 1391a8: PHibeh I.17; Lefkowitz, *Lives* (note 3 above) 50-53.

³³ E.g., esp. *Pyth.* 10 inscr.: II 242 and *Nem.* 5.1a: III 89. Cf. sch. *Eur. Med.* 9, "there is an impetuous(?) tale by philosophers current, which Parmeniscus also reports, that Euripides got five talents from the Corinthians to attribute the murder of the children to Medea."

of the wise (18), the scholia remark, "that Pindar is completely avaricious is clear from the preceding; our interpretation is very appropriate, since he continues with it in the next lines [by talking about rich and poor]" (*Nem.* 7.25a: III 120).³⁴ It is ironic that such external information, which seems to have had its origin in comic parody, comes to replace appreciation of the rhetorical purpose of Pindar's reflections on men's attitude toward wealth. Allegations about Pindar's avarice cannot but have had a devastating effect on the interpretation of an ode, by implying the presence of hidden meanings and allegories, and by their tacit assumption that the poet can interrupt the expected sequence of thought for purely personal reasons. No wonder that admirers of Pindar in the Hellenistic age and after appear only to cite phrases from the odes and never try consciously to reproduce their general format.

It is possible to detect in certain later poetic adaptations of Pindar's poetry the influence of Aristophanes, the biographers, and the Alexandrian commentators. Theocritus has Pindar in mind when he asks for payment for his poetry (*Id.* 16.22 ff.).³⁵ Callimachus' echoes of Pindaric phrases have a concreteness that is lacking in the original but is present in the scholia; for example, Pindar in *Olympian* 14 says that the Graces sit near Apollo (10), but the scholia and Callimachus put them at his right hand (fr. 114.9).³⁶ Horace in particular appears to have read Pindar with a commentary or at least have seen him through an Alexandrian filter, because the emphasis in his references to Pindar bears the stamp of interpretations found in the scholia. For example, Horace's simile of the ilex in *Odes* 4.4 applies specifically to the Romans; his model is the oak in Pindar's *Pythian* 4.263 ff., but where Pindar's text characteristically gives the simile no direct application, the scholia identify the oak tree with his patron Damophilus (468a: II 163). In *Odes* 1.12 Horace adapts Pindar's simile about *areta* growing like a tree, but with an emphasis on reputation found not in Pindar's text but in the scholia: "crescit immenso velut arbor aevo fama Marcelli" (45 ff.); "raised up by the wise and just words of the poets" (*Nem.* 8.68b: III

³⁴ Cf. N. Austin, "Idyll 16: Theocritus and Simonides," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 10: "Pindar could talk of money in his poems without ever tainting his reputation."

³⁵ D. Young, "Pindar 'Nemean 7,'" *TAPA* 101 (1970) 642-43; cf. R. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book II* (Oxford 1978) 33; Austin (note 34 above) 16.

³⁶ Cf. also Callim. fr. 384.39, which uses the terminology of the schol., to *Ol.* 9.11: I 168.

147). Horace describes Pindar in *Odes* 4.2 as "rushing down like a stream from a mountain which storms have swollen beyond its accustomed banks, Pindar seethes (*fervet*) and rushes forth immense with his deep voice" (*profundo*. . . *ore*, 5-8). Horace's language in this passage recalls certain descriptions of Pindar's style in the scholia. As we saw, in the scholium at *Ol.* 1.5g: I 21 he is called "passionate" and "profound." When Pindar describes his poetry as drafts of water or uses the simile of a sweeping wave to characterize the effect of his song, the scholia paraphrases say a "flowing stream" (ῥεῦμα) represents his poetry.³⁷ The phrase "beyond its accustomed banks" suggests that Horace too regarded Pindar as willing "to alter even mythological accounts for his own purpose" (*Isthm.* 1.15b: III 200).

In *Odes* 4.2 Horace explicitly contrasts the scope of his poetry to Pindar's.³⁸ Pindar is the Dircean swan, he himself only an Italian provincial bee. As when Callimachus describes his *Hymn to Apollo* as pure drops of water carried by bees in contrast to the flow of a big river (ῥόος), like Homer, Horace means his similes to set him in the Pindaric tradition, but on his own more limited terms; the idea of a song darting from theme to theme like a bee is, of course, Pindar's (*Pyth.* 10.53-54).³⁹ Pindar, at least in microcosm, is frequently on Horace's mind, not in the way that Pindar might have represented himself, but as the Alexandrians saw him.

The scholia to the opening lines of *Olympian* 2 state that "Pindar makes it a rule (τυποῖ) that it is necessary in every victory ode to praise a god, a hero, and a man" (1d, 4a: I 59).⁴⁰ Pindar seems not to have abided by this "rule," but Theocritus refers to Pindar's formula at the beginning of each of his *encomia*.⁴¹ Horace too selects the formula for the opening of his *Odes* 1.12 in praise of Augustus. Horace claims in *Odes* 3.4 that he was protected as a young boy by doves while he slept;

³⁷ Cf. *Nem.* 7.16b: III 119; *Isthm.* 6.108: III 260; *Ol.* 10.13a-b: I 311; Wilson (note 6 above) 101.

³⁸ Setting up such a comparison is a rhetorical topos that places the present writer (or speaker) in a tradition; cf. Menander Rhetor 437.15 ff.

³⁹ Callim. *Hymn* 2.198 ff.; see esp. F. Williams, *Callimachus, Hymn to Apollo* (Oxford 1978). The similarity was noted by Orelli, in Baiter and Hirschfelder, eds., *Q. Horatius Flaccus*⁴ (Berlin 1886). Cf. also R. Thomas, "Callimachus and Roman Poetry," *CQ* 33 (1983) 95.

⁴⁰ Wilson (note 6 above) 107.

⁴¹ R. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book I* (Oxford 1970) 143-44.

according to his Hellenistic biographers, while the young Pindar was asleep bees built a honeycomb in his mouth (*Vit.* 2: I 1).⁴² The scholia to the celebrated passage in *Olympian* 2 about Pindar's obscurity state that "Pindar knows he uses a lot of mythical learning and unusual figures of speech and varied expression, for he has many dislocations" (ὑπερβατά, 153b: I 98). This might serve also as a fair description of Horace's style, especially in odes where he refers directly to Pindar.⁴³ It could serve also as a description of the Pindaric style of poets like Goethe or Gray.⁴⁴ Until Bundy explained the meaning of formal conventions in the odes, literary criticism of Pindar was based on the Alexandrian notion of an impulsive, impressive, but enigmatic Pindar.⁴⁵

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⁴²Cf. Kiessling-Heinze on *Odes* 3.4.10; on the topos, Lefkowitz, "Pindar's Lives" (note 4 above) 73.

⁴³On Horace's Pindaric style, see esp. J. H. Waszink, "Horaz und Pindar," *A&A* 12 (1966) 111-24; E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 425 ff.; G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 751 ff. Horace *Odes* 3.27 has the format of an ode like *Nem.* 10; E. Highbarger, "The Pindaric Style of Horace," *TAPA* 66 (1935) 250. But cf. W. Bühler, *Die Europa des Moschos* (Hermes Einzelschrift 13; Wiesbaden 1960) 22-23. Cf. also Callimachus' imitation of Pindar's unusual language, allusiveness, and uneven pacing in his *Victoria Berenices*; P. Parsons, *ZPE* 25 (1977) 49-50.

⁴⁴In a letter Goethe cites *Ol.* 2.85 and refers to Horace *Odes* 4.2 as expressing what he feels about Pindar; E. Grumach, *Goethe und die Antike* (Berlin 1949) I.226. Cf. his Pindaric imitation "Wanderers Sturmlied" (1772). On Gray, M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Victory Ode* (Park Ridge 1976) 175, n. 7; cf. also Wilson (note 6 above) 97-98.

⁴⁵Cf. D. Young, "Pindaric Criticism," in Calder and Stern, eds., *Pindaros und Bakchylides* (Darmstadt 1969) 86-88.

ORESTES AS FULFILLMENT, *TERASKOPOS*, AND *TERAS* IN THE *ORESTEIA**

Aeschylus' *Oresteia* is filled with the portentous: prophecy and prophetic vision, dream, omen, ominous speech and action.¹ All these have in common a need for interpretation and a prophetic significance that expects fulfillment, and thus exemplify vividly two central and related motifs of the trilogy: the persistent ambiguity of word and action and the search for a final fulfillment that will solve and settle every problem.² At the very start of the *Agamemnon*, in the watchman's opening speech, we are presented with language that is obscure save to those somehow initiated in its meaning (36-39), and in the parodos we already find an uncertain wait for the final fulfillment and outcome of predictions long past.

Although the *Oresteia* contains no single prophecy as much discussed as those, for example, in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* and the *Prometheus Bound*, it is a trilogy (to adapt Frank Kermode's phrase) preoccupied with prophecy and portent.³ And the trilogy's central character plays a threefold prophetic role, for Orestes is the fulfillment of a series

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¹ On prophecy and portents in the *Oresteia*, see R. Staehlin's "Das Motiv der Mantik im antiken Drama," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten* 12 (1912), and, more recently, E. Bächli, *Die künstlerische Funktion von Orakelsprüchen, Weissagungen, Träumen usw. in der griechischen Tragödie* (Zurich 1954); P. Vicaire, "Présentiments, présages, prophéties dans le théâtre d'Eschyle," *REG* 76 (1963) 337-57; J. J. Peradotto, "Cledonancy in the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 90 (1969) 1-21; and D. H. Roberts, *Apollo and his Oracle in the Oresteia*, *Hypomnemata* 78 (Göttingen 1983). On the oracular quality of language in the *Oresteia*, see especially A. Lebeck, *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Washington, DC 1971), and M. D.-S. Dobson's dissertation, "Oracular Language: its Style and Intent in the Delphic Oracles and Aeschylus' *Oresteia*" (Harvard 1976).

² On fulfillment as a motif in the *Oresteia*, see K. Burke, "Form and Persecution in the *Oresteia*," *Sewanee Review* 60 (1952) 377-96; D. Clay, "Aeschylus' Trigeron Mythos," *Hermes* 97 (1969) 1-9; U. Fischer, *Der Telosgedanke in den Dramen des Aischylos* (Hildesheim 1965); Roberts (note 1 above) chs. 2 and 3; and J. de Romilly, *Time in Greek Tragedy* (Ithaca 1968) 66.

³ The phrase is adapted from Kermode's comment that *Macbeth* is a play "obsessed by prophecies" (*The Sense of an Ending* [Oxford 1966] 84).

of portents, he is an interpreter of portents, and he is himself a portent that must be interpreted. All three roles are present in the *Choephoroi* and are brought together in the account of Clytemnestra's dream at 526-50; in the *Eumenides*, the first two roles are virtually lost, and Orestes emerges as a problem others must solve.⁴

I

The vengeance of Orestes fulfills a sequence of predictions, portents, and prayers that begins in the last part of the *Agamemnon*. At 1279-85, Cassandra predicts the arrival and vengeance of a μητροκτόνον φίτυμα, ποινάτωρ πατρός. At the end of the play, Aegisthus, quarreling with the chorus, says that he will not refuse death, and the chorus eagerly accepts his words as an omen (1652-53).⁵ Near the beginning of the *Choephoroi*, Electra, on the chorus' advice, prays for Orestes' safe return and for an unnamed avenger who will kill the killers (138-39, 142-46); this last prayer (κακὴν ἄραν) amounts to a curse, a form of ill-omened speech. Shortly afterward, Orestes, heralded by signs of his presence, appears to her and relates the oracular command that he avenge his father (269 ff.). After the kommos, he is told of Clytemnestra's dream, which has already been mentioned in the parodos of the *Choephoroi* (32-41) but is here recounted in full and understood as predicting the matricide (526-50).

In Cassandra's and Aegisthus' speeches and in Clytemnestra's dream, Orestes' name, though easily supplied from the context,⁶ is not explicitly mentioned but only suggested in the manner characteristic of

⁴References cited are from the Oxford Classical Text of Aeschylus, edited by D. Page (Oxford 1972), unless otherwise noted.

⁵Χο. εἶα δὴ, Ξίφος πρόκωπον πᾶς τις εὐτρεπιζέτω. 1651
Αἰ. ἀλλὰ κἀγὼ μὴν πρόκωπος κοῦκ ἀναίνομαι θανεῖν.
Χο. δεχομένοις λέγεις θανεῖν σε· τὴν τύχην δ' αἰρούμεθα.

The distribution of lines here is much debated; for a detailed discussion of the problem see E. Fraenkel's edition with commentary of the *Agamemnon* (Oxford 1950) ad loc. I here use his text. The mss. disagree on 1651 but give 1652 to Aegisthus and 1653 to the chorus, and I am essentially in agreement with Fraenkel's argument for retaining this attribution.

⁶When Cassandra makes her prediction, Orestes' name has already been mentioned (at 879) in Clytemnestra's excuse for his absence. Aegisthus' words follow closely on the chorus' observation that Orestes is alive and will return to kill the murderers.

prediction. Electra's prayer is both for an avenger and for Orestes' safe return, but she does not explicitly identify the two; indeed, she seems to avoid doing so. Here the omission is part of a general hesitancy about whether what she asks (and what Orestes will do) is εὐσεβῆ (122).⁷ By their omission these passages resemble riddles, to all of which Orestes is the answer, and they are followed by an explicit riddle about Orestes. At *Choephoroi* 886, the servant tells Clytemnestra that the dead are killing the living, and she replies: οἷ γὰρ, ξυνῆκα τοῦπος ἐξ αἰνιγμάτων (887).

Riddling or indirect references are common in Aeschylus and play a variety of roles; such references to Orestes are important in two ways. First, the ways in which Orestes is described often point to aspects of his role that are problematic or significant. He is to be both his mother's killer and his father's avenger, he is avenger and bringer of justice, and he represents both his dead father and himself. Second, the very omission of Orestes' name where he is obviously meant serves as a form of emphasis.⁸

There are more direct forms of emphasis in the text as well. Orestes stresses his role as fulfiller at two points, using the word τελεσφόρος. His first words to Electra tell her to announce to the gods that her prayers have been fulfilled:

εὔχου τὰ λοιπά, τοῖς θεοῖς τελεσφόρους
εὐχὰς ἐπαγγέλλουσα, τυγχάνειν καλῶς.

(*Cho.* 212-13)

After he hears his mother's dream, he prays that it be fulfilled in him:

ἀλλ' εὔχομαι γῇ τῇδε καὶ πατρὸς τάφῳ
τοῦναιρον εἶναι τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ τελεσφόρον.

(*Cho.* 540-41)

⁷For a discussion of a similar and related avoidance of the word *mother* by Orestes, see Lebeck (note 1 above) 23-30, and Roberts (note 1 above) 51-52.

⁸Cf. Lebeck (note 1 above) 123, on "Orestes' inability to use a word conspicuous in its absence." J.-L. Borges remarks that in a riddle whose answer is chess, the only prohibited word is *chess*, and further that "to omit a word always, to resort to inept metaphors and obvious periphrases, is perhaps the most emphatic way of stressing it" ("The Garden of Forking Paths," tr. D. A. Yates, in D. A. Yates and J. E. Kirby, eds., *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings* [New York 1964] 27).

Pylades may be said to emphasize Orestes' responsibility for fulfillment at *Choephoroi* 900-2 when he asks what will become of Apollo's oracles if Orestes does not kill his mother. Finally, the last exchange between Orestes and his mother emphasizes the fact that what he is doing was foretold in the dream: he is the snake she nursed, and the fright inspired by the dream was indeed a true prophet.

Κλ. οἱ ᾗ γώ, τεκοῦσα τόνδ' ὄφιν ἐθρεψάμην·
Ορ. ἢ κάρτα μάντις οὐξ ὄνειράτων φόβος.

(*Cho.* 928-29)⁹

II

Other characters in the *Oresteia* fulfill prophecies, but no other character fulfills so many, and all by one act. Orestes, moreover, combines the role of fulfiller of portents with that of their interpreter. He takes this role upon himself when he hears Clytemnestra's dream (κρίνω δέ τοί νιν ὥστε συγκόλλως ἔχειν, *Cho.* 542), and is identified as interpreter by the chorus when it accepts his interpretation and chooses him as τερασκόπος:

τερασκόπον δὴ τῶνδε σ' αἰροῦμαι πέρι·
γένοιτο δ' οὕτως.

(*Cho.* 551-52)

The word τερασκόπον links Orestes with other figures in the trilogy who possess divinatory power: Calchas, who in the parodos of the *Agamemnon* is said to have spoken τεράζων when he interpreted the omen of the eagles and the hare (*Ag.* 125); the foreboding chorus at *Agamemnon* 975 ff., with its καρδίας τερασκόπου (977); Cassandra, who after her death is scornfully described by Clytemnestra as τερασκόπος (*Ag.* 1440); and Apollo himself, who is called τερασκόπος by the Pythia at *Eumenides* 62 as she turns to him for help against the Erinyes. It is not only by virtue of his dream interpretation, however, that Orestes belongs with this group. As the recipient and bearer of an oracle he is, like Calchas and Cassandra, associated with the god Apollo and

⁹ Here I would accept (against Page) the manuscript attribution of 929 to Orestes, but the attribution is not crucial to my point.

given special knowledge by him. And at the end of the *Choephoroi* he, like Cassandra, sees in a frenzy horrible visions which no one else can see and which will soon be proved true.

III

As fulfillment, Orestes acts to fulfill portents, and as interpreter he knows them and explains their meaning. Even as he acts and speaks, however, he reveals himself to *be* a portent. His role as portent is suggested by two passages in the *Choephoroi* that are also linked by their imagery, Orestes' prayer to Zeus at 246–63 and his interpretation of Clytemnestra's dream at 542–50.¹⁰

Op. Ζεῦ Ζεῦ, θεωρὸς τῶνδε πραγμάτων γενοῦ,
 ἰδοῦ δὲ γένναν εὖνιν αἰετοῦ πατρὸς
 θανόντος ἐν πλεκταῖσι καὶ σπειράμασιν
 δεινῆς ἐχίδνης· τοὺς δ' ἀπωφανισμένους
 νῆστις πιέζει λιμός· οὐ γὰρ ἐντελεῖς
 θήραν πατρῶαν προσφέρειν σκηνήμασιν.
 οὔτω δὲ κάμῃ τήνδε τ', Ἥλέκτραν λέγω,
 ἰδεῖν πάρεστί σοι, πατροστερῇ γόνον,
 ἄμφω φυγὴν ἔχοντε τὴν αὐτὴν δόμων.
 καίτοι θυτῆρος καὶ σε τιμῶντος μέγα
 πατρὸς νεοσσοῦς τούσδ' ἀποφθείρας πόθεν
 ἔξεις ὁμοίας χειρὸς εὐθοῖνον γέρας;
 οὔτ' αἰετοῦ γένεθλ' ἀποφθείρας πάλιν
 πέμπειν ἔχοις ἂν σήματ' εὐπιθῇ βροτοῖς,
 οὔτ' ἀρχικός σοι πᾶς ὁδ' αὐανθεὶς πυθμὴν
 βωμοῖς ἀρήξει βουθύτοις ἐν ἡμασιν.

(*Cho.* 246–61)

Orestes calls on Zeus in 246–53 to look upon him and Electra, described as young eagles orphaned by a viper, and in 255–57 asks the god how he can expect sacrifices such as their father gave him if he destroys them. The lines that follow speak again of both eagles and sacrifice:

¹⁰ This pair provides a counterpart to the paired vulture simile and eagle omen in the parodos of the *Agamemnon*; see on this J. Dumortier, *Les images dans la poésie d'Eschyle* (Paris 1935) 97, and Lebeck (note 1 above) 13.

If you destroyed the offspring of the eagle,
 you could not again send convincing signs to mortals
 and if this kingly stock withers completely
 it cannot serve your altars on days of sacrifice.

(Cho. 258-61)

Lines 258-59 seem at first to be extending the metaphor beyond what makes sense; what is the significance here for Orestes' and Electra's situation? Editors and translators generally handle these lines by reading them not as an independent possibility but as an analogy, a comparison expressed paratactically; just as the destruction of eagles would prevent the sending of signs, so the destruction of the royal house will prevent sacrifices.¹¹ But this interpretation makes lines 258-61 little more than a recapitulation of what precedes.¹² Moreover, both the use of the eagle metaphor for Orestes at the beginning of this prayer and the earlier association of omen-bearing eagles with the house of Atreus (*Ag.* 104 ff.) suggest that there is more than mere analogy in this identification of Orestes with the eagles.¹³

We need to understand the identification in the following way. If the eagles are destroyed, Zeus can send no signs mortals will trust. Orestes has himself been sent by Apollo and so by Zeus, and mortal trust in the gods' sendings is dependent on Orestes' success and survival. Orestes raises the issue of trust in speaking of Apollo's oracle:

τοιοῖσδε χρησμοῖς ἄρα χρὴ πεποιθέναί;
 κεῖ μὴ πέποιθα, τοῦργόν ἐστ' ἐργαστέον·

(Cho. 297-98)

¹¹ Versions of this view may be found in the commentaries of P. Groeneboom (Groningen 1949); H. J. Rose, *A Commentary on the Surviving Plays of Aeschylus*, v.2, (Amsterdam 1958); A. Sidgwick (2nd ed., Oxford 1902); A. W. Verrall (London, New York 1893), and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Orestie* v.2, *Das Opfer am Grabe* (Berlin 1896); and in R. Lattimore's translation (Chicago 1953). E. Fraenkel's term "paratactic comparison" (used in his commentary on the *Agamemnon*, ad 1.76) is applied to this passage by O. Smith, "Some Observations on the Structure of Imagery in Aeschylus," *C&M* 26 (1965) 44, and by H. Friis Johanssen, "Sentence Structure in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*," *C&M* 15 (1954) 21-22.

¹² Sidgwick comments ad loc.: "The accumulation of images is characteristic; but the thought is the same in all: 'If you let us perish, you will lose our service.'"

¹³ As E. Petrounias observes in his *Funktion und Thematik der Bilder bei Aischylos, Hypomnemata* 48 (Göttingen 1976) 163 and 388, n. 629.

The same issue is perhaps suggested by Pylades' warning to Orestes (*Cho.* 900–2) and by Apollo's words when he cautions the jurors not to render his and Zeus' oracles fruitless by condemning Orestes (*Eum.* 713–14). E. Petrounias has observed that Orestes is here identifying himself with Zeus' party and threatening mortal disbelief if help is not forthcoming.¹⁴ More crucial is the fact that the continuation of the metaphor makes Orestes the eagle in this new and important sense: he is a σῆμα, a sign from Zeus.

The prayer shows Orestes to be a σῆμα; the dream interpretation makes him a τέρας.

Ορ. ἢ καὶ πέπυσθε τοῦναρ ὥστ' ὀρθῶς φράσαι;
 Χο. τεκεῖν ὄράκοντ' ἔδοξεν, ὡς αὐτὴ λέγει.
 Ορ. καὶ ποῖ τελευτᾷ καὶ καρανοῦται λόγος;
 Χο. ἐν σπαργάνοισι παιδὸς ὀρμίσαι δίκην.
 Ορ. τίνος βορᾶς χρήζοντα, νεογενὲς δάκος;
 Χο. αὐτὴ προσέσχε μαστὸν ἐν τῷ νείρατι.
 Ορ. καὶ πῶς ἄτρωτον οὐθαρ ἦν ὑπὸ στύγους;
 Χο. ὥστ' ἐν γάλακτι θρόμβον αἵματος σπάσαι.
 Ορ. οὗτοι μάταιον ἂν τόδ' ὄψανον πέλοι.
 Χο. ἢ δ' ἐξ ὕπνου κέκλαγγεν ἐπτοημένη,
 πολλοὶ δ' ἀνήθοντ' ἐκτυφλωθέντες σκότῳ
 λαμπτήρες ἐν δόμοισι δεσποίνης χάριν.
 πέμπει δ' ἐπειτα τάσδε κηδεῖους χοάς,
 ἄκος τομαῖον ἐλπίσασα πημάτων.
 Ορ. ἀλλ' εὐχομαι γῇ τῇδε καὶ πατρός τάφῳ
 τοῦνειρον εἶναι τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ τελεσφόρον.
 κρίνω δέ τοί νιν ὥστε συγκόλλως ἔχειν·
 εἰ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν χῶρον ἐκλιπὼν ἐμοὶ
 οὐφίς † ἐπᾶσα σπαργανηπλείζετο †
 καὶ μαστὸν ἀμφέχασκ' ἐμὸν θρεπτήριον
 θρόμβῳ τ' ἔμειξεν αἵματος φίλον γάλα,
 ἢ δ' ἀμφὶ τάρβει τῷδ' ἐπώμωξεν πάθει,
 δεῖ τοί νιν, ὡς ἔθρεψεν ἔκπαγλον τέρας,
 θανεῖν βιαίως· ἐκδρακοντωθεῖς δ' ἐγὼ
 κτείνω νιν, ὡς τοῦνειρον ἐννέπει τόδε.

(*Cho.* 526–50)

Orestes here begins his interpretation by pointing out the likeness between the snake and himself—they were born from the same place

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 388, n. 629.

and nursed at the same breast — and by telling how it bit and frightened his mother. But instead of concluding, “The snake is myself, and as it drew blood from my mother I will kill her,” Orestes continues:

Then she must, since she has nourished a terrible τέρας,
die by violence, and I, turned snake,
kill her, as this dream says.

(Cho. 548–50)

This may be taken simply as an elliptical expression of the expected conclusion,¹⁵ but the meaning of the dream would have been fairly clear even without these lines, and this fact makes their inclusion and wording the more interesting.¹⁶ Here, as in Orestes’ prayer to Zeus, an apparent redundancy signals a new level of meaning. It is not just that Clytemnestra dreamed she nourished a τέρας; she has nourished a τέρας, and that τέρας is Orestes, the son who will kill her. The identification of Orestes with the τέρας is further emphasized by the word ἐκδρακον-τωθείς, “turned snake,” a type of compound that, as H. J. Rose observes in his commentary, is used elsewhere of actual metamorphosis.¹⁷

¹⁵ W. Whallon, for example (“The Serpent at the Breast,” *TAPA* 89 [1958] 271–75), describes Orestes’ interpretation as follows (271): “When he learns of the apparition, he deduces that if the serpent was wrapped in the swaddling clothes in which he himself was wrapped, and if it sought to take the same breast as he himself took, then it surely represented himself.”

¹⁶ G. Devereux, *Dreams in Greek Tragedy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1976) 203, comments: “Orestes’ *Interpretation of the Dream* (540 ff.) seems, from the literary point of view, heavy-handed and unnecessary: Athenian audiences were not slow-witted.” In Devereux’s view, “Orestes interprets the dream, out loud, in a particular way, so as to make it come true in that particular way.” This last comment is certainly in keeping with the way portents and their interpretation work in Greek literature—see, for example, Peradotto (note 1 above) and H. D. Cameron, “The Power of Words in the *Seven Against Thebes*,” *TAPA* 101 (1970) 95–118—but Orestes’ interpretation is hardly otiose in any case, as I argue here.

The chief question commentators raise about Orestes’ interpretation concerns the precise sense of δεῖ τοι νῦν, ὥς ἔθρεψεν ἐκπαγλὸν τέρας, θανεῖν βιάίως (548–49). Groeneboom and others, following a comment of the scholiast, understand βιάίως with ἔθρεψεν; Sidgwick, followed by Verrall, dismisses this argument in favor of the view that “to dream of giving suck to a monster means violent death.” This debate is largely irrelevant to the question raised here.

¹⁷ The closest parallels I have found included by Paley in a list in his commentary (*The Tragedies of Aeschylus*, 2nd ed. [London 1861] ad loc.) are ἐκθηριοῦσθαι, which is used of actual transformation at Euripides’ *Bacchae* 1331, though in later authors it has a metaphorical meaning, and ἐξανδροῦσθαι, which can mean “grow to manhood” but is used of the growth of dragon’s teeth to men at Euripides’ *Suppliants* 703.

Like the metaphor in Orestes' prayer, the symbol here, which originally seems a limited likeness establishing only that Orestes by analogy to the snake will draw his mother's blood, comes to impose itself in its full nature on what it stands for.¹⁸

Orestes is the snake, as he is the eagle, and by these identifications he is made both τέρας and σῆμα. A τέρας is monstrous or portentous or both.¹⁹ As matricide Orestes is monstrous; as the matricide who is also the just avenger of his father he is a portent that demands interpretation.

IV

It is in the *Choephoroi*, then, that Orestes' triple role emerges, and it is in the interpretation of Clytemnestra's dream (centrally placed, and central also to important patterns of imagery in the trilogy) that the three roles are set side by side. Orestes prays for the dream's fulfillment in himself, is confirmed as interpreter, and is shown to be a portent. Only the last of these roles persists in the final play of the trilogy. At the end of the *Choephoroi*, the baffled chorus asks whether it should call

¹⁸ A close relationship between symbol and symbolized is in several respects characteristic of Aeschylus. As many have noted, his similes often show what O. Smith (note 11 above) calls fusion of *illustrans* and *illustrandum*; terms appropriate to one are applied to the other. Aeschylean images move easily from metaphor or simile to verbal description of the object in question and to its actual representation on stage. Finally, one view of language that is prominent in Aeschylean tragedies is that words do not merely represent but act to bring into being that of which they speak. On imagery, in addition to the words cited above in notes 1, 10, 11, and 13 by Dumortier, Lebeck, Petrounias, and Smith, see R. F. Goheen, "Aspects of Dramatic Symbolism: Three Studies in the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 76 (1955) 113-37; B. Knox, "The Lion in the House," *CP* 47 (1952) 17-25; J. J. Peradotto, "Some Patterns of Nature Imagery in the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 85 (1964) 378-93; and F. Zeitlin, "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *TAPA* 96 (1965) 463-508. On efficacious language in Aeschylus, see especially H. Bacon, "The Shield of Eteocles," *Arion* 3 (1964) 27-36; Cameron (note 17 above); Peradotto (note 1 above); and F. Zeitlin, *Under the Sign of the Shield: Semiotics and Aeschylus' Seven Against Thebes* (Rome 1982) 42-49.

¹⁹ The etymology of τέρας is obscure; for discussion of the possibilities see P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique* (Paris 1968-77), and H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, vol. 2 (Heidelberg 1961). LSJ give as meaning both "sign, wonder, marvel, portent," exemplified first in several passages in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and "monster," which becomes more common in later texts but occurs in the *Iliad* in reference to the Gorgon on Athena's shield. The word is also common in the specific sense of a monstrous birth; cf. Plato's *Cratylus*, 393b and 394a.

Orestes σωτήρ or μόρος (1073-74). In the *Eumenides*, Orestes can no longer fulfill or interpret; he is only the object of an interpretation through which the final fulfillment is attained.

There is one prophecy yet to be fulfilled as the last play opens, the part of Apollo's oracle which promised that Orestes would be free of blame if he did as he was told:

Ορ. καὶ φίλτρα τόλμης τῆσδε πλειστηρίζομαι
τὴν πυθόμαντιν Λοξίαν, χρήσαντ' ἔμοι
πράξαντα μὲν ταῦτ' ἑκτός αἰτίας κακῆς
εἶναι, παρέντι δ' οὐκ ἔρῳ τὴν ζημίαν.

(*Cho.* 1029-32)

But it is Athena and the jurors who are responsible for fulfilling this prophecy. Their responsibility is made explicit in Apollo's charge to the jurors at *Eumenides* 713-14.

κᾶγωγε χρησμούς τοὺς ἔμοις τε καὶ Διὸς
ταρβεῖν κελεύω μηδ' ἀκαρπώτους κτίσαι.

The final part of the oracle will be fulfilled by means of the court's judgment. This judgment is also an interpretation of the τέρας Orestes represents and the σῆμα Zeus and Apollo have made of him, as indeed the two central arguments of the trial suggest.

The first of these is that in killing his mother Orestes was doing what Zeus (through Apollo) ordered, and that his act was therefore just and his acquittal necessary. It is Zeus' role that is stressed by Apollo both in his opening words at the trial (*Eum.* 614-21) and in his final charge to the jurors (*Eum.* 713-14, cited above), and by Athena in her efforts to win over the Erinyes (*Eum.* 797-99). By his acquittal, then, Orestes is accepted and confirmed as a sign of Zeus' will.

The second argument is the notorious claim that only the father is the child's parent (*Eum.* 657-66). This argument seeks to make the matricide unmonstrous and unproblematical by the revelation that Orestes is not in fact his mother's blood kin. It does not follow, however, that he is no τέρας at all.²⁰ He is a τέρας that must be differently inter-

²⁰ Whallon argues something of the sort (though with different emphasis) when he observes: "Thus the dream appears a false omen: Orestes cannot be thought the serpent in swaddling clothes to which Clytemnestra offered her breast, if she did not fill for him

preted, and we have already been given the means for this interpretation. Both the theory of conception proposed in the *Eumenides* and the dream image of birth in the *Choephoroi* are foreshadowed by the image at *Agamemnon* 1388-92, suggestive of both conception and birth, in which Clytemnestra tells the chorus that she rejoiced in her husband's blood as the earth rejoices in the rain:

οὕτω τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ὀρμαίνει πεσῶν
 κάκφυσιῶν ὀξεῖαν αἵματος σφαγὴν
 βάλλει μ' ἔρεμνῃ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου,
 χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἤσσον ἢ διοςδότῳ
 γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν.

The avenging and snaky-locked Erinyes are linked with the father's blood at *Choephoroi* 283-84, and in Hesiod's account of their origin at *Theogony* 183-85 the Earth bears them from the blood shed by the castrated Ouranos. Orestes, born as a snake, is the offspring of the murdered Agamemnon's blood, as his vengeance is the product of the murder.²¹ Apollo's theory of conception is therefore in part a confirmation of Orestes' special case; Orestes, in a double sense the child of his father's blood alone, is a *τέρας*, a monstrous birth, but his act (properly understood) was vengeance and not matricide.

as a child this most tender office of a mother (breast-feeding). The bond between them is loosened by the denial that an image connecting them is valid. The bond is then broken completely by Apollo's argument that the mother has no part in procreation but only gives nurture to the implanted seed (*Eum.* 658-59). ("The Serpent at the Breast" [note 15 above] 204; cf. his recent *Problem and Spectacle* [Heidelberg 1980] 135-37.) Whallon is concerned not with Orestes as *τέρας* but with whether the serpent image correctly represents him. (The larger question here is whether an image once established can be denied and undone or only reinterpreted.)

²¹ The dream is more often seen as stressing the kinship of Orestes and Clytemnestra; Lebeck observes (*The Oresteia* [note 1 above] 130): "This is the portent of Clytemnestra's dream: herself a serpent she has borne a serpent . . . Orestes truly is his mother's son, his act of vengeance offspring of her own." This is so, but it is only part of the story, and Orestes' act of vengeance is ultimately differentiated from his mother's. Devereux (note 16 above, 191) stresses the ways in which the dream associates Orestes with Agamemnon. R. Fagles and W. B. Stanford, in the introductory essay to Fagles' translation of the *Oresteia* (New York 1975) 31, suggest a link between the image of fertilization in the *Agamemnon* and Orestes' later arrival and vengeance, described as a new birth: "Even now she labors with the spear at spring, the son who will destroy her." I have found no one who makes the connection between image and dream explicit.

It might be objected that there are in fact no references to Orestes as portent in the *Eumenides*, and that mention of prophecy of any kind is very scarce in this play; we have shifted to the world of the polis and of law-courts.²² But the world of the *Eumenides* is also a world in which many things once only spoken of appear on stage,²³ and this is true of the portentous as well: a dream (Clytemnestra's ghost) urges vengeance; curses (the Erinyes) and the representative of an oracle (Apollo) vie for supremacy.²⁴ In similar fashion, the portents earlier spoken of now appear in the person of Orestes; the law-court decides the meaning and fate of a portent. In the outcome, just as Apollo's oracle is fulfilled, Zeus's sign in the person of Orestes is confirmed. The threatening curses that are the Erinyes and the τέρας of the matricide Orestes are more problematic, but both are in effect reinterpreted (their ambiguities taken in a positive sense) and lose their monstrous aspect.

V

The significance of the pattern I have described here is that Orestes' threefold relation to the important theme of prophecy in the *Oresteia* further emphasizes and delineates his special role in the unfolding of the trilogy and reveals something as well about how we are to understand the trilogy.

In the *Agamemnon*, a variety of predictions and portents find their fulfillments in a series of events brought about by different people at different times.²⁵ The omen of the eagles and the hare is fulfilled in the taking of Troy, while Calchas' prediction of Artemis' anger and her demand for sacrifice have already been fulfilled in Iphigenia's death. The murder of Agamemnon fulfills Calchas' last dark hints, together

²² Peradotto (note 1 above, 9) sees a shift from magically efficacious language to language with a "secular, civilizing efficacy" in the last play of the trilogy.

²³ As Lebeck puts it (note 1 above, 131) "... images developed on a verbal level in the other two plays are dramatized and acted out in the last."

²⁴ The Erinyes identify themselves as curses at *Eum.* 417; the binding song (*Eum.* 307-96) further suggests this role, and the change to *Eumenides* at the end can be read as a reinterpretation or transformation of curses into blessings. (See especially *Eum.* 902, 978, 1021.)

²⁵ For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the arrangement of prophecies in the *Oresteia*, see Roberts (note 1 above) ch. 2, esp. pp. 28, 35-37.

with Cassandra's prophecies and Thyestes' ancient curses. By contrast, all portents and predictions from the end of the *Agamemnon* until the climax of the *Choephoroi* point to Orestes' matricide.

Again, in the *Agamemnon* a variety of interpreters and prophets are at work. Calchas reads the omen of the eagle and the hare; the chorus, uncertain what exactly it forebodes, has premonitions of disaster;²⁶ and Cassandra sees visions of past and future. But after the partial interpretation of Clytemnestra's dream by the household interpreters at the start of the *Choephoroi*, Orestes becomes the *τερασκόπος*.

In the *Agamemnon*, moreover, the roles of fulfiller and interpreter are separated. Those who actively fulfill have at best partial understanding, and those who interpret are observers and victims. In the *Choephoroi*, Orestes is both fulfiller and interpreter—the most effectively active, and the one who knows most.

That Orestes is fulfiller points not only to the centrality of his actions in the trilogy but to the fact that it is with him that the troubles of the house of Atreus come to an end. That he is interpreter points not only to the knowledge on which his revenge is based but to his subsequent consciousness of the horror and complexity of his act. That he is portent as well suggests that an interpretation of the problem he represents must be looked for and can be found.²⁷

This interpretation, as I have argued, takes the form of the judgment in the *Eumenides*. Orestes here relinquishes all claims to action and to interpretation; he becomes a suppliant subject to the decisions of others, and can only state what he has done, not judge it.²⁸ In order that a satisfactory fulfillment be reached, the gods and the court must interpret Orestes' action.

And so must we. As many recent critics have shown, the *Oresteia* is characterized by a pervasive ambiguity: word, action, and character require interpretation both within the trilogy's story and by the reader. The trilogy, like Heraclitus' lord at Delphi, does not speak its meaning to us transparently, nor does it decoratively and decorously conceal the truth; it gives us signs. Orestes is the trilogy's central sign.

²⁶ Although not gifted with true prophecy, the chorus at *Ag.* 975 ff. uses prophetic terms expressing its premonitions.

²⁷ Mere rejection of portents, oracles, and the like is a notoriously unsuccessful strategy; witness in this trilogy Clytemnestra's effort to avert the household curse (*Ag.* 1568–76).

²⁸ *Eum.* 463–68, 611–13.

VI

It should be obvious that the triple role I have here ascribed to Orestes is shared by (and more frequently ascribed to) Sophocles' Oedipus, who has been described as reader of riddles, answer to riddles, and himself a riddle.²⁹ It is also shared by Eteocles, who interprets the omens on the attackers' shields in the *Seven Against Thebes*, and whose death fulfills dreams, a curse, and an oracle; as F. Zeitlin has observed, he is himself a riddle he cannot read.³⁰ What are we to make of such parallels? In the first place, in narratives where the oracular is prominent, this triple role seems in part a function of a character's centrality in the plot. It is because the story is about him that he fulfills prophecies, and because his is the consciousness we are most aware of that he interprets them; it is because he poses the story's problem that he must be interpreted, by us as by the other characters.³¹ But it is also the case that each of the three plays mentioned here turns to some extent on incomplete fulfillment and inadequate interpretation, and the central character may in his triple role be said to exemplify the fact that apparent fulfillments or solutions turn out to be problematic and interpreters do not have the knowledge to solve the problems they themselves constitute. Orestes is more fortunate than Oedipus and Eteocles in that he is given a solution.

A final parallel may be found in Plato's Socrates. Socrates is the frequent recipient of a divine sign, his δαιμόνιον.³² He is also the subject of an oracle in the *Apology* and receives a dream command in the *Phaedo*;³³ he reads (and carries out) both oracle and dream, and is concerned throughout the dialogues with inquiry and examination. He is

²⁹ On Oedipus as enigma, see especially J. P. Vernant, "Ambiguïté et renversement. Sur la structure énigmatique d'Oedipe-roi," in J. P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Mythe et tragédie en grèce ancienne* (Paris 1973) 99-131.

³⁰ On Eteocles in the *Seven Against Thebes*, see Bacon (note 18 above), Cameron (note 16 above), and Zeitlin (note 18 above) part I, 15-51, "Language, Structure, and the Son of Oedipus in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*." Zeitlin calls Eteocles (48) "the best interpreter with regard to the defense of the city and the worst in regard to himself."

³¹ This last aspect may be most prominent in figures like the three noted here who are particularly problematic by virtue of their position in a family. For an extended discussion of the relationship between Eteocles' place in his family and his roles as interpreter and enigma, see Zeitlin (note 18 above) part I, 15-51.

³² *Apol.* 31d, 40c, 41d, *Euthyd.* 272e, *Euthyph.* 3b, *Phaedr.* 242c, *Rep.* 6.49c.

³³ *Apol.* 21a-23b, 30a, 33c; *Phaed.* 60d-61c.

himself a riddle as well: Alcibiades in the *Symposium* (215a4-b3) tells us that Socrates' outer form conceals secrets, and at the beginning of the *Phaedrus* (229d2-230a6) Socrates refuses to turn his attention to the interpretation of myth and mythical beings when he has not yet adequately understood what sort of enigmatic creature he himself may be.³⁴ As so often, however, Plato here both uses and revises an earlier literary motif, for Socrates is an interpreter who understands the limits of interpretation and understands that he is himself the problem he must interpret. He thus plays self-consciously the roles that Orestes, like other tragic heroes, plays with a consciousness that is late and partial.

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³⁴ *Symp.* 215a-b, *Phaedr.* 229d-230a. Socrates in fact refers to the mythological creatures in question as τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων (*Phaedr.* 229e). (Citations from Plato are taken from the Oxford Classical Text v. 1,2 [Oxford 1900, 1901] ed. J. Burnet.)

THE LENGTH OF ERATOSTHENES' STADE*

The problem of the length of the stade used by Eratosthenes in his measurement of the Earth's circumference and his measurements of other distances has long been mired in a forbidding morass of conflicting hypotheses and tangled arguments. Indeed, so much confusion has been generated by this question that the study of ancient geography has suffered, since the stade of Eratosthenes was a basic unit of measurement. J. O. Thomson in a counsel of despair wrote, "It is astonishing that ancient writers, even geographers, betray hardly any uneasiness about the value of travel reports in stades which might be a very variable quantity."¹ I hope to show that this lack of "uneasiness" occurred because ancient geographers knew perfectly well the length of the stade they used, indeed it was never in doubt among them, and that the "variable quantities" of ancient stades are more often the result of modern confusion and not ancient measurements. It will be further argued that Eratosthenes used the Attic stade of 184.98 m. (606 ft. 10 in.) based on 600 Attic feet of 308.3 mm. apiece, which was also the standard unit of measurement of the Greco-Roman geographical tradition.

The Attic stade used in this study is based on the measurements of the Parthenon and the Stadium at Athens, and the Roman foot of 296 mm. on the length of the *pes monetalis*.² It would be wrong to assume, however, that all Attic stades and Roman feet were of exactly these lengths. In an age before concepts of universal standardization and only rough and ready methods of measuring distances overland, some variation in these measurements was natural. Nevertheless, there are sufficient differences in the lengths of different types of ancient (and modern) stades to justify making distinctions among them.

Before discussing Eratosthenes' use of the Attic stade, the alterna-

*I am grateful to Gerald Toomer, the editor of *American Journal of Philology*, and the *Journal's* anonymous referee for their useful advice and help. They are not responsible for the views expressed nor for any errors.

¹J. O. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography* (Cambridge 1948) 161. It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze Eratosthenes' procedure. For this the reader is referred to O. Neugebauer, *History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy* (Berlin 1975) 652-54, 734-36; G. Aujac, *Strabon et la science de son temps* (Paris 1966) 176-79.

²For the length of the Attic stade, see note 33 below; for the Roman foot and related measurements, see note 7 below. Of course, there were other stades besides the Attic, but Eratosthenes did not use them.

tive values assigned to Eratosthenes' stade at various times must be considered. The two alternative measurements are a stade of 148 m. or 10 per Roman mile, and one of about 157 m.³ In order to understand why the values of 148 m. and 157 m. are incorrect (and in fact entirely fictional), it is necessary to see where these values came from and analyze the arguments that have been used to support them. Often, these arguments were made over a century ago and involve some tendentious mathematical calculations. It is hoped that the reader will understand that an analysis of these calculations is necessary to show the bogus reasoning that forms the basis of these alternative values of the stade. Furthermore, all too often, these early determinations have been uncritically followed by later writers, so it is necessary to go back to the beginnings to find the sources of error. A stade of about 148 m. in length, which exists entirely in the imaginations of modern writers and is never mentioned by any ancient source, has had nevertheless a long, if not glorious history. The first to advocate this length was M. d'Anville in 1759; he was followed by Hultsch in 1862, and most recently by Lehmann-Haupt.⁴ The methodology d'Anville used to establish this length is significant since it characterizes the type of reasoning used in later arguments and since d'Anville is still cited as a basic source on the problem.⁵ It must be stated once again that the reasons behind d'Anville's complex mathematical manipulations will not become apparent until the end of this section about him.

As in later writers, d'Anville bases his argument on the statement of Pliny *NH* 12.53 that "by the calculation of Eratosthenes, a schoenus

³A third length for Eratosthenes' stade was given by a late source, Julianus of Ascalon, who wrote, "the mile according to the geographers Eratosthenes and Strabo contained 8 and 1/3 stadia (178.3 m.)," F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie*, 2nd ed. (Berlin 1882) 65. However, Strabo himself, as he tells us on two occasions (7.7.4; Bk. 7, frag. 57) used a stade of 8 per Roman mile and states that this was the measure used by most other geographers except Polybius. Therefore, since Julianus was inaccurate concerning the stade used by Strabo, there is a good chance he was inaccurate concerning Eratosthenes as well. As far as I can determine, no modern author maintains that Eratosthenes used a stade of this length.

⁴M. d'Anville, "Mémoire sur la mesure du schène égyptien, et du stade qui servoit à le composer," *Mémoires de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* 26 (1759) 82-91; M. d'Anville, "Discussion de la mesure de la terre par Ératosthène," *Mém. Acad. inscript. et belles-lettres* 26 (1759) 92-100; F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie*, 1st ed. (Berlin 1862) 50; Lehmann-Haupt, *RE s.v. stadion*, 1934-1942.

⁵E.g., by Thomson (note 1 above) 162.

measures 40 stadia, that is 5 (Roman) miles, but some authorities have made the schoenus 32 stadia."⁶ It may seem obvious that the way to calculate the length of Eratosthenes' stade would be to divide 5 Roman miles by 40 stades and obtain a stade length of 184.98 m., since the length of the Roman mile has long been known (1,480.0 m. or 1,618.4 yds.).⁷ But instead of using this simple method, d'Anville first attempts to discover the length of the Egyptian schoenus, a measurement which was extremely variable. Artemidorus (cited by Strabo, 17.1.24) wrote that the length of the schoenus varied from province to province in Egypt; it was equal to 30 stades in the Delta, 120 stades from Memphis to the Thebaid, and 60 stades from the Thebaid to Syenē. Pliny noted that the schoenus can sometimes equal 30 stades, 32 stades, or 40 stades, and both Herodotus and Diodorus wrote that a schoenus equalled 60 stades.⁸ In fact, because of its variability, the schoenus can be equal to almost whatever length one wishes and this characteristic explains why we often find it used in arguments concerning the stade.

Nevertheless, in the first of two articles relating to the stade of Eratosthenes, d'Anville attempts to discover the length of the Egyptian schoenus.⁹ His first difficulty is to reconcile the widely differing lengths of the schoenus given in Herodotus, Diodorus, and Pliny. However, this seemingly insurmountable obstacle offers d'Anville little trouble. Although Pliny wrote that the schoenus equalled 5 miles, d'Anville cheerfully calculates Pliny's schoenus as 4 Roman miles or 32 stades, which equals 3,024 fathoms.¹⁰ (D'Anville regularly used fathoms in his calculations; one fathom equals about 6 ft. 5 in. or 1.96 m.; there are about 756 fathoms per Roman mile.) Next, he divides the length of the schoenus by 60 to obtain the length of Herodotus' and Diodorus' stades (which are 60 per schoenus) at 50.4 fathoms or 98.67 m. (c. 323 ft. 7 in.).

To check this length of the schoenus, d'Anville takes the measurement of Egypt's length along the Mediterranean coast given in Strabo and

⁶"Schoenus patet Eratosthenis ratione stadia XL, hoc est passuum V milia, aliqui XXXII stadia singulis schoenis dedere."

⁷Hultsch (note 3 above) 88 f.; *Dar.-Sag. s.v. mensura*; Lehmann-Haupt (note 4 above) 1933-34.

⁸Pliny *NH* 5.63, 12.53; *Hdt.* 2.6; *Diod.* 1.51.5; d'Anville, "Mémoire sur la mesure du schène" (note 4 above) 83.

⁹"Mémoire sur la mesure du schène" (note 4 above) 82-91.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 83. When Pliny wrote (*NH* 12.53) that, "aliqui XXXII stadia singulis schoenis dedere," d'Anville thinks this means that the schoenus equals 4 Roman miles. However, this is not what Pliny said; see note 6.


Diodorus as 1,970 stades and multiplies this by 94.5 fathoms (the length of the Attic stade, which d'Anville and other writers before the mid-nineteenth century mistakenly called the Olympic stade),¹¹ to obtain a total length of 186,165 fathoms. He divides this by 60 to obtain Herodotus' schoenus of 3,102.75 fathoms (6,074.17 m.), since Herodotus wrote that the Egyptian seaboard was 60 schoeni in length.¹² This figure is in turn divided by 60 to obtain a stade of 51 fathoms, 4 feet, 3 inches (101.1 m.), which is averaged with the earlier figure of 50.4 fathoms to obtain finally aschoenus of 3,060 fathoms (5,990.5 m.) based on a stade of 51 fathoms or 99.8 m. This schoenus is nearly equal to 4 Roman miles (3,024 fa.), and d'Anville believes that the related stade of 99.8 m. was used by both Herodotus and Diodorus.

There are several problems with the methodology d'Anville has used to establish the length of his schoenus. Essentially, he assumes, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that the length of the schoenus always remains constant, while the length of the stade varies. However, it is more probable, given the known variability of the schoenus, that the schoenus Pliny gave as 40 or 32 stades in length was different from the schoenus Herodotus and Diodorus gave as 60 stades in length. Second, the length of the stade resulting from d'Anville's calculations, 99.8 m. (c. 323 ft. 6 in.), is far shorter than any stade length given in any author, ancient or modern. Third, it is arbitrary to assume that Pliny's schoenus was 4 Roman miles when he said it was 5 Roman miles. Finally, one may note the arbitrary division of 1,970 stades or 186,165 fathoms by 60 to obtain a length of Herodotus' and Diodorus' schoenus of 3,102.75 fa. There are several errors committed in this operation. Herodotus indeed wrote that the seaboard of Egypt was 60 schoeni in length, but he added that this was equal to 3,600 stades and not the 1,970 stades of Diodorus. It is not justifiable to conflate the 1,970 stade figure and the 3,600 stade figure of Herodotus; it has long been recognized that, for whatever reason, Herodotus' measurement is simply too long.¹³ In other words, the 1,970

¹¹Hultsch (note 3 above) 64; cf. R. Hussey, *An Essay on the Ancient Weights and Money* (Oxford 1836) 234 f. For the length of the Attic foot and its corresponding stade, see note 33.

¹²Hdt. 2.6.

¹³A. B. Lloyd, *Herodotus Book II: Commentary 1-98* (Leiden 1976) 41-45. Actually Diod. 1.31.6 gives 2,000 stades for the length of Egypt, but d'Anville has added together several distances in various sources and obtained 1,970.



stades figure and the 3,600 stades figure are simply two widely differing lengths and not the same length measured with different stades.

In his second article, d'Anville attempts to find the length of Eratosthenes' stade through an ingenious sequence of calculations which are linked to the ancient mathematician's determination of the earth's circumference.¹⁴ First, d'Anville notes that Eratosthenes erred in his calculation of the section of the earth's circumference subtended by the arc between Alexandria and Syene. He calculated this as $1/50$ of an arc ($7\frac{1}{5}^\circ$, $7^\circ 12'$), or 5,000 stades. In actual fact, however, d'Anville believes that the distance is $7^\circ 21'$ or $7\frac{2}{5}^\circ$.¹⁵ Hence, the number of stades per degree will not have been 700 but only 676, since about 700 stades fills the length of a degree if $7\frac{1}{5}^\circ$ forms the distance of 5,000 stades, but only 676 will fill the length of a degree if $7\frac{2}{5}^\circ$ forms a distance of 5,000 stades.

Next, d'Anville asserts that Eratosthenes has rounded off too much from the itinerary distance between Alexandria and Syene, that is the distance measured over the actual terrain, to obtain his straight-line distance of 5,000 stades. According to d'Anville, Eratosthenes should have rounded off $1/8$ of the itinerary distance, but instead, he rounded off more. D'Anville calculates the actual itinerary distance as 6,250 stades by asserting that Eratosthenes might have rounded off $1/5$ from his itinerary distance to obtain a 5,000 stade straight-line distance. Then, taking 6,250 as the accurate figure (in the previous article he has calculated the itinerary distance between Alexandria and Syene himself as 640 Roman miles and the straight-line distance as 560 Roman miles) for the itinerary distance, he says that Eratosthenes should have deducted $1/8$ from this distance and then he would have obtained a straight-line

¹⁴ According to Cleomedes *On the Orbits of the Heavenly Bodies* 1.10, Eratosthenes' measurement was made on the basis of two observations made at Syene (modern Aswan) and Alexandria. At noon on the summer solstice, an upright gnomon cast no shadow at Syene but at Alexandria at the same time, a gnomon cast a shadow of $1/50$ of a circle ($7\frac{1}{5}^\circ$).

By the geometric principle that opposite interior angles of two parallel lines (the rays of the sun at Syene and Alexandria) are the same, the angle subtended by the arc between Syene and Alexandria at the earth's center is also $1/50$ of a circle. Eratosthenes assumed that Syene and Alexandria were on the same meridian (in fact, Syene is 3° east of Alexandria), and he believed that the distance between the two places was 5,000 stades. Therefore, the circumference of the earth was 50 times 5,000 stades or 250,000 stades. Later writers (Pliny *NH* 2. 247; Str. 2.5.7) gave the figure as 252,000 stades, perhaps on the basis of further observation, or a desire to have the circumference more easily divisible.

¹⁵ According to Knaach, *RE s.v.* Eratosthenes, 366, the actual distance is $7^\circ 7' 54''$.

distance of 5,500 stades. Indeed, d'Anville notes that Hipparchus corrected Eratosthenes' figure for the circumference of the earth by adding 10% or 25,000 stades to the total figure (actually, Hipparchus added 26,000 stades to the total).¹⁶ This was done, d'Anville believes, because Hipparchus knew that Eratosthenes had underestimated the itinerary distance by 10%. By this calculation, the distances filled by a degree increases to 744 stades instead of 676 stades and hence $7\frac{2}{5}^\circ$ would fill the distance of 5,500 stades and not 5,000. Therefore, d'Anville concludes that the stade Eratosthenes used was c. 10 per Roman mile or 76 fa. 3 ft. and some inches (c. 149 m.). This is equal to c. 75 Roman miles per degree of latitude, which makes Eratosthenes' degree equal to 111.3 kms. (69.19 miles), virtually the exact distance of a degree of latitude.

D'Anville checks his calculations by using the length of the Egyptian schoenus he has calculated in the previous article. He notes that 40 of his stades of 76 fa. 3 ft. and some inches is exactly equal to his schoenus of 3,060 fa. Finally, d'Anville castigates Pliny for writing that the Egyptian schoenus equalled 5 Roman miles according to Eratosthenes' calculation.

One may make several comments about the methodology of this argument. Suffice it to say that d'Anville's final result of $7\frac{2}{5}^\circ$ distance between Alexandria and Syene, the distance of 5,500 stades, and his estimate of 744 stades per degree, bears no relation whatsoever to what Eratosthenes was recorded to have said. Eratosthenes' assumption that Alexandria and Syene were on the same meridian, his straight-line distance between the two places, and his measurement of $1/50$ of a circle ($7\frac{1}{5}^\circ$) between them were all incorrect,¹⁷ and these errors have not surprisingly led to an incorrect determination of the earth's circumference. Undoubtedly, he used the most reliable figures available to him, but to simply exchange his figures for more accurate ones to have his determination of a degree of latitude come out accurately tells us very little about Eratosthenes' own calculations. Nor is it justifiable to assume that, by some astonishing coincidence, all his errors exactly cancelled each other out. Finally, a stade length of c. 10 per Roman mile (c. 148 m.) bears no relationship to any real measurement recorded in any ancient literary source or on any ancient monument. Such is the methodology and the logical basis for the stade length of c. 148 m. that many modern authorities still accept as accurate.

The stade length of c. 148 m. was accepted by Hultsch in his 1862

¹⁶D. R. Dicks, *The Geographical Fragments of Hipparchus* (London 1960) frag. 38.

¹⁷Knaach (note 15 above) 365-66.

edition of *Griechische und römische Metrologie* without further argument, and finally by Lehmann-Haupt.¹⁸ The latter writer finds support for this length in Strabo 5.3.12, who wrote that the distance between Rome and Aricia was 160 stades and the distance was given as 16 Roman miles in the *Itinerarium Provincia*. However, it must be pointed out that not all measurements given by ancient authors are correct, for one reason or another, and this appears to be one of them.¹⁹ Once again, no ancient source ever mentions a stade whose length was 10 per Roman mile.

Lehmann-Haupt concludes by noting that Eratosthenes used a figure of 700 stades per degree and that if a stade equalled 8 per Roman mile, then the resulting figure of his calculation of the earth's circumference would have been 16.67% too large; if he used a stade of $8 \frac{1}{3}$ per Roman mile, Eratosthenes' figure would be 12% too large. But if he used a stade of 10 per Roman mile, then his measurement would only have been 6.45% too small. He further notes that Eratosthenes has not been appreciated in ancient or modern times because of all the errors committed in determining the length of the stade he used. One might suggest that the reason Eratosthenes has been neglected, at least in modern times, is because the study of his achievement has been dominated by contrived arguments such as this, which have baffled even the most determined efforts of interested students.²⁰

The next alternative is the stade of c. 157.5 m. in length, which was first suggested by A. Letronne in his posthumous work, *Recherches sur les fragments d'Héron d'Alexandrie ou du système métrique égyptien*.²¹ He

¹⁸See note 4. Others have also accepted this figure without adding anything new to the discussion, as far as I can determine.

¹⁹In an earlier study on Alexander the Great, I noted the following erroneous measurements: Str. 15.2.11, Arr. 3.8.7, Diod. 17.68.4, Pliny *NH* 6.62 on the distance from the Jhelum to the Beas; there are undoubtedly many others in other sources.

²⁰Lehmann-Haupt (note 4 above) 1935. Dicks (note 16 above) 43-44 also offers cogent reasons for rejecting Lehmann-Haupt's views and especially the groundless assumption that Eratosthenes used two different stades in his measurements, one for the earth's circumference and another for local distances.

²¹(Paris 1851) esp. 212-46, 104-19. This was a youthful essay originally written in 1816 but virtually disowned by the older and wiser Letronne, which is why it was not published in his lifetime. But Letronne's great authority was doubtless responsible for the widespread acceptance of this stade in the nineteenth century. For a critique of the scholarship done on the length of the stade up to the mid-nineteenth century, see T. Henri Martin, "Escamen d'un mémoire posthume de M. Letronne," *Revue Archéologique* (1853, 1854) esp. pp. 732 ff. (1853), p. 53 (1854). I am grateful to Gerald Toomer for pointing out these facts to me.

was followed by Müllenhoff, Vivien de St. Martin, Hultsch in his second edition of *Griechische und römische Metrologie*, and more recently by Firsov and Fraser.²²

Like d'Anville, Letronne based his stade on the length of "the" Egyptian schoenus. In Heron of Alexandria's table of measurements, the schoenus is equal to 30 Egyptian stades and 4 Egyptian miles.²³ The Egyptian measurements were longer than the Greek or Roman, a stade equalled 211 m. and was composed of 400 cubits of 527.5 mm.; the resulting schoenus in this system was 6,330 m., according to Letronne. Letronne obtained the length of the cubit by measuring various Egyptian buildings and monuments, including a Nilometer found at Elephantine. This long Egyptian stade was then combined with Pliny's statement that according to Eratosthenes, the schoenus was composed of 40 stades, which makes his stade $6,330 \text{ m.} \div 40$ or 158.25 m.

A later series of measurements taken by Lepsius, however, indicated a cubit length of 525 mm., hence a stade of 157.5 m., and Müllenhoff believed that this cubit was based on two Ptolemaic feet of 262.5 mm. apiece.²⁴ This latter measurement for the stade has been generally followed by many modern works.

One notes again that in order for this stade length to be correct, the gratuitous assumption must be made that Pliny correctly calculated Eratosthenes' stade in terms of the Egyptian schoenus, but incorrectly in terms of the Roman mile. Furthermore, since the length of the schoenus was so variable, it is unwarranted to assume that Pliny's schoenus, comprised of 40 or 32 stades, was the same used by Heron, composed of 30 stades. Also, a cubit length of 525 mm. throws Heron's table of measurements into confusion. According to this source, the Egyptian stade is composed of 720 Italian (presumably Roman) feet or 400 cubits.²⁵ Since the length of the Roman foot has long been known as 296 mm.,²⁶ 720 of them

²²K. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde* (Berlin 1870) 259-96; L. Vivien de St. Martin, *Histoire de la géographie* (Paris 1875) 138; F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (Berlin 1882) 60-64; L. V. Firsov, "Eratosthenes' Calculation of the Earth's Circumference and the Length of the Hellenistic Stade," *Journal of Ancient History* 121 (1972) 154-75 (in Russian with English synopsis); P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) 599, n. 312.

²³Heron *Geometria* 106.24 (ed. Hultsch).

²⁴R. Lepsius, "Die altägyptische Elle und ihre Eintheilung," *Abhandlung der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1865) 1-64. esp. 13-17; Müllenhoff (note 22 above) 260-61. This would give 600 "Ptolemaic" feet to this stade.

²⁵Heron *Geo.* 106.21.

²⁶See note 7 above.

are equal to a stade of 213.12 m. This figure gives a cubit length of 532.8 mm. ($213.12 \div 400$). One cannot have, therefore, a stade comprised of 720 Italian feet of 296 mm. and 400 cubits of only 525 mm. at the same time. And, of course, all our sources state that the Egyptian and Ptolemaic cubits were composed of $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet and not 2 feet.²⁷ It will be noted that the use of this stade gives the most accurate result for Eratosthenes' calculation of the earth's circumference, only 300 kms. too low or an error of .006%, an astonishing coincidence considering all the errors Eratosthenes is known to have made.

In conclusion, there is no literary evidence for a cubit composed of 2 feet, nor has a foot length of 262.5 mm. been found on any Egyptian monument, nor have efforts to find a stade length of 157 m. used in the neighborhood of Alexandria been convincing.²⁸ Quite the contrary, Hyginus wrote that the Ptolemies used the Attic foot, $1\frac{1}{24}$ of a Roman foot, to measure their territory and presumably they also used the Attic stade based on this foot.²⁹

The most recent writer to attempt to prove Eratosthenes used a stade of c. 157 m. in length was L. V. Firsov. Fortunately, he avoids the tortuous logic of his predecessors, and his methodology is a simple one. He takes 81 measurements of distances recorded by Eratosthenes and preserved mainly in Strabo. For each one, he divides the straight-line distance by the number of stades recorded by Eratosthenes. Finally, he averages the 81 lengths of the stades he derives from this method and obtains 157.7 m. for the length of Eratosthenes' stade.

Nevertheless, this simple and straightforward methodology contains two false assumptions. First, Firsov assumes that the maps of geographical

²⁷Hdt. 2.149; Heron *Geo.* 106.9, 12; Didymus *Mensurae Marmorum* 12-13 (ed. Hultsch); Hesych. s.v. stadion; Suidas, s.v. stadion.

²⁸Even as Müllenhoff (note 22 above) 261 admitted. Letronne (pp. 220-29) tried to find evidence for his stade in the measurements of various features of the city of Alexandria recorded in ancient sources and their actual measurement at the site. The problem is that in the 1810s, the ancient site of Alexandria was not known very accurately. For example, his measurement of the Heptastadion is 1.1 kms., whereas modern plans of the city (e.g., A. Aymard and J. Auboyer, *L'Orient et la Grèce antique* [Paris 1967] 442) give less than 1 km., and his measurement of the circumference of the Great Harbor is 4,760 m. (p. 224), but a modern plan gives over 5,000 m.

²⁹Hyginus Gromaticus, p. 122 f. (ed. Lachmann, quoted by Hultsch, *Metrologie*², 70): "in provincia Cyrenensium agri sunt regii, id est illi, quos Ptolemaeus rex populo Romano relinquit; — pes eorum, qui Ptolemeicus appellatur, habet monetalem pedem et semiunicam." The *pes monetalis* is the Roman foot of about 296 mm. and hence, $1\frac{1}{24}$ of a Roman foot would be 308.3 mm.

positions used by Eratosthenes were extraordinarily accurate—as accurate as our own maps, in fact. However, there is abundant evidence that this was not the case, especially in determining longitudes.³⁰ Hence, since Eratosthenes did not have an accurate knowledge of geographical positions, any measurement he gave between two places may be inaccurate, or accurate only coincidentally. Second, one will note the wide variation in Firsov's measurements of Eratosthenes' stades, which vary from 300 m. to 116 m., and these variations are statistically significant. It is nowhere stated that any of the distances Firsov records as measured by Eratosthenes were in fact straight-line distances, and we know that, quite often, this was not the case. For example, Eratosthenes' measurement of 1,400 stades between Trebizond and Phasis is the distance of the coastal voyage, which of course is curved and does not proceed in a straight line.³¹ The same can be said for many other distances Firsov lists.³² Firsov's stades measured from distances between two or more places that lie on curved coastlines are shorter than his average stades, and this is precisely the systematic error one would expect if the actual distances were measured along the curve rather than straight lines, since more stades in a shorter distance would give a shorter length of the stade in such instances. Firsov has averaged giants and pygmies and has obtained a normal average

³⁰Thomson (note 1 above) 164–65. Of course, longitude was always difficult to calculate before the development of accurate chronometers in the late seventeenth century A.D., S. Mason, *A History of the Sciences* (New York 1962) 269–71. Eratosthenes' itinerary distances could be quite accurate (see below pp. 309–10), but a major difficulty was the conversion of itinerary distances into straight-line distances along lines of latitude and longitude—a difficult task without a good clock and a compass. Perhaps the most famous ancient example of this difficulty was the attempt to time the lunar eclipse in September 20, 331 B.C. The eclipse was recorded to have occurred at Arbela in the fifth hour (of night) and at Carthage in the second hour. However, these times were inaccurate and the resulting difference in longitude of 45° was 11° greater than the actual difference between Arbela and Carthage; Ptol. *Geo.* 1.4; M. R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, *A Source Book in Greek Science* (Cambridge, Mass. 1975) 168.

³¹Str. 12.3.17. Firsov, measurement no. 65. Strabo wrote that the voyage was along the seaboard and hence was curved and not in a straight line. Cf. Str. 2.4.7, "Again, the measure employed for these lengths is that by stadia; and we seek to discover the number of stadia either by travelling through the continents themselves, or else along the roads or waterways parallel to them."

³²For example, one finds shorter stades than Firsov's average of 157.7 m. for his measurement numbers 59 (Chalcedon to Heraclea), 60 (Heraclea to the Sangarius), 63 (Amisus to Sinope), 64 (Amisus to Trebizond), and 66 (Chalcedon to Phasis), to name but a few. All these distances were measured along curved coastlines.

height. His average obscures a wide variation that is the result of applying straight lines to often curved and in any event inaccurate distances.

The final contender for the length of Eratosthenes' stade is the Attic stade of 184.98 m. or 606 ft. 10 in. based on 600 feet of 308.3 mm. That this is indeed the length of the Attic stade has long been known and should never have been questioned.³³

There is clear evidence that Eratosthenes used this length stade in his measurement of the earth's circumference and his other geographical works. First is the unequivocal statement in Pliny *NH* 12.53, "by the calculation of Eratosthenes, a schoenus measures 40 stadia, that is 5 miles" The length of the Roman mile has long been known, and it is obvious that the length of Eratosthenes' stade should be calculated in terms of the known length of the mile and not the unknown length of the Egyptian schoenus. To assert that Pliny was correct in calculating Eratosthenes' stades in terms of the Egyptian schoenus but inaccurate in terms of the Roman mile is arbitrary.

Second, we have Pliny's conversion of Eratosthenes' circumference measurement of 252,000 stades into 31,500 Roman miles, which gives the Attic stade of 8 per Roman mile.³⁴ Third, we have the statements in Strabo 7.7.4 and Book 7, frag. 57, that the majority of geographers use a stade equivalent to 8 per Roman mile except Polybius who uses a stade of 8 1/3 per Roman mile.³⁵ As Dicks has observed, it would be remarkable if Strabo failed to mention that Eratosthenes, one of his primary sources, did not also use a stade of 8 per mile.³⁶ Next, we have the statement of Hyginus, that the Ptolemies used the Attic foot of 308.3 mm., and

³³The length of the Attic *stadion*, whether the race course or the measurement, was 600 Attic feet. In the stadium at Athens, the distance between the starting and finishing lines is 606 ft. 10 in. or 184.98 m., based on a foot of 12.137 in. or 308.3 mm. W. B. Dinsmoor, *The Architecture of Ancient Greece* (New York 1973) 251. One Attic *stadion* 1/8 of a Roman mile, Pliny *NH* 2.85. See Hultsch (note 3 above) 64-73; *Dar.-Sag. s.v. mensura*. As far as I can determine, only Lehmann-Haupt (note 4 above) 1933-34, maintains that the Attic stade was 8 1/3 per Roman mile.

³⁴*NH* 2.247.

³⁵Although it must be pointed out that Polybius himself knew the Attic stade of 8 per Roman mile, Polyb. 3.39.8.

³⁶Dicks (note 16 above) 44-45. Although it is true that Eratosthenes would hardly have occasion to mention the Roman mile and give its equivalence in stades, surely the Attic stade of c. 185 m. was known to him and Strabo knew that 8 of these stades comprised 1 Roman mile.

presumably the Attic stade based on that foot, to measure their kingdom.³⁷ Hence, Eratosthenes' distance between Alexandria and Syene is likely to have been recorded in Attic stades.

There is one final piece of evidence that demonstrates Eratosthenes used Attic stades which has been hitherto overlooked. This is the series of measurements between various locations in Iran and Afghanistan visited by Alexander and his army found in Pliny 6.61-62, based on Alexander's bematists Diognetus and Baeton, and Strabo 11.8.9, based on Eratosthenes:³⁸

City	Pliny 6.61-62		Strabo 11.8.9		Actual Distance (English miles)
	milia passuum	English miles	Stadia	English miles	
Hecatompylos-	575	529	4530	521	531 Silk Route
Alexandria Areion	(565)				
Alexandria Areion-	199	183	1600	184	189 Herat-Juwain
Prophthasia			(1500)		
Prophthasia-	565	520	4120	474	525 Juwain-Kelat-
Arachoti Polis					i-Ghilzai
Arachoti Polis-	250	230	2000	230	231 main road Kelat-
Hortospana	(165, 175, 227)				i-Ghilzai-Kabul

When one converts Pliny's Roman miles and Strabo's stades into miles or kilometers at the rate of 8 stades per Roman mile for the four distances, one finds that three are virtually identical. Furthermore, the distances can be checked by measuring the actual distances between the locations, and they correspond to the measurements in Attic stades and not to stades of 148 or 157 m. The two different measurements of the distance between Prophthasia and Arachoti Polis probably indicate that two slightly different routes were recorded or that one of the measure-

³⁷See note 29 above.

³⁸For a full discussion of these measurements, see D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978) 157-58. Variant readings in the mss. are in parentheses.

ments (probably that of Strabo) has been recorded inaccurately. In any event, the substitution of a shorter stade here only makes the difference greater. For the other distances, the routes follow ancient, well-worn paths that have varied little for millennia.³⁹ Surely, this correspondence is not yet another coincidence that needs to be explained away by another bizarre and contrived theory, but further evidence that Eratosthenes used the Attic stade.

In conclusion, the length of Eratosthenes' stade may be determined by two alternative methods; the first is to accept the ancient evidence for Eratosthenes' use of the Attic stade of 184.98 m., and the second is to ar-

³⁹There are three potential difficulties in using these figures: the possibility of scribal errors in their transmission, the possibility that the routes have changed over time, and third, the figures may have been rounded off.

Indeed, some ancient measurements may have been corrupted through transmission and some may not. The best way to find out is to see if the measurements correspond to actual distances measured on the ground, or at least on a good map. While writing my work of Alexander's logistics, I found large numbers of ancient measurements in the sources, and in a majority of cases, I found the measurements to be accurate, including these. The way I measured these distances is described in Engels (note 38 above) 28, n. 14. The reader may measure these routes for himself on a good map using a different technique, but he will obtain similar results.

Second, the routes in question are determined to a large extent by the location of river valleys and mountain passes that have not changed for millennia. The routes that follow these natural features have not changed either; see K. Fischer, "Zur Lage von Kandahar an Landverbindungen zwischen Iran und Indien," *Bonner Jahrbucher* 167 (1967) 129-232; Engels (note 38 above) 83-95.

Finally, some of these figures may have been rounded off, although if they have, this does not materially affect the argument. If the figures were rounded off, the process has apparently affected both sets (probably both are ultimately based on Alexander's bematists) before Strabo and Pliny received them. How else are we to explain the correspondence between them? Nor did any possible rounding off affect Pliny's conversion of his figures into Roman miles at the rate of 8 stades per mile. The use of his rate of conversion seems to be the only sensible explanation for the correspondence between Pliny's figures and those of Eratosthenes. The distances actually measured on a good map also indicate that any possible rounding off was slight.

However, I do not believe that the figures were rounded off. Surely if any of the Roman figures were, it would be the 199-mile distance between Alexandria Areion and Prophthasia, but, obviously, this has not occurred. As for the Greek figures, if there are 8 stades per Roman mile (8.7 per English mile, more if shorter stades are used), then giving a distance to the nearest 10 stades is almost equivalent to rounding off a modern distance to the nearest mile. For a distance of about 200 miles, rounding off to the nearest 10 stades would change the total figure by only about .005, scarcely worth splitting hairs about. Just because a number happens to end in 0 or 5 does not mean that it has been rounded off excessively, if at all.

bitrarily assert that the evidence is wrong and invent our own stade. That a great many in the past have chosen the latter route reveals something about their own attitudes concerning their classical heritage. Perhaps the real importance of Eratosthenes' achievement is that it was accomplished at all. In other ancient cultures, not only was there no attempt made to measure the earth's circumference, but there was no awareness that the earth was a sphere.⁴⁰ Instead of trying to make Eratosthenes' measurement fit the known distance of the earth's circumference, perhaps we should be trying to answer the broader question of why the attempt was made in Greek science and not in other ancient scientific traditions.

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⁴⁰Indian knowledge of the sphericity of the earth was apparently derived from Greek sources, O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (New York 1962) 173 f. It has also been claimed by J. Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 3 (Cambridge 1959) 216-18, that the Chinese knew the earth was a sphere as well. However, C. Cullen, " 'Chinese Scientific Philosophy' and some Chinese Attitudes Towards Knowledge about the Realm of Heaven-and-Earth" in M. Elvin, et al., "Symposium: The Work of Joseph Needham," *Past and Present* 87 (1980) 41-42, has observed that this claim rests on a mistranslation of the Chinese source, and, apparently, according to the symposium participants, mistranslations of a similar nature occur through Needham's entire work.

POMPEY AND THEOPHANES OF MYTILENE

Pompey the Great has been closely scrutinized by a variety of biographers in recent years,¹ but few of these have examined closely his relationships with his clients, particularly the foreign clients.² One of these, Theophanes of Mytilene, is of special interest.³ Theophanes was a Greek intellectual who became a friend of Pompey during his campaign in the East in 67 B.C. and remained a part of Pompey's group of friends until Pompey's death. Pompey surrounded himself with a large group of *amici* who provided a variety of services for him, but Theophanes fulfilled many roles at once: personal historian and chronicler, advisor and confidant, guide to the East. Theophanes was an important enough figure to appear in Cicero's *Pro Archia* as the archetype of a Greek writer who had received Roman citizenship from a Roman commander.⁴ The *Pro Archia*, published in 62, soon after Theophanes was granted citizenship by Pompey, defends the franchise of Archias, another Greek who, like Theophanes, had written a book in honor of a commander in

¹The four recent biographies are: J. Leach, *Pompey the Great* (London 1978); R. Seager, *Pompey: A Political Biography* (Berkeley 1980); P. Greenhalgh, *Pompey: The Roman Alexander* (Columbia, Mo. 1981), and *Pompey: The Republican Prince* (Columbia, Mo. 1982). For other biographies and source books on Pompey, see J. van Ooteghem, *Pompée le Grand, bâtisseur d'empire* (Brussels 1954); M. Gelzer, *Pompeius*, 2nd ed. (Munich 1949); Beryl Rawson, *The Politics of Friendship: Pompey and Cicero* (Sydney 1978). J. P. V. D. Balsdon, in his review of M. Gelzer's *Pompeius*, points out that any potential biographer of Pompey is challenged by the lack of evidence in the early, and most successful, part of his career and by the mass of conflicting information from different ancient sources (*Historia*, 1 [1950] 296-300).

²There is disagreement regarding the importance of patronage to the fluctuations of Roman politics. See, for example, M. Gwyn Morgan, review of R. Seager (note 1 above) (*The History Teacher*, 14 [1980/81] 597-98); against this view, see W. S. Anderson, "Pompey, His Friends and the Literature of the First Century B.C.," *CPCPh* 19 (1963) 34-41.

³For Theophanes, see Drumann-Groebe, *Geschichte Roms* (Berlin 1908) IV, pp. 557-59; R. Laqueur, *RE* 5A.2090-2127 s.v. "Theophanes."

⁴Cic. *Arch.* 24. For discussions of the year and place of the grant of citizenship of Theophanes, see L. Robert, "Théophraste de Mytilène à Constantinople," *CRAI* (1969) 47, who says that it was received during the campaigns, and H. de la Ville de Mirmont, "Théophraste de Mitylène," *REG* 18 (1905) 166, 168, who believes after Cicero (*Arch.* 24) and Valerius Maximus (8.14) that Pompey granted the citizenship to Theophanes on Mytilene in 62 B.C.

the Mithridatic war.⁵ When Cicero wishes to compliment Pompey in his speech for Archias, he does so by recalling the generous grant of citizenship to Theophanes, "scriptorem rerum suarum [Pompeii] in contione militum" (*Arch.* 24). The name of Theophanes, then, was already familiar to Cicero's Roman readers, and his influence with Pompey continued to grow.

I would like in this paper to reopen the question of the importance of foreign clients to Roman *imperatores* and, within that framework, to assess the significance of Theophanes as a writer of history, a prominent citizen of Mytilene, and a client of Pompey. To this end I will begin with brief remarks on the nature of *amicitia* and the importance of relationships between Romans and Greek intellectuals, and I will then consider the role played by Pompey's close friends and clients, specifically Theophanes. I am not interested in Pompey's role as a literary patron and will not treat it here; it has been amply treated by others and given far more weight than it, in fact, deserves.

Friendship in Rome, *amicitia*, was, as Robin Seager says, a "kaleidoscope of sentiments, ranging from simple and sincere affection to urbane and opportunistic hypocrisy," which played a vital part in the social and political life of the Republic.⁶ It was often measured not by affection and loyalty, but rather in terms of political alliances and of *beneficia* conferred and *officia* performed. The resulting political union was formed on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interest.⁷ Each party was able to perform a particular favor for the other. When the relationship had outlived its usefulness, it was often dissolved and the members formed new friendships. There was nothing in Rome that remotely resembled our political parties, enduring groups based not so much on the desires of individual men as on long-standing principles.

⁵ Archias' work was written in honor of Lucullus. For the connection between Archias and Theophanes, see H. Gotoff, *Cicero's Elegant Style: An Analysis of the Pro Archia* (Urbana 1979) 191-93; S. P. Haley, "Archias, Theophanes, and Cicero: The Politics of the *Pro Archia*," *CB* 59 (1983) 1-4.

⁶ See R. Seager, "Amicitia in Tacitus and Juvenal," *AJAH* 2 (1977) 40.

⁷ For a discussion of the terms *amicus* and *amicitia*, see E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (264-70 B.C.) (Oxford 1958) esp. pp. 12-13; P. A. Brunt, "Amicitia in the Late Roman Republic," *PCPhS* 191 n.s. 11 (1965) 1-20; J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république* (Paris 1963) 41-62 and passim; Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley 1949; repr. 1975) 7-8 and passim; and P. White, "Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome," *JRS* 68 (1978) 74-92.

Lily Ross Taylor calls *amicitia* the Roman substitute for a political party;⁸ this is true only in the sense that *amici* worked together for a time to achieve a political goal that suited both of their desires. Sallust's famous definition of these fluid Roman political relationships makes clear their ephemeral nature: "sed haec inter bonos amicitia, inter malos factio est."⁹

A second type of relationship that existed in Rome in the first century B.C. was the partnership between a foreigner and a Roman, often called *hospitium*. As is the case with other types of *clientela*, including *amicitia*, *hospitium* had no legal but only a political and moral basis and was constantly redefined.¹⁰ Like *amicitia*, it was based on the idea of reciprocity. It was generally not, however, a relationship between men of equal stature, particularly in the late Republic when the Romans held increasing dominance over the rest of the ancient world. Earlier, *hospites* had been individuals of equal stature, one Roman and one non-Roman, who were obligated to provide hospitality for each other.¹¹ By Pompey's time, Roman ascendancy in the ancient world changed the nature of such relationships and gave the Roman partner the superior position. This was particularly true of a Roman *imperator* like Pompey.

Even at this stage the notion of reciprocity remains the basis for any kind of *clientela*. All *beneficia* bestowed were expected to be repaid with suitable *officia*. Such gifts and favors were not legislated, but their nature was generally understood by both partners. Occasionally we find that foreign clients did not understand their obligations in such relationships; Polybius gives several examples of φιλία or *clientela* that

⁸ Cf. Taylor (note 7 above); Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 157; see also, on the subject of political alliance and morality, D. C. Earl, *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome* (Ithaca 1967) ch. I, esp. p. 26.

⁹ Sall. *BJ* 31.15. For a discussion of different kinds of *amicitia*, see Brunt (note 7 above) 1, 6-7, 20 and passim. Cf. Cic. *Amic.* passim for descriptions of different types of *amicitia*, including personal friendships based on mutual affection and shared principles, and Petr. 80.4: *sacramentum amicitiae*, another reference to private, not political friendship.

¹⁰ Badian (note 7 above) 11-13.

¹¹ *Hospes* could also refer to someone who entertained visiting state envoys and in return enjoyed the right of *publicum hospitium*. See CIL I².2.23, 828, 1764; M. Gelzer, *The Roman Nobility*, trans. Robin Seager (Oxford 1969) 67, 89 ff.; A. von Premerstein, "Vom Werden und Wesen des Prinzipats," *ABAW N. F.*, Heft 15 (1937) 13 f.; Badian (note 7 above) 154 ff. See also L. J. Bolchazy, *Hospitality in Early Rome: Livy's Concept of Its Humanizing Force* (Chicago 1977), who discusses the *ius hospitii* in Chapter 2.

failed because the client received favors without returning them.¹² Polybius himself certainly understood the system and the importance of *clientela* if his remark to the younger Scipio (quoted by Plutarch) can be trusted: "Never return from the forum until you have made a new friend (φίλον) of one of your fellow citizens."¹³

Despite evidence that certain foreign dependents did not understand fully the role of *hospes* or φίλος, other clients such as Theophanes formed lasting bonds with important Romans, performed valuable services for them, and became themselves established members of Roman society. As we shall find in the case of Theophanes, often it was the foreign dependents who became powerful influences on Roman generals and dynasts, sometimes more powerful than Roman *amici*, because the foreign clients were not so quick to abandon the relationships and, in fact, used them to their own advantage to gain an influential position.

Pompey is famous for his numerous alliances with a variety of Romans and non-Romans: Roman nobility, *equites*, municipal dynasts, military men, provincials, foreign *hospites*. He is often painted as a man who searched for a following among foreigners, soldiers, and provincials because the Roman aristocracy scorned him.¹⁴ It is certainly true that he, like other Romans in his position, relied heavily on ties of *amicitia* and *hospitium* for his support, and that he had a larger following than many of his peers. There was every reason for Pompey to seek support from those outside of the traditional aristocratic families. Although technically a *nobilis* by virtue of his father's consulship in 89

¹² See on this Badian (note 7 above) 45-47; E. Badian, "Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria (230-201 B.C.)," *PBSR* 20 (1952) 86; S. I. Oost, *Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the Roman Conquest of Greece* (Dallas 1954) 13 and passim; I. E. M. Edlund, "Invisible Bonds: Clients and Patrons through the Eyes of Polybius," *Klio* 59 (1977) 133-34; A. Mauersberger, *Polybios-Lexicon* (Berlin 1956) s.v. ἀχαριστία. For examples of foreign ingratitude toward Rome, see Polyb. 3.16.2 (Demetrius of Pharos); 3.40.6 (the Boii); see also 15.8.10-12 (Hannibal); 21.31.7 (the Aetolians). Some critics believe that Polybius failed to understand the nuances of the Roman social structure and particularly the possibilities of the system of patronage; see, for example, F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Berkeley 1972) 8. For the opposite view, see Edlund, "Invisible Bonds," 130, 135-36.

¹³ Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* iv.656; cf. *Comm. Pet.* 5.16; L. R. Taylor (note 7 above) 7 ff. See A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization* (Cambridge 1975) 24-25.

¹⁴ For a good discussion of Pompey's bases of power, see E. S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley 1974) 62-66 (= *LGRR*).

B.C., he was not from a respected family and was scorned for this reason.¹⁵ He had in his background a despised father and lawless and violent beginnings, which had earned him the epithet *adulescentulus carnifex*. He had usurped the honors of many of the optimates, thus earning their envy and hatred. His name Magnus, acquired during the Sullan civil war, only served as a reminder of his previous misdeeds and incursions on senatorial privilege.¹⁶

He was not, however, without support from among the *nobiles*. He developed ties to several leading families through marital alliances. Of five well-planned marriages, two ended in divorce and two in death. His fifth wife, Cornelia, daughter of Q. Metellus Scipio, a man of illustrious lineage but dubious morals, is called by Lily Ross Taylor "the great catch of Rome"; she gave to Pompey closer ties to the optimates and restored his lost prestige.¹⁷ Each marriage alliance was beneficial to Pompey for a time. The list of his noble adherents in the 70s and 60s is long; it includes men such as P. Servilius Vatia, C. Scribonius Curio, and C. Cassius Longinus, all consulars who gave their support to Pompey's eastern command, and L. Gellius Poplicola and Cn. Lentulus Clodianus, consuls in 72 B.C., who accepted the position of legate with Pompey in his war against the pirates.¹⁸ But he was rebuffed by Cato when he attempted to marry Cato's niece,¹⁹ and there was growing suspicion and fear of him in the senatorial circles. In order to cover himself on all sides, he also cultivated friends among the non-*nobiles*, some of whom served him in a military or political capacity: L. Afranius, T. Labienus, A. Gabinius, and M. Petreius.

Pompey had, then, a large group of adherents from all sectors of society. This enabled him to maintain prestige and power, but the associations fluctuated as did most Roman political relationships, particularly those conducted at higher levels. Fortunately, he was also aided by a smaller and more stable group of men, who became his political advi-

¹⁵ On Pompey's family and status, see G. V. Sumner, "The Pompeii in Their Families," *AJAH* 2 (1977) 8-25, esp. 16-25. Cf. L. R. Taylor (note 7 above) 121; Syme (note 8 above) 30; F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart 1920) 248 f.; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.181 (for Pompey's ancestor).

¹⁶ See Balsdon (review cit. note 1 above) 299 on the name Magnus and its Sullan associations.

¹⁷ For Cornelia, see L. R. Taylor (note 7 above) 35; see Luc. *BC* 8.73; Münzer (note 15 above) 314 ff. For Q. Metellus Scipio, see Plut. *Pomp.* 55.1; Cic. *Brut.* 212 f.; Val Max. 9.1.8; Caes. *BC* 1.4.3, 3.31.1.

¹⁸ For a longer list, see Gruen (note 14 above) 63; Seager (note 1 above) 36 ff.

¹⁹ Plut. *Pomp.* 44; *Cato* 30.2-5, 45.1-2.

sors and publicists and who remained remarkably faithful to him throughout his jagged career. In return for their long and valuable friendship and advice, they obtained a level of influence rarely seen among adherents of Roman magnates.²⁰

The group appears a hodgepodge of a most unlikely sort. It included such men as L. Lucceius, L. Scribonius Libo, M. Terentius Varro, and Theophanes. They were indeed from widely disparate backgrounds and are bound together only by their level of influence with Pompey. Lucceius was a wealthy Roman senator who first embarked on an unsuccessful political career and then, after this failed, became a historian of some repute and a personal advisor to Pompey.²¹ He supported Pompey from the early 60s, opposing Cato and Caesar in their attempts to prosecute those who had profited from Sulla's proscriptions (as Pompey had) and attacking Catiline. Lucceius supported Cicero in 63, but by 59 had turned against him, presumably in accordance with Pompey's desires. In every political action, he appears on Pompey's side. He turned in the 50s to the writing of history, and was engaged in a history of the Social and Civil wars (which included, quite possibly, Pompey's role in the activities of this period). Cicero, in a famous letter to Lucceius from 56 (*Fam.* 5.12) tried shamelessly to win Lucceius over and sign him on as his propagandist, but Lucceius failed to accomplish this task as so many others had. It is from Cicero that we hear of Lucceius' role as advisor to Pompey in the last part of Pompey's life. In two letters to Atticus, Cicero mentions Lucceius and Theophanes as the two men most responsible for advising Pompey to leave Italy in March of 49 and go to Dyrrhachium.²² They advised a blockade of Italy using the resources of the East—reasonable advice; the plan, however, failed because Pompey was unable to gain control of the grain-producing provinces and coastal routes.

L. Scribonius Libo, like Lucceius from a nonpatrician but senatorial family, was consul in 34.²³ He too was a writer of history, but his

²⁰ See Cic. *Att.* 2.5.1, 2.17.3, 5.11.3; *Arch.* 24; cf. Caes. *BC* 3.18.3; Strabo 13.2.3; Plut. *Pomp.* 76.

²¹ For Lucceius, see Cic. *Fam.* 5.12-15; H. Peter, *HRR* II.xxx-xxxi (no fragments); H. Bardon, *La littérature latine inconnue* (Paris 1952) I, 263 ff.

²² Cic. *Att.* 9.1.3, 9.11.3, where Cicero refers to the inflammatory language of Lucceius and Theophanes.

²³ For Libo, see F. Münzer, *RE* 2A, 881-85 s.v. "L. Scribonius Libo"; Caes. *BC* 1.26.3, 3.5.3, 3.18.3, 3.23.2. For Libo's literary activity, see Bardon (note 21 above) I, 268; Cic. *Att.* 13.30.3, 13.32.3.

main connection to Pompey was *adfinitas* through his daughter's marriage to Sextus Pompeius in about 55 B.C. He supported Pompey's quest for the commission to restore Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt in 56, and he was Pompey's most trusted admiral and commander of his fleet (succeeding Bibulus) in 49–48. Libo's appointment as commander-in-chief came at a time in 48 when more and more members of Pompey's family were assuming positions of importance—for example, Pompey's son Gnaeus and his father-in-law Scipio. Libo remained a trusted advisor to Pompey until the end, and even after the battle of Pharsalus worked for the Pompeian cause as a negotiator between his son-in-law Sextus Pompeius and Antony.²⁴ In the end, he deserted the Pompeian side and became consul in 34 with Antony; the point is that he was faithful to Pompey and his cause up to and after Pompey's demise.

The third and most prolific member of Pompey's trusted advisory group was M. Terentius Varro.²⁵ Varro, a non-*nobilis* and perhaps a man of wealth, was a legate with Pompey in Spain from 76 to 71, in the East in 67, and again in Spain in 49. He, like the others mentioned above, remained loyal to Pompey throughout his various magistracies and campaigns. He was unlike them, however, in his polymathy and tremendous literary output, some of it designed to praise or to assist Pompey. We know that he produced in 77 a work on naval matters addressed to Pompey; again in 70, this time at Pompey's own request, he wrote a "how-to" handbook entitled Εἰσαγωγικός, detailing matters of senatorial protocol and procedure for the new consul;²⁶ later he published a work entitled *De Pompeio*. He traveled with Pompey as perhaps a sort of scholar-in-residence, amassing information on such matters as Indian trade routes.²⁷ Cicero makes it clear that Varro was an important advisor to Pompey; he acted as a conduit of information for Cicero, Atticus, and Pompey, and it is to Varro, among others, that Cicero appeals for recall in 58.²⁸

It was these men, along with Theophanes, who remained faithful

²⁴ App. *BC* 5.52.

²⁵ For Varro, see H. Dahlmann, *RE* supp. 6, 1172–1277 s.v. "M. Terentius Varro"; Aul. Gell. 14.7.2 f. (on Varro's handbook of protocol for Pompey); App. *BC* 2.9 (on Varro's *Tricaranus*); Cic. *Fam.* 11.10.5 (on his wealth if this is the same Varro); Cic. *Att.* 3.8.3, 5.11.3; Pliny *NH* 6.51–52; 7.115, 16.7 (on Varro's military and literary achievements).

²⁶ See on this *liber commentarius* Aul. Gell. 14.7.2 f.

²⁷ Pliny *NH* 6.51–52.

²⁸ Cic. *Att.* 3.8.3, 5.11.3.

to Pompey until the end of his career and had considerable influence on him. Other associations like Pompey's friendship with Metellus Nepos fell victim to the ever-shifting and unreliable political tide and vanished in time. Lucceius, Libo, Varro, and Theophanes, however, remained Pompey's closest advisors, due perhaps partly to their literary abilities,²⁹ but also to their long-standing loyalty, which made them valuable allies. As different as they were in backgrounds, abilities, and connections to Pompey, they had one thing in common: all, as Cicero and others make clear, had equal *auctoritas* with Pompey and helped him to make his most important decisions up until the end.³⁰

Theophanes was the only prominent Greek in this group.³¹ He had taken a leading role in opposing Mithridates on Lesbos in the 80s B.C. Mytilene had, at that time, lost her freedom because of her stiff opposition to the Romans. Pompey the Great moved into the East against the pirates in 67 B.C. under the powers granted to him by the *Lex Gabinia*, and it is reasonable to assume that he met Theophanes when he was using Mytilene as a naval base. Theophanes was certainly in the company of Pompey the next year when Pompey's command was extended to include the war against Mithridates. He was, Strabo tells us, both a συγγραφεύς and a πολιτικός ἀνὴρ.³² In other words, he was a writer,

²⁹ Pompey may also have adopted some of these men as *amici* out of literary interests. On the question of Pompey's intellectual interests or lack of them, see the essay by M. H. Crawford, "Greek Intellectuals and the Roman Aristocracy in the First Century B.C." in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (Cambridge 1978) 193–207, in which it is argued that Pompey and other Roman *principes* were philistines and were interested in Greek intellectuals only for their snob appeal, and that the Greeks in turn fostered the illusion of these Roman magnates as men "of deep Hellenic culture" (p. 204). A. N. Sherwin-White in his review of the book disagrees (*TLS* [April 18, 1980] 447).

³⁰ See note 20.

³¹ There were other Greeks besides Theophanes in Pompey's circle of friends, but none as prominent or faithful as Theophanes. Among those who might be mentioned are Curtius Nicias of Cos, scholarly and urbane, who attached himself to many prominent (but often unsavory) Romans: Pompey, Memmius, and Dolabella. Syme suggests that he may have come to Rome in 62 with Pompey from the East along with Theophanes (see R. Syme, "Who was Vedius Pollio?" *JRS* 51 [1961] 25–26, 27–28; Suet. *Gram.* 14). Another Greek in Pompey's house was Demetrius of Gadara, a freedman of great wealth and influence (see Syme [note 8 above] 385). He was, like Theophanes, honored by Pompey through a gift to his native city (Gadara); see Plut. *Pomp.* 40; Jos. *BJ* 1.155; *AJ* 14.74 f.

³² Strabo 13.2.3. Συγγραφεύς can indicate simply a writer or a prose writer or, in a more restricted meaning, one who collects and writes down historical facts, a historian. Cf. LSJ v. συγγραφεύς; Plato *Phaed.* 272b; Isoc. 15.35; Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.1; Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 5.

but, perhaps more important to Pompey, he was a man who was involved in the political life of Mytilene and who could thus be of help in Pompey's reorganization of the East. He was one of a group of cultured Greeks and Easterners who accompanied Roman *imperatores* on their campaigns and acted as guides to an unfamiliar world, advisors, and sometimes chroniclers or panegyrists.³³ Theophanes went along with Pompey on his Eastern expeditions against the pirates and, Strabo says, "became a friend to Pompey, particularly on account of his integrity and worth" (Πομπηίῳ τῷ Μάγνῳ κατέστη φίλος, μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν).³⁴ Ἀρετὴ here probably refers to his political acumen.

It is clear that Theophanes was a man well-versed in the political affairs of his own city and also knowledgeable about the geography of the region; thus, he was able to act as an advisor and guide for Pompey. Strabo tells us that Theophanes "set straight all of Pompey's affairs for him" (πάσας συγκατῶρθωσεν αὐτῷ [Πομπηίῳ] τὰς πράξεις).³⁵ It was important for the Romans in this period to have a good knowledge of Greek affairs, language, customs, and topography.³⁶ This knowledge gave the Romans a real edge over the Greeks, who knew nothing about the local area and customs.³⁷ Pompey could have gained much useful information about the customs, attitudes, and terrain of the Greek East from Theophanes, and among the services that Theophanes performed for Pompey, the most valuable were undoubtedly paving the way for him at Mytilene, which Pompey was later to use as a base of operations, and instructing him in the habits and customs of the area.³⁸

Theophanes also performed another service for Pompey: a work written in honor of him. Jacoby cites seven extant fragments or paraphrases and tentatively entitles the work τὰ περὶ Πομπηίου or Πομπηϊοί

³³ For examples of other men like Theophanes, see G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford 1965) 2-4.

³⁴ Strabo (13.2.3). (ἀρετὴν here is an emendation for the manuscript reading αὐτήν.) φίλος in this passage carries no doubt the same ambiguity as the latin *amicus* and means "friend" in both senses: a personal friend and political ally.

³⁵ For other uses of the rare word συγκατορθοῦν, "to help succeed," cf. Isoc. *Phil.* 5.151; Dion. Hal. 6.86.2 (cf. ἐπανορθοῦν, Dion. Hal. 6.86.5).

³⁶ See Momigliano (note 13 above) 36-40; Bowersock (note 33 above) 3-4, 30-31.

³⁷ See Polyb. 31.25.4, 39.1; Momigliano (note 13 above) 38. Not all Romans knew Greek well, however; see Nicholas Horsfall's article on the subject called "Doctus Sermones Utriusque Linguae?," *CNV* 23 (1979) 79-95.

³⁸ For Theophanes and Pompey at Mytilene, see Gelzer (note 1 above) 84 and 272, n. 65.

πράξεις.³⁹ Cicero tells us that Theophanes was the *scriptor rerum Pompeii* and implies that Theophanes was awarded Roman citizenship by Pompey as a result of this work.⁴⁰ The work must have been written by 62, since Cicero mentions it in the *Pro Archia*. Theophanes may have been rewarded at least partly for acting as guide and advisor to Pompey in the East and not only for his work in honor of Pompey; we must keep in mind here that Cicero is simply using Theophanes, the writer, as an example to support his defense of Archias' enfranchisement.

Both Cicero and Plutarch inadvertently reveal some interesting facts about Theophanes' relationship to Pompey. Cicero, in the many letters to Atticus in which he mentions Theophanes, makes it very clear that he relied on Theophanes to act as a liaison between himself and Pompey, and that he viewed Theophanes as a man of influence with Pompey. Cicero sees Theophanes as someone who is fully apprised of both the political situation in Rome and of Pompey's views.⁴¹ He tries to convince Pompey not to go to Spain by asking Theophanes to "apply pressure to" (*incumbet*) Pompey, and he ends his letter with this comment: "valet autem auctoritas eius apud illum (Pompeium) plurimum."⁴²

Plutarch relates two anecdotes about Theophanes in his capacity as a writer and propagandist for Pompey.⁴³ One concerns notebooks belonging to Mithridates found in a fort of Mithridates that was surrendered to Pompey. These notebooks, Plutarch says, not surprisingly were of considerable interest both to Pompey and to Theophanes. Also found in this fort was a speech of Rutilius Rufus, who was at that time living as an embittered exile in the East. In this speech, Plutarch claims, Rutilius Rufus urged Mithridates to massacre all Romans living in Asia. Plutarch says that most people believe that the speech was a malicious invention of Theophanes designed to please Pompey by implicating Rutilius Rufus, who was a former enemy of Pompey's father.⁴⁴ The second

³⁹Jacoby, *FGrHist* iiB.188.

⁴⁰Cic. *Arch.* 24. This is the earliest mention of Theophanes (62 B.C.).

⁴¹Cic. *Att.* 2.5.1, 2.12.2, 2.17.3.

⁴²Cic. *Att.* 5.11.3.

⁴³Plut. *Pomp.* 37, 49.

⁴⁴Plutarch seems to believe that Theophanes wrote the speech and inserted it himself into the papers of Mithridates. It is also possible that Theophanes only *alleged* this speech was found. See Anderson (note 2 above) 36; de la Ville de Mirmont (note 4 above) 180-83, 192, 194, who points out that Plutarch may have borrowed this story from the sharp-tongued Timagenes, who was always ready to vilify Theophanes.

anecdote, which Plutarch attributes to Timagenes, concerns Ptolemy Auletes, who had left Egypt and wished to be restored to the throne. Timagenes claimed that Theophanes had been responsible for persuading Ptolemy to leave Egypt in order to create a new command for Pompey. It is interesting to note that, whether or not either of these was true, Plutarch even thought it plausible for Theophanes to have done such things merely to please Pompey.

What did Theophanes receive from Pompey in return for his services? What could a Greek client expect from a Roman of Pompey's stature? Theophanes, Cicero tells us, was made a citizen by Pompey, an act that was vociferously approved by the Roman soldiery present at the public ceremony (*Arch.* 24). He was also appointed *praefectus fabrum*.⁴⁵ This was an important post, not to be underrated, and held by many an interesting man. In this period (the later republic), the *praefectus fabrum* was, in essence, a chief-of-staff to a person holding the high command. It was given to such men as Volumnius Eutrapelus, *praefectus fabrum* of Antony in 43; Mamurra, much reviled by Catullus, ex-Pompeian and *praefectus fabrum* of Caesar in Gaul in 58-55; and Cornelius Balbus, *praefectus fabrum* of Caesar in Spain and the most intriguing of the group, partly because of the close parallels between him and Theophanes.⁴⁶

We should, perhaps, examine him more closely. L. Cornelius Balbus, like Theophanes, began as a very prominent citizen of his own city, Gades, and obtained citizenship through Pompey's offices, probably from L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus, for services during the Sertorian War.⁴⁷ Balbus later became associated with Caesar and was made his *praefectus fabrum* not once but twice, both when Caesar was praetor and when he was consul.⁴⁸ Because of Balbus' importance to Caesar, Caesar gave many favors to the citizens of his native city, Gades, as Pompey did to Theophanes' city, Mytilene (*Balb.* 43). Balbus remained an extremely influential man with Caesar and in Roman life as a whole.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Cic.* 38.4 calls Theophanes τεκτόνων ἑπαρχός. See de la Ville de Mirmont (note 4 above) 197-99, who places much importance on this post. J. Suolahti, however, in a book entitled *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period. A Study on Social Structure* (Helsinki 1955), describes the *praefectus fabrum* as the equivalent of an aide-de-camp, whose importance depended on the status of his commander. He points out that men such as Balbus used the post to rise to a high position in government (pp. 205-9, 216).

⁴⁶ See Syme (note 8 above) 355 and n. 2 for other possible *praefecti fabrum*.

⁴⁷ For Balbus and Lentulus, see Cic. *Att.* 8.15A.2, 9.7B.2.

⁴⁸ The years were probably 62-59 B.C.; see Cic. *Balb.* 63.

Like Theophanes, Balbus remained loyal to his patron up until and even after his patron's death.⁴⁹

Another parallel between the two men lies in the lasting mark they left on Roman society. Theophanes found a firm foothold in Rome: his son, Pompeius Macer, was a knight and procurator of Asia under Augustus, and his grandson rose to the post of praetor in A.D. 15.⁵⁰ So too, Cornelius Balbus, who himself rose to be *consul suffectus* in 40 B.C. as an adherent of Octavian and had a nephew, L. Cornelius Balbus Minor, who became quaestor in Spain under Pollio in 44 B.C. Much of his family was enfranchised: father, brother, and nephew, and Balbus Minor became *consul suffectus* in 32.⁵¹ Balbus, like Theophanes, became a sort of ambassador for his own city; Cicero calls him a *hospes* in the *Pro Balbo* (43). We have little evidence, however, that Theophanes became unpopular with the Roman *nobiles* (except possibly Cicero's remark to Atticus in *Att.* 9.11.3), whereas Balbus' weighty influence over both Pompey and Caesar, his wealth, and his extravagance caused him to become *persona non grata* in high circles (*Balb.* 18.56-59). Eventually, in 56, his citizenship was called into question 16 years after his enfranchisement, by a fellow-townsmen from Gades, who was spurred on, no doubt, by political elements in Rome.⁵² Cicero successfully defended Balbus' case.

One last and rather strange incident links the two influential foreign clients. In 62, Balbus was adopted by Theophanes, a situation mentioned by Cicero in the *Pro Balbo* as something much discussed and criticized by many, but perfectly defensible (*Balb.* 57). Later, however, in a letter to Atticus in 50, Cicero lists this as just one more bizarre irregularity that he was forced to tolerate along with Caesar's command, the adoption of a patrician by a plebeian, and the wealth of Mamurra and Balbus.⁵³ Cicero explains this adoption in a vague way, saying only that

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Suet. *Div. Iul.* 53, 81.2.

⁵⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 1.72, 6.18; *ILS* 9349; G. W. Bowersock, "Eurycles of Sparta," *JRS* 51 (1961) 116-17, n. 42. R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958) 748-49, discusses the problem of how many generations there were between Theophanes and the praetor of A.D. 15; there is some confusion on this point. Theophanes himself was still active in Roman affairs after Pompey's death; see Cic. *Att.* 15.19.1.

⁵¹ Cic. *Fam.* 10.32 (a letter from Pollio to Cicero castigating the younger Balbus); Pliny *NH* 5.36, 7.136; *CIL* 1, p. 168 (for citizenship).

⁵² The situation of Balbus is closely parallel to that of Archias, whose claim to citizenship Cicero also defended. Both men had held the citizenship for many years by the time they were brought into court for what were obviously political reasons.

⁵³ Cic. *Att.* 7.7.6.

through it Balbus gained an inheritance from his relatives. In any case, the adoption must have taken place shortly after Theophanes came to Rome with Pompey in 62, and Balbus went so far as to call himself Balbus Theophanes.⁵⁴ One is tempted to think that Pompey must have figured largely in this adoption since he was then the patron of Theophanes and had been the patron of Balbus, or that the purpose of the adoption was to forge another link between Pompey and Caesar through their *praefecti fabrum*. We might compare the alliance made in 59, only a couple of years later, by the marriage of Julia to Pompey. It is unlikely that Theophanes needed an heir; his son may well have already been born by then (*PIR*¹ P472).

A further favor that Theophanes, like Balbus, received for which we have considerable epigraphical evidence were the benefits done for his city of Mytilene by Pompey. After his campaign against Mithridates, Pompey returned with Theophanes to Mytilene, viewed a festival in his own honor, and restored to Mytilene the freedom that she had lost in 79 B.C.⁵⁵ For this important service to his fatherland, Theophanes was rewarded with inscriptions honoring him as benefactor, savior, and second founder of the city and, ultimately, probably after his death, with deification. The earliest inscription honoring Theophanes, dating perhaps from about the time when Theophanes received Roman citizenship from Pompey, has only recently come to light, not on Lesbos but in Constantinople.⁵⁶ This inscription has been published and examined in detail by Louis Robert. It is on a statue base and is in an Aeolic dialect; Robert speculates that this once supported a statue of Theophanes and was brought at a later date to the hippodrome at Byzantium. The inscription honors Theophanes, called Gnaeus Pompeius Theophanes, for having recovered from the Romans, the universal benefactors, their city, territory, and freedom, and for having caused to be reestablished the ancestral cults and rituals. Theophanes is honored for his ἀρετή and εὐσεβεία εἰς τὸ θεῖον.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ See Laqueur, *RE* 5A.2099.21.

⁵⁵ Plut. *Pomp.* 42.43.3. Plutarch claims that Pompey was inspired by the theater at Mytilene where the games were held to build his theater at Rome. The Roman theater, however, is built on traditional Italian lines, and it is difficult to see a Greek model for it. See J. A. Hanson, *Roman Theater-Temples* (Princeton 1959) 43 ff.; Anderson (note 2 above) 35.

⁵⁶ L. Robert (note 4 above) 42-64, esp. 52 ff.

⁵⁷ Cf. Strabo 13.2.3, where he says that Theophanes became a φίλος to Pompey because of his ἀρετή.

Other inscriptions also indicate the importance of Theophanes as an outstanding citizen of Mytilene and the gratitude owed to him by the Mytileneans. In one inscription he is called εὐεργέτης, benefactor (a title given to the Romans in the Constantinople inscription) and σωτήρ (savior), neither of which, as Robert points out, is a religious title.⁵⁸ But elsewhere, in a tripartite inscription dedicated to Pompey, Theophanes and another illustrious Mytilenean of the Augustan age, Polemon, Theophanes is deified.⁵⁹ This may have given rise to Tacitus' charge of *Graeca adulatio* for those who had given Theophanes *caelestis honores*.⁶⁰ Theophanes holds the central place of honor in this inscription and is called θεῷ Διὶ [Ἐ]λε[υθε]ρίῳ φιλοπάτριδι Θεοφάνη τῷ σωτήρι καὶ εὐεργέτῃ καὶ κτίστῃ δευτέρῳ τῆς πατρίδος ("Zeus liberator, friend of his native city, Theophanes, savior and benefactor and second founder of his city"). Some have speculated that the two parts of the inscription dedicated to Pompey and Theophanes were inscribed early, in the 60s, and the section to Polemon later, but Robert makes a strong case for the view that the entire inscription was dedicated under Augustus or sometime after Theophanes' death. If Robert is correct, then Theophanes was deified only posthumously by his fellow citizens, perhaps to ensure the continuation of his benefactions even after death.⁶¹

The epigraphical evidence is essential to demonstrate the importance of Theophanes both in his own right as a citizen of Mytilene and as an associate of Pompey. His fame and reputation as the liberator of Mytilene (and thus the title of "second founder") long survived him.

The relationship of this Roman *imperator* and his Greek friend and advisor closes on a rather ironic note. After the battle of Pharsalus, when Pompey was deliberating with his closest advisors over the safest place of refuge, three possibilities were suggested: Parthia, Africa, and Egypt.⁶² Our information for this episode comes mainly from two con-

⁵⁸ *IG* 12.2.150; *IGR* 4.56; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³ 755. E. Fabricius, "Inscripfen aus Lesbos," *MDAI* 9 (1884) 86, n. 2; Robert (note 4 above) 48-52.

⁵⁹ *IG* 12.2.163; *IGR* 4.55; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³ 752, 753, 754.

⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 6.18.

⁶¹ See also Laqueur, *RE* 5A.2094. We might compare the less kind fate of the aforementioned Nicias of Cos, client of Pompey, Memmius, and Dolabella, who returned to his native island from Rome and was buried there. His fellow citizens, however, violated his tomb. See *Anth. Pal.* 9.81.

⁶² For the various accounts of this episode, see Plut. *Pomp.* 76; Luc. *BC* 8.331-453; App. *BC* 2.83. See also Anderson (note 2 above) 38-40.

flicting accounts in Plutarch and in Lucan. There is no basis for choosing one account over the other, or for believing that either speech is accurately transmitted; nonetheless, the reported speeches bear examination. Plutarch claims that Theophanes alone recommended that Pompey go to Egypt, where he might expect to receive fair treatment from the young Ptolemy whose father he had helped.⁶³ According to Plutarch's account, Theophanes also suggested as a second viable alternative that Pompey join Caesar, to whom he had once been related by marriage and who was known for his moderation. Theophanes thought, according to Plutarch, that to decide against either one of these reasonable choices and for Parthia was madness.⁶⁴ Parthia, Theophanes maintained, was an ignoble and un-Roman choice, because the Parthians were a treacherous race, and also because Pompey might expose his noble wife Cornelia to their wantonness. Plutarch ends by commenting that Pompey, swayed solely by the latter consideration, went to Egypt instead of Parthia guided not by λογισμός but perhaps by a δαίμων.⁶⁵

Lucan gives a similar account but, as we might expect from a Roman writer, puts the speech, in greatly amplified form, into the mouth of a Roman, the ex-consul L. Cornelius Lentulus.⁶⁶ Lentulus, like Theophanes in Plutarch's account, claimed that to take refuge with the Parthians would be shameful, un-Roman, and unsafe for the noble Cornelia. Lucan introduces Lentulus' speech by calling it *dignas modo consule voces*.⁶⁷ The language in the speech of Lucan is of course thoroughly Roman (*libertatis amor*, 340; *vulnus pudoris*, 349-50; *fiducia*, 362), but the argument is the same as that which Theophanes advances.

What are we to make of all of this? Plutarch, who may have had Lucan's account, chose to put this speech in the mouth of a Greek.⁶⁸ He weakens the impact of Theophanes' advice by having Theophanes present his alternatives in a negative fashion, and by stating twice that irrationality was involved in Pompey's final decision. Nonetheless, Theophanes' speech was, by this account, psychologically astute enough

⁶³ App. *BC* 2.83 claims that all of Pompey's advisors recommended this course of action.

⁶⁴ Plut. *Pomp.* 76.5.

⁶⁵ Plut. *Pomp.* 76.6.

⁶⁶ Luc. *BC* 8.331-453.

⁶⁷ Luc. *BC* 8.330.

⁶⁸ We do not know whether Plutarch used Lucan as a source or not, but there are many close correspondences, e.g., Luc. *BC* 5.406 ff., esp. 577-93; and Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 319 C-D.

to convince Pompey to act against the counsel of all of his other advisors.

If we believe Plutarch, then we must admit a fact that rather clouds the end of this relationship: Theophanes was responsible for the death of Pompey. We have no way of knowing which of his advisors did indeed suggest this ill-omened plan. Plutarch, however, at least thought it possible that Theophanes' advice would have been seriously considered. And that it should be plausible for a man such as Theophanes, a Greek without previous influence in Rome, to have such a relationship with so powerful a Roman as Pompey is an interesting note in the history of such relationships. Their relationship, like that of Libo, Lucceius, and Varro with Pompey, seems to have been founded on a genuine and lasting loyalty and not simply on opportunism. If we can believe Cicero, foreigners like Theophanes and Balbus held extremely important positions with the major Roman leaders of the first century B.C. and were the chief sources of information for those who, like Cicero, tried to ascertain the thoughts and potential movements of these leaders. The clients, in turn, improved their own lot, both in Rome and in their native cities, but also made this *amicitia* more than the ephemeral and self-seeking relationship that it often was between one Roman and another.⁶⁹

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⁶⁹ An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the 1980 meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South in Columbia, S.C.

MIRIFICUM GENUS COMMENDATIONIS: CICERO AND THE LATIN LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION

Many years ago L. Gurlitt put forward a very attractive suggestion, namely that the collection of letters of recommendation in Book 13 of the *Ad Familiares* was made and perhaps published in Cicero's lifetime.¹ If true, this would prove beyond doubt that Cicero regarded these letters as a definite type. Furthermore, if Book 13 was conceived as a handbook containing *Musterbriefe* for a type of letter that was in great demand in daily practice, in addition to being a demonstration of Cicero's skill in *varietas*,² then we have impressive evidence for the rootedness of the practice of writing recommendations in Cicero's Rome.

Gurlitt's hypothesis, although very plausible, cannot be proved.³ However, the presence of certain features common to all the letters in the collection suggests wide usage and entrenched practice: an easily detectable schema or formula in the background,⁴ traditional set phrases, and finally certain conventional attitudes that make up the *de-*

¹ *De M. Tulli Ciceronis Epistulis Earumque Pristina Collectione* (Diss. Götting. 1879) 14 f. Gurlitt bases his hypothesis on *Att.* 16.5.5 from 9 July 44 B.C.: "Mearum epistularum nulla est συναγωγή; sed habet Tiro instar septuaginta, et quidem sunt a te quaedam summendae. Eas ego oportet perspiciam, corrigam; tum denique edentur." "Instar septuaginta" corresponds to the 81 letters of Book 13. Moreover, the latest letter in this book dates from 1 July 44 B.C., although other recommendations were written after this date (for a list, see K. Büchner, *RE* VIIA, 1219). Although as a rule in the rest of the collection *Ad Familiares* letters addressed to the same person are put together, Book 13 contains letters to people who appear in the other books, and conversely no letter of Book 13 appears elsewhere (Büchner, *ibid.*). Gurlitt suggests that Cicero himself might have edited Book 13: "Quoniam igitur ordo librorum IX-XVI fortuitus est, et siquidem recte locum illum referemus ad librum XIII, non est quantum video, cur Ciceronem ipsum hunc librum edidisse negemus" (*ibid.*, 25).

² Cf. Büchner (note 1 above) 1217; H. Peter, *Der Brief in der römischen Literatur* (1901) 23, 57-58; F. Lossmann, "Cicero und Caesar im Jahre 54: Studien zur Theorie und Praxis der römischen Freundschaft," *Hermes Einzelschrift* 17 (1962) 13.

³ However, it is generally accepted: Büchner (note 1 above) 1217 f.; Peter (note 2 above) 35 f.; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* I (1965) 59.

⁴ On the schema, see Lossmann (note 2 above) 13; R. Andrzejewski, "La structure de la lettre de recommandation antique à la lumière des principes de la rhétorique," *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 21 (1973) 17 (in Polish with a résumé in French).

corum of such letters.⁵ When used in reference to these letters, the term *genus* has the narrow, technical sense of the τύποι or the χαρακτήρες of the Greek handbooks for letter writing,⁶ as, for example, in the opening of one of the letters to Servius Sulpicius Rufus: "Licet eodem exemplo saepius tibi *huius generis litteras* mittam, cum gratias agam quod meas commendationes tam diligenter observes" (*Fam.* 13.27.1).⁷

Even more telling from this point of view are Cicero's attempts at deviation from the norm, his struggles to free himself from existing conventions and formulae and his assertions that the present recommendation does not conform to the ordinary pattern of recommendation.⁸ This paper will focus on these efforts.

It is true that Cicero's writings contain the first documentation of the technical term in Latin for a letter of recommendation: *litterae commendaticiae*.⁹ The Latin term, even if coined under the influence of the existing Greek term — ἡ συστατικὴ ἐπιστολή¹⁰ — is by no means a servile translation of the latter. The adjective *commendaticius* is a later offshoot of a family of words with a strictly native frame of reference, evocative of Roman practices and social behavior. The new term naturally assumed all the connotations with which the other words derived

⁵ For the *decorum* of letters of recommendation, see H. M. Cotton, "Documentary Letters of Recommendation in Latin from the Roman Empire," *Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* 132 (1981) *passim*.

⁶ I.e., the τύποι Ἐπιστολικοί attributed wrongly to Demetrius of Phaleron and the Περί Ἐπιστολιμαίου Χαρακτήρος or the Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι Χαρακτήρες assigned variously to Proclus or Libanius; both can be found in Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* (1873) on 1-13.

⁷ Unlike the use of *genera* in *Fam.* 2.4.1; 4.13.1 and 6.10.4-6 which defy a systematic classification into τύποι or χαρακτήρες along the lines of the Greek handbooks; cf. H. Koskeniemi, "Cicero über die Briefarten (*genera epistularum*)," *Arctos* n.s.1 (1954) 97; K. Thraede, "Grundzüge griechisch-römischer Brieftopik," *Zetemata* 48 (1970) 27 f.

⁸ Cf. Lossmann (note 2 above) 12 f.

⁹ "Tabellae commendaticiae" in II *Verr.* 4.148 mean probably *litterae commendaticiae*; Cicero uses *tabellae* to sustain the parallel contrast with "tributariae" there. For later occurrences, see *Dig.* 41.1.65 pr (Paulus); Iulius Victor, *Ars Rhetorica* XXVII p. 448 (Halm); *P. Mich.* VIII, no. 468, col. ii, ll. 39-40.

¹⁰ The adjective συστατικός may have applied to a letter of recommendation as early as the fourth century B.C., that is if the attribution of the gnomic saying τὸ κάλλος παντός . . . ἐπιστολίου συστατικώτερος to either Aristotle or Diogenes is correct (D.L. 5.18-19). If incorrect, a second century B.C. date could be safely put forth as suggested by the occurrence of the saying in a fragment from one of Polybius' later books (31.16.3). The fuller expression ἡ συστατικὴ ἐπιστολή appears for the first time in the Greek NT II Cor. 3:1.

from the same root—*commendatio*, *commendare*—were imbued, regardless of whether these connotations were identical with the Greek ones. Moreover, although the term's first appearance is in Cicero's writings, he nowhere gives any theoretical definition of it, and one must infer the meaning from the context. The fact that it is used unself-consciously in a strictly technical sense is one of the many arguments for Cicero's awareness of the independent nature of the genre constituted by letters of recommendation.

The term *litterae commendaticiae* (or just *commendaticiae*) occurs twice in Cicero's letters. We shall deal first briefly with its later occurrence, since it has been dealt with at length in another context.¹¹ In a letter from 46 B.C. addressed to the governor of Achaia, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, Cicero asks the latter to help Cicero's former quaestor to clear up certain matters connected with the inheritance left to him in the province; Cicero would like Servius to send to Rome any opponents who prove intractable. This last request is accompanied with the following reassurance: "Quod quo minore dubitatione facere possis, litteras ad te a M. Lepido consule, non quae te aliquid iuberent (neque enim id tuae dignitatis esse arbitramur) sed quodam modo quasi commendaticias sumpsimus" (*Fam.* 13.26.3). The phrase "non quae te aliquid iuberent . . . sed quodam modo quasi commendaticias," although not a straightforward definition, allows us to draw some negative conclusions about the nature of the letter of recommendation as understood by Cicero: it has no compelling, official authority, and therefore it does not purport to achieve its effect by command but by request. It is an affair between *privati* and compatible with the dignity of both recommender and recipient.

The term had already occurred earlier in a letter from the end of 62 B.C.¹² to Cicero's former colleague in the consulate, C. Antonius Hybrida, at the time the governor of Macedonia:

Etsi statueram nullas ad te litteras mittere nisi commendaticias (non quo eas intellegerem satis apud te valere sed ne iis qui me rogarent aliquid de nostra coniunctione imminutum esse ostenderem), tamen, cum T. Pomponius . . . ad te proficisceretur, aliquid mihi scribendum putavi, praesertim cum aliter ipsi Pomponio satis facere non possem (*Fam.* 5.5.1).

¹¹"Cicero, *Ad Familiares* 13.26 and 28: Evidence for *Revocatio* or *Reiectio Romae/Romam*?" *JRS* 69 (1979) 39.

¹²For the date, see Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares* I (1977) 282–83.

The extract makes it quite clear that not every recommendation was written in earnest ("non quo eas intellegerem satis apud te valere"). It is precisely this fact which proves that the practice was deeply rooted in Roman social life. For only under such circumstances could a title be divorced from its content and a letter of recommendation be written not for the purpose which it ostensibly set out to achieve, but rather to conjure up the atmosphere its very existence implied: a free exchange of favors between friends.¹³

The absence, or termination, of friendship between the recommender and the recipient renders the letter of recommendation ineffective.¹⁴ When there is no need to keep up the pretense of an uninterrupted friendship—as in the present case—Cicero avoids writing one. For the opening statement implies that the present letter is not a letter of recommendation. Nevertheless the concluding sentence resembles those of many letters of recommendation: "Atque ipsum tibi Pomponium ita commendo ut, quamquam ipsius causa confido te facturum esse omnia, tamen abs te hoc petam ut, si quid in te residet amoris erga me, id omne in Pomponi negotio ostendas." Cicero must have had a very definite idea of the content, tone, and form of a formal letter of recommendation to deny the title to the present one. Obviously the re-creations that fill the body of the letter are not the stuff a letter of recommendation is made of; nor is their grudging tone a fitting accompaniment to a recommendation. A recommendation at the end does not turn *any* letter into a *litterae commendaticiae*, unless the pattern, the flow of the argument, and the content make it such.

Another letter involving Atticus implies that Cicero finds the stereotyped letter of recommendation to fall short of what his true intimacy with Atticus requires. At the end of *Fam.* 13.18, Cicero does what he denies throughout the letter to be necessary¹⁵; he recommends Atticus

¹³Cf. Lossmann (note 2 above) 15; Andrzejewski, "Quo modo Cicero Commendandi Doctrinam in Epistulis Servavit?," *Eos* 63 (1975) 43 (in Polish with a résumé in Latin).

¹⁴Cf. *Fam.* 2.17: Cicero complies with the addressee's request to be recommended by Cicero to his superior, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, the governor of Syria at the time, but he adds a word of warning: "sin autem a me est alienior (scil. Bibulus), nihil tibi meae litterae proderunt" (§7).

¹⁵"utrumque eorum quae negavi mihi facienda esse faciam. Nam et ad id quod Attici causa te ostendisti esse facturum tantum velim addas quantum ex nostro amore accessionis fieri potest." The last motif appears again and again in letters of recommendation, e.g., *Fam.* 13.15.3: "ad id, quod ipsorum Precilliorum causa te velle arbitror, addideris cumulum commendationis meae"; 66.1: "A te . . . peto . . . ut ad ea quae tua sponte sine cuiusquam commendatione faceres in hominem tantum et talem et calamitosum aliquem adferant cumulum meae litterae. . . ."



to Servius Sulpicius Rufus. By now the letter of recommendation has been used so much that it seems inadequate for a recommendation meant in earnest. New methods and new ways of expression have to be found to avoid the leveling down of all recommendations.

In a letter to Q. Valerius Orca, the governor of Africa in 56 or 55 B.C., Cicero is admitting the inadequacy of the ordinary letter of recommendation in order to draw the line of demarcation between the present recommendation and others. He tells Valerius Orca at great length of his predicament:

P. Cuspius singulari studio contendit a me ut tibi quam diligentissime L. Iulium commendarem. Eius ego studio vix videor mihi satis facere posse si utar verbis iis quibus cum diligentissime quid agimus, uti solemus. Nova quaedam postulat et putat me eius generis artificium quoddam tenere. Ei ego pollicitus sum me ex intima nostra arte deprompturum mirificum genus commendationis. Id quoniam adsequi non possum, tu re velim efficias ut ille genere mearum litterarum incredibile quiddam perfectum arbitretur (*Fam.* 13.6.3).

Needless to say, all this elaborate circumlocution armed with rhetorical devices would have been quite unnecessary had fewer recommendations been written, and had it been easier to distinguish a letter of recommendation written in earnest from one which is a matter of routine.

In the same letter Cicero mentions a *nota* agreed upon between himself and Valerius Orca,¹⁶ by which, as it has been suggested, the latter could distinguish "a serious *commendatio* from those given as a matter of routine."¹⁷

An attempt to invent a "mirificum genus commendationis" appears in a letter from 45 B.C. addressed to the dictator Iulius Caesar. Probably on account of the quotations from Greek poetry, Cicero feels that he has transcended the ordinary letter of recommendation:

¹⁶"Qua re Cuspiatorum omnium commendationis causam hac tibi epistula exponendam putavi, reliquis epistulis tantum faciam ut *notam* apponam eam quae mihi tecum convenit" (§2). On *notae* in letters see Iul. Vic. *Ars Rhetorica* 27, p. 448 (Halm).

¹⁷G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Suffragium: from Vote to Patronage," *Brit. J. of Soc.* 5 (1954) 42, n. 4. Gurlitt, "Die Briefe an M. Brutus," *Philologus* (1884) suppl. IV, 593-94, takes the *nota* as proof that in accordance with *urbanitas* a letter of recommendation was given to the person recommended unsealed.

"Genere novo sum litterarum ad te usus ut intellegeres non vulgarem esse commendationem" (*Fam.* 13.15.3).¹⁸

The last expression, *commendatio vulgaris*, also occurs in a letter addressed to M. Acilius, the governor of Sicily in 46–45 B.C., to whom ten (or eleven¹⁹) letters of recommendation are addressed. Having entered into some detail concerning the recommended person, C. Avianius Philoxenus, Cicero concludes: "Quae ego omnia collegi ut intellegeres non vulgarem esse commendationem hanc meam" (*Fam.* 13.35). It crops up also in the recommendation of A. Trebonius to P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, the governor of Cilicia in 56 B.C.: "omnibus . . . rebus eum ita tractes ut intellegat meam commendationem non vulgarem fuisse" (*Fam.* 1.3.2). Finally, it appears in a letter to the jurisconsult C. Trebatius Testa who joined Caesar in Gaul armed with a recommendation by Cicero: "In omnibus meis epistulis quas ad Caesarem aut ad Balbum mitto legitima quaedam est accessio commendationis tuae, nec ea vulgaris sed cum aliquo insigni indicio meae erga te benevolentiae" (*Fam.* 7.6.1).

Commendatio vulgaris perhaps describes the stereotyped letter of recommendation, which has an easily detectable schema or formula in the background and abounds in set phrases and formulae,²⁰ in contrast to one which goes beyond the traditional pattern into new kinds of phrase and detail, like the one written to Caesar mentioned above. However, it can also mean a recommendation "extended to all" or "to anybody." This interpretation may be confirmed by the opening of a letter to P. Sevilius Isauricus, the governor of Asia in 46–44 B.C.: "Quia non est obscura tua in me benevolentia, sic fit ut multi per me tibi velint commendari. Ego autem tribuo non numquam in vulgus, sed plerumque necessariis, ut hoc tempore" (*Fam.* 13.70). Of course, the last remark is not necessarily to be interpreted as an admission by Cicero. It may be a way of playing down the others in order to elevate the present

¹⁸See R. B. Steele, "The Greek in Cicero's Epistles," *AJP* 21 (1900) 392 f.; G. Dammann, *Cicero quo modo in epistulis sermonem hominibus accomodavit* (Diss. Greifswald 1910) 57.

¹⁹Eleven if the governor of Greece in 45 B.C. to whom *Fam.* 13.50 is addressed is the same as the proconsul of Sicily to whom *Fam.* 13.30–39 were sent, cf. Broughton, *MRR* II, 285, n. 8 and 308.

²⁰Cf. W. Kroll, *Die Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit* I (1933) 60 f., who brings *Fam.* 13.35 as an example; cf. also Andrzejewski (note 4 above). In his other article Andrzejewski compares the *commendatio vulgaris* with the *vulgare exordium* "quod in pluris causas accommodari potest," Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.71 (note 13 above) 55.

recommendation. Even the ordinary letter of recommendation was presumably written on behalf of people Cicero knew or knew of.²¹ Nevertheless there is no doubt that by being one among many the single letter of recommendation stands to lose much of its effect: "Sed vereor ne, quia compluris tibi praecipue commendo, exaequare videar ambitione quadam commendationes meas" (*Fam.* 13.32.1).²²

An attempt to avoid even the impression of writing a letter of recommendation comes up in another letter to Caesar from 45 B.C. Apollonius, the freedman of P. Crassus, fired with the desire to write Caesar's *res gestae* in Greek, sets off to join Caesar who is engaged in the Spanish War. Cicero assures his correspondent that the man could obtain enough recommendations from other people, whereas he, Cicero "testimonium mei de eo iudici, quod et ipse magni aestimabat et ego apud te valere eram expertus, ei libenter dedi" (*Fam.* 13.16.3). "Testimonium mei iudici" or "opinionis mei testimonium" (*ibid.*, §4) is nothing but a recommendation,²³ and yet by denying that this is so, Cicero is trying to reinvigorate and breathe new life into what seemed to him to have lost its former vitality and hence its potential efficacy.

In conclusion it may be suggested that these elaborate attempts to free himself from a fixed format constitute strong proof for the entrenchment of the practice of writing recommendations in Cicero's Rome, stronger than the presence of a pattern and the recurrence of traditional set phrases themselves.²⁴

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²¹ *Fam.* 13.6a on behalf of P. Cornelius "mihi a P. Cuspido commendatus" is an example for the latter case.

²² Cf. Lossmann (note 2 above) 15, n. 3.

²³ That the contrast is specious and used as a rhetorical device can be proved by the fact that in his attempt to exonerate the tribune designate, L. Clodius, from the suspicion of being a partisan of M. Antonius, Cicero makes the opposite claim (to M. Brutus): "Multa eius indicia, sed ad scribendum non necessaria; nolo enim testimonium hoc tibi videri potius quam epistulam" (*Ad Brut.* 6.1).

²⁴ I should like to thank Mr. Ari Paltiel περί πολλῶν.

SUGGESTIONS OF DATE IN CONSTANTINE'S ORATION TO THE SAINTS*

The oration *To the Assembly of the Saints* attributed to Constantine the Great comes down to us appended to manuscripts of Eusebius of Caesarea's *Life* of that emperor.¹ It purports to be a Greek translation of a speech composed by the emperor in Latin. In twenty-six chapters of what is best described as a fourth century version of "pop philosophy," Constantine offers a defense of Christianity and an exhortation to the pious life, implicitly and sometimes explicitly celebrating as well his own pious career. Its genuineness has been questioned, but scholars of the present generation have shown themselves willing to presume authenticity, no doubt in reaction against the hyper-criticism of earlier generations.²

Instead, the question of date has taken preeminence in the past dozen years, which have seen the appearance of several studies, varying widely in assumptions, methods, and conclusions.³ The reason for this

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¹I. A. Heikel, ed., *Eusebius' Werke*, I, GCS 7 (Leipzig 1902) 154-92. References in subsequent notes that are preceded by "H." refer to page and line of this edition.

²Suspicion first was cast on the *Oratio* by J.-P. Rossignol, *Virgile et Constantin le Grand* (Paris 1845). It suffered particularly at the hands of Heikel, *Kritische Beiträge zu den Constantin-Schriften des Eusebius* (Leipzig 1911) ch. 1, then became a victim of a general attack on the authenticity of the *Life* and its documents launched in the 1930s by Henri Grégoire. In a lengthy and judicious 1931 review, Norman Baynes denied its use as evidence for Constantine's personal convictions: *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church*, 2nd ed. (London 1972) n. 19. The tide began to turn in the 1950s with publication of a contemporary copy of one of the documents in the *Life* by A. H. M. Jones and T. C. Skeat, "Notes on the Genuineness of the Constantinian Documents in Eusebius' 'Life of Constantine,'" *JEH* 5 (1954) 194-200. Significant problems remain, and the very nature of the work makes it likely that some always will. But a more flexible attitude was signaled by H. Dörries, *Das Selbstzeugnis Kaiser Konstantins* (Göttingen 1954) 147-61, putting the burden of proof on those who would deny authenticity.

³Sec, e.g., R. P. C. Hanson, "The ORATIO AD SANCTOS Attributed to the Emperor Constantine and the Oracle at Daphne," *JTS* 24 (1973) 505-11; S. Mazzarino, "La data dell' *Oratio ad sanctorum coetum* . . .," in *Antico, tardantico ed era costantiniana* I (Rome 1974) ch. 5, pp. 99-150; T. D. Barnes, "The Emperor Constantine's Good Friday Sermon," *JTS* 27 (1976) 414-23; D. DeDecker, "Le discours à l'assemblée des Saints attribué à Constantin et l'oeuvre de Lactance," in J. Fontaine and M. Perrin, eds., *Lactance et son temps* (Paris 1978) 75-87.

labor is self-evident. Not only would a precise date help resolve the question of authenticity, but also it would enhance the *Oration's* value as a piece of Constantine's "self-witness" by placing it in the context of his political and religious growth. Yet it will be a final purpose of this present review to propose that precisely for this reason concern to find an exact date may itself be profoundly misleading.

Unfortunately, no date attaches to the *Oration*, nor is there any direct indication of one in Eusebius' description of it in the *Life*.⁴ Perforce, scholars have had to rely on information provided in an address whose nature it is to be allusive and imprecise about historical matters: it was written, alas, to celebrate the Providence of God, not to lighten the load of future investigators. Potentially fruitful allusions are strewn throughout the work, but these present the obvious temptation of reading more into an innocent or irrelevant remark than the author could ever have intended. Primary attention must be paid, therefore, to the emperor's few direct references to events of the day.

Of these there are only three. The first occurs at the very outset, where his words make clear that Constantine was speaking on a Good Friday—a fact by itself not terribly enlightening, but one which has proved crucial when combined with other variables.⁵ The second comes at the start of chapter 22, as the *Oration* traditionally has been divided. At the end of the preceding chapter, Constantine began an address to Piety, invoking her as his helpmate and, with Clemency, the source of his inspiration. He now continues:

To your favor [Piety], I assign my good fortune and all that is mine. The outcome of everything in accordance with [my] prayers bears witness to this: acts of bravery, victories, trophies over enemies. Even the great city knows this, and approves with praise, and the people of the dearest city concur, even though, having been misled by false hopes, they preferred a champion unworthy of her, who was swiftly conquered, in a manner both suitable to and worthy of the things he had dared.⁶

Constantine proceeds to discuss the "tyrants," whose war against Piety was thwarted by the steadfastness of the martyrs (22.2). He then ad-

⁴F. Winkelmann, ed., *De vita Constantini (VC)* 4.32 (Berlin 1975) 132.

⁵*Oratio* 1.1: ἡ τοῦ παθήματος ἡμέρα πάρεστιν (H. 154.5). For examples of the significance of the day, see Barnes (note 3 above) 416.

⁶*Oratio* 22.1: σύννοιδεν δὲ καὶ μετ' εὐφημίας ἐπαινεῖ καὶ ἡ μεγάλη πόλις, βούλεται δὲ καὶ ὁ δῆμος τῆς φιλάτης πόλεως, εἰ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς σφαιραῖς ἐλπίσιν ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἀνάξιον ἑαυτῆς προεῖλετο προστάτην, ὃς παραχρῆμα ἑάλω προσηκόντως τε καὶ ἀξίως τοῖς ἑαυτῷ τετολμημένοις . . . (H. 188.1–4).

dresses one of these tyrants directly, unfortunately invoking him only as the "most impious of men" (22.4). Your defense, he says to this one, doubtless would be that you were safeguarding the honor of the gods and defending the ancestral ways and public opinion.⁷

The final piece of information occurs at the end of chapter 25. After a stinging rebuke of Diocletian for authorizing the persecution, Constantine claims that, in retribution,

the entire army of the aforementioned emperor, having fallen subject to the authority of a certain worthless individual who seized the Roman imperium by force, was destroyed in many and various battles when the Providence of God was liberating the great city.⁸

The concluding chapter of the work calls on all men to render thanks for the victory won by the Providence of God and Constantine's prayers.

These statements seem sufficiently detailed to provide at least a *terminus post quem* by which to date the *Oratio*, if their subject can be identified. Unfortunately, such a task is not as easy as it might seem. Clearly they refer to an opponent of Constantine's, and scholars long took this, and the reference to the liberation of a great city, as indications of the famous battle Constantine fought with Maxentius in October 312 for control of the city of Rome. Intimately bound as it is with the conversion experience which traditionally first aligned Constantine with Christianity, the Battle of the Milvian Bridge qualifies in modern eyes as no other battle can for Constantine to celebrate in a speech to a Christian audience.⁹

⁷*Oratio* 22.4-5.

⁸*Oratio* 25.4: πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ προειρημένου βασιλέως στράτευμα, ὑποταχθὲν ἔξουσίᾳ τινὸς ἀχρήστου βία τε τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρχὴν ἀρπάσαντος, προνοίας θεοῦ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν ἐλευθερούσης, πολλοῖς καὶ παντοδαποῖς πολέμοις ἀνήλωται (H. 191.24-27).

⁹Valois translated the "great city" as "Roma" in his edition: Migne, *PG* 20, col. 1303, with n. 86, and Heikel, although attacking the authenticity of the work, took the passage as reference to Maxentius in his *Kritische Beiträge* (note 2 above) 40. A. Kurfess argued that the *Oratio* was delivered in the aftermath of this battle ("Kaiser Konstantins Rede an die Versammlung der Heiligen, ein Karfreitagsrede von Jahre 313," *Pastor Bonus* [1930] 115-24). A. Piganiol, "Dates constantiniennes," *RHPhR* 12 (1932) 371, took Maxentius as the subject of this passage, although he thought the remainder of the *Oratio* dealt with Licinius. Studies of the significance of this battle to Constantine abound. Particularly useful are N. H. Baynes, *Constantine the Great and the Christian Church*, 2nd ed. (London 1972) 9, n. 25 and 32; R. MacMullen, "Constantine and the Miraculous," *GRBS* 9 (1968) 81-96. Testimonia are collected in J. Aufhauser, *Konstantins Kreuzevision* (Bonn 1912).

But there are difficulties with this identification. For the passage from chapter 25 appears to say that Diocletian's army, now subject to this "worthless individual," also was destroyed, and no stretch of the scholarly imagination has been able to explain how Maxentius, whose rule was confined to Italy at the time of the battle, could have had control of Diocletian's army in the East. To complicate matters further, the heading to chapter 22 identifies the tyrant addressed therein not as Maxentius but Maximinus, presumably meaning thereby the persecutor Maximin Daia.¹⁰

Other candidates have accordingly been brought forward, as well as other dates and events. Two particularly engaging and fruitful studies have been presented by S. Mazzarino, who identifies the opponent as Licinius, the city as Byzantium, and the date as 325; and T. D. Barnes, who opts for Galerius, Serdica, and 317.¹¹ The means used by each scholar to reach his conclusion are as instructive as the conclusions themselves.

Assuming from the similarity of expression that Constantine's opponent in chapter 22 is identical to the one mentioned in chapter 25, Mazzarino concludes that no opponent other than Licinius can meet all of the conditions indicated in this work. As Constantine's co-ruler in the East for more than a dozen years, Licinius qualifies as an heir to Diocletian's army. Moreover, prior to the outbreak of war with Constantine in 324, he undertook restrictive, if not persecuting, measures against Christians, and during that war Byzantium served him as a major base; its fall led shortly after to his own disgrace, exile, and eventual execution.

Mazzarino also sees the use of direct address in chapter 22 as an indication that the "most impious of men" was alive when Constantine spoke. This strengthens his case for Licinius, for none of the other contenders could conceivably have been so, Galerius having died in 311 and both Maxentius and Maximin Daia perishing in, or shortly after, their respective defeats. But if the *Oration* is dated to the Good Friday subsequent to Constantine's victory over Licinius—16 April 325—then it is

¹⁰κβ'. Εὐχαριστία Χριστῷ τὰς νίκας καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιγράφουσα, καὶ ἐλεγχος τοῦ κατ' αὐτῶν τυράννου Μαξιμίνου τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ διωγμοῦ μείζονα δόξαν τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ περιποιήσαντος (H. 153.1-4).

¹¹Mazzarino (note 3 above) 115; Barnes (note 3 above) 423.

just possible for Licinius still to have been alive, since he spent some months in exile before being put to death.¹²

Barnes takes a different approach. Arguing that the heading for chapter 22 conforms to Eusebius' practice and therefore probably was written either by him or his editor, Barnes concludes that it provides a contemporary identification of Galerius, Diocletian's lieutenant and successor as chief Augustus, as the author of the Great Persecution.¹³ His reasoning is intricate, as indeed it must be, since the heading refers not to Galerius but "the tyrant Maximinus," apparently disqualifying Galerius both by name and title, since as an emperor legitimately invested with the purple he should not be called a "tyrant." Barnes shows, however, that in Christian usage this term also was applied to persecutors and, as such, fits Galerius. The name "Maximinus" poses less of a problem, since emending it by insertion of an easily omitted "a" produces "Maximianus," Galerius' official name.¹⁴

With one exception, Barnes finds that the contents of chapter 22 apply exclusively to Galerius: only he can be accused of declaring war on Christianity, torturing and executing Christians, and justifying his policy with oracles. Constantine's allusion to the death of this "unworthy champion" also, according to Barnes, "fits Galerius perfectly—and Galerius alone." The single exception, for Barnes, occurs at chapter 22.2, where, after listing the crimes against the martyrs, Constantine speaks of "those at Rome who rejoiced at such great public evils." These, Barnes concedes, cannot include Galerius, who never entered Rome during this period; the passage, therefore, must be an "allusion to Maxentius" which Constantine has intruded "into a context which is otherwise concerned with Galerius alone."¹⁵

With the subject of the passage thus identified, Barnes proceeds to identify the "great city" and the date of the *Oration*. The city, he stipulates, must be one in which Constantine is speaking, and one in which

¹²Mazzarino, loc. cit. No date is given in the sources for Licinius' execution. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (Cambridge, Mass. 1981) 214, connects it with the *damnatio memoriae* of one of the consuls for 325 in May of that year, suggesting a pagan rebellion which made Licinius too dangerous to tolerate, even as a private citizen.

¹³Barnes (note 3 above) 420–21. For an argument against Eusebian authorship of the chapter headings in the *VC*, see R. T. Ridley, "Anonymity in the *Vita Constantini*," *Byzantion* 50 (1980) 241–58.

¹⁴Barnes (note 3 above) 416, 420.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 421.

the "unworthy champion" died "soon after taking up residence there." It must, therefore, be Serdica, the city in which Galerius died "not many years" after making it his capital, and one which Constantine used as a base between 317 and 324. From his known whereabouts on Good Friday, Constantine must have delivered the *Oration* in Serdica in 317.¹⁶

When two such meticulous scholars arrive at such contradictory conclusions, caution, if not despair, is advisable. Yet on reflection it seems clear that both scholars made stipulations that limited their range of options unnecessarily.

The attributes, for instance, that Barnes sees as peculiarly Galerian—hostility to Christians, use of oracles, a miserable end—apply equally well to other of Constantine's rivals.¹⁷ To deny the apparent identification of Rome as the "great city," he compresses the eight years Galerius used Serdica as a capital into "soon after," and ignores completely the necessary implication of the text that the city chose its champion, not vice versa. Such contortions suggest that Barnes was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to defend his earlier choice of Galerius as the real author of the Great Persecution against the claim that Constantine fails to name him as such in this *Oration*.¹⁸

Mazzarino's argument is more subtle, but it also makes important stipulations. Like Barnes, he rejects the simplest identification of the opponent as Maxentius and the "great city" as Rome. The city cannot be Rome, he argues, because Maxentius was the only one of Constantine's opponents to hold sovereignty there; and Maxentius cannot be the tyrant addressed because he never persecuted Christians. Therefore, he concludes, the "great city" of the *Oration* must be Byzantium, and the honeyed language Constantine uses for both the city and its inhabitants

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 421, 423. Barnes subsequently has wavered on the date, opting more tentatively for a period between 321 and 324, but he still holds that "my central argument is sound." See Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius* (note 12 above) 73, with n. 115.

¹⁷Maxentius, for instance, consulted oracles before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, and his death can hardly be called pleasant: Lactant. *De mort. pers.* 44.1, 8; Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* 9.3; *VC* 1.37–38. Eusebius specifically accuses Licinius of persecuting Christians and practicing divination prior to his war with Constantine (*VC* 2.1–5). Maximin Daia's hostility to Christianity, devotion to the "ancient ways," and miserable death are all well attested (Lactant. *De mort. pers.*, chs. 36, 49; Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* 9.10–11).

¹⁸See the revealing comments in "Sermon" (note 3 above) 422, with n. 6.

shows that the emperor's thinking about his new capital already was set as early as 325.¹⁹

Such reasoning raises problems. It is true that modern scholars have determined that Constantine's opponent at the Milvian Bridge was no persecutor, but by 325 he surely had become one in Constantinian propaganda.²⁰ It is also true that Constantine remade Byzantium into a second capital, but there is no reason to believe that he also transferred to it—especially as early as 325—an epithet more readily associated with Rome, or that he would have been understood had he done so: years later, this phrase still meant the traditional capital to Eusebius.²¹ On this point, therefore, Mazzarino's argument does not support his choice of Licinius as the subject of the address.

Mazzarino's conclusion that Constantine's use of direct address in chapter 22.4 means that his rival must have been alive at the time he spoke also seems unnecessary. The invocation of the "most impious of men" is only one of a series of direct addresses which Constantine uses in these final chapters, beginning with Piety in chapter 21 and including the persecutors Decius, Valerian, and Aurelian—all of whom were surely dead—in chapter 24.²² As in the other cases, so here its use is most likely to have been rhetorical. For the intent of the passage is to make the "most impious of men" see the error of his ways. If meant literally

¹⁹Mazzarino (note 3 above) 114. Mazzarino also argues (p. 115) that Maxentius is excluded by Constantine's use of the plural "tyrants" in ch. 22 (H. 188.9), which he uses to refer to Licinius and his son as co-rulers. The argument neglects the fact that Maxentius also had a son. But Constantine's more likely reference is to the persecutors as a group: his switch to the passive voice suggests that he is no longer speaking of the "unworthy champion" at this point (see below, p. 343).

²⁰Piganiol (note 9 above) took the presumed identification of Maxentius as a persecutor as evidence that the *Oratio* could not have been delivered as early as 313, but saw no conflict with a date of 323. On Maxentius' policies, see A. Pincherle, "La politica ecclesiastica di Massenzio," *Studi Italiana di Filologia Classica* 7 (1929) 131-43; H. von Schoenebeck, *Beiträge zur Religionspolitik des Maxentius und Constantin*, *Klio Beiheft* 43, n.s. 30 (1939; repr. 1962); D. DeDecker, "La politique religieuse de Maxence," *Byzantion* 38 (1968) 472-562.

²¹ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν τίς ἀγνοεῖ κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τῇ τοῦ Λατ[ρ]ιαρίου Διοῦς ἑορτῇ σφαγιαζόμενον ἄνθρωπον; [LC] XIII.7 (H. 239.5-6). The phrase is from an oration on the Holy Sepulchre delivered in 335, which has become mixed in the mss. with Eusebius' *laus Constantini* (LC) of 336. Valois saw the significance of this passage for understanding Constantine's usage (see note 9 above).

²²*Oratio* 21.4 (Piety); 24.1 (Decius); 24.2 (Valerian); 24.3 (Aurelian).

for Licinius, it would require him to be not merely alive but also still capable of pursuing an independent policy: exhortations to a Licinius alive but beaten and stripped of the purple make little more sense than ones addressed to a dead Galerius or Maxentius or Maximin Daia. Yet Licinius cannot still have been regnant at the time the *Oration* was delivered—if indeed it is his persecution being attacked—for in this case the note it strikes of victory and an end to persecution would be distinctly out of place.

The strongest argument for Mazzarino's choice comes from a different assumption, which is that chapters 22 and 25 must speak of one and the same individual. But is the assumption necessary? Barnes tacitly assumed that chapters 22 and 25 deal with separate events, and even found a third opponent "intruded" into one of the chapters. Others have observed that Constantine follows the tone and argument of Lactantius in these pages.²³ If this is so, then chapters 22 and 25 should not be read in terms of a single person or event, but instead as a synopsis—albeit in highly condensed form—of a series of events.

On this reading, Constantine begins chapter 22 at the obvious place, by speaking of his own victory over Maxentius, Rome's "unworthy champion." Significantly, in light of Mazzarino's argument, Constantine does not call this "unworthy champion" a persecutor, stating only that he was punished for "the things he had dared." Only in the next passage does persecution come up, as Constantine speaks of the madness of the tyrants. But by this point he has clearly changed the subject, although his shorthand style makes the change an easy one to overlook.

Constantine began, it will be recalled, by modestly attributing all his successes to Piety. Rhetoric clearly is at work, and all but the most naïve reader will understand by this gambit that Constantine now intends to recount his great deeds. It is as witnesses to his success that the "great city" and its people are invoked, with Constantine adding that they did so even though initially they had "preferred a champion unworthy of her, who was swiftly captured, in a manner suitable to and worthy of the things he had dared." For all the attention scholars have lavished on him, the "unworthy champion" arises in what is little more than an aside, a grudging admission on Constantine's part that the Divine Hand was at one point not as apparent as it should have been.

²³So Piganiol (note 9 above) 372. Barnes decided ch. 25 refers to Licinius in "Sermon" (note 3 above, 423).

What were the "things he had dared"? Constantine demurs. They are "things which ought not to be recalled, especially by me as I hold converse with you [Piety] and make every effort to address you with gentle and auspicious language." Not surprisingly, given the rhetorical tone of this chapter, Constantine proceeds immediately to discuss such deeds.

But I will say something which may not be improper or unfitting. An implacable war once was waged against you, Piety, and all your most holy churches, by the tyrants who excelled in madness and cruelty, and there was not lacking certain of those in Rome who rejoiced at such great public evils; the field was prepared for war.²⁴

Scholars have rightly assumed that by the war against Piety Constantine means the persecution of Christians. But is he still speaking of the "unworthy champion"? The voice has changed to the passive, and with it the subject as well: "tyrants," as yet unspecified, are responsible for this war. Assuming, for the moment, that the "unworthy champion" is Maxentius, his only part in this sentence is among those in Rome who "rejoiced" at this turn of events. Maxentius is indeed insinuated into this passage, but in a way which suggests Constantine has used the compressed form of his narrative to finesse a point: he cannot call Maxentius a persecutor directly, so he will accuse him of guilt by association.

At this point, after brief praise for the steadfastness of the martyrs, Constantine invokes the "most impious of men."

What did you benefit, then, daring these things, most impious of men? Why did you take such leave of your senses? You will say that it was because of the honor due to the gods. What sort are these? Or what sort of concept do you hold in any way worthy of the divine nature? . . . You will say, perhaps, that it was because of ancestral customs and public opinion. I agree. Because those customs, like the events, are the products of one and the same folly.²⁵

²⁴*Oratio* 22.2: ἐρῶ δέ τι ἴσως οὐκ ἄσχημον οὐδὲ ἀπρεπές. ὑπερβάλλων μέντοι μανία καὶ ὠμότητι προκεκήρυκτό σοί ποτε, ὡ θεοσεβεία, καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀγιωτάταις σου ἐκκλησίαις ὑπὸ τυράννων πόλεμος ἄσπονδος, καὶ οὐκ ἐπέλειψάν τινες τῶν ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τηλικούτοις ἐπιχαίροντες δημοσίοις κακοῖς, παρεσκεύαστο δὲ καὶ πεδῖον τῇ μάχῃ (H. 188.7-12).

²⁵*Oratio* 22.4-5: τί οὖν ταῦτα τολμῶν ὤνησας, ὡ δυσσεβέστατε; τί δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς ἐκστάσεως τῶν φρενῶν; ἐρεῖς ὅτι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμὴν τίνας τούτους; ἢ ποῖαν τινὰ ἀξίαν τῆς θείας φύσεως λαμβάνεις ἔννοιαν; . . . ἐρεῖς ἴσως διὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων νομισθέντα καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπόληψιν συγχωρῶ. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶ παραπλήσια τοῖς ὀρωμένοις τὰ νομιζόμενα μᾶς τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀφροσύνης.

It is hard to read this passage without thinking of Galerius, whose deathbed edict ending the persecution explained the policy as an effort to restore the ancestral gods.²⁶ But if Galerius' edict is on Constantine's mind, then his use of the future tense, as well as "perhaps" (ἴσως), is being unnecessarily coy. There is, however, another persecutor who used ancestral ways and, in particular, public opinion to justify his actions, and who is, incidentally, cited by name in the chapter heading as it comes down in the manuscripts: he is Maximin Daia, Augustus in the Orient and, until his death in the summer of 313, the most versatile and relentless of the persecutors.²⁷

If Constantine is indeed following a sequence of events, then the logic which led him to turn to Daia at this point becomes clear. For in the papers of the defeated Maxentius, Constantine discovered an alliance made with Daia, in defense against the one Constantine himself had made with Licinius.²⁸ This pact, linking the tolerant Maxentius with the Church's most bitter enemy, was a propaganda bonanza for Constantine. It justified his invasion of Italy and provided the first stroke on a canvas which, fleshed out by time, depicted Maxentius as a tyrant and persecutor.

The argument of the chapter thus runs: Maxentius was rightly conquered because, despite the cruelty of the persecution which the tyrants had sponsored, he put his personal interest above the public interest in allying with the "most impious of men." It is thus Daia, not Maxentius, who is the primary object of Constantine's attention in this chapter and, by extension, in the remaining chapters of the *Oration*. For as Augustus in the Orient he was the direct heir to the army of Diocletian, precisely as Constantine describes him in chapter 25. Here, too, however, a compressed narrative, as well as what might be an ulterior motive on Constantine's part, has kept Daia's identity from being as obvious as it might.

²⁶Lactant. *De mort. pers.*, ch. 34; Eusebius prints a Greek translation in *Hist. Eccl.* 8.17.

²⁷For Maximin's use of both religious custom and public opinion, see Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* 9.2-7 and 9.9a for Maximin's letter in defense of his policies. For modern studies see H. Castritus, *Studien zu Maximinus Daia*, Frankfurter Althistorische Studien, Heft 2 (Kallmünz 1969); G. S. R. Thomas, "Maximin Daia's Policy and the Edicts of Toleration," *Antiquité Classique* 37 (1968) 172-85; R. M. Grant, "The Religion of Maximin Daia," in *Christianity, Judaism and other Greco-Roman Cults* (Leiden 1975) IV, 143-66.

²⁸Lactant. *De mort. pers.*, chs. 43-44.

In this passage, Constantine speaks again of the liberation of the "great city," providing the grounds for Mazzarino and others to assume that he was speaking of the same event, and thus the same individual, as in chapter 22. But that victory is not here the subject of the passage; it is mentioned in a participial phrase to provide a relative date for the event under discussion, the destruction of Diocletian's army:

For the entire army of the aforementioned emperor, having fallen subject to the authority of a certain worthless individual who seized the Roman imperium by force, when the foresight of God was liberating the great city, was destroyed in many and various battles.

The actual subject is the destruction of Diocletian's army, which occurred in not one but "many and various" battles, and which was brought on by an attempt to "seize the Roman imperium by force." In much abbreviated form, this sentence refers precisely to the events of 313, when Daia invaded Licinius' territories, catching the allies by surprise as they conferred in Milan. Licinius destroyed Daia's main force near Adrianople, but Daia himself escaped to raise a new army in Asia Minor. Only after several months of pursuit and skirmish did the persecutor concede defeat and commit suicide.²⁹

The victory in chapter 25 thus is not Constantine's own but Licinius', and Constantine once again follows Lactantius in carrying his story down to the destruction of the last of the Tetrarchic persecutors. With not a little skill, he has managed to tell the story in such a way as to keep attention focused on his own deeds, thereby ensuring maximum credit to himself and the very minimum to Licinius, who is not even identified by name.

Chapters 22-25 thus deal with the events of A.D. 312-313. Since Daia's defeat did not occur until Easter of 313 had passed, the earliest date at which the *Oration* might have been delivered is the subsequent Good Friday, 16 April 314.³⁰ Yet Constantine's choice of these events does not, by itself, mean he was in fact speaking so early. Taking Rome was decisive to his fortunes, and it became the great foundation legend

²⁹Lactant. *De mort. pers.*, chs. 45-49.

³⁰Easter in 313 fell on 29 March, whereas Daia's defeat can be dated precisely to 30 April by Lactantius' comment that he chose the day before his imperial anniversary, 1 May, for the battle. O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste* (Stuttgart 1919; repr. Frankfurt 1964) 160; Lactant. *De mort. pers.* 46.8-9. Daia's suicide, described by Lactantius in ch. 49, probably did not occur until July: T. D. Barnes, *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine* (Cambridge, Mass. 1982) 67.

of his reign. Constantine still enjoyed talking about it many years later when Eusebius heard the story, and Eusebius himself preferred it to more recent events when giving an official address at the very end of Constantine's long reign.³¹

The apparent lack of reference to either of Constantine's wars with Licinius—in 316 or 324—is, therefore, no certain proof that the *Oration* was delivered before either had occurred. Too much can be made as well of the backhanded way in which Constantine refers to Licinius' victory over Daia. It could reflect a period of hostility between the two, as Barnes suggests, but like all Romans, Constantine was a vainglorious man. According to Peter the Patrician, he shared fame with such worthies as Augustus and Trajan only grudgingly; there is no reason to believe he ever would have been more generous to the likes of Licinius.³²

The *Oration*'s theme of victory and its celebration of the end of persecution are a more certain indication of date. For such topics would have been out of place had Licinius begun to take active measures against Christians, as he appears to have done by 319 or 320 at the latest,³³ and they would have remained so anytime between then and his defeat in the fall of 324. The *Oration* can, on these grounds, be limited to two periods: the first, from the defeat of Daia to the beginning of Licinius' anti-Christian measures, say A.D. 314–319; the second, from the first Easter following the defeat of Licinius to any time before Constantine's death, A.D. 325–337.

Can the date be made any more precise? Barnes hoped to do so by finding a correlation between a "great city" and Constantine's known whereabouts on Good Friday of different years.³⁴ This approach depended, however, on the assumption that Constantine must have been speaking in the city to which he refers—an assumption prompted by the special tone of his references. But this assumption, in turn, rested upon another—that the city in question could not be Rome. Once Rome is identified as the city in question, the possibility of making such a corre-

³¹LC 9.8 (H. 219.2–16). The reference to Constantine's war against Maxentius is confirmed by Eusebius' use of the phrase βασιλευούση πόλει (H. 219.13) for the site of the victory.

³²Const. Porph. *Excerpta Historica*, IV: *Excerpta de sententiis*, ed. U. Boissevain, p. 271.191; cf. Mueller, *FGH* IV, p. 199.15.2. Barnes detected hostility in "Sermon" (note 3 above, 423).

³³F. Görries, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die licinianische Christenverfolgung* (Jena 1875) 19; Barnes (note 12 above) 71–72.

³⁴Barnes (note 3 above) 416, 423.

lation disappears. For the special status of Rome would have been conceded anywhere in the Empire, making Constantine's language appropriate—indeed, perhaps obligatory—wherever he spoke.

Without a city on which to triangulate, Constantine's whereabouts no longer promise a key to the mystery of date. But less mechanical approaches are still possible. Chapter 22.1, which has been so central to the discussion thus far, may also be exploited for a date. In looking at this passage, scholars have been concerned only to identify the "great city" and its "unworthy champion." An obvious question, therefore, has not been asked: why, in a speech devoted to a confession and celebration of Constantine's faith, and to the divine favor it has brought, did the emperor find it necessary to admit that the "people of the dearest city" preferred his opponent to himself, even if only initially? And who are the people so precious that their failure to support Constantine must even now be explained? They are not simply the *plebs Romana*: the scorn that Constantine professes throughout this *Oration* for the ignorant opposition of the masses³⁵ makes it unlikely that concern for their opinion would have prompted such an embarrassing admission. These are people who had been "misled by false hopes" into selecting their champion. Exegesis of the succeeding narrative has revealed that these "false hopes" were the belief that Maxentius did not support the Tetrarchy's policy of persecution. They were dashed only after the event, by discovery of Maxentius' pact with Maximin Daia, which allowed Constantine to place him among "those in Rome who rejoiced at such great public evils."

It must be that these people are the Christians of Rome. Remarks in the *Oration* make it clear that Constantine was speaking to a Christian audience,³⁶ and this would explain why he had no choice but to answer for the failure of this particular constituency immediately to rec-

³⁵E.g., *Oratio* 4.1: δόξα δὲ τῶν ἀλογίστων δῆμων (H. 157.20); IX.5: παρὰ τοῖς ἀλογίστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων (H. 164.1); XXI.4: ὁ δὲ ἄπειρος ὄχλος (H. 187.23). See also, in this very chapter, Constantine's ridicule of the "most impious of men" for using public opinion as a defense (22.5, H. 188.27 ff.) and note 25 above.

³⁶In the first sentence of the *Oration*, Constantine refers to his hearers as προσφιλέστατοι καθηγηταί (*Oratio* 1.1, H. 154.5), a term identified by Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, as a title of address for Christian bishops. In ch. 2, Constantine addresses the president of the meeting, praising his age and celibacy, and the personified Church (H. 155.21-22), and calls on his hearers to be indulgent of the doctrinal exposition that follows. The title of the *Oration*, of course, as well as the subject matter, also suggest a Christian audience.

ognize his own superior claim to their allegiance. It is a stunning admission, with implications for interpreting the *Oration*—indeed, for interpreting Constantine's whole career—that have yet to be assessed.

This interpretation of chapter 22.1 requires an early date for delivery of the *Oration*, for within a matter of years the problem was solved by rewriting the early career of Maxentius. The pages of Eusebius are instructive. In his treatment of Maxentius in the *Church History*, probably written around 315, Eusebius portrays Constantine's enemy as a ruler whose friendliness to the Church proved to be false when he allied himself with the arch-persecutor. In the *Life of Constantine*, written more than twenty years later, Maxentius appears in the more familiar guise of the tyrant whose villainies against the Church provoked Constantine to action and precipitated his conversion experience.³⁷

The relatively passive and subsidiary role assigned to Maxentius in the *Oration* thus would also speak for an early date. For here he is still a secondary figure, whose crime amounts primarily to casting his lot with Maximin Daia. Instead, it is Daia who is the focus of Constantine's judgment, receiving a measure of attention and scorn out of all proportion to the role scholars now assign him in relation to Galerius and Licinius. This would be more readily understood if the *Oration* was delivered in the flush of his defeat.

Too much of this conclusion rests on interpretation for it to be put forward with any claim to scientific finality. The minimal role of Maxentius and focus on Daia could be as readily explained by locating the *Oration* in the East, where Daia's impact was felt most strongly. Such a locale would also make it easier to explain why Eusebius ignored the implications of Constantine's remarks for his relations with the Christians of Rome, and how he managed to have a copy of the *Oration* to append to his *Life* in the first place. But it would also require a date in the last period of Constantine's reign, when he both controlled and resided in the East.³⁸

³⁷Cf. *Hist. Eccl.* 8.14 (esp. 1-7) and 9.9 with *VC* 1.26-40.

³⁸DeDecker found signs of a "milieu antiochéen" in the *Oration*: see "Évocation de la Bible dans le 'Discours à l'Assemblée des Saints' prêté à l'empereur Constantin," *Studia Biblica* 1978 (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series 11) I, 136, and note 3 above. Barnes (note 3 above, 417) has argued that the absence of "Victor" (Νικητής) from Constantine's nomenclature in the *Oration's* title demands a date earlier than 324. But use of the epithet appears not to have been so consistent. See C. Ehrhardt, "'Maximus,' 'Invictus,' und 'Victor' als Datierungskriterien auf Inschriften Konstantins des Grossen," *ZPE* 38 (1980) 177-81.

The *Oration* thus defies a precise date. But does it need one? Eusebius appended it to the *Life* not as evidence for Constantine's conversion or of any of the particular acts of his reign, but as an example of the emperor's developed thought. It was, he says, a type of speech that Constantine was always giving, and indeed its contents bear remarkable similarity to one which Eusebius later says the emperor gave shortly before his death in 337.³⁹ It seems clear, then, that Eusebius took the *Oration to the Saints* as a valid guide to Constantine's thinking at the very last stages of his reign, and scholars who would try to limit its use merely to one period or another run the risk of assuming precisely what we would most like this *Oration* to prove: that the momentous decisions of his reign had an impact of any sort on the religious conceptions of the first Christian emperor.

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³⁹Eusebius' specific reference to the *Oration*, at *VC* 4.32, occurs in the context of an extended discussion of the emperor's pious habits. He speaks more generally of Constantine's writings and speeches at *VC* 3.24 and 4.29. For the account of an oration delivered shortly before his death, see *VC* 4.55.

INTERPRETATIONS

PINDAR'S HEROIC IDEAL AT PYTH. 4.186-87

In one of the most memorable passages in his epic-like *Pythian* 4, Pindar sets forth the heroic ideal that Hera inspired in the Argonauts (184-87):

τὸν δὲ παμπειθῇ γλυκὺν ἡμιθέοισιν πόθον ἔνδαιεν Ἥρα
ναὸς Ἀργούης, μὴ τίνα λειπόμενον
τὰν ἀκίνδυνον παρὰ ματρὶ μένειν αἰῶνα πέσσοντ', ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
καὶ θανάτῳ
φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἕως ἀρετᾶς ἀλιξιν εὐρέσθαι σὺν ἄλλοις.

The problem lies in the expression φάρμακον κάλλιστον and its relationship to the following genitive ἕως ἀρετᾶς. There are basically three ways of understanding the phrase grammatically: the φάρμακον can be a "remedy to heal" ἀρετά; it can be a "remedy to effect" ἀρετά; or it can be a "remedy consisting of" ἀρετά. All three have been proposed, and to make matters more complicated, there has been disagreement as to what precisely φάρμακον is a metaphor for. Is it "fame" as the scholia claim (330 b, 332 a), or "danger" as many recent scholars argue? Virtually all combinations of these variables have been advanced, and some remarkable misunderstandings have resulted, not only of this passage but, more important, of Pindar's concept of heroic ἀρετά. I shall eventually argue that Heyne and Boeckh are correct in understanding φάρμακον . . . ἀρετᾶς as *remedium virtutis*, namely *gloria*, but first it is necessary to review in some detail the problems entailed in the other interpretations.

Admittedly the expression φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἕως ἀρετᾶς "most noble remedy for his own valor," if taken out of its context, is a startling (if not paradoxical) statement, and in 1815 J. Gurlitt adduced Eur. *Phoen.* 893 (φάρμακον σωτηρίας, "a remedy to produce safety") to argue that φάρμακον . . . ἀρετᾶς meant *incitamentum virtutis*, "a stimulus to valor."¹ Although Dissen followed the traditional interpre-

¹A. Boeckh, *Pindari Opera quae Supersunt* II.ii (Leipzig 1821) 276, reviews Gurlitt's arguments, but rejects them by citing N. 3.18 and O. 8.7, and pointing out that the words κάλλιστον and εὐρέσθαι tell against his interpretation. A century later O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922) 44, will also review Gurlitt's arguments, but approvingly.

tation of his predecessors Heyne and Boeckh, he nevertheless concedes, almost as an afterthought: "ceterum φάρμακόν τινος aut remedium alicuius rei est aut adminiculum eius efficiendae."² With this addendum he leaves open a path that will be taken by most subsequent commentators.

Once one accepts the meaning of "incentive" for φάρμακον, the problem becomes one of determining in what that incentive lies. J. W. Donaldson's proposal, although attracting few adherents, entails problems that other scholars will encounter. His translation of the last clause is: "but that each of them might strive to obtain in company with his peers a seasoning or relish even for death itself in his own glory and renown."³ The very idea of "striving to obtain a relish for death" is clearly nonsense, but it is worthwhile to see what has happened. Gurlitt's *incitamentum* has become a "seasoning or relish," but no longer does it apply to ἀρετή; it is a relish *for death*, while ἀρετή takes on the meaning of "glory and renown." Finally, and no less important, this inducement is located *in his own* ἀρετή (here taken to mean "glory and renown"). This last interpretation (where presumably ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς is taken as a genitive of material) has found acceptance in LSJ, s.v. φάρμακον, III.a.3, where a special category is created for this single entry with the translation: "a *remedy* or *consolation* in his own virtue." Even F. Nisetich's usually excellent translation gives the following rendering: "but to win, / together with his agemates, / a cure for death itself / in his own renown."⁴ Instead of φάρμακον as "seasoning or relish" we return to the meaning of "cure," but in both instances it applies to death,⁵ not to ἀρετή, and the genitive ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς becomes "in his own

²L. Dissen, *Pindari Carmina* II (Gotha 1830) 238.

³J. W. Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes* (London 1841) 135-36. His "seasoning or relish" can be traced back to E. Schmid, Πινδάρου Περίοδος (Wittenberg 1616) 203, who glosses φάρμακον as "ἄρτυμα, condimentum: h.e. Gloriam." D. W. Turner, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1852) 71-72, well illustrates the confusion possible in this difficult passage. In his prose translation he provides what I will argue is the correct interpretation: "but that, even on condition of death, he should seek to find the fairest remedy for his valour, with the rest of his peers." But in his note he gives the following (clearly indebted to Donaldson): "or, that with the rest of his peers he should seek to find the sweetest zest which virtue gives to death."

⁴F. J. Nisetich, *Pindar's Victory Odes* (Baltimore 1980) 184.

⁵It is very tempting to take ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ with φάρμακον as "a remedy against even death," and there is a suggestion that even in dying the hero gains a remedy, but there is no satisfactory parallel for φάρμακον + ἐπὶ as "a cure for." (Cf. LSJ, sv. φάρμακον and ἐπὶ and Slater, sv. ἐπὶ 3.f.) L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* II (London

renown."⁶ Another feature common to these (and other) translations is the absence of a very prominent word, κάλλιστον. It isn't just any "relish" or "cure," but specifically "the most noble one."⁷

Confusion continues with T. D. Seymour, who glosses φάρμακον with the impossible meaning of "victory," while retaining the idea of "inducement," by commenting: "Without such an opportunity for action, his ἀρετά would fade and wither; these exploits would be the elixir of fame."⁸ Once again "fame" and ἀρετά are being confused, but the poetic charm of the word "elixir" was to captivate succeeding scholars. B. L. Gildersleeve comments on φάρμακον: "It is not 'a solace for their valorous toil,' but an 'elixir of valor,' as we say the 'elixir of youth.'"⁹ This "elixir of valor" (= "capable of producing valor"?) becomes a genitive of material in C. A. M. Fennell's gloss: "The 'elixir compounded of his prowess' is renown."¹⁰ These are followed by Sandys' "a peerless elixir of prowess," probably also by R. Lattimore's "that essence of valor," and perhaps even by Swanson's "the grand intoxication of high excellence."¹¹ I suggest that the intoxication is not in Pindar's

1932) 161, renders it: "to find in their renown a charm to conquer even death itself," but the "exact parallel" that he adduces (S.I.G. 37.2: ὅστις φάρμακα δηλητήρια ποιοῖ ἐπὶ Τηίοισιν) is totally different (for ἐπὶ with a proper noun meaning "against," cf. Smyth 1689.2c and LSJ, s.v. ἐπὶ B.1.2.d., which cites this example). The phrase ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ clearly must mean "on the condition (or at the price) even of death."

⁶There is no parallel for φάρμακον + genitive meaning "remedy consisting in (or of)," as the lone reference cited above in LSJ indicates. Furthermore, those who attempt to locate the φάρμακον in the expression ἔα δ' ἀρετᾶς are either forced to render ἀρετᾶς as "fame" (e.g., Donaldson, "in his own glory and renown" and Nisetich, "in his own renown") or actually claim that the remedy is in the ἀρετά itself (an unparalleled notion), as C. M. Bowra, *The Odes of Pindar* (Baltimore 1969) 197, does: ". . . Find in his own valour the fairest enchantment / With others young as he."

⁷It is remarkable how often κάλλιστον simply disappears or is given a vague meaning like "magic" (E. Myers, *The Extant Odes of Pindar* [London 1908] 75), "peerless" (Sandys), "grand" (Swanson), or "fair and potent" (Conway). Boeckh (note 1 above) had wisely seen that κάλλιστον would be a problem for the followers of Gurlitt.

⁸T. D. Seymour, *Selected Odes of Pindar* (Boston 1882) 170.

⁹B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) 296. Note how Seymour's "elixir of fame" becomes "elixir of valor," just as Donaldson's "in his own glory and renown" was to become "in his own virtue/valour" in LSJ and Bowra.

¹⁰C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893) 202. Now that the φάρμακον is thought to consist of ἀρετά, both κάλλιστον and εὐρέσθαι lose their point, and are ignored.

¹¹J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (Cambridge, Mass. 1915) 219 (note that ἔα δ' is neglected); R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar* (Chicago 1947) 64; and R. A. Swanson, *Pindar's Odes* (Indianapolis 1974) 90.

text, but has been arrived at by a kind of ὑπεροχή that finally results in nonsense.

Before returning to the traditional explanation of φάρμακον, it is necessary to examine yet one more strain of interpretation that has many current advocates. It also begins with Gurlitt's *incitamentum virtutis*, but it locates the inducement not in fame, but in the danger (κίνδυνος) that supposedly prompts the heroes. Its first important exponent was O. Schroeder, who approved Gurlitt's interpretation of the grammar and added: "Was vermag denn männlich Verlangen mehr zu reizen (und zu stillen) als die Gefahr? ὁ μέγας δὲ κίνδυνος ἀναλκιν οὐ φῶτα λαμβάνει."¹² This interpretation was approved by H. Gundert with the clarification: "Eines φάρμακον bedarf die Areta, um sich nicht in Untätigkeit zu verlieren; wenn sie ihre Bestimmung nicht erfüllen kann, geriete sie in eine ἀμαχανία, die nur der κίνδυνος heilen kann, weil er allein ihr die Möglichkeit (μαχανά) zur ruhmvollen Tat gibt."¹³ G. Norwood (significantly ignoring κάλλιστον) translates φάρμακον ἕως ἀρετᾶς as "a talisman to create valour," and concludes, "here we perceive high-hearted worship of adventure as a kind of religion."¹⁴ R. W. B. Burton says, more cautiously, "κίνδυνος . . . is the φάρμακον which makes actual each man's ἀρετή."¹⁵ And finally, the latest commentator on the poem, G. Kirkwood, glosses φάρμακον with "'remedy,' the 'specific,' namely the daring expedition, that actualizes ἀρετή (Burton, p. 163)," and says further on, "The expedition becomes a φάρμακον κάλλιστον for ἀρετή."¹⁶ All this is very exciting, very modern, but I shall try to show that it is not in the text; it is not in Pindar.

How, then, are we to interpret φάρμακον? On the literal level it means "remedy"; as a metaphor it means what the scholiasts say: "fame." If one compares the numerous other places where Pindar refers to celebration and song as the "best doctor" (ἄριστος . . . ἰατρός) for toils (N. 4.1-2), or the "healing remedy" (ἄκος ὑγιερὸν) for wearisome blows (N. 3.18), or the "fame-giving requital" (λύτρον εὐδοξόν) for

¹²O. Schroeder (note 1 above).

¹³H. Gundert, *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Tübingen 1935) 25.

¹⁴G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley 1945) 40-41. In this thoroughly Romantic view, φάρμακον κάλλιστον . . . εὐρέσθαι becomes "the young hero seeks a beautiful exploit." It is not surprising that he finds this attitude very different from Homer's.

¹⁵R. W. B. Burton, *Pindar's Pythian Odes* (Oxford 1962) 163. Burton adduces the earliest example of φάρμακον + genitive meaning "remedy to produce a desired effect" in a line attributed to Ibycus (PMG 313): οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποφθιμένοις ζωᾶς ἔτι φάρμακον εὐρεῖν.

¹⁶G. Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar* (Chico 1982) 190.

effort (I. 8.1, and cf. P. 5.106), or the "recompense" (ἀποινα) for ἀρετά (P. 2.14, and cf. I. 3.7, I. 8.4), it is difficult to escape the conclusion that φάρμακον belongs in this same metaphorical group.¹⁷

But, one will rightly object, ἀρετά by itself does not mean "toil" (πόνος, μόχθος, κάματος, etc.). In this passage, however, there is an important qualification: ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ "even when it entails death." In order to emphasize the contrast between the life without risk (τὰν ἀκίνδυνον . . . αἰῶνα, 186) and that of dangerous action inspired by Hera, Pindar places ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ at the head of its clause, but it qualifies the rest of the sentence, including εὐρέσθαι and ἀρετᾶς (the valorous action that resulted in "gaining"), and ἀρετά displayed ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ is the extreme form of πόνος, μόχθος, κάματος, etc. ἀρετά here is not some inward quality, nor fame, but that heroic action which may involve death for the individual (cf. ἑᾶς, 187), but when it is done in the company of others (ἄλιξιν . . . σὺν ἄλλοις, 187), that is, in the open, in the common interest (as opposed to παρὰ ματρὶ μένειν, 186), then a man gains (εὐρέσθαι, 187)¹⁸ "the most beautiful/noble rem-

¹⁷In every one of these examples, the genitive defines the thing "healed" or "compensated for." Pindar uses the word φάρμακον five times. Twice it is unqualified (P. 3.53 and N. 3.55). In the other two instances (besides the present passage), Pindar follows Homeric usage by using an adjective to designate the *effect* of the remedy (e.g., ἥπια φάρμακα at *Il.* 11.515: "remedies producing mildness," "soothing remedies"). Thus at O. 13.85, Pindar refers to the bridle as a φάρμακον πραύ (a "remedy to produce gentleness"). At O. 9.97-98 he uses both the adjective and a genitive in a highly metaphorical sense to describe the coat won by the victor: καὶ ψυχρᾶν ὀπότη' εὐδιανὸν φάρμακον αὐρᾶν Πελλάνῃ φέρε, "and at Pellana when he won the warm(ing) remedy for cold winds." When one considers all these passages and adds P. 4.221: ἀντίτομα στερεᾶν ὀδυνᾶν ("remedies for fierce pains"), P. 5.63-64: νοσῶν ἀκέσματα, and Pa. 4.26: βιόδωρον ἀμαχανίας ἄκος, Pindar's consistent usage tells strongly against creating a completely separate entry for φάρμακον at P. 4.187, as Slater does (following Burton) with the meaning "help for, means to." An anonymous referee suggests the following plausible interpretation: "to find the fairest medicine (i.e., fame) for producing valor even in the face of death," but besides deviating from all the other Pindaric examples noted above, it shares with all interpreters who follow Gurlitt's *incitamentum* an awkward reversal of the normal sequence of events by which action leads to fame, for the hero then *wins* (for the meaning of εὐρέσθαι, cf. the following note) *an incentive to action*, rather than a compensation that follows upon it, thus making possible a Roman-tic interpretation such as Norwood's.

¹⁸It is, I think, significant that the other three examples of εὐρέσθαι (middle) in the odes mean "win" (cf. Slater, s.v.) and involve "fame." The verb εὐρέσθαι makes nonsense of attempts to understand φάρμακον as "danger" or as "the daring expedition." What sense is there in "winning a dangerous expedition"? Only Norwood (note 14 above) squarely faces the incongruity and makes of it a "religion."

edy," and that remedy *for* action/valor (ἀρετά) gained even at the cost of death is, of course, fame, as a comparison with similar passages at O. 1.82 (ἀνώνυμον) and O. 6.11 (τίμῃαι) show.¹⁹

Finally, the above interpretation brings this passage into the mainstream of the Hellenic tradition as a species of "Achilles' choice" between the obscurity of a long life (αἰών, *Il.* 9.415) at home with his parents, or the κλέος for fighting (and dying) at Troy with his companions. Of many later variations, I select two which illustrate motifs implicit in the Pindaric passage. The first is from an epigram attributed to Simonides commemorating those who died at the battle of Eurymedon (in the 460s), A.P. 7.258 (= Peek 8.1-4):

οἷδε παρ' Εὐρυμέδοντά ποτ' ἀγλαὸν ὤλεσεν ἦβην

.....
κάλλιστον δ' ἀρετῆς μνημ' ἔλιπον φθίμενοι.

4

Here are men whose heroic action (ἀρετή) really was ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, and for whom the consolation was fame.²⁰ As the fourth verse states it, "in dying (cf. ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ) they left behind (cf. εὐρέσθαι, which includes those who might survive to enjoy their fame) the most noble memorial of their valor (cf. φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς)." Pericles' *Funeral Oration* contains many variations on this theme,²¹ but the following illustrates the implicit contrast between the public and private realms (Thuc. 2.43): κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες (cf. ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ . . . ἄλιξιν σὺν ἄλλοις), ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγῆρων ἔπαινον ἐλάμβανον (cf. φάρμακον κάλλιστον ἑᾶς ἀρετᾶς . . . εὐρέσθαι).²²

¹⁹Cf. D. E. Gerber, *Pindar's Olympian One: A Commentary* (Toronto 1982) 123-25, who also cites the helpful article by H. J. Mette, "Die 'Grosse Gefahr,'" *Hermes* 80 (1952) 410-11. For an analysis of the language in these passages, cf. "Negative Expressions and Pindaric ΠΟΙΚΙΛΙΑ," *TAPA* 113 (1983) 103-4. Also to the point is Bacch. 1.181-84, where ἀρετά is qualified by ἐπίμοχος and leaves behind fame even after death (καὶ εὖτε θάνῃ).

²⁰ἐπὶ καὶ θανάτῳ corresponds to the very frequent ἐν προμάχοισι in inscriptions (cf. I. 7.35-36) and to ζῶων τ' ἀπὸ καὶ θανόν at I. 7.30 (where in the previous verse μέγιστον κλέος is at issue). For the whole nexus of ideas associated with fame for bravery in the face of death as found in Pindar, Callinus, Tyrtaeus, and inscriptions, cf. D. C. Young, *Pindar Isthmian 7, Myth and Exempla* (Leiden 1971) 20-25.

²¹Although elsewhere Pindar refers to fame in song as a "requirement" (χρέος) of *arete* or as a "wage" (μισθός) for it, φάρμακον stresses the consolatory nature of fame for the hard work, the risk, and (*in extremis*) death.

²²ἑᾶς (*pace* W. Christ, *Pindari Carmina* [Leipzig 1896] 162) is singular and refers emphatically to the individual's (cf. τινα, 185) performance in the face of death.

In conclusion, I would argue that we must clear from our minds those "relishes," "elixirs," "essences," "enchantments," and "talismans," as well as those strange notions about *arete* itself being a remedy for death and about questing for danger as a φάρμακον ("catalyst"²³) for *arete*. Although it may turn out to be much less exciting than many commentators have found it, this passage contains a traditional statement about fame as a compensation for heroic action in the face of death, a compensation that is, in fact, the most beautiful that the heroic worldview provided.

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²³The word is in the translation of C. Ruck and W. Matheson, *Pindar, Selected Odes* (Ann Arbor 1968) 45.



THE "CORRECT" UNDERSTANDING OF ΕΥ ΔΙΑΒΑΣ: A REPLY

In a recent issue of this journal, B. D. MacQueen argued that the traditional rendering of the phrase εὖ διαβάς is incorrect.¹ In place of "standing with feet well apart," he proposes "with a great forward stride (or leap)." Examples of this expression are adduced from the *Iliad* (12.458) and Tyrtaeus (frs. 7.31-32 = 8.21-22 and 9.16 Gentili-Prato, 10.31-32 = 11.21-22 and 12.16 West).² This new proposal possesses a

¹"On the Correct Understanding of ΕΥ ΔΙΑΒΑΣ," *AJP* 105 (1984) 453-57. Of commentators on Tyrtaeus, MacQueen oddly refers only to D. A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (London 1967) 174. See also D. E. Gerber, *Euterpe* (Amsterdam 1970) 74, and, especially, C. Prato, *Tyrtaeus* (Rome 1968) 101, who provides a useful collection of relevant material.

²It should be noted that in fr. 9.16 διαβάς occurs without εὖ, but commentators usually assume that the participle has the same value as the fuller phrase (see Prato ad loc.). There is a similar use of the simple verb in a passage of Theocritus (14.66), which seems to be modeled on Tyrtaeus (see Gow ad loc.): . . . ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις δὲ βεβακώς / τολμασεῖς ἐπιόντα μένειν θρασὺν ἄσπιδιῶαν. Cf. also Eur. *Cycl.* 6 with R. Kassel, *Maia* 25 (1973) 100.

certain superficial attraction: it appears to derive from a basic sense of διαβαίνω and can be made to fit the Homeric passage and the second Tyrtaean passage.³

The first example from Tyrtaeus, however, raises difficulties:

ἀλλὰ τις εὖ διαβάς μενέτω ποσὶν ἀμφοτέροισιν
στηριχθεὶς ἐπὶ γῆς, χεῖλος ὁδοῦσι δακῶν.

It is difficult to see how "with a great forward stride (or leap)" coheres with the rest of the couplet. διαβάς stands in apposition without connective to στηριχθεὶς. On MacQueen's view, we would be forced to regard the first participle as referring to action anterior to the second, but without any articulation of this in the Greek text such a sequence is highly unlikely. It is far more probable that the second participial phrase amplifies εὖ διαβάς.⁴

There are further considerations which support the usual understanding. MacQueen (453) sees it as part of "a lexical tradition that goes back at least as far as Guillaume Budé." The truth is that it goes back to Eustathius, who glosses εὖ διαβάς with διαστήσας τὰ σκέλη (375.33, van der Valk 1.593). Also relevant is the word διαβήτης ("compass"), which is so named because it is shaped like a lambda (Λ),⁵ whose form is reminiscent of the stance implied by the traditional rendering of εὖ διαβάς. More important, there are other instances of the phrase, overlooked by MacQueen, to which the new proposal is altogether unsuitable.

There are two occurrences in Apollonius of Rhodes. The first is in a description of Heracles uprooting a pine (1.1198-1200):

... ἐν δὲ πλατὺν ὦμον ἔρεισεν
εὖ διαβάς, πεδόθεν δὲ βαθύρριζόν περ ἑοῦσαν
προσφὺς ἐξήειρε σὺν αὐτοῖς ἔχμασι γαίης.

Heracles here stands with feet well apart (εὖ διαβάς) for stability. More

³There is some strain in the case of the Homeric passage at least: Hector appears to throw the stone from a stationary position (cf. 457, στήθεϊ δὲ μάλ' ἐγγύς ἰών).

⁴Prato remarks (ad loc.): "...l'espressione è una ripresa, non del tutto superflua né inefficace, del concetto espresso al v. precedente con εὖ διαβάς."

⁵Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 178e (Holwerda I 3.1).

decisive is the second passage, which contrasts Jason's reaction to the approach of the fire-breathing bulls with that of the other heroes (3.1293-96):

ἔδδειςαν δ' ἥρωες ὅπως ἴδον· αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῦσγε
εὖ διαβάς ἐπιόντας ἅ τε σπιλάς εἰν ἀλὶ πέτρῃ
μῖμνει ἀπειρεσίησι δονεύμενα κύματ' ἀέλλαις·
πρόσθε δέ οἱ σάκος ἔσχεν ἐναντίον.

Panic seizes the heroes, but Jason stands his ground, shield in hand. There can be no question of Jason striding (or leaping) to meet the bulls; he stands unmoving as a reef against storm-tossed waves.

The final instance of εὖ διαβάς comes from Aelian (*V.H.* 4.15), who tells of the boxer Democritus. Having some problem with his feet (αὐτὸς νοσήσας τοὺς πόδας), Democritus went about to the games and, drawing a circle about himself, challenged his opponents to drag him from the circle. Nonetheless, by firmly standing his ground he bested the challengers: ὁ δὲ εὖ διαβάς ἐν τῇ στάσει καὶ ἐγκρατῶς, στεφανούμενος ἀπῆει.

From the passages here discussed we can conclude that εὖ διαβάς refers to a stance with feet set well apart. In a martial context we can imagine the soldier standing with one foot in front of the other; when seen in profile, as it regularly is in vase-painting,⁶ the position of the legs would resemble a lambda.⁷ Such a meaning is not at odds with διαβαίνω,⁸ as MacQueen alleges, for "to step" is a basic meaning of βαίνω, and "in two," "apart" are basic senses of διά, especially in composition (it is etymologically related to δῖς, etc.).⁹

MacQueen concludes his paper by referring his interpretation of εὖ διαβάς to his understanding of Tyrtaean ἀρετή (fr. 9.13 Gentili-

⁶ E.g. A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (London 1967) pl. 26, 29, 30.

⁷ This stance is probably what Archilochus refers to when he speaks of standing ἀσφαλέως (frs. 114.4 and 128.4 West). As MacQueen notes (455), this is the posture usually assumed by Greek warriors in battle; indeed, it is also a traditional posture of modern infantry receiving a charge with regiments fixed. MacQueen (454), however, strangely supposes that "Those who appeal to the Homeric passage [*Il.* 12.458]" envision "a man standing with his feet even with each other laterally and spread wide," but he offers no references to substantiate this.

⁸ Note the translations "die Beine spreizen" of Frisk (*GEW* 1.383) and "écarter les jambes" of Chantraine (*DELG* 1.156).

⁹ See Frisk, *GEW* 1.209 and 383; Chantraine, *DELG* 1.156 and 275.

Prato, 12.13 West): “. . . not to stand, but to attack; not to wait for the blow, but to strike.”¹⁰ MacQueen seems to be thinking in terms of an individual ἀρετή, and, consequently, his remarks are applicable to Homeric warfare, not to hoplite tactics.¹¹ The hoplite's first duty is to remain in formation and not leave his place, whether the phalanx is advancing or retreating.¹² This then is the ἀρετή of the hoplite, and εὐ διαβάς refers to his steadfast position in the rank.¹³

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¹⁰MacQueen makes no attempt to reconcile this statement with μενέτω in both Tyrtaean passages.

¹¹On hoplite warfare, see H. Lorimer, *BSA* 42 (1947) 76–138, who gives special attention to Tyrtaeus. For more recent discussion, see P. Cartledge, *JHS* 97 (1977) 11–27; J. Salmon, *JHS* 97 (1977) 84–101; A. J. Holladay, *JHS* 102 (1982) 94–97. For a good general statement of the nature of hoplite fighting, see F. E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley 1957) 4–5.

¹²Note the traditional definition of ἀνδρεία offered by Laches in Plato's dialogue (*Lach.* 190e): εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγειν, εὐ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη (cf. *Apol.* 28d). In such contexts μένω is a technical military term for keeping one's place in the rank. Cf. also the concept of καμμονίη, for which see the passages collected by Erbse on Schol. *Il.* 22.257a.

¹³Tyrtaeus calls attention to the importance of the hoplite rank at frs. 6/7.15, 8.11, 31–33, 9.19 Gentili-Prato, 10.15, 11.11, 31–33 12.19 West.

Thanks are due to Professors E. Robbins and L. Woodbury for commenting on this note in draft.



ON THE MEANING OF FORS FORTUNA: A HINT FROM TERENCE

The genesis of the goddess Fortuna as an influential force in the religious thought and literary expression of the Roman people consists of a developmental process involving linguistic, social, and literary elements. The effects of these elements overlap one another and are not confined to a single period. The development of the concept embodied

in the word *fortuna*, in fact, continued throughout the period of the Roman Republic and into the imperial period, continuously adapting itself to new social and literary influences and incorporating a larger sphere of activity as successive generations entertained an ever-broadening outlook on the relationship between Fortuna and their perception of the world. Fortuna, however, probably was not initially a very important concept in men's lives, but a minor deity, exercising control over a very specific area of life.

One of the ways in which earlier scholars have attempted to define this area of life is by investigating the origin of the word *fortuna*. The origin, they agree, is from the verb *ferre*,¹ "to carry or bring" and, arguing from the parallel development of the words *portunus* (from *portus*) and *neptunus* (from **neptus*), they propose that *fortuna* is the feminine form of **fortunus*, which is derived from **fortus*, which is itself derived from *ferre*.² *Fortuna*, in its formative period, would have been used as a predicative modifier of *fors*, which subsequently became a substantive and survived as an independent term and concept.³

There is a widespread agreement that the goddess Fortuna was first known in Roman religious thought under the compound name Fors Fortuna. Double names for gods and goddesses were not uncommon in this early period, as the well-documented names Anna Perenna, Lues Rues, and Mater Matuta demonstrate. The mechanics of such double names, according to Gerhard Radke, in his work *Die Götter Altitaliens*, is to portray various functions of a deity predicatively—that is, as representing the power of that deity exercised in a given area.⁴ The designation of the function of the deity is accomplished in two ways: either by adding the function of one deity to that of another (e.g., Pales Matuta) or, more frequently, by affirming the effects of the deity named in the first half of the name⁵ (Fors Fortuna).

Concerning the original meaning of Fors Fortuna, specifically in its compound form, there have now been two scholars, Gerhard Radke

¹A. Walde, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1938) 534. Wilhelm Corssen, *Über Aussprache, Vokalismus, und Betonung der lateinischen Sprache* (Leipzig 1868) Vol. I, 434. Julius Pokorny, *Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern und Munich 1959) Vol. I, 128-30.

²Walde (note 1 above) 534. Corssen (note 1 above) 434. Manu Leumann, *Die lateinischen Adjectiva auf -lis* (Strassburg 1919) 7, n. 2.

³Gerhard Radke, *Die Götter Altitaliens* (Münster 1965) 132.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 24-26.

and H. J. Rose, who have ventured to offer a suggestion which is consistent with this morphological analysis and yet unencumbered by the correlative concepts of birth, chance, and agriculture so frequently and uncritically appended to Fortuna in its early form. Radke and Rose suggest that Fors Fortuna was originally a goddess who brought something to people, especially poor peasants, and who had nothing at all to do with chance or luck.⁶

This interpretation, although most satisfactory with respect to the history of the word *fortuna* and the nature and purpose of the double name, has not been supported by primary source evidence, either epigraphical or textual, by either of the scholars who have presented it. Its credibility as anything more than a scholarly exercise, therefore, is very tentative, and it is necessary for anyone who wishes seriously to adopt this interpretation to provide such evidence. I propose that textual evidence is available in Terence's *Hecyra* and *Phormio* to support the interpretation of Fors Fortuna as a generic "Goddess Who Brings," as opposed to the later, single name, Fortuna, which is, even in the earliest Latin literature, replete with literary connotations inherited from Greek.

Terence's most evocative allusion to the goddess Fors Fortuna is to be found in the comedy *Hecyra*. The allusion is made by Pamphilus, a young man, in a long monologue, in which his domestic affairs are explained. Pamphilus, it seems, had been married to Philumena for seven months. He had not yet consummated his marriage, however, because of an affair with a certain courtesan. At the very time when he was prepared to abandon the courtesan and assume normal relations with his wife, he was sent off to Imbros on his father's business, and Philumena went to live with Pamphilus' mother, Sostrata. When Pamphilus returned, he was informed that Philumena had, for no apparent reason, left Sostrata and returned to live with her own mother, Myrrina, where she would have nothing whatever to do with anyone from Pamphilus' family.

Pamphilus resolved to settle the apparent falling out between his wife and his mother, and, immediately after his arrival home, he went to Philumena to seek an explanation. He no sooner arrived at Myrrina's house, however, than he discovered that Philumena, who had feigned illness as an excuse for not returning to Sostrata, was actually in the

⁶Radke (note 3 above) 28. H. J. Rose, "Fortuna or Fors," in *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1970) 445.

final stages of a pregnancy which he was certain he did not cause. He was about to burst indignantly from the house when Myrrina pleaded with him to keep the pregnancy a secret, since Philumena had come by her misfortune at the hands of an unknown assailant (Pamphilus, of course) at a festival shortly before her marriage.

Pamphilus, in his monologue, quotes Myrrina's plea for secrecy:

"Quaeque Fors Fortunast," inquit, "nobis quae te hodie obtulit, per eam obsecramus ambae, si ius, si fas est uti advorsa eius per te tecta tacitaque apud omnes sient."

(*Hecyra*, 386-88)

There can be no doubt that the Fors Fortuna whom Myrrina mentions here is a personified goddess and not merely an abstract natural power. Myrrina's words, "per eam obsecramus," are constructed in the form of an invocation to a deity, and the word *obsecro* itself denotes primarily an entreaty of a religious nature. Fors Fortuna is likewise quite clearly intended here to be understood as the "Goddess Who Brings," as is indicated by the fact that the predicate of Fors Fortuna is a compound of the verb *ferre*, the root word from which both *fors* and *fortuna* are derived.

The indefinite *quaeque*, however, is somewhat puzzling.⁷ It seems to suggest, at least at first reading, that there exist a number of goddesses known as Fors Fortuna and it is one of this number who has just brought Pamphilus home. If we interpret Fors Fortuna as the name of a single goddess, however, and attribute the force of the indefinite to the speaker's attitude toward that goddess, the result is strikingly different. Such an interpretation would suggest that Myrrina considers Fors Fortuna a somewhat vague, undefined power, almost as if the goddess still existed and acted in a numinous sense.⁸ Fors Fortuna, in fact, when dealt with on the most primitive level of a "Goddess Who Brings," may well have been nothing more than a numinous power, in spite of her various associations with cult, which are mostly of late date or of a secondary nature to Fors Fortuna's original meaning.

Another factor to be considered with regard to this appearance of Fors Fortuna is its effect on the dramatic structure of the play. The scene revolves around a fortuitous coincidence of persons, places, and time. Pamphilus has returned from Imbros and visits Philumena at precisely the mo-

⁷Sidney Ashmore, *The Comedies of Terence* (New York 1908) commentary, 229, note to line 386.

⁸W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity* (London 1914) 62.

ment when her period of labor is upon her. Had he arrived but a few days later, the baby would have already been born and exposed; Philumena's secret would have been preserved, and the remainder of the complications of plot would have been easily resolved.

When Myrrina says, therefore, that Fors Fortuna brought Pamphilus home to them "*hodie*," she means not simply "today," but something akin to "today, of all days!" Terence seems to be attributing purposeful action to Fors Fortuna and emphasizing her power as a personal agent. Such emphasis dispels any concern that the appearance of Fors Fortuna as a substantive in this passage (and, as we shall see, in the *Phormio*) is no different in nature from the adverbial phrase, *forte fortuna*, which appears fairly frequently in early Latin writers, but which is too conventional an expression to be a reliable source of information concerning Fors Fortuna.

An investigation of the entire scene from the *Hecyra* in which the passage we are studying occurs offers us an opportunity to compare Terence's understanding of Fors, Fortuna, and Fors Fortuna, for he mentions all three within the space of thirty-six lines.

Shortly before he quotes Myrrina's plea to keep Philumena's pregnancy a secret, Pamphilus offers an explanation of why the maidservants in Myrrina's house appeared disconcerted upon seeing him, after expressing their initial joy at his arrival: "*Quia tam incommode illis fors obtulerat adventum meum*" (l. 370). The appearance of *fors* in this sentence serves both to introduce the concept of chance in the scene and to prepare for the subsequent appearance of Fors Fortuna. This entire statement, in fact, is practically identical to that spoken later by Myrrina. The same verb, *offerre*, is used to describe the action of the agent power which has brought Pamphilus back, and there is reference to the fact that his arrival at this particular time is detrimental to all involved. The close similarity between Pamphilus' and Myrrina's statements seems to enhance the fact that it is not simply the result of chance or luck that Pamphilus returned when he did, but that some vaguely defined power "brought" him home at a critical moment and for a specific reason.

The whole mood of a primitive power operating in this scene, however, is somewhat dispelled toward the end of the monologue when Pamphilus, having catalogued all his problems, complains: "*O Fortuna, ut numquam perpetuo es bona!*" (l. 406). This statement, which recalls a *sententia* found in Ennius' *Annales*,⁹ portrays Fortuna as the fully developed goddess of chance: fickle, deceitful, and devious. The goddess referred to

⁹"Haudquaquam quemquam semper fortuna secuta est." *Annales* VIII, 289.

here is totally different from the Fors Fortuna of line 386, and the type of agency operating in Fortuna in this sense is far removed from the agency of *fors* as it appears in line 370. Terence has shifted the emphasis of the concept embodied in the words *fors* and *fortuna* in this scene from one of archaic significance to one of current and, to a great degree, literary significance. The concept of luck or chance, however, is certainly present, to some degree, in the words *fors* in line 370 and Fors Fortuna in 386, but is secondary to the concept of bringing, which is more germane to Terence's purpose in these specific instances. His shift of emphasis in the reference to Fortuna in line 406, therefore, merely reaffirms the existence of the concept of chance throughout the scene, without destroying the literary or aesthetic effect of the reference to the primitive function of Fortuna, under the aspect of the archaic goddess Fors Fortuna.

Terence's other unequivocal reference to the goddess Fors Fortuna is often quoted by modern scholars as an example of a literary employment of Fors Fortuna and of the difference or similarity between Fortuna (which appears along with Fors Fortuna in this passage) and Fors Fortuna,¹⁰ but it has yet to be analyzed with a view toward determining the functions that these goddesses are intended to portray. The reference is found in the *Phormio*, line 841, in a passage spoken by the slave, Geta, who has just discovered that the wife, Phanium, whom his young master, Antipho, has married without his father's consent, is the illegitimate daughter of Antipho's uncle, Chremes. Antipho's father, Demipho, was also unaware of this fact, but as soon as he learns the truth, both he and Chremes are anxious to preserve the previously undesirable marriage of Phanium to Antipho, in order to keep Chremes' indiscretion a secret from his own wife.

Geta overhears Chremes informing Demipho that Phanium is his daughter and that they should now favor the match that they had just done their best to dissolve. He realizes that Antipho's desperate situation is now saved and runs into the street shouting: "O Fortuna, O Fors Fortuna, quantis commoditatibus / Quam subito meo ero Antiphoni ope vostra hunc onerastis diem!" (ll. 841-42).

Before we attempt to explain the role played by Fors Fortuna in this context, we must be careful to note that both Fortuna and Fors Fortuna are mentioned here and that the plural forms, "vostra" and "onerastis," indicate that both goddesses are viewed as independent agents. Fors Fortuna,

¹⁰Radke (note 3 above) 132. Franz Bömer and Peter Herz, *Untersuchungen über die Religion der Sklaven in Griechenland und Rom* (Wiesbaden 1981) 147-49. Kurt Latte, *Römische Religionsgeschichte* (Munich 1960) 179.

therefore, is not to be construed merely as an emphatic repetition of Fortuna.

Aelius Donatus, well aware of this fact, points out, as he had previously in his comments on *Hecyra* 386, that Fortuna is concerned with affairs of uncertain outcome, while Fors Fortuna deals only with that which ends happily for all. He likewise acknowledges the cult distinctions between Fortuna and Fors Fortuna, noting that Fors Fortuna's temple is located "trans Tiberim."¹¹ Any action predicated of these goddesses, therefore, may be interpreted as a function of both goddesses, acting in concert. The complementary nature of their action, moreover, points to the fact that the evolution of the concept of bringing encountered in Fors Fortuna to that of chance or luck in Fortuna was complete and that any reference to the idea of bringing should be interpreted as an archaizing tendency.

In this passage from the *Phormio*, the idea of Fors Fortuna bringing something is not as dramatically presented as in the passage from the *Hecyra*, where we find an expressed verb meaning "to bring," but it is present nevertheless. The verb, *onerare*, in the sense in which it is employed here, may be interpreted as a synonym for *ferre*, *offerre*, or some other such verb. Geta's use of *onerare* is obviously ironical; the goddesses "burden" Antipho with happiness, and their "burden" unburdens him of the difficulties that plagued him from the moment of his father's return from abroad.

Geta makes this clear in his next lines, in which he continues speaking about the two goddesses, without naming them: "... nosque amicos eius exonerastis metu" (l. 843). Once again the plural form is employed, and both goddesses are included in the action. It is highly improbable, therefore, that Terence meant to emphasize the power of one goddess over that of the other. Terence's principal concern is to convey Geta's excitement at the sudden and unexpected resolution of Antipho's difficulties, and an allusion to either of these goddesses would probably have been sufficient.

Naming both goddesses, however, offers two advantages to the playwright, and Terence was clearly cognizant of both. First, naming both goddesses emphasizes Geta's state of extreme excitement and happiness, not only at having discovered the secret of Phanium's birth, but even more important, at having made this discovery without the old men knowing it. The discovery, therefore, not only saves Antipho's marriage and vindicates Geta for his part in arranging the match, but also presents Geta with a piece of information with which to blackmail the old men into giving up their claim to some money extorted from them to buy a flutegirl for Antipho's cousin.

¹¹Aelius Donatus, *Commentum Terenti*, *Phormio*, V, 6, 1.

Geta's excitement and happiness are not conveyed merely by naming both these goddesses, but also by the anaphora of "O" before each goddess' name and the subsequent assonance of "o" sounds throughout the sentence. Consequently, the entire sentence takes on the aspect of a prolonged exclamation of euphoria and speechlessness.

The second advantage afforded by the double allusion is as functional as the first, but depends on the literary tone rather than on the structure of the language. By mentioning both Fortuna and Fors Fortuna, Terence is able to convey both a feeling of unexpectedness and immediacy and a sense of free and bountiful giving. He reinforces these initial impulses by repeating the same concepts: the goddesses aid Antipho unexpectedly, "quam subito," and with such bounty, "quantis commoditatibus," that they "burden" the day with their gifts. Both Fortuna and Fors Fortuna are functional units of the action described in this sentence, but the effects of one in no way impede the effects of the other. Consequently, the appearance and the active force of Fortuna in this sentence neither prohibit the appearance of nor diminish the effectiveness of the concept of bringing, which is both expressed and implied in the reference to Fors Fortuna.

If the relationship between Fors Fortuna and the idea of bringing something to someone is less direct, although clearly present, in this passage than in that from the *Hecyra*, the relationship between the action ascribed to Fors Fortuna and the resolution of the plot is closer in this instance than in the *Hecyra*. Geta's discovery of Chremes' other marriage solves every problem which faces Antipho and his cousin. It is true that the recognition of Phanium resolved Antipho's dilemma, but, as Norwood observes,¹² Terentian double plots, such as that of *Phormio*, are so intricately interwoven that the resolution of one is impossible without the resolution of the other. The solution to the first plot, in fact, often provides the means by which the second is solved, and, as we have just pointed out, such is the case in the *Phormio*.

These two references to Fors Fortuna in Terence are scant enough evidence that the interpretation of this deity as a "Goddess who brings" is accurate. They do take on a somewhat greater significance, however, when one learns that the name Fors Fortuna appears only seven times in Latin literature from the beginnings to 31 B.C. (excluding references to the founding of temples or simple catalogues of names).¹³ This evidence supporting the interpretation of Fors Fortuna as a "Goddess who brings" does

¹²Gilbert Norwood, *The Art of Terence* (Oxford 1928) 52.

¹³"Fors," *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Leipzig 1926) Vol. VI, Part I, p. 1129.

not, of course, end debate concerning the original meaning of the goddess. There is some textual and epigraphical evidence in support of interpreting Fors Fortuna as a goddess of birth, of women, and of slaves.¹⁴ It is, in fact, possible that there was no single original meaning of the goddess, but the evidence presented here, it seems to me, lends credence to the morphological and etymological interpretation and allows us, for the first time, to discuss the validity of this interpretation on the basis of original sources.¹⁵

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¹⁴C.I.L. XIV, 2863 (for birth); I², p. 211 (for agriculture); I², 977-79 and VI, 188, 235, 251 (for slaves as *ministri* in the *collegia* serving Fortuna). Columella, *De re rustica*, X, ll. 311-17 (again for agriculture); Ovid *Fasti* VI, l. 569 (for women); Plutarch *De Fortuna Romanorum* 5 and Ovid *Fasti* VI, ll. 627 and 784 (again for slaves). It is interesting to note that neither of the two scholars (Elizabeth Evans, *Cults of the Sabine Territory* [Rome 1939] 179, and W. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People* [London 1911] 245) who have proposed that Fors Fortuna meant "chance" or "luck" from the very beginning offers any clear textual or epigraphical evidence in support of the argument.

¹⁵I wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions made by the AJP referee, by Professors R. Conard and K. Marre of the University of Dayton and by Professor F. Newton of Duke University. Any errors which remain are, of course, my own.



ASCONIUS P. 60 (CLARK), † *PRIMA PARS*:
THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF C. MANILIUS IN 65 B.C.*

quo haec oratio a Cicerone praetura <nuper>
p<eracta> dicta est, cum † prima pars . . .
Manilius qui iudicium per operarum <duces tur->
baverat, deinde quod ex S.C. a<mb>o co<s>s. . . .
pra<e>sidebant e<i> iudicio, non respondi<sset absens-> 5
que esset damnatus, recreavi<t se Cominius ut infam->
iam accepta<e> pecunia<e> tollere<t> a<c> repetiit>
Cornelium lege maiestatis.

*I wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues Michael Alexander and Alexander MacGregor for their advice. I am also grateful to Dr. Bruce Marshall who criticized an earlier draft and shared with me by letter some of his views on this problem.

2 *primum apparuisset* Sigonius, *prima parte anni* C. Madvig, *primum effugisset maiestatis accusationem* Mommsen, *primum pari modo elusisset accusationem collega Corneli* C. Kiessling-Schoell 3 *quia* Mommsen 4 *praesentes erant et suppl.* Clark, *consules aderant et suppl.* Stangl 5 *respondisset atque*², *respondisset absensque* Kiessling-Schoell

In the *argumentum* to his commentary on Cicero's *pro Cornelio*, Asconius (p. 60C) reports that the recent conviction of the ex-tribune C. Manilius in 65 led to a renewal of the prosecution of C. Cornelius (tr. pl. 67) for *maiestas*, which had been dropped in 66 amid violence. The text, however, is defective, and no satisfactory supplement has been proposed for † *prima pars* in line 2 above. Clark prints Sigonius' old conjecture, but all other modern editors treat this corruption as a *locus desperatus*. This note will propose that *pars* is, in fact, an ill-begotten expansion of a *p*-plus-apostrophe abbreviation, all that remained of an original *postulatus esset* (here = "indicted") after the mutilation of the archetype. *Prima* represents an attempt to force some adverbial form of *prim-* (presumably *primum*) into concord with the noun *pars*.

Most previous attempts to mend this corrupt passage take as their starting point the change from *prima* to *primum*. The restoration of *primum* is attractive given the presence of *deinde*. What we expect after the word *primum* is a statement of the first in a series of two events that encouraged Cominius to revive the charges against Cornelius. Furthermore, as we can see from the tense of the verb *turbaverat* in the *qui* clause, both events reported in the *cum* clause must have occurred after Manilius employed gangs to disrupt a trial. It becomes important, therefore, to identify, if we can, the incident to which Asconius alludes in the relative clause.

A paragraph earlier, Asconius states that Cornelius' prosecutors in 66 were driven from court "a notis operarum ducibus" (p. 59C.21-22); but despite the similarity in language, there is no reason to believe that the *qui* clause in the passage under discussion concerns this earlier trial.¹ No evidence exists to connect Manilius with the disruption of Cornelius' trial,² while we know that a disturbance by Manilius' supporters

¹Contra M. Griffin, "The Tribune C. Cornelius," *JRS* 63 (1973) 209, and n. 131, who concludes from the reference to *operarum duces* in both passages that Manilius was credited with providing the gangs that broke up Cornelius' trial in 66.

²None of the surviving fragments of Cicero's *pro Cornelio* suggests that Manilius was implicated in quashing the prosecution of Cornelius, although several of these fragments show that the prosecutor attempted to establish a link between Cornelius and various activities of Manilius during his tribunate. In fact, if we accept a recent proposal by

erupted when an attempt was made to prosecute Manilius himself for extortion after he ceased to be tribune on December 10th of 66.³ The prosecution was launched late in December while Cicero, as praetor, still presided over the *quaestio de repetundis*, but the case had to be continued into the following year when Cicero's attempt to set a hearing for December 29th, the last day of his term, met with resistance. Cicero, we are told, promised to defend Manilius when the court changed hands and was taken over by Cicero's successor, but according to Dio (36.44.2), an outbreak of violence prevented the court from hearing the case.⁴

The incident reported by Dio provides a natural reference for the words "qui iudicium per operarum duces turbaverat." If Asconius refers to the outbreak of violence at Manilius' trial for extortion early in 65, we can readily understand why the senate took steps, as reported by the *quod* clause, to post a guard over the court that was eventually to convict Manilius.⁵ Once the apparent connection is seen between the violence at an earlier trial and the measures adopted by the senate, it becomes obvious that the words after *primum* in the first half of the *cum* clause must have reported either the resumption of the original trial for

K. Kumaniecki, "Les discours égarés de Cicéron *pro Cornelio*," *Med. Kon. Vlaam. Acad. Belg.* 32 (1970) 14-15, to transpose fragments 13-17P (ed. Puccioni) before 10P, Cicero apparently concluded his remarks on the disruption of Cornelius' previous trial before he began the section in which he addressed the charges linking his client with Manilius.

³Our chief sources for the course of this prosecution are Dio 36.44.1-2 and Plut. *Cic.* 9.4-6. See my article, "The Prosecution of C. Manilius in 66 B.C. and Cicero's *pro Manilio*," *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 323-36, for a discussion of the chronology and possible motives of the prosecutor in selecting such a charge.

⁴In a fragment of the *pro Cornelio* introduced by Asconius (p. 66C) with the words "dicit de disturbato iudicio Maniliano," Cicero blames certain unnamed *magni homines* for inciting Manilius to violence and states that Manilius' action was "meis alienissimum rationibus." The latter comment implies that the outbreak of violence prevented Cicero from carrying out his plans to participate in this trial and hence that he is referring to the same incident reported by Dio since the prosecution for extortion was the only case involving Manilius in which Cicero had agreed to play a role.

⁵According to Dio (36.44.4) the senate assigned a bodyguard to the consuls in 65 in response to the rumors of a conspiracy formed by Catiline and some others, but the role played by the two consuls in standing guard over (*praesidebant*) the court that convicted Manilius may well provide a better explanation of the decision to furnish this armed guard; see B. Marshall, "The Vote of a Bodyguard for the Consuls of 65," *CP* 72 (1977) 318-20. If this view is accepted, we should perhaps read after *coss.* in line 4 *cum armatis* ("with a bodyguard," paralleled by Ascon. p. 20C.11 in this sense).

extortion after order had been restored by the presence of the two consuls, or the initiation of a fresh prosecution.⁶ This conclusion follows from the sound portion of the text which reports that Manilius was eventually convicted by a court before which he failed to appear.

Asconius elsewhere uses *postulare* absolutely (i.e., without specifying a charge), meaning "to arraign" or "prosecute" (p. 63C.8), and if *postulatus esset* is restored after *primum*, it would report the institution of a new trial after the earlier one for extortion had been blocked by violence. One source does, in fact, lend support to the view that Manilius was indicted *de novo* in 65 on a charge other than extortion. We are informed by the Bobbio scholiast (p. 119St) that Manilius was prosecuted in 65 for *maiestas*,⁷ and although the reliability of this evidence is sometimes questioned,⁸ several arguments can be advanced for accepting this statement. First, we may point to the implication of Dio's account that the prosecution for extortion was dropped when an outbreak of violence prevented the court from hearing the case. After this event, Dio reports no further stages in the attempt to bring Manilius to trial for extortion, and the conclusion that this violence effectively quashed the indictment for extortion and led to the introduction of a new charge receives some support from a fragment of Cicero's *pro Cornelio*. In an apparent reference to Manilius' indictment for extortion in 66, Cicero (ap. Ascon. p. 62C) writes "postulatur apud me praetorem primum de

⁶The demonstrative *ei* (an emendation for *et* of the mss.) before *iudicio* in line 5 need not imply that Asconius is referring back to the *iudicium* mentioned two lines earlier, if, in the first half of the *cum* clause, Asconius reported the commencement of a new trial: "when Manilius, who had disrupted his trial by employing the leaders of gangs, (had first been indicted), then failed to answer the charges because both consuls stood guard over this court as provided by a *senatus consultum*. . . ."

⁷L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54) is credited with frustrating Manilius' attempt to quash the prosecution for *maiestas* by laying siege to his accuser, but we are not told that the court itself was disrupted. This account, therefore, does not contradict the inference to be drawn from Asconius' version that the presence of the two consuls deterred Manilius from making an assault on the court before which he had been indicted.

⁸Most recently by E. J. Phillips, "Cicero and the Prosecution of C. Manilius," *Latomus* 29 (1970) 603-5, and A. Ward, "Politics in the Trials of Manilius and Cornelius," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 548-49. The majority opinion, however, holds that there was such a trial for *maiestas* in 65: F. Münzer, *RE* 14 (1928) 1134; T. R. S. Broughton, *MRR* 2.153; R. Seager, "The First Catilinarian Conspiracy," *Historia* 13 (1964) 345, n. 30; R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley 1964) 88, n. 21; E. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley 1974) 262.

pecuniis repetundis."⁹ The placement of *primum* before *de pecuniis repetundis* leads one to conclude that if Manilius was "indicted in 66 first for extortion," then this indictment must later have given way to a second charge. Finally, we should note that if the account of the Bobbio scholiast is accepted, and *postulatus esset* is restored to the text of Asconius, we may discover in the relative clause the probable grounds that gave rise to this fresh indictment.¹⁰

This reconstruction of the events leading up to the conviction of Manilius and the identification of the charge on which he was convicted as *maiestas* also serve to explain better why Cominius was emboldened by the outcome of Manilius' trial. Cornelius was to be brought before the *quaestio de maiestate* shortly after the conviction of Manilius. If this is the court that had recently handed down a verdict in the case against Manilius, Cominius had all the more reason to hope that he could successfully exploit the mood of this same court to secure the conviction of another ex-tribune with Pompeian ties. The conduct of Cornelius' supporters at his former trial in 66 was used against him in 65, as we can see from the fragments of Cicero's speech,¹¹ and it now appears from the arguments advanced in this paper that similar conduct on the part of Manilius and his supporters provided sufficient grounds for an indictment and conviction a short time before.

⁹See Kumaniecki (note 2 above) 12-13 for a discussion of the grounds for believing that Manilius is the defendant to whom Cicero refers.

¹⁰This observation favors Mommsen's suggestion to read *quia* for *qui*, an attractive proposal since the introduction of *quia* improves the balance of the sentence by providing a member corresponding to the *quod* clause after *deinde* (cf. Ascon. p. 28C.11 for *quia* . . . *quod* where the mss. offer *qui*). Asconius' fondness for the indicative in *quia* clauses, even when he is reporting the substance of a criminal charge (e.g., p. 78C.15), may explain the choice of mood here (*turbaverat*) where we would expect a subjunctive (e.g., Tac. *Ann.* 3.70.1; 4.34.1, *quod* clauses in both cases in conjunction with the verb *postulare*).

¹¹This aspect of the case may not have been an extraneous issue. Recently M. Alexander, "Repetition of Prosecution, and the Scope of Prosecutions, in the Standing Criminal Courts of the Late Republic," *Classical Antiquity* 1 (1982) 141-66, has attempted to show that an indictment on a given charge such as *maiestas* need not have been grounded on a single infraction of the law but necessarily took into account all prior actions of the defendant that could serve as an indictable offense under the law in question. On this view, the disruption of Cornelius' first trial supplied at his second trial further grounds for securing a conviction in addition to those on which the original indictment had been based. Hence one of the complaints lodged against Cornelius may have corresponded directly to the charges on which Manilius had been convicted.

The probable condition of the archetype may well explain why copyists were unable to decipher the abbreviated *postulatus*. The state of the archetype can be reconstructed on the basis of the frequently recurring lacunae in the text of Asconius: the text in the vicinity of *prima pars* fails at intervals of approximately 30 letters, and similar corruption may be observed elsewhere. As Kiessling and Schoell stated,¹² and Clark confirmed by an independent investigation,¹³ the lacunae in our extant mss. reflect damage suffered by the archetype along the edges of its folia.¹⁴ The model at the beginning of this note is intended to show the probable arrangement of the text in the archetype.¹⁵ It will be seen from this reconstruction and from the length of the supplements generally accepted that *postulatus esset*, perhaps with the addition of Manilius' praenomen C., is of an appropriate length for filling the lacuna in line 2.¹⁶ Since *postulatus esset* will have been written at the end of a line, all that remained would be the abbreviation p' (normal for *pos* or *post*)

¹²Ed. Asconius (Berlin 1875) xxiv-xxvii.

¹³*The Descent of Manuscripts* (Oxford 1918; repr. ed. 1969) 365.

¹⁴The earlier portions of the *in Cornelianam* and the later sections of the *in Milonianam* were particularly prone to damage as having originally been contained on the outer leaves of the Sangallensis, the lost archetype discovered by Poggio in 1416.

¹⁵Clark (note 13 above) concluded from the spacing of the lacunae and from omissions peculiar to one of the three witnesses to the readings of the archetype that the archetype itself had 39-40 lines to a page and an average of 36 letters to a line. The condition of the text on pp. 60-61C is in agreement with the layout of the archetype as reconstructed by Clark. The text as printed in the OCT, partially defective, from *quo haec oratio* (p. 60C.9) down to the point at which lacunae again become frequent (p. 61C.17), occupies 1384 letter-spaces. If we divide this total by 36 (the average number of letters per line in the archetype), the result is 38+ ($38 \times 36 = 1368$), which is approximately the number of lines this portion of the text would have occupied according to Clark's estimate of 39-40 lines per page if the two lacunose passages were copied on opposite sides of the same folium.

¹⁶If we may judge the length of the supplement required from the length of the lacunae preserved in two of the three principal witnesses to the lost archetype, a gap of eight to ten letters existed in the archetype. Contrary to Clark's report in the OCT that S and M each leave room for only six letters, my own reexamination of the mss. reveals that the lacunae are somewhat longer. The scribe of S leaves space for at least five letters after *p(ar)s* in the right margin and must have considered this inadequate since a lacuna of approximately six letters occurs at the beginning of the following line. The lacuna in M is eight letters long, not six, while the third principal ms. P interpolates the praenomen Marcus, clearly intended to fill a gap of eight letters in the archetype. Even if the space available is slightly less than what is indicated by the evidence of our extant mss., the supplement proposed, viz. *-ulatus esset* (*post-* being properly an emendation of *pars*), may have been written with as few as six letters if heavily abbreviated (viz. *-l'at' eet*).

and a portion of the *t* or *u* following, the rest being obscured by the damage suffered by the folium along its edge. Since *p'* was a symbol occasionally employed for *per* or *par*,¹⁷ the change to *pars* in our extant mss. is quite understandable, especially if just enough of the *t* after the abbreviation for *pos* was visible to suggest the tall *s*.

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¹⁷See W. M. Lindsay, *Notae Latinae* (Cambridge 1915; repr. ed., Hildesheim 1963) 190-91, and Gaius, *Inst.* ed. M. Studemund (Leipzig 1874) 284-85.



REVIEWS

P. A. HANSEN. *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca Saeculorum VIII-V a.Chr.n.* Berlin and New York, de Gruyter, 1983. Pp. xxiii + 302. 188 DM. (Texte und Kommentare, Band 12)

Students of early Greek metrical inscriptions have welcomed the quickening pace of scholarship in their field over the last several years. While much of this work is valuable, it tends to rely heavily on the older corpora and avoid ongoing developments in epigraphy and archaeology. Exceptions exist; arguably the most significant has been Ebert's *Griechische Epigramme auf Sieger* (1972). Still, the major thrust has been literary and interpretive; examples of high quality include the relevant portions of Lausberg's *Das Einzeldistichon* (1982) and, one expects, the second volume of VÉrilhac's Παῖδες ἄωροι (announced at *Bullep* 1983.36). Needless to say, interpretation remains our goal, but it must rely on the best "eye for the stones," take full account of the inscribed object, beware of conclusions that ignore periodization, and keep abreast of epigraphical publications. The philologist without epigraphical experience can find this process bewildering and the scholarship very fluid, but a good corpus can, at least for a few years, ease the situation. Unfortunately, no one since Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata* (1948), has published in one volume the early inscribed epigrams of all types and provenances. Hansen has rectified this situation with *CEG*, a fine book and much more than an updated *Epigrammata*.

Hansen edits some 465 pieces that he calls *omnia carmina epigraphica saeculorum VIII-V a.Chr.n.* (p. xi). We might miss a new text (the Eretrian herm noted in *CEG*'s Addenda, now published at *Phoenix* 37 [1983] 16-37) or a disputable fragment (Bradeen, *AthAg* 17, no. 3), but one could seriously expand the collection only by violating Hansen's admittedly conservative criteria for inclusion. He rejects as prose numerous inscriptions that Gallavotti, *Metri e ritmi* (1979), describes as exhibiting lyric meters, and he allows only three exceptions to the rule that epigrams down to 400 were composed in dactylic hexameters, pentameters, or iambic trimeters. He promises a full reply to Gallavotti in the future (p. xi).¹ Hansen also rejects texts preserved only in literature. Questions of authenticity among such epigrams are vexatious, and one wants a reliable collection of *inscriptions*; yet students of early epigrams cannot afford to ignore ὦ ξείν', ἀγγέλλειν . . . and its literary compatriots.²

¹M. B. Wallace, in the Appendix to his article, "The Metres of Early Greek Epigrams," *Studies in Honour of Leonard Woodbury* (Chico, Calif. 1985), maintains that even Hansen is too liberal in including some prose that only approximates verse (nos. 23, 29, 37, 38, 282, 289, 290).

²The question is, of course, where to draw the distinctions. At no. 131, Hansen prints the second distich from literature, but Boegehold only proved it *could* have stood on the stone. For a list of such epigrams often considered inscriptional, cf. Wallace (note 1 above) n. 1.

Fortunately, Page's *Further Greek Epigrams* (1981) can play the role of a latter-day Preger to Hansen's Kaibel. A different question about the integrity of the collection in *CEG* concerns its rather artificial terminus of 400 B.C. Private Attic sepulchral monuments, for example, virtually ceased ca. 490. When the tradition continues in the 430s, both stelai and epigrams have to be classed with fourth century, rather than archaic, types. No. 89 (ca. 410), with a pathetic domestic scene in both stele and poem, provides a good example.³ Other patterns hold for public epitaphs, dedications, and non-Attic material; yet perhaps the four-part scheme envisaged in *Epigrammata* (p. 3), but never completed, is less artificial than that implied by *CEG*: (1) the beginning to the Persian wars; (2) the Persian wars to Alexander; (3) Alexander to Augustus; (4) from Augustus on.

Except in an English foreward, Hansen composes in Latin *cum brevitatem modo pura modo Sallustiana*. He disposes his entries in the traditional order: Attic epitaphs (nos. 1-105), other epitaphs (106-178), Attic dedications (179-321), other dedications (321a-429), Attic and other *tituli varii* (430-465). Within each category public monuments precede private ones, each group ordered chronologically. Most dates are determined epigraphically (note the scheme on p. xii); this is a slippery procedure but often all we have. The dates given for Nestor's cup are surely misprinted (no. 454; read 735-720). For dating, Hansen relies heavily on Jeffery's work, including *IG* I³.2 for the Attic material. He provides an interesting preview of this as yet unpublished fascicle of *IG*; besides using its dates, he cites its numbers and sometimes takes other information.

Most entries include four items: archaeology, a two-part bibliography, text, and apparatus. The archaeology is minimal: type of object, date, general provenance, location (most museum numbers provided), a remark on the inscription's form (occasionally with a diagram). There are no dimensions, figures, or plates. Still, Hansen deals proficiently with cases where the object's shape or size affects restoration, and the second part of each bibliography lists published photographs and drawings. Moreover, Hansen supplies more archaeological information than many collections and he is normally accurate; oversights include nos. 38 (no cutting or stele exists; the question mark should precede *stelae*) and 66 (no stele exists; its subject is conjectured from the shape of the cutting). The bibliographies are selective but sufficient for reconstructing the history of the texts' criticism.

The heart of *CEG* lies in the texts and apparatus. The latter are not full literary commentaries but abbreviated records of the establishment of the texts. Knowledgeable readers will recognize in them an acute recension of scholarship guided by a philological method that is perhaps the best aspect of this fine book. Since Hansen, wary of apparent literary and inscriptional parallels (cf., e.g., no. 135), restores very conservatively,⁴ his arguments are more often negative than positive. They, together with the complete *Index Graecus*, make *CEG*

³For the increasing domesticity, cf. S. C. Humphreys, "Family Tombs and Tomb Cult," *JHS* 100 (1980) 96-126.

⁴At p. xiii, Hansen adumbrates his method of restoration and promises a fuller treatment for the future.

an indispensable tool for studying the language of early epigrams. He does not ionicize orthography, but he lays out texts by poetic verses. These layouts, though sometimes risky (e.g., at no. 252, Hansen places a fragment differently from others), often improve on previous ones and facilitate restoration; for example, Hansen shows no. 377 to be hexametric as against Jeffery's restoration as elegaic.

Occasionally this reviewer's reading of a stone disagrees with Hansen's. At no. 67, he reads $\pi\iota[\nu\upsilon]\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, which he supports philologically; but the top of a diagonal stroke, certainly to be read as a sigma, appears to the left of the dotted tau. Hence, $\pi\iota[\sigma]\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$, the older restoration, is to be preferred. On the same stone, read $\chi\sigma\epsilon\nu[\iota\kappa]\acute{o}\varsigma \dots \kappa\omicron\rho\alpha[\iota\omicron]$ for Hansen's $\chi\sigma\epsilon[\nu\iota\kappa\acute{o}]\varsigma \dots \kappa\omicron\rho[\alpha\iota\omicron]$. One should not overemphasize such criticisms; of some eighty stones the reviewer has examined, his readings differ from Hansen's in only eight cases, seriously only at no. 88. Here Hansen accepts Bradeen's mistaken version; a trace of the original left-hand surface shows that we should read something closer to Raubitschek, *GB* 9 (1980) 21 f. (a reference missed by Hansen):

Ἑλλην τῶιδε ὄν[ομα]
 νίοισι ΔΕΤΗΣ [. π]
 ελταστής ἔθα[νεν . . . μα]
 ρνάμενο [ς ---].

CEG's usual epigraphical accuracy mitigates the book's one potentially serious drawback; we quite clearly cannot rely on it as a record of Hansen's personal examinations of the objects, although sometimes he notes the recent autopsy of others reported to him privately (cf. nos. 31 and 118).

Hansen has given us a well-edited collection that will stimulate and facilitate more study of these texts. The book contains a wealth of information that is intelligently organized, if sometimes densely reported, and printed elegantly and almost without errors. While *CEG* does not compromise principles dear to the epigraphist, the philologist who is inexperienced in epigraphy will nevertheless be able to use it with facility. The book will become the standard resource for the early Greek verse inscription. But let the reader remember that Thoth's invention does not allow of change; the Addenda at the end of *CEG* remind us of just how quickly epigraphical matters move along.⁵

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⁵For further addenda and corrigenda, see Hansen's *List of Greek Verse Inscriptions, c. 400–300 B.C.* (1985) 11–13.

HERWIG MAEHLER. *Die Lieder des Bakchylides. Erster Teil: die Siegeslieder.* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982. I, pp. xviii + 137; II, pp. 307. Paper.

The appearance of Maehler's *Bakchylides* is a happy event. The text is essentially that of the 1970 Teubner edition, though the author has rechecked

the papyri and has also incorporated literature since 1970, so that there are a few changes in the apparatus. He has also, with Odes 10 and 13, made use of readings and conjectures from a work of W. S. Barrett not yet published. The translations are almost exactly those of Maehler's 1968 volume in the series *Schriften und Quellen der Alten Welt* (Berlin); they are smooth and admirably literal, with concepts and even words kept whenever possible in their proper places in the lines. Now, however, the author has supplied commentary and a general introduction whose 45 pages are the best short description I have read of the nature of choral poetry, and of Bacchylides' contributions to that genre. Maehler is aware of Bundy, but a follower of Snell, and consequently his understanding of the epinician mode balances a consciousness of the necessities of individual praise against a sense of its social purposes. About archaic choral song, Maehler lucidly states what has too often been either overlooked or argued at incomprehensible length. He says simply,

Ihre Aufgabe ist, für ihren Auftraggeber — den privaten wie den öffentlichen — ein Bild zu entwerfen, das die Beziehung zwischen dem aktuellen Anlass des Liedes und der Vergangenheit, der historischen oder der mythischen, sichtbar werden lässt, einen Bild in dem etwa der Olympiensieger, seine Familie und die Mitbürger seiner Gesellschaftsschicht sich wiedererkennen konnten, oder in dem eine Stadt in einem Paian oder Dithyrambus, der von ihrer Gründung oder ihren Heroen berichtete, sich darstellen liess. (I p. 5)

The discussion of Bacchylides' style is illuminated by taste and sympathy; one may note, for example, Maehler's observation (I pp. 24–25) that the often criticized superfluity of epithet is usually not a superfluity at all, but a knowing contrivance for contrast (here he acknowledges Segal's article in *QUCC* 22 [1976] 104), or again his description of the Bacchylidean narrative manner as meant to evoke drama and pathos (I p. 28). Maehler well observes the craft of Bacchylides' poetic structures, as witness his analysis of the concentric Ode 11, "einem Lied das — entgegen der herkömmlichen Meinung — mit besonderer Sorgfalt komponiert ist" (I p. 29).

All of these virtues continue to be evident in the commentary, where Maehler steadily discriminates between elements deriving from convention and those arising from the impulse of a particular song. In discussing Ode 5.3–6 (II p. 86), he points to the motif of the victor's "Kunstverstand" as a generic phenomenon, a technique which emphasizes the *recherché* nature of epinician song and thus economically offers double praise to a patron: as worthy of this costly article, and as capable of appreciating it. Speaking of Ode 13, on the other hand, he notes the wholly untraditional, peculiarly Bacchylidean effect of the long simile in the fourth epode, that "auf ersten Blick so 'homerisch' wirkende Gleichnis," remarking that "es nicht einen Vorgang veranschaulicht, der sich sichtbar und konkret abspielt, sondern den Umschwung in der Stimmung der Troer. Dieses subjektiv-pathetische Element ist charakteristisch für B" (II p. 254).

Some of the fashionable questions, such as the precise meaning of Bacchylides' *aletheia*, Maehler may seem to beg, but this is because he knows that in poetry words are not logical symbols. Thus, in his treatment of Ode 8.20

(II pp. 139–40), he would have both the subjective and the objective aspects of *aletheia*—both the rememberings of men and the inherent unforgettability of certain events—present in the phrase σύν ἀλαθείᾳ δὲ πᾶν λάμπει χρέος. I am dubious, however, about the author's notion that χρέος in this passage has the narrow meaning of "payment of debt" and refers directly to the present song. Such a meaning is of course quite likely in a victory ode, but nevertheless in this case it seems unsuitable to the context, while it also makes the word πᾶν somewhat difficult. Maehler understands "my praise is brilliant throughout" ("leuchtet ganz"), and if we accept this it might be well to change the punctuation so as to achieve the sequence: "Touching earth I make boast to say that all I here sing is illumined by truth." However, since a question of numerical accuracy dominates what follows, it would be easier to let the poet's words remain as gnomic as they appear to be: that is, "Every thing with which the quality of the memorable combines makes itself manifest and therefore I can take my oath about the number of this man's victories, in comparison with those of any one else (without fear of charges of exaggeration)."

There are a few more points where agreement must be withheld or qualified. In Ode 13, for example, it can hardly be right to describe the divine speaker of the beginning as bringing Heracles' contest to the listener as a "Sportsreporter" (I p. 27; II p. 252) does an athletic event. It is precisely not the event that this nameless prophet evokes, but a time-shattering vision of a future scene that is already past. Again, in the same passage, though Maehler is surely right to remind us that the δίκας of line 45 must, in their plurality, refer to individual exactions of restitution or penalty (II p. 260), not to an abstract Justice, it must be wrong to translate the phrase about Heracles' activity as "Strafen an Sterblichen vollstreckend" (I p. 119). In putting an end to the hybris of monsters, the hero was not executing punishments upon mortals but rather ushering in a period of human history when men no longer brutalized by fear might work out the procedures of justice. Once more, in Ode 5, we find Maehler following Maas and quashing the syncopation of line 8 by writing δεῦρ' <ᾗ> ἄθρησον νόωι, although the rudeness of the resulting expression is proved by the very passage cited in its support. It is conceivable that Bacchylides might let his singers skip a beat after a call like δεῦρ', but it is inconceivable that he should address any patron, much less Hieron, with the same insolence that Laodamas used when he meant to insult Odysseus.

In Ode 10, Maehler follows Barrett and proposes a series of slightly altered readings for lines 20–23. A full stop is marked at the end of line 20; εὐτ[ε γάρ] is read at the beginning of 21, and line 23 is made to open with ἔστα[, διανε]ν δ' αὐτε instead of the alternative, ἔστα [participle] ἐν δ' ἄλλε. These changes taken together yield a long section in which statements are coordinated by a series of temporal expressions (ἄνικ', 20; εὔτε, 21; αὐτε, 23; ἐπεί, 25) so as to produce a passage that is prosy, tautological, and crudely emphatic of the stanza break. By this reading, the poet says that his song is to announce how many times the victor has won when he ran at Isthmia (end of antistrophe); then he says that when he won once, and when he won again, the judges pronounced him twice victorious (end of epode). In the words of Bacchylides this sounds much better, of course, for the first victory is represented by hot breath at the finish, the second by oil-spattered spectators. Nevertheless, the final

sense is far from pleasing, and the reason for its failure is not hard to find. The announced subject here is swiftness of feet (see line 20), but the only finite verbs that this version produces are a static "he came to a halt" and an irrelevant "he spattered." These verbs do not revive deeds worthy of being fixed forever in mortal memory because they contain the runner's *arete* (see line 13), and I for one cannot believe that they would have satisfied either the poet or his patrons. Surely it is better to suppose that Bacchylides here used ἔσται in its dynamic and dramatic sense, "stood for a (second) contest" (see the epigram from Thera that Maehler cites at II p. 186), and that he followed this verb with a participle of sprinkling, then capped it with αἶξε, one of the fastest words in the language. Maehler objects to Blass' genial βρέχων, the best candidate for the participle, on the grounds that the word commonly soaks its object quite through, but he might have remembered that in the uncommon usage of these poets, as evidenced by Pindar, it can dapple a baby's skin with colored light or touch the earth with golden snow. Furthermore, he reports that Barrett refuses αἶξε with the argument that it could only describe motion at the start of a race, but this cannot be accurate since Euripides' ἤξαν δρόμημα (*Phoen.* 1379) proves that the rushing movement of this verb can extend over an entire course. In this passage, then, Maehler seems to the present reviewer to have let Barrett lead him to choose the worse over the better of the textual alternatives.

The individual introductions to each ode are exemplary, touching upon questions of chronology, victors and their families, sources for myths, graphic representations, and peculiarities of structure. These sections, like the line-by-line notes, are infused with good sense and expressed with a clarity rarely found among those who write about choral poetry. No one will want to abandon the incomparable companionship of Jebb while reading Bacchylides, but everyone must be grateful for this new presentation and eager for the second section, which is to treat the dithyrambs and fragments.

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WILLIAM MULLEN. *Choreia: Pindar and Dance*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 263; index.

In classical Greece dance once was sacramental. But old forms pass away and new forms arise, and what once had been sacramental was reduced to the merely recreational. Both the choreography of ancient Greeks and the cultural context for such choreography vanished from ancient Greece, and we are left with written texts severed from most of what made them music.

So remote from us is that culture in which dance exercised a major educational function that it would seem a useless task, either pedantic or sentimental, to attempt reconstructions of the choric aspects of ancient Greek lyric. Most scholars are willing to agree with Gildersleeve, who asserts, in his commentary on Pindar, that the dance "element of choral lyric has perished for us beyond all

recovery." We can live with our loss in the case of tragedy since the tragedies do not depend on specific choreography for their emotional force. The loss is more severe, and interpretation more problematic, in the case of Pindar. Can we accept the loss with equanimity when Pindar's epinicians are dance through and through, each ode and the whole corpus testimonials to the force and social function of dance? What are we to make of the intrusion of the poet's person in such a form? We may talk of the poet's persona, and the strategies for its deployment, but are we not thinking of our kind of lyric, and the kind of poet who writes modern lyric? Are the strategies the same when the poet has his persona speak through the nimble movements of a company of dancers?

William Mullen has published a study of Pindar which attempts to recover, to some degree at least, that element which Gildersleeve was prepared to relinquish to oblivion. Readers sensitive to Greek culture and poetry will grant, I think, that Mullen has, despite the odds against such a project, achieved a remarkable success.

In *Choreia* Mullen has made a real contribution to our understanding of the Pindaric epinician. He has so aligned himself with his poet that what is central to the poet is central to the scholar. Mullen has acknowledged, as no other Pindarist has done, that Pindar's epinicians are dance, mode, and metaphor in one. The consequences of such an orientation are two-fold. First, Mullen has given us an excellent treatment of the social context in which dance was a dynamic presence, practiced and exalted, a society in which almost all free-born members participated in dance and looked to dance for the expression of the collective being. We are reminded of the high status of dance in Athenian life by Mullen's discussion of Plato's concern for the forms of dance which would most truly and reliably simulate, express, and inculcate the values of his ideal city.

Lastly, Mullen has demonstrated that reading Pindar with the eyes of a dancer can reveal connections and cogencies we would not have otherwise suspected. Pindarists may disagree with some of the details in Mullen's analysis of individual epinicians, but few would deny that Mullen has demonstrated that the strophic form is a dance form, affected in its form and content by choreographic considerations. Mullen has not attempted the impossible: a step-by-step reconstruction of the choreography. Rather, he has shown that the movement of dancers informs the movement of thought in the Pindaric odes. Particularly impressive is Mullen's discussion of the epode in its relationship to the accompanying strophe and antistrophe. Mullen finds enough in Pindar to corroborate, linguistically and thematically, the ancient view that the epode was, within the strophic economy as a whole, the still point of the dance. Mullen notes the frequency within the epodes of specific phrases with which the poet arrests his thought. He then considers the subjects which bring Pindar to such arrests and concludes that the epode is the favored position in which the poet, following the winding paths of myth, reaches the divine or heroic space: either the *arche*, as Mullen puts it, "from which the later fortunes of the hero or clan are to be traced," or the *telos*, "at which the god's sign of favor to hero or clan is made . . . manifest." Only a careful reading of Mullen's exposition can do justice to what seems in a review hardly more than a bland formula.

I do not recall reading a commentary on a classical poet which has spoken

so eloquently of the poet's sense and use of space as Mullen's *Choreia*. In avoiding idle biographical chatter when we read the ancient poets and fastening our attention instead on the conventions of the genre, we have sometimes forgotten that epinicians were occasional poems, commissioned by individuals, composed to honor the particular victory of a particular athlete. Mullen recovers this particularity in Pindar. Mullen's *Choreia*, despite the inescapable tables and statistics, is itself a dance. In Mullen's interpretation the epinicians come alive as dances. His study is an invitation for us to take our positions too in that space which is the site of Pindar's choreography. The vertical axis of this space is a band passing through the dance floor, linking the sovereign witnesses on high, the tutelary witnesses of the city, and the infernal witnesses who are to be awakened into life by the thud overhead of dancers' feet coding the most recent triumph into the clan's archives. The horizontal axis sweeps around the dance floor to include the victor, the victor's family, his friends, the elders, and all the townsfolk, not as spectators merely but as participants in a joyous hymn celebrating anew an epiphany of divine grace piercing through all hazards to light once again upon precarious mortal beings. Would that our towns, cities, and states had such a sense of space. Would that our poets and dancers could restore such space to our lives.

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ALAN H. SOMMERSTEIN. *Aristophanes: Knights*. The Comedies of Aristophanes: Vol. 2. Warminster, Wilts, England, Aris and Phillips, Ltd., 1981. Available in U.S. from Humanities Press, Inc., Atlantic Highlands, NJ 07716. Pp. ix + 220. \$29.

As Sommerstein explains in the first volume of this series, his edition of the comedies of Aristophanes was intended for the Loeb Classical Library. Aris and Phillips, Ltd. have retained the Loeb format—that is, Greek text with brief apparatus criticus and facing translation—except that the commentary is more copious and is printed as end-notes. The translation is not the same as the one Sommerstein published in the Penguin Classics (1978) but an entirely new, more literal version.

In every way, this volume represents a sensitive, lively, and learned reading of *Knights*. It is unfortunate that the plan of the series dictated a mixed result. On the one hand, the numbers of the lemmata look to the lines of the translation, and a dozen or more of the notes explain only the translation. Some of them provide glosses for a reader who is not only Greek-less but a stranger to all things Greek. For example, "the son of Leto" in 1080–81 is glossed by "Apollo." On the other hand, the reader of the commentary is expected to know the significance of the brackets in such a reference as "[Aesch.] *Prom.* 613" (on 836), to be able to follow the injunction, "cf. . . . Matron, *Attic Dinner* 10–11" (on 956), and to want to "See M. G. Bonanno, *Studi su Cratete comico* (Padua 1972)" (on 537).

To the present reviewer's way of thinking, it is good that Sommerstein is usually addressing himself to the classicist. His Introductory Note and his Note on the Text are excellent *mises en point*. The apparatus, brief as it is, is generally more interesting and useful than that of the OCT edition. His metrical notes are helpful, though he says almost nothing about the formal divisions of the play to which the various meters are related. Twenty or more notes contain references to literature published in the 1970s, many of which, on archaeological matters or other realia, will not turn up in Aristophanic bibliographies. Sommerstein is unduly modest about the excellent set of notes on *Knights* which he published in *CQ* 30 (1980) 46-56. Not until line 1225 does he cite them. Sommerstein's good dramatic and literary sense, which is reflected also in the stage directions in the translation, sometimes enables him to see the point where it was concealed from Neil by his enormous learning (e.g., 313, 400, 555, 566, 571, 1091, 1399). Again, Sommerstein can sometimes supplement Neil (e.g., 300, 410, 857, 900, 1177, 1271-73 [a reminder that Neil had not seen van Leeuwen's commentary], 1309) or correct Neil, as on 1136 (Neil, living in Cambridge, England, at the turn of the century, naturally believed that human sacrifices were offered at the Thargelia).

Here follows a list of places in which one might want to take issue with or add something to Sommerstein's commentary. The references are to the line numbers of the Greek text. 1-497. Sommerstein provides no comment on his assignment of lines to speakers, though we have such comment elsewhere (on 970-71, 1254-56). The assignment of 482-87 is especially in need of discussion (with 486-87 cf. 627). 17. θέρτε: see Pohlenz (cited on 1288-89), p. 106. 50. A word or so has dropped out of the last sentence of Sommerstein's note. 89. There should be a cross-reference to p. 3, n. 2. 284-302. A note on the meter might have been expected. 336. αὔ: Neil is right. See also Kock. 344-45. From the translation it is clear that Sommerstein construed the adverbs as did van Leeuwen, but some comment is needed. Merry, following Kock, took one adverb with the participle, as ironic, and the other with the main verb, as serious. On these lines Konrad Zacher wrote: "Um diese Verse glaube ich mich am besten verdient zu machen, wenn ich erkläre, dass ich sie nicht verstehe." 413. τοῦτοισιν needs a note. It refers to but is not exactly the same as ἀναιδεία (409). *Istis tuis artibus* (van Leeuwen); "in your own walk" (Neil). 442. This note argues plausibly for Göttling's conjecture but neither note nor apparatus shows that it was Meineke who divided 442 into two lines and postulated the lacuna. Coulon retains the trimeter. 580. Sommerstein accepts van Leeuwen's emendation of ἀπεστλεγγισμένοις to ἀν -, and translates "wear tiaras." But cf. Neil on 967-69. It is difficult to believe that the Knights want to wear tiaras. 608. Sommerstein holds that this Theorus was the associate of Cleon, but what was he doing with the Knights in Corinth (if this is what the Greek means)? Cf. the doubts of Neil and Kock. 732 ff. Landfester (cited p. 4), pp. 53 ff. might have been cited for the erotic language. 813. A quotation from Eur. *Telephus*, yes, but what is the point? R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972), p. 319, n. 2, has an interesting suggestion. Like Neil, he refers to line 465, where the Sausage-seller accuses Cleon of dealings with the Argives. 814. Sommerstein should have given a reference to his note in *CQ*. 892. In accepting Lenting's emendation, he curiously applies a principle of realism. 941-42. The impor-

tant point to be made is that the heliastic oath is the model. See Neil. 1054. Sommerstein's explanation is right as far as it goes, but another interpretation is possible. See van Leeuwen and Neil. 1062. Sommerstein brackets, but his objections may not be decisive. 1150. κημὸν καταμηλῶν : the construction may be the one explained by R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Hypomnemata 43: Göttingen, 1976), p. 53. The verb and the object form a periphrasis equivalent to a transitive verb that takes a (second) object, which is here the clause of line 1149. (The infinitive in line 1148 can be absolute.) "Funnel-probing whatever they have stolen from me." 1204. Sommerstein gives the whole line to Paphlagon but the particles suggest that the second half of the line belongs to another speaker. See Blaydes. 1253. Sommerstein omits the pan-Hellenic aspect. See Kock and Neil. 1319. Sommerstein's comment, "little has been said in *Knights* about imperial policy," is odd. Cf. 169-76, 313, 326, 361, 438, 555, 801-2, 832-35, 839-40, 975, 1034, 1408.

Despite these demurrals, Sommerstein's edition of *Knights* is most welcome. It is regrettable that the production of the volume does not do justice to his achievement. The Greek alphabet was excluded from the notes. The Greek of the text is printed from a typescript. The print is skewed and, on the vertical axis, pushed to the very top of the page. It would have cost only a few cents or pence to include the excellent general introduction from the first volume in the series. The hypotheses to *Knights* have also been omitted. The shoddiness of this production at this price is inexcusable.

LOWELL EDMUNDS

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CHARLES ROWAN BEYE. *Epic and Romance in the Argonautica of Apollonius* (Literary Structures, ed. John Gardner). Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 191. \$22.50.

It is hard to imagine a classical author more difficult to explain to the Greekless reader than Apollonius of Rhodes. The hermetic qualities of Alexandrian poetry do not readily lend themselves to exposition in English, and the often unappealing and intractable nature of Apollonius' poem—its difficult language, its disjointedness, the tedium of the opening catalogue, the long stretches of geographical description, the abrupt conclusion—tends to make even classicists read only Book 3. What is more, although there are any number of specialized studies and a few good literary articles, there has been no serious book-length critical study of the *Argonautica* in English for a long time, and none that brings to it any degree of literary sophistication. The task that Charles Beye has undertaken in this short book is a daunting one, and it is one that he has accomplished with a remarkable degree of success. Assuming no knowledge of Greek language, literature, or culture on the part of the reader, Beye gives enough background to make the poem accessible, analyzes the text in enough detail to make his book valuable for classicists as well as others, and

offers a critical reading of the whole that manages to make sense of the poem both in its time and as a literary work of continuing worth. If there are aspects of this book that are not entirely satisfactory, that should not detract from its real and solid achievements.

The first two chapters of the book ("The Poet" and "The Tradition") offer the background information necessary for the analysis of the individual books in the remaining four chapters. Despite its title, the first chapter wisely says little about the life of the poet; instead, Beye concentrates on the Alexandrian milieu and on some characteristics of Apollonius' poetry as a whole. He is generally very good, often better than more technical studies, on the basic character of Alexandrian literary theory and its manifestations in Apollonius. He emphasizes the importance of form in Alexandrian poetry; he stresses, by contrast with oral poetry, the importance of the narrator's voice, and he has some excellent comments on the Muses as *hypophêtores* (p. 15), on Orpheus' song at 2.701-13 (18), and on other relevant passages. He is equally good on the demands that the poet makes on the reader, and on the continual use of *aitia* and present tenses to provide a real context for mythical events (25 ff.). He has valuable comments to make on the role of specific episodes not to advance the plot, but to enhance a mood or the character and psychology of the heroes (21 f.).

On the other hand, the further Beye is from the text of Apollonius himself, the less convincing he is. In the first place, there are some mistakes: the ancients did not use the term "epyllion" (it was invented in the nineteenth century); Eudoxus (not Eudoxes) wrote on astronomy, not meteorology; and, more significant, *amarturon* in the famous fragment of Callimachus does not mean "false." In fact, Beye tries too hard to make Callimachus drier and less interesting than he is—we are told that he admired Aratus because he was a poet of hard facts—in order to make Apollonius seem more bold and innovative. But much of what Beye says about Apollonius is equally relevant to Callimachus, and the contrast between them is a false one. In the second place, while Beye is surely right to emphasize Apollonius' conscious experimentation with various narrative forms (and there are many excellent observations on this throughout the book), he goes overboard in reading the poem as literary criticism or theory. While his view (11) that the *Argonautica* is a statement about literature is more or less valid for all Alexandrian poetry, it is hard to accept his equation of Phineus with Apollonius himself (18, cf. 104), or the following (83): "As a metaphor for the Alexandrian literary scene, Jason functions as the young and therefore tentative new direction in poetry which must contend with the moral authority imposed by the centuries of superlative creativity in the past. . . ." Beye is capable of much more subtlety and sophistication than this.

The number of subjects with which Beye must deal in the first chapter make it somewhat hard to follow; the second is positively bewildering in its detail and its changes of subject. Starting from a summary of the myth, he proceeds to the folktale origins of the story, going back to Gilgamesh, then to literary antecedents (*Pythian* 4, Euripides' *Medea*), then to the various traditions surrounding Heracles, of which his explanation is extremely lucid. But from that point, we go on to a discussion of the hero from Homer to tragedy (including brief explanations of what history and tragedy are, together with a short course on Hellenistic philosophy), back to Gilgamesh, then back to epic, with

particular emphasis on Apollonius' modifications of Homeric narrative style, to the contrast between history and tragedy, to romance, and finally to Xenophon. Given the audience for which this book was written, such profusion was perhaps necessary, but it could surely have been made easier to follow.

There are other distracting features of the book. It is filled with gratuitous colloquialisms and contemporary references which seem condescending rather than helpful. The talking crow is described as a "yenta" (138). Odysseus in Scheria is compared to "a traveling salesman from Hartford who has stumbled into Big Sur" (122). The characters in the poem are compared to those of John Fowles' *French Lieutenant's Woman* (107), while a few pages later the passage of the Symplegades "has the quality of a Disney fantasy" (110). The fourth book is "a kind of magical mystery tour" (17), the heroes are "the best and brightest of the Greeks" (41). Freud, Karen Horney, and Robert Pirsig (51, 60) are brought in with no valid reason. More idiosyncratic is Beye's continual interest in sex and sexuality. While a revision of the usual male-oriented interpretation of ancient literature is welcome, I find it odd to learn that Euripides' Medea "wants sex with her man for recreation and self-fulfillment" (52), or that Jason has a handsome backside (90), or that masculine passion is hard to describe "perhaps because the poet must always and immediately confront the erection, that obvious, true and inevitably slightly ridiculous love offering which only an Aristophanes could set in its proper perspective" (156).

But if this review has dwelt on criticisms, that is only in the nature of reviews; Beye's failings are more than balanced by his many valuable insights. Over and over, he manages to convey a detailed sense of Apollonius' style, to the extent of giving discussions of the use of vocatives, subjunctives, and particular words, which is no mean feat in translation and transliteration. His knowledge and intelligence are apparent throughout; on virtually every page I found good, original, and true observations about specific passages, about Apollonius, and about Alexandrian poetry as a whole. Beye manages in his reading of the poem to balance detail and generalization, to explain the larger effects and purposes of Apollonius through the reading of single episodes. And it should not go without saying that, while Alexandrian poetry generally seems to bring out carping hostility and faint praise in most scholars, Beye is unstinting and generous in his acknowledgments of the work of others. Whatever faults one might find, this is a warm, lively, imaginative, intelligent, and much needed book. I learned a great deal from it, and not just about Apollonius.

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G. W. BOWERSOCK. *Roman Arabia*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 214; 8 figures and 17 plates.

Roman Arabia, one of the most recent of a spate of books to be devoted to individual Roman provinces, is welcome not least because it restores a distinct identity for a province too often absorbed into treatments of its large neighbor,

Syria. It is curious that that should have happened at all when one recollects Brunnow and von Domaszewski's monumental *Die Provincia Arabia* (1904-07) and the voluminous publications of the American and Princeton Expeditions from the early years of this century. Already in the doldrums by the 1930s, Arabian studies subsequently suffered from the upheavals in the five modern countries amongst whom it is today divided.

Re-awakened interest in the 1960s was given a fresh impetus by the stimulating survey from Bowersock himself in 1971 (*JRS* 61 [1971] 219-42). The extensive bibliography of the current book (which does not include all references in the footnotes) tells the story since then: over half, some 200 items, are post-1970; the 1980s alone give four new books. We may add now A. Kindler, *The Coinage of Bostra* (1983), and will soon have monographs on internal administration (MacAdam), the *limes* (Parker), and the fourth century (Shahid). As always, Bowersock is generous in his acknowledgments.

The book is divided into 10 chapters and four appendices. The style is lucid and highly readable, the content readily intelligible to the undergraduate while having much to offer the serious scholar. Printing errors are rare: 78 l. 25 "Nabataea"; 91 l. 20 "blends"; 100 n. 34 "But"; 115 ll. 18-19—something missing?; 128 l. 26 "Sassanids"; 193 f. —reverse Barger and Bardaisan.

Chapters 1-5 describe the region and trace the development of the nomadic Nabataeans, centered on Petra, in the late fourth century, to the prosperous and much enlarged kingdom of the first century B.C., with a settled trading and farming population. Brought under the domination of the Roman Republic, the new client-state survived the perils of Rome's transition to Empire and entered on a period of growing prosperity and accelerated hellenization during the century before its annexation in 106.

Notable amongst Bowersock's fresh interpretations and new ideas in this part: Pompey's supposed aggressive intentions are rejected (31 f.); the "Arabs" against whom the second and third Syrian governors campaigned cannot have been the Nabataeans (33); the part of Nabataea granted to Cleopatra is identified as the Hedjaz (41), harmonizing with her alleged plans after Actium for a Red Sea kingdom; the cessation of Nabataean silver minting from A.D. 64/5-70 is linked to Roman monopoly of bullion during the First Jewish War. Above all, however, he argues convincingly for a brief annexation: To the assertion of Strabo (*Geog.* 16.4.21) that Arabs and Syrians were subject to Rome (at the time of his writing at least), Bowersock brings in the evidence from the important coin studies by Meshorer which show a break beginning in 3 B.C. in the previously plentiful minting of the Nabataeans. It makes good sense to associate annexation with the search for a new arrangement in the region after the death of Herod the Great in 4 B.C., and Bowersock goes on to suggest restoration in A.D. 1 in the time of Gaius Caesar's *expeditio Arabica* which took him to the Gulf of Aqaba. Here we might add a mention of the argument of Isaac that the Petra-Gaza road of the first century is Roman in construction and perhaps datable to this same expedition. Is it possible that a part of the kingdom, around Hegra, was left to the Nabataeans? Certainly more may be made of developments there.

I suspect more may yet be derived from the coin evidence: the introduction of a laureled head on Nabataean coins (Meshorer, 43)—royal tact in the

early Principate?; the marked debasement of the silver coinage in the 20s B.C. (Meshorer, 73)—a shortage of bullion after meeting the demands of Ventidius Bassus?; the failure to strike silver coinage but once (A.D. 7) between 4 B.C. and A.D. 18—slow recovery from annexation and the confiscation of the royal treasure? In any case, from where did they get their silver?

As an imperial province, incorporating both the Nabataean kingdom and some former cities of Syria, Arabia, despite its legionary garrison, remained out of the mainstream of major events in the East. Only in the third century, with the Palmyrene takeover, did it become directly involved; later still, the massive reorganization of the defenses of the East by Diocletian and Constantine is amply attested in the archaeological record in Arabia. The cities, from the provincial capital and legionary base at Bostra, through Gerasa, Philadelphia, and Petra, to the towns of the Negev, prospered and developed, while evidence is accumulating for further land exploitation.

The papyri of the Babatha Archive—in Greek, Aramaic, and, uniquely, Nabataean—give a remarkable picture of events and life in the years of straddling annexation: we see Jewish families buying land in Nabataea/Arabia, have a reference to a royal (later imperial?) estate, see litigation before the governor of Arabia according to Roman legal procedures, and obtain four new names for the gubernatorial fasti.

Bowersock rightly remarks on the delay in officially proclaiming the province till 111 (82 ff.). One may plausibly speculate here that, faced with the need for troops in the new province at that juncture, Trajan may have had misgivings about permanent annexation. What, one wonders, became of the royal family—none appears later in imperial service as happened elsewhere. The revealing bilingual text from Ruwwafa in the Hedjaz enlightens us on relations with the nomads, in this case the confederation of the Thamudeni dedicating a temple to Marcus and Verus (96 ff.). Bowersock's handling of the rise of the Tanukh confederation and its relationship with Palmyra and Rome is most illuminating (ch. 9); his resolution for the apparent split loyalties of Imru'iqais in the early fourth century is entirely convincing (240 f.).

It is difficult to believe in Arabia's fidelity to Severus in 193 even if Severianus, its governor, is a native of Perinthus (113); that the governor and army took an early opportunity to change sides (after Niger's defeats at Cyzicus and Nicaea?) is more likely. *ILS 2771* need not show the prefect much less the legion *I Parthica* at Bostra under Philip, even as victors (106 n. 48)—only the regiment of catafracts, presumably returning West with the emperor. Understandably, the author questions the unlikely claim in the *HA* (*Sev.* 12.6) that during the campaign of Lugdunum "*legio Arabica*" defected to Albinus (116 f.). That *III Cyrenaica* was intended seems incredible. If "*Arabica*" is correctly transmitted might the author not have meant a legion (*III Scythica* or one of the *legiones Parthicae*?) based amongst the newly defeated Arabs of Mesopotamia? (I hope to develop this elsewhere.)

The strikingly named *ala celerum* attested at Philippopolis in a dedication to Philip's father, was certainly raised locally, and so-named, on the eve of Rome's millennial celebrations, to evoke recollection of the "celeres" who guarded Romulus.

For the *Actia Dusaria* at Bostra, see Kindler (op. cit.); for Philip's possi-

ble complicity in the death of Gordian, add Stolte (*Lampas* II [1970] 378-87). App. I (Latin and Greek text from the Yemen): might the Latin be completed *eques a [lae]?* App. II (Nabataeans and Romans in the Wadi Sirhan: Bowersock recognizes in the Arabic "Qura Arabiyya" applied to the Hedjaz, the Greek *Chora Arabia*. Survey in Saudi Arabia is now enhancing what we know of this region (below). App. III (governors of Arabia): one may add that with some 40 praetorian governors known, we can expect about 15 more, mostly for the second century. App. IV (Roads and the Peutinger Table): from the roads and places shown or omitted, Bowersock proposes an early date for the archetype of the *PT*, probably the Map of Agrippa. Amongst a number of interesting place-name identifications, he offers the attractive explanation that Moa of the Madaba Map and Beersheva Edict is the Moahilae/Mohaile/Mohaila of the *ND* where "*haila*" is the Arabic for "a military force" or "detachment."

This book will stimulate much new interest in Arabia. Already it is being overtaken by the mass of archaeological work in progress and, while there is clearly much which may yet be done with the corpus of literary evidence, it is in this field above all that future developments will be most significant. Excavation reports pending, in preparation, or soon to be undertaken; the analysis of the evidence from several multi-period surveys in Jordan, Israel, and the exciting new discoveries in Saudi Arabia (see now, recent volumes of *Atlat*), will provide the raw material for developing the social and economic history of Arabia. The new edition of *Roman Arabia* which will be necessary within a few years will be a very different book both in scale and emphasis: urban development, settlement patterns, and land use will all figure prominently, and one will be better placed to trace frontier development. It is to be hoped that Bowersock again will be willing to tackle it for us.

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CHRISTOS THEODORIDIS, Editor. Photii Patriarchae Lexicon, Volume 1. Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1982. Pp. lxxxii + 461, 5 plates. Cloth, DM 298.

In the monastery of St. Nicanor (western Macedonia) in November 1959, L. Politis discovered a group of long-ignored manuscripts. The gold of the find turned out to be Zavordensis 95, a copy of the (later lacunose) Codex Galeanus containing an almost complete text of the *Lex*. A new edition, based on all known mss., was initiated, a series of collaborators grew, and, after what seems to have been considerable turnover among these, the full job was turned over to Theodoridis in 1974. The first product of the enterprise was the monograph of K. Tsantsanoglou, ΤΟ ΛΕΞΙΚΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΦΩΤΙΟΥ: ΧΡΟΝΟΛΟΓΗΣΗ-ΧΕΙΡΟΓΡΑΦΗ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΣΗ = ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ Beiheft 17 (Thessaloniki 1967): see K. Alpers, *BZ* 64 (1971) 78-84. With this basis, C. discusses the text-tradition (11), the relationship of the ῥητορικόν of the *Etymologicum Genuinum* (111: the

EG drew on a fuller recension of the *Lex.* than that contained in the mss. and may thus be used to supplement the mss. in reconstructing it), the working habits of the scribe of *Zavordensis* (IV) and the sources of Photius (V).

The text: the format is that initiated by Adler in her edition of the *Suda*. Each lemma/gloss is numbered and its source, where attainable, is noted in the adjoining margin. An upper apparatus, much fuller than Adler's, lists parallel passages; questions of the text are dealt with in the lower. In editing a secondary work like a commentary or lexicon, it is desirable to print what the author transmitted, that is, what was in the source he was using. The result is that error is deliberately printed in the text, while truth is sought in the critical apparatus. Since the number of mss. involved is small, their evidence can be set out fully and provide a solid basis for further emendation (a process which has already begun: cf. N. Conomis, *ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ* 33 [1981] 382-93; 34 [1982-83] 151-90).

The mind can only boggle at the technical quality of the edition. Although I assume there are more, I have caught only three typographical errors, accents at α 654, 2290, and one English letter in the last sentence of lxxii n. 1. At α 1419 the reference should be to Herodotus 1.87.3; 128.2 and at α 2089 to Demosthenes 24.178: both glosses go back to the *Lexicon* of Harpocration, and the book-number of the *Histories* and the name of the speech were omitted in the epitome used by the source of Photius.

Since there are no indices, a list of new fragments of classical authors may be thought useful. Aeschines Socraticus (α 2774), Aeschylus (α 2416, 3226, 3296), Ameipsias (β 105), Antiphon (α 3460), Aristarchus (α 1568; γ 23), Aristophanes (α 2097, 2331, 2472, 2595, 2710, 2831, 2840, 2872, 3138, 3190, 3258, 3276, 3283, 3313, 3404, 3495; β 39, 50, 201; δ 4), Aristotle (?) (δ 588), Axioniscus (β 197), Callias (γ 1, 9), Cephisodorus (α 3139), Crates (β 174; δ 154), Cratinus (α 2489, 2860, 2866, 3217, 3403, 3447; ; δ 287, 306) Demetrius com. (α 3140), Didymus (α 752, 1179), Diogenianus (α 2846), Diphilus (α 2438), Douris (α 2809), Epicharmus (?) (δ 705), Epicurus (α 3187), Eupolis (α 2283, 2596, 2824; β 27, 60; γ 154; δ 161), Euripides (α 2272, 2953, 3161), Hecataeus (α 3352, 3438), Hermippus (α 2774), Hyperides (α 3388), Ion (α 2304, 2835), Irenaeus (α 563), Leuco (α 2491, 3139), Lysias (α 2030, 2031 [bis], 2095, 2711, 3097), Menander (α 2526, 3074; β 143; γ 132), Metagenes (α 3277), Nicochares (α 3467), Nicomachus (α 3167), Pherecrates (α 238, 2473, 2533, 2548, 2551, 3107, 3184; β 170, 189; δ 342), Philemon (β 4), Philistus (α 3278), Philochorus (α 3311), Philonides (α 2782), Phrynichus (α 2521, 2866, 3097), Plato com. (α 2365, 2420, 2712, 2867, 3353, 3417, 3461), Sophron (β 158), Strattis (α 2239, 2265, 3020), Teleclides (α 277), Theophrastus (δ 181), Theopompus (α 2807, 3097, 3483; β 34; γ 20), adespota comica (α 372, 2572, 2848, 3187), adespota tragica (α 1363, 2287).

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LORING M. DANFORTH. *The Death Rituals of Rural Greece*. Princeton, 1982.

This book is a vivid account and analysis of the death rituals of a village in northern Thessaly, which the author calls by the pseudonym "Potamia." The story of death in Potamia is told in L. Danforth's text and also in A. Tsiaras' photographs, which are arranged so as to present the sequence of events from the beginning of the funeral to the exhumation of the body five years later. Both text and photographs constitute a compelling and poetic narrative that succeeds in involving the reader emotionally as well as intellectually.

Danforth approaches the study of these rituals with the view that they are a form of communication, which can only be properly understood by breaking the code of symbols through which they "talk" (pp. 27-29). To "break the code" he adopts a structuralist perspective, seeking to understand how the rituals attempt to "mediate the opposition of life and death" (pp. 30-33). The book is rich in interesting associations and interpretations, and only some of Danforth's many examples of rituals and songs which attempt to achieve such a mediation between life and death can be discussed here.

Danforth analyzes the rituals which effect the passage from the world of the living to the world of the dead according to van Gennep's tripartite division of the rite of passage into stages of separation, transition, and incorporation. Rather than neatly categorizing each part of the ceremony as a rite of separation, transition, or incorporation, Danforth examines each individual ritual to see if it should be analyzed as a rite of passage in itself, with features of rites of more than one stage. For example, the burial of the corpse can be seen as a rite separating the dead from the living, and the beginning of a long period of transition until the soul is finally incorporated into another world. But the burial is also a rite of incorporation, of the body into the earth, and is accompanied by prayers for the incorporation of the soul into Heaven. And the burial is followed by a meal at the home of the grieving family, which marks the beginning of the reincorporation of the family of the deceased into normal life (pp. 38-43). The inclusion of elements of incorporation as well as separation in the beginning of the death ritual shows the pervasiveness of the attempts to bridge the opposition between life and death.

At the time of burial, as throughout the death rituals, the position of corpse, soul, and mourners can be seen to be closely linked. Danforth points out in particular the parallels which the villagers see between the condition of the soul and the body (pp. 48-54). The soul's forgiveness for its sins and incorporation into Heaven are said to correspond to the body's dissolution. Thus, a completely decomposed body, reduced to clean, white bones, betokens a soul that has entered Heaven. The language of prayers illustrates the Orthodox church's sanction of this belief; the verb λύω is used to describe the "loosing" of the soul from its sins, and διαλύω or ἀναλύω is used to describe the "loosing" of the body into the earth (pp. 51-52). Danforth indicates that the burial process carries out the same symbolism; the hands, feet, and jaws of the deceased are bound together during the funeral, but loosed before burial so that the body can decompose. The mourners can be seen to have a role parallel to the corpse and soul here, too, as the gradual incorporation of the body into the earth and the soul into heaven is accompanied by their reincorporation into society, which is complete after the exhumation of the bones.

The author devotes the most attention to the final rite of passage, exhumation, after which the bones of the deceased are deposited in the village ossuary and the sustained "conversation" between the relatives and the deceased ends (pp. 55-69). This is the final separation of the deceased from his family and friends, as he must leave the grave which has been a home for all of them since his burial. Nevertheless, since the exhumation reverses the process of burial, it is the ultimate attempt to bridge the opposition between life and death and extends to the bereaved the illusion that the deceased is returning to life above ground. Danforth exemplifies the resultant ambiguity of emotion with several laments, some of which stress the sadness of the final separation, while others express the happiness of the deceased at being freed from the dark earth and speak of his "homecoming" (pp. 58-64). These laments continue the "conversation" with the dead in a literal sense, as they contain not only words addressed to the dead but also the replies of the deceased.

Laments are sung not only at the exhumation, but also from the time of death until burial and during the many visits to the grave. Danforth devotes a chapter to the structural analysis of these laments and identifies several metaphors that diminish the distance between life and death. Comparisons of the deceased to a plant hold out the hope that human life and death are cyclical, that death is only seasonal and the deceased will return to life with the new growing season. Death may also be softened by comparison with marriage or a journey to a distant place, both examples of separations that are not permanent and so less painful to contemplate than death. Danforth demonstrates that not only do the songs sung at funerals make comparisons to a wedding, but that the same songs are used for both occasions, to lament the departure of the bride from her family or the departure of the deceased. The adaptations needed to fit the songs to a specific occasion are small, usually only the insertion of different names or kinship terms, and point to the ease with which these folk songs can be "personalized" for reuse.

Danforth concludes his study of death rituals with a chapter that examines their social context and function. The rituals that care for the dead are enacted according to the same patterns of social relationship and obligation through which care is given to the living. Even the type of care given to the dead is modeled on the care that is given to the living, with the same emphasis on feeding, cleaning (the house or grave), and keeping company. It is the women who perform these duties, because of the sexual division of labor in Greece and also because, in the case of the death of a woman's husband, she must maintain her relationship to him in order to preserve the identity and position that come to a woman only through a man. It is also the women who have the most need of the opportunity presented by the death rituals to express their grief, since their lives are more confined. And as the women gather, evening after evening, to mourn for the dead, the widows and other bereft women have a chance to form new relationships with each other, to replace the gap left by death as the period of mourning goes on and the fiction of communication with the dead becomes less compelling. The fact that the women come to face the reality of death is borne out by laments that speak of death as final and the efforts of the mourners as futile.

Potamia's death rituals are not fully typical of all of Greece; there is a certain amount of variation, and Danforth admits that "the intensity with

which the women of Potamia mourn for their dead and the frequency with which they visit the graveyard appear to be somewhat unusual" (p. 56). Nevertheless, this book is an important contribution to the study of death because it brings to light the universal significance of the death rituals it explicates. Danforth encourages his readers to identify with the people whose lives he describes and to come to a better understanding of death in their own society through their understanding of death in Potamia. The structural perspective with which he analyzes the death rituals and laments serves to diminish the distance between the anthropologist (and his readers) and the villagers of Potamia. The denial of the finality of death that is communicated by these rituals is a feature of death rituals in all parts of the world. Thus, the customs of lamentation, prolonged mourning, and exhumation, which seem so exotic to us, as Danforth admits, can be recognized as variations of a familiar response to death.

Danforth is sensitive to the beauty and power of the rituals and songs that he examines; as a result his work is very readable, unlike many structuralist studies, with a clarity that comes of his skillful handling of his techniques of analysis. Each of the laments is printed in Greek and then translated, so that the collection of songs will be useful to the specialist and also accessible to a larger audience.

Classicists should read this book to gain a better understanding of the death rituals of ancient as well as modern Greece, as there are many correspondences and continuities between the practices described by Danforth and those of the ancient Greeks. Danforth mentions the remarkable similarity of ancient and modern beliefs concerning the soul and the afterlife (p. 45), and the continuity between ancient and modern Greek death rituals and songs has been demonstrated by M. Alexiou (*The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*, Cambridge 1974). Not only the basic ceremonial structure of a wake, procession, lamentation at the grave, and a meal at the dead man's house has remained unchanged (as well as many of the details of the ceremony; see Alexiou pp. 4-51), but the themes and metaphors for death expressed in the laments discussed by Danforth are attested for ancient Greece as well.

One example is the image of the dead body as food, an image which is exploited with grim wit in the *Iliad*, where the battle setting makes possible a number of fine additions to the modern Greek picture of the earth feasting on the corpse. Homeric heroes faced not only the greedy jaws of the earth but also hungry dogs and birds and the "biting" spear of the enemy, images which are nicely assembled by E. Vermeule (*Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* [Berkeley 1979] 103-9). The Attic lekythos depicting Hekate's dog eating a dead man in the underworld (Vermeule, fig. 26) indicates that such a fate was not reserved only for the dead who lay on the battlefield, but could welcome any newcomer to Hades. This is seen also in lament no. 21 in Danforth, in which a child replies to his mother's questions about the underworld with a sense of detail not unlike Homer's (pp. 101-2):

Mother, here in the underworld where I have come
I found snakes twisted like braids and vipers curled like ribbons.
One snake, mischievous and smaller than the others,
came and built a nest above my head.

He ate my eyes, with which I saw the world.
 He ate my tongue, with which I sang like a nightingale.
 He ate my hands, with which I did my chores.
 And he ate my feet, with which I used to come and go.

Behind all of these images lies the transformation of the cultural being into a part of nature, with the result that the dead body becomes a source of nourishment and life. Danforth's discussion of this transformation as an attempt to mediate the distance between life and death is as enlightening to our understanding of the ancient beliefs as of the modern ones. And the parallels he draws between the earth's consumption of the body and the mourners' eating food following the burial point to a contradiction in beliefs which is equally apparent in the grave offerings of antiquity. The villagers of Potamia were conscious of the body's decomposition, but at the same time speak of feeding the dead; the ancient Greeks made no serious attempt to furnish the dead with the necessary items for a journey or life elsewhere, but they gave various offerings as though reluctant to acknowledge that the dead man no longer feels the needs of the living.

In addition to the insights to be gained from a comparison of ancient and modern metaphors for death, the ancient practices of lamentation become clearer when they are compared to Danforth's descriptions of the performance of laments. The majority of the laments sung in Potamia are not composed for a specific occasion, but are traditional songs that can be adapted to various circumstances by changing the few lines which contain the name, kinship terms, or any other individualized reference. These laments are known to most women in the village, but the singing is usually led not by the closest relatives of the deceased, who are most affected by grief, but by women who have had much experience with death and who have developed some skill in singing laments. In ancient Greece, too, the kinswomen were led in their singing by women who were not directly affected by the death, sometimes by professional mourners (see Alexiou, pp. 10-13, 102-3), and we can imagine that these hired mourners had a repertoire of laments that could be adapted to the occasion, like the laments of Potamia. And the regulatory function of such songs in providing a socially approved method of articulating grief, as pointed out by Danforth (pp. 73-74), was present also in the ancient songs, as is clear from the strict tradition described by Alexiou (see esp. pp. 131-40, 161-205).

So far we have discussed a few of the many correspondences between ancient and modern Greek rituals of death, which demonstrate how Danforth's analysis of modern rituals can elucidate ancient practices. There is also, however, at least one striking discontinuity between ancient and modern Greek death rituals—the ancient practice of cremation, which is found alongside inhumation in all periods of antiquity (see D. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* [London 1971]), is not found in modern Greece. The Orthodox church does not approve of cremation or of any interference with the natural decomposition of the body, because of the belief that the body and soul go through a parallel process of passage. Related to this belief are the exhumations that are performed in many parts of modern Greece, so that the relatives of the deceased can see if the soul has reached paradise or if more prayers and good

deeds are necessary to accomplish its forgiveness. The early Greeks may have shared the feeling that the process of death was only complete with the disappearance of the flesh from the bones, but they felt no hesitation in helping this process along, without waiting for any time of judgment. This contrast between ancient and modern methods of disposing of the dead points to a difference in attitude toward what happens after death and a different emphasis, which is noticed by Vermeule (p. 7): "we detect a feeling among the early Greeks that there is a deeper concern for the body than for the soul."

Despite this difference, it is clear that the ancient Greeks were as reluctant as the villagers of Potamia to bid a final farewell to their dead, so much so, in fact, that their desire to communicate with the dead could be exploited commercially by the deceptive operations of the *Nekyomanteion* in Epeiros (see Vermeule, pp. 200-1). Many of the themes and practices that express the desire of the people of Potamia to overcome the opposition of life and death are found also in ancient Greek art and literature, and Danforth's techniques for understanding the messages conveyed by Potamia's ritual acts and songs is equally applicable to the study of ancient Greek death rites. And since the denial of the finality of death is a universal feature of death rites, this perspective enables us to see ancient Greek death rituals as an example of the human response to death and not so different from our own. The hopes of men the world over are not unlike the expectations expressed by the ancient comedian Antiphanes (CAF II p. 32 no. 53):

Don't grieve too much for your dear ones,
For they are not dead, but have passed down
The same road which we must all
Go down. We, too, will come later
To the same inn where they are,
And will spend the rest of time together.

REBECCA HAGUE

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
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THE EMBASSY AND THE DUALS IN *ILIAD* 9*

The problem of the duals in *Iliad* 9.182-98 is relatively easy to describe and has been clear to scholars since antiquity. Why does the poet use the dual of an embassy that contains five people: Phoenix, Ajax, Odysseus, and two heralds? Particularly troublesome is the fact that he switches from the correct plural of lines 177-81 to the problematic duals of 182-98. Much has been made of Homer's seeming inconsistency or error here, and widely divergent conclusions have been expressed, both about the force of the dual and about the composition of the book as a whole.¹ Some have held that the dual here stands for the plural, on the assumption that just as Homer could use the plural for the dual, so he could use the dual for the plural; others feel that the duals refer to two *groups* of people, either Phoenix with Odysseus and Ajax as opposed to the heralds, or Phoenix as opposed to the rest; still others believe that the dual is a relic of an earlier time when the embassy in fact consisted of only two people and that the dual preserves a precious relic of an earlier version of Book 9. No one of these views has commanded anything like universal assent.²

*I thank Charles Segal for reading this paper and offering his advice.

¹For clear accounts of problem and conclusion, cf. W. Leaf, *The Iliad*, Vol. I (London 1900; repr. Amsterdam 1960) 371, 384 ad loc., and M. M. Willcock, *A Commentary on Homer's Iliad* (London and New York 1970) ad loc. Willcock gives a full and measured account of the problems and the various solutions proposed.

²Earlier scholarship on the subject is of course considerable. For an overview I refer to A. Heubeck, *Die homerische Frage* 71-73 (Darmstadt 1974), and his Forschungsbericht (VII) in *Gymnasium* 89 (1982) 423-24, and A. Lesky, *Homerios* 103-5 (Stuttgart 1967). More recent articles from which I have benefitted include: C. P. Segal

Before proceeding further, two basic points must be established. First, Homer nowhere refers to the "embassy" as an embassy. We cannot therefore hold the Achaean mission to Achilles in 9 up to any model of an embassy established elsewhere in the poems or imagined by modern scholars: all we know is what Homer tells us, and he in no way states or implies that the mission in 9 is a canonical or uncanonical version of anything. It is what it is, and those who objectify "embassy" and use arguments based on this putative "embassy" are guilty of faulty method.³ Presumably embassies of various sorts were known,⁴ but each probably had variations from a norm appropriate to the situation.

Second, the poet—Homer—chose to use the duals in *Iliad* 9, and these duals are therefore evidence of the poet's intent and not of prehistoric or previous stages of the epic. Had he been moved to speak differently, he would have spoken differently. The fact that Homer did not use the plural is an irrelevance: he chose to use the dual. If one will accept these two basic points at the outset, we may proceed to examine the text of Book 9 in hopes of elucidating Homer's treatment of both the duals and the embassy as a whole.

By the time Book 9 opens, Agamemnon's misguided attempt to take Troy without Achilles has failed, and the Achaean army is in deep trouble, pressed up against their very ships. Agamemnon calls an as-

in *GRBS* 9 (1968) 101-14, who stresses connections with Book 1; O. Tsagarakis in *Hermes* 99 (1971) 257-77, who argues against D. L. Page (see next note) that Book 9 as a whole is integral to the *Iliad*, and in *RhM* 116 (1973) 193-205 that Phoenix, though sent on ahead, is part of the embassy; the thematic relevance of Phoenix's speech is argued by J. A. Rosner in *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 314-27; A. Koehnken in *Glotta* 53 (1975) 25-36, 56 (1978) 5-14 makes most of the correct observations and arguments, particularly in identifying Ajax and Odysseus as the subjects of the duals. He furthermore correctly separates Phoenix from the embassy, holding in *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 221-42 that Phoenix is not a member of the embassy because he is not a social equal of the heroes. A. Thornton in *Glotta* 56 (1978) 1-4 and R. Gordesiani in *Philologus* 124 (1980) 163-74 both make excellent interpretative points, but their arguments are vitiated by strained interpretations of the duals as referring to two groups of people rather than two individuals.

³This observation refers most particularly to D. L. Page who, in his *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley 1959) 297-315, uses the duals and Phoenix in Book 9 as his main argument in favor of multiple authorship in the Homeric poems. In many of his points, Page uses a priori arguments drawn from what he presumes an embassy to be. Clearly such arguments cannot but weaken his position, this quite apart from the inherent unlikelihood of any assumption of earlier versions embedded in the text of a poem which was performed before a live and attentive audience.

⁴Cf. Book 1 with its embassies to Achilles and to Chryses.

sembly and proposes that the army return home. This proposal is greeted with silence, and thus is defeated. Diomedes' counterproposal that the army remain at Troy is approved by acclamation, but as Nestor points out, the proposal merely maintains the unsatisfactory status quo: more is needed. Nestor in turn suggests that guards be posted for that evening and that the chieftains meet to see if they cannot come up with some plan to better the situation. At the resulting council meeting, Nestor, who had proposed the meeting in the first place, opens with tactful references to Agamemnon's position and power, and then suggests that the Achaeans' problems began on the day that Agamemnon had taken away Achilles' girl, Briseis. It is his view that only Achilles can save the situation. He suggests (110-12), "But even now let us consider how we may persuade him (to rejoin the fighting) by making amends with pleasing gifts and sweet words."

Agamemnon has no notion of Achilles' true objections, and therefore fails to hear that Nestor had suggested not gifts merely, but some form of apology or flattery as well. He hears only of gifts and—generously, as he seems to think—offers extravagant gifts and concludes, "Let him yield to me inasmuch as I am more kingly and inasmuch as I claim to be senior in birth."⁵ Had the embassy been despatched at this point, the message would have been conveyed by heralds, as in Book I. The duals would have referred to the heralds, and it would have been they who conveyed the message contained in lines 122-56 (=264-99), probably without any preamble or argument. This is the kind of "embassy" Agamemnon had in mind.

The embassy does not depart at this point, however, because Nestor wisely intervenes. Though he may very well (we cannot know) have had grave doubts that any appeal to Achilles can succeed given Agamemnon's unwillingness to make verbal amends (ἔπεισοσί τε μιλίχοισι), he nonetheless tries to increase the chances of success by suggesting that others than heralds carry the message. He opens his speech with a decorous rebuke to Agamemnon, telling him, using the full honorific formula which he had used above (96):

⁵A good deal is made of these words and the fact that they are not repeated by Odysseus later on. Combined with Achilles' remarks about telling the truth, some scholars feel that Achilles had seen through Odysseus' words to Agamemnon's arrogance which lay behind them. I see no way in which this can be true. Rather, these words are addressed by Agamemnon to the council of elders and do not constitute a part of his list of gifts. How could they, after all, since they are not gifts and in no way represent a statement to be conveyed to Achilles?

Most noble son of Atreus, lord of men Agamemnon,
The gifts you give lord Achilles are not at all contemptible.

A lukewarm compliment. He then modifies Agamemnon's original plan by suggesting a different group to present Agamemnon's offer: it is his hope that the people he selects may convince Achilles to return to battle. Nestor may even discount altogether the proffered gifts as Odysseus himself does in the event (300-1):

But come, let us all urge chosen ones to go
quickly to the hut of Peleus' son Achilles.
But come, the ones I choose, let them obey.
First of all let Phoenix dear to Zeus lead the way,
and then great Ajax and glorious Odysseus.
Of heralds let Hodios and Eurybates follow along.
But bring water for their hands and order silence
so we may pray to Kronian Zeus, if he may pity us. (165-72)

Nestor's proposal for a restructured mission to Achilles is approved by the chieftains and preparations are made for its departure. At this point it is well to recall that two embassies to Achilles were proposed. The one, Agamemnon's, involved only the two heralds and a bald recitation of Agamemnon's gifts. This embassy did not take place. Had it taken place, however, the duals in lines 182-85 (at least) would have been appropriate and grammatically correct. This psychologically prior embassy with its grammatically correct duals was superseded by the actual embassy with its problematic duals. This second embassy involved heralds, as all embassies apparently did, but the main participants were Phoenix, Ajax, and Odysseus. It will be well to determine as best we can their roles, the roles (apparently but not explicitly in all cases) assigned them by Nestor (179-81).

Phoenix was to lead the group to Achilles' hut (168); he was not to "lead" the "embassy." His leading is like that of Calchas (1.71), who brought the Greeks to Troy through his gift of clairvoyance. Homer does not choose to tell us why such a leader is necessary in this instance, but two reasons suggest themselves. (1) There may have been some danger that Achilles or his men would refuse to admit the Achaean delegation unless accompanied by one of its own, but this seems unlikely; (2) it was, after all, dark, and the Myrmidons were positioned at the end of the Achaean line, and some guidance might therefore have been neces-

sary.⁶ Furthermore, it is conceivable that the Myrmidons needed to recognize someone approaching the camp before admitting him. We must not forget that the Trojans were encamped near the Achaean ships, and any strange visitors during the night might be taken for Trojans.⁷ We cannot know for sure what the reason was, but it is at least clear that Phoenix's role was that of guide, not chief. Had he been the chief of the embassy, clearly he would have had to report its results to Agamemnon and could not have remained with Achilles (658–62). His role in fact ends at line 223 when, after Achilles' formal welcome of his friends, Ajax suggests that it is time to deliver Agamemnon's message to Achilles.

Ajax is clearly one of the two principals of the mission. It is he who signals that the time has come to begin (223), and it is also he who signals that the mission has failed and that it is time to leave (624 ff.). He is not the spokesman, but he is a part of the mission, and must therefore be one of the two referred to by the duals of 182 ff. The other is, of course, Odysseus, the spokesman of the mission, the man who assumes the role of herald in reporting verbatim Agamemnon's offer. He picks up on Ajax's signal in 223⁸ and presents the Greeks' proposal. He is the leader both conceptually (180, 673) and temporally (225 ff.) and spatially (192, 657, 688 ff., if genuine). Line 192, τὼ δὲ βᾶτην προτέρω ἤγεῖτο δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, proves that he was one of the two referred to by the duals. It is only on this interpretation that lines 197–98 make sense. For if two people are to be considered φίλτατοι, those two can be only Ajax and Odysseus: the heralds clearly do not qualify.⁹ In the embassy that actually took place, Nestor's embassy, the duals refer to Ajax and Odysseus, and there is no irregularity either in conception or in grammar.

But the duals are abrupt and have seemed so to many, to the extent, indeed, that they have questioned Homer's knowledge of Greek

⁶One will compare Priam's need for guidance later on in Book 24.

⁷Odysseus is here on a night mission, and he engages in another one in the next book. We might imagine that the Myrmidons were apprehensive that something might happen to them similar to what happened to Rhesus and his Thracians in Book 10.

⁸Some have felt that Odysseus here preempts Phoenix's role in the mission and that, had Phoenix been allowed to speak first, the mission might have succeeded. This view represents a misreading both of the embassy and Achilles' disposition.

⁹One will compare line 642 in which Ajax sardonically repeats the φίλτατοι there clearly referring to himself and Odysseus.

and his understanding of poetic plot construction. While confessing that I do not fully comprehend why Homer introduced the duals so abruptly, I offer the following considerations. First and most important is the fact that Homer either positively wanted duals here or at least did not care enough to modify the (already modified) formula of 1.327. He probably considered that there was no problem of comprehension among his audience, that everyone would clearly recognize either immediately or upon hearing 192, that Ajax and Odysseus were the subjects of the duals.¹⁰ It is, however, equally possible that by using the dual, Homer recalls Agamemnon's two earlier embassies, the one which actually took place and resulted in the high-handed removal of Briseis (1.327 ff.)¹¹ and the aborted second embassy which would likewise have been brutal and counterproductive, and which was replaced, at Nestor's suggestion, by the current one.¹² This is all mere speculation, and I remain satisfied with the point that Homer chose to use the dual because (at the very least) he found no objection in so doing.

The real shocker, however, is that the duals not only appear abruptly, they disappear as abruptly. Nowhere after line 198 in the rest of Book 9 is the dual used in any context.¹³ We may excuse the use of plurals in 204, either on the assumption that this is a case of the familiar¹⁴ alternating of dual and plural in Homer, or by holding that once

¹⁰Had there been any lack of comprehension among his hearers, Homer would have known of it and would either have changed the phrasing of his remarks, or provided more introduction to them, or have later offered an explanation of the confusion. He simply was not in a position to allow perplexity in an audience which would have denied him payment if themselves denied of comprehension and thus satisfaction. The fact that none of these solutions was adopted in this instance to me at least indicates clearly that there was no lack of comprehension. Koehnken (note 2 above) is good on this: he holds that the only people important enough to be singled out are Ajax and Odysseus, and that an ancient audience would have grasped this immediately.

¹¹This is Segal's (note 2 above) position, and is, I feel, quite correct.

¹²In being reminded of Book 1, the audience would have recognized that Agamemnon in 9 was up to the same high-handed tactics he had employed in Book 1 (cf. 9.158-60)—he simply does not understand Achilles and his feelings, and still thinks of Achilles as, though perhaps necessary, nonetheless petulant and insubordinate. The duals underline similarities with 1 (Agamemnon has not changed) but differences as well (recognized by Nestor). We also, though, as audience, do not know exactly Achilles' position and thoughts, so an expanded embassy is essential, not only for the plot, but for our understanding of Achilles' motivations. Though Agamemnon cannot learn, we can.

¹³Save perhaps of the heralds in the (athetized) 689.

¹⁴Cf. P. Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* II (Paris 1953) 22-29, on the dual in general, and 27-29 on the seemingly unprincipled alternation of duals and plurals.

inside the hut Achilles includes all in his remark—that is, Phoenix, as well as Ajax and Odysseus. More difficult, and indeed impossible on any dual assumption, is 421–22:

ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν ἰόντες ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν
ἀγγελίην ἀπόφασθαι. τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἔστι γερόντων

in which Achilles apparently addresses only Ajax and Odysseus, since they alone will return and are γέροντες. Likewise in 649, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς ἔρχεσθε καὶ ἀγγελίην ἀπόφασθε, Achilles does not use the dual, though it is possible that he here may be including the heralds. In fact his non-use of the duals is surprising to us only because he had used the dual in 197–98. Elsewhere in the poem, two people are routinely referred to in the plural, as indeed were the heralds by Achilles in Book 1.334–35.

At this point it is well to recall that the duals in 182–98, though referring to the same people, refer to them in different capacities. In 182 ff., Ajax and Odysseus are the twin ambassadors of Agamemnon; in 193–98, they are, in Achilles' eyes and words, the two dearest to him of the entire army. Achilles was not aware that he was in fact receiving an embassy from Agamemnon and believed rather that two dear friends—ἢ τι μάλα χρεώ—had come to visit him after a day's fighting. After Odysseus began speaking, and especially when he recounted Agamemnon's proffered gifts, Achilles recognized what was up, and Odysseus and Ajax were no longer just the two people dearest to him in the Greek army. Though friends, doubtless, they were nonetheless Agamemnon's agents as well. Achilles no longer recognized them as a natural pair, and hence they are addressed in the plural, though only two.

I have been forced to use the term embassy, and it might be well now to state what I conceive the embassy to have been. It was formed in the first instance by Agamemnon, in order to convey a message to Achilles and to return his response. At this stage it consisted of two heralds and a message. At Nestor's suggestion the heralds' function was assumed by Odysseus and Ajax, with Odysseus as conveyor of the message. Odysseus did in fact convey the message (225–306) and brought back Achilles' response (677–87). The embassy as such, namely the conveying of Agamemnon's request and offer, ended with Odysseus' failure to convince Achilles to return to the battle. This failure is signaled by Achilles twice (309, 421–22), by Odysseus in his report to Agamemnon (677–87), and by all those present during Achilles' reply to Odysseus (430–31):

“Ὡς ἔφατ’, οἳ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ
μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι· μάλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἀπέειπεν

The embassy did not include Phoenix, as he himself indicates when he says (of Agamemnon) in lines 520–23:

ἄνδρες δὲ λίσσεσθαι ἐπιπροέηκεν ἀρίστους
κρινάμενος κατὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιϊκόν, οἳ τε σοὶ αὐτῷ
φίλτατοι Ἀργείων· τῶν μὴ σύ γε μῦθον ἐλέγξης
μηδὲ πόδας·

Clearly he cannot be one of the ἄριστοι in the Achean army.¹⁵ The φίλτατοι repeats Achilles’ own words (204, picked up ironically later on by Ajax, 642), which refer only to Ajax and Odysseus; most important, the only μῦθον which has been heard and which can be “put to shame” (LSJ) is that of Odysseus just heard. Phoenix is not part of the original embassy as sent out (modified by Nestor) by Agamemnon.

This is not, however, to say that Phoenix was not present or was not expected (by Nestor) to take part in the mission. We cannot know whether Nestor intended him to speak, though we can be reasonably certain that Agamemnon did not. Whatever the case, he was present, and it would have been rude of the heroes not to allow him to speak and, had he won Achilles over, to credit him with the mission’s success. More important, though, Achilles had just mentioned him and had suggested that he stay the night and, if he wished, go home with him the next day. A reply of some sort was therefore expected from Phoenix, and since everyone was silent out of wonder or surprise at the vigor of Achilles’ refusal, a rather longer reply might be expected, one which commented on Achilles’ reply itself. The formal embassy—the delivery of Agamemnon’s message and Achilles’ response—was over in any event, and there was no reason why Phoenix should not speak at this juncture.¹⁶

In summing up, we can see that there is no need to assume multiple authorship in order to explain developments in *Iliad* 9 and the duals

¹⁵On this point cf. Kuehnken (note 2 above), who is opposed in this by Tsagarakis in *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 221–42. I prefer to think of Phoenix’s role rather than his status. His role is that of friend and counselor to Achilles, and in this respect he is to Achilles as Nestor is to the *Iliad* as a whole.

¹⁶On the function of Phoenix’s speech, cf. Rosner and Tsagarakis (note 2 above) and R. Scodel, *AJP* 103 (1982) 128–36. Phoenix’s speech is the only one that advances the plot line and is therefore necessary to our *Iliad*.

that have provoked so much comment. Rather, a fairly straightforward set of events was put in motion and developed along the lines in the text (obviously), but which could have under other authorial circumstances developed otherwise. Agamemnon wanted to send two heralds with a message to Achilles. This embassy, which I shall label A, was never sent: the duals of 182–83, had Homer chosen to frame the passage in that way, would have referred to two heralds. This embassy was never sent because Nestor intervened and suggested that Ajax and Odysseus be entrusted with the message. This embassy (B) did depart with Phoenix to lead the way: the duals in 182 ff. here refer to Ajax and Odysseus, as do those in 197–98, which would have been inappropriate to heralds. The appropriate response to heralds is given by Achilles in 1.333–34. Embassy C is the embassy as it actually took place and corresponds to lines 182–692 of Book 9. It includes the speech of Phoenix and is the actualization of embassy B. The duals have nothing to do with this embassy, since Phoenix was not conceived as a part of it, and the duals have reference only to B. Phoenix's speech was not intended by the ambassadors when they set out, but came about as a result of circumstances as they developed.

If I might, I should like to speculate a bit on the several fates of the embassies, relying only in the case of C on the text as it actually stands. I shall first give a schematic representation of the three embassies, from which one will see that each successive embassy contains an added element:

- A (two heralds & message)
- B (two heralds & message) & Ajax and Odysseus
- C (two heralds & message & Phoenix
& Ajax and Odysseus)

What would the result of these embassies have been? One may imagine that A would have met with outright rejection but with no verbal explanation, because heralds do not merit such. Agamemnon's foolish embassy would have accomplished nothing and would have produced no rhetorical response. B likewise would have encountered rejection, but, because Odysseus was a friend and an equal, Achilles would have given vent to the true nature of his feelings, as he did in the magnificent speech of 308–429. The plot, however, would not have been advanced and no further actions foreshadowed. C is the Book 9 that we have, and I think all will agree that, with Phoenix's speech which foreshadows

Achilles' future suffering, it is far superior to embassies A and B. Schematically:

- A Refusal
- B Refusal & Achilles' reply to Odysseus
- C Refusal & Achilles' reply to Odysseus & Phoenix's speech

I do not intend that the three embassies isolated by my analysis be considered in any way chronologically successive stages of the poem's composition, though such, of course, cannot be excluded. Rather, I believe that we should look on *Iliad* 9 as a triumphant example of Homer's ability to allow his characters, as it were, to take charge of their own poem. We must not be deluded into thinking statically that the *Iliad* merely recounts events as they happened. Rather, it shows people in action, people making various tentatives, some successful, others not. The *Iliad* is a poem of process, not of state. In our case we see Agamemnon, who had intended no such thing, agreeing to send a message in what he seems to have regarded as the normal way, with heralds. His plan was not carried out because Nestor intervened and suggested a differently constituted embassy in which Odysseus would convey the message: he cannot have known what Achilles' response would be. He certainly cannot have known that Achilles would ask Phoenix to stay and that Phoenix would reply at the length and in the manner he did. The heroes know less than we and are, unlike ourselves as scholars, influenced by events in the poem to change their course of action. Homer skillfully shows us a scene as it developed among characters who cannot have known the outcome of their actions. In this he is realistic and dramatic rather than historical, and sings from within events rather than from without.

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THE MAKING OF A THYRSUS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF PENTHEUS IN EURIPIDES' *BACCHAE*

The thyrsus is a fennel rod which, when it is adorned with leaves, becomes a symbol of Dionysus.¹ The first reference to this essential symbol in Euripides' *Bacchae* occurs in the Prologue, where Dionysus calls it an "ivy spear" (23-25);

πρώτας δὲ Θήβας τῆσδε γῆς Ἑλληνίδος
ἀνωλόλυξα, νεβρίδ' ἐξάψας χροός
θύρσον τε δοῦς ἐς χεῖρα, κίσσινον βέλος. . . .²

The ivy cluster itself becomes an important element in Euripides' treatment of the Bacchic wand since, without it, the wand is not a thyrsus.³ A process of transformation is involved; only when crowned with leaves and raised by the Bacchic worshipper does the simple narthex, the fennel rod, acquire the power and symbolic value of the thyrsus. Similarly the worshipper is crowned with a garland of leaves, long hair, or a *mitra*.⁴ In the parodos, the chorus describes the Dionysiac worshipper as "garlanded with ivy" (81)⁵ and urges Thebes to be crowned with ivy (106) as symbolic of the conversion to the Dionysiac religion, and Pen-

*I wish to thank Charles Segal, Ruth Pavlantos, and Diskin Clay for their comments and suggestions during the preparation of this paper.

¹E. R. Dodds, *Euripides' Bacchae* (Oxford University Press 1960), note on line 113. Subsequent references to Dodds' comments will be to those in this edition on the lines in question and will not be otherwise noted.

²Greek quotations throughout this paper are from *Euripidis Fabulae*, III, Gilbert Murray, ed. (Oxford University Press 1913).

³Jeanne Roux, *Euripides, Les Bacchantes*, Vol. II (Paris 1972) 284-85, comment on lines 113-14. Subsequent references to Roux's comments will be to this edition on the lines in question and will not be otherwise noted.

⁴See Roux and Dodds on lines 831-33 on the *mitra* as part of the Dionysiac ritual garb for both sexes, and Charles Segal, *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' Bacchae* (Princeton 1982) 45-48, on "crowning" as part of sacrificial ritual, and 206, on the *mitra* as a symbol of "bondage to Dionysiac delusion." For an argument against interpreting κόμην . . . ταναόν as a wig, see Roux's discussion of lines 831 and 1115-18.

⁵Cf. lines 205, 383-84, 531. The translation here and all the translations in this paper, unless otherwise specified, are from Geoffrey Kirk, *The Bacchae of Euripides* (Cambridge 1979). References to Kirk's comments will be to those in this edition and will not be otherwise noted.

theus, transformed visually and mentally by Bacchic dress and Bacchic power, will wear long hair and a *mitra* (831, 833, 929, 1115). The motif of transformation is important in the *Bacchae* and has been viewed variously as transformation from man to beast, from hunter to hunted, from powerful pursuer to powerless victim, from repressed to expressed sexuality, from reality to illusion or illusion to reality, and "from spectator to spectacle."⁶ Complementing these motifs is another more visual transformation, emphasized by the repeated image of the "crowning," and therefore of the making of a thyrsus. Euripides creates a Pentheus who is transformed visually into a symbol of Dionysus. Pentheus becomes the thyrsus of the god: first he is crowned with long-hair and a *mitra*, then he himself crowns the tip of a fir tree raised by the maenads on the mountain, and finally he becomes the literal crown of the thyrsus carried by his mother.

The motif of "crowning" is applied to the thyrsus, the worshipper, the god himself, and the god's victim, Pentheus, and it is intertwined with the images of ivy and long hair. The thyrsus is "ivied" (κίσσινος, 25, 363, 710) and the worshippers "garlanded with ivy" (81, 106, 177, 313, 341-42, 531, 702-3). The god is "garlanded with snakes" by Zeus, and the maenads follow the same custom (99-104):

ἔτεκεν δ', ἀνίκα Μοῖραι
τέλεσαν, ταυρόκερων θεὸν
στεφάνωσέν τε δράκόντων
στεφάνοις, ἔνθεν ἄγραν θη-
ροτρόφον μαινάδες ἀμφι-
βάλλονται πλοκάμοις.

The effect of the emphatic positioning of στεφάνωσέν and στεφάνοις is strengthened by the injunction to Thebes four lines later to garland itself with ivy (στεφανοῦσθε κισσῶ, 106) and assume the other attributes of the Bacchic worshipper, the tree branches, the fawnskins, and finally the thyrsi: . . . ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὕβριστὰς / ὄσιοῦσθ' . . . (113-14).

⁶Helene P. Foley, "The Masque of Dionysus," *TAPA* 110 (1980) 122. For other discussions of the idea of transformation or reversal in the *Bacchae*, see, for example, Marilyn Arthur, "The Choral Odes of the *Bacchae* of Euripides," *YCS* 22 (1972) 169-70; Anne Pippin Burnett, "Pentheus and Dionysus: Host and Guest," *CP* 65 (1970) 23; Charles Segal, "Euripides' *Bacchae*: Conflict and Mediation," *Ramus* 6 (1977) 103-20, and *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' Bacchae* (note 4 above) 266-71, 343-44, on "theatrical illusion and symbolic transformation" and "transformative play."

Roux, translating these lines as the chorus' invitation to Thebes, "rendre saints les narthex tout autour," sees here an allusion to the making of a thyrsus, "à les entourer de la guirlande de lierre qui sanctifiera et transformera les bâtons profanes en thyrses doués d'une violence magique et irrésistible par le dieu θυρσομανής."⁷ She further suggests that the chorus, making clear the meaning of this phrase, ought to have gestured to the garlands of their thyrsi.

Teiresias, too, advocating the acceptance of the god, has agreed to "fit up thyrsi," wear fawnskins, and garland his head with ivy (176-77). The expression, θύρσους ἀνάπτειν, is unusual; Euripides has Teiresias say "fit up thyrsi" rather than "carry" or "raise" them, as might be expected. Dodds explains the expression as making a thyrsus from a narthex by tying on a crown of ivy leaves.⁸ The phrase thus serves as a reminder of the process of making a thyrsus in preparation for participation in Bacchic rites. Teiresias then twice repeats his intention to garland his head (205, 323), and he and Cadmus separately urge Pentheus to do the same (313, 341-42). Segal notes that Teiresias "makes a point of mentioning his garland of ivy."⁹ Other aspects of Bacchic dress, such as the fawnskin (176), receive less attention from Teiresias and Cadmus in this scene in which Pentheus has his first direct encounter with worshippers of the new god, or, at least, ναρθηκοφόροι.¹⁰ The acceptance of the god is implied in the acceptance of the garland, but Pentheus utterly rejects both. His first reaction to hearing of the

⁷Cf. lines 1054-55.

⁸Roux prefers R. P. Festugière's interpretation of ἀνάπτειν as "to light, set alight, or arouse" in the sense of "lighting the anger or frenzy of the thyrsi which are ὕβρισταί." In a passage which emphasizes the preparations for participating in the Bacchic rites (cf. 177, 205, 323, where references to crowning their heads are stated as something agreed upon or intended or are expressed in the future tense), however, Dodds' interpretation seems more fitting.

⁹Segal (note 4 above) 46; for other implications of garlands, ivy, hair, and the *mitra*, see 46-48, 174-77, 206, 228, 265.

¹⁰The proverb, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι (Plato, *Phaedo* 69c; cf. *Orphica fragmenta* 5 and Zenobius 5.77), comes to mind in regard to Cadmus and Teiresias here; their crowning themselves with ivy transforms them in appearance and behavior, but does not necessarily make them truly inspired devotees. Supporting this impression is the relative lack, in Teiresias' "rationalizing" explanations of the myth and Cadmus' comments about having a god in the family and in this scene generally, of words with ἀνα- prefixes, which are so frequent in other parts of the play and which Roux notes are abundant in the language of the Dionysiac cult, *culte de l'exaltation* (Roux on lines 80, 579, 1153).

arrival of the Stranger in Thebes brings together the images of the thyrsus and the loose hair of the Bacchic worshipper (240-41):

παύσω κτυποῦντα θύρσον ἀνασεῖοντά τε
κόμας, τράχηλον σώματος χωρὶς τεμών.

The thyrsus and the ivy garland arouse Pentheus' ire then when he sees Teiresias dressed in fawnskins and his grandfather "playing the bacchant" with a narthex (253-54):¹¹

οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις κισσόν; οὐκ ἐλευθέραν
θύρσου μεθήσεις χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πατέρ;

Yet Pentheus will soon carry a thyrsus himself and be crowned with a *mītra* and long hair (831, 833).

These images of garland, thyrsus, ivy, hair, and crowning all come together in two significant lines which precede the climactic scene of the placement of Pentheus on the tip of the fir tree and his destruction at the hands of the maenads. Here in lines 1054-55 the process of the making of a thyrsus is made explicit:

αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν θύρσον ἐκλελοιπότα
κισσῷ κομήτην αὖθις ἐξανέστεφον. . . .

Some of them were re-garlanding with trailing ivy
a thyrsus that had come to pieces. . . .

These lines serve as a reminder, at an important point in the drama, that a thyrsus is something created from an ordinary narthex by attaching a cluster of ivy leaves to its tip; then it may be raised in the worship of the god, once it has again become a thyrsus. It is unlikely that the word ἐκλελοιπότα means "abandoned" as if a thyrsus which had been cast aside was at this moment receiving additional leaves. Dodds and Roux both explain θύρσον ἐκλελοιπότα as a "thyrsus which had ceased (to be a thyrsus)." The thyrsus then crowned, will become κομήτην, "long-haired" with ivy. This word is striking in this context and recalls line 831, where Dionysus says to Pentheus, κόμην μὲν ἐπὶ σῷ κρατὶ ταῦτ' ἔκτενῶ, and line 494 earlier, where the god as the Stranger says,

¹¹The verb ἀνατινάσσειν is also used of the ivy-crowned worshipper shaking the thyrsus in line 80, and τινάσσειν of the god himself wielding the thyrsus (553); ἀνατινάσσειν is also used of the god "shaking up the palace" (623).

ἱερὸς ὁ πλόκαμος· τῷ θεῷ δ' αὐτὸν τρέφω. The hair is like the crown of ivy added to the narthex to make it a thyrsus; uncommonly long (455), such hair helps to transform an ordinary man into something holy and signifies his association with Dionysus. The use of κομήτην for the "re-garlanded" thyrsus in line 1055 thus enforces the three-fold parallels between Pentheus, the thyrsus, and the god, here in the form of the long-haired Stranger.¹² This image also foreshadows Agave's "re-garlanding" her thyrsus with the head of her son when the massive "tree-thyrsus" with Pentheus as its crown "comes to pieces" (πήξας' ἐπ' ἄκρον ὀύρσον . . . , 1141).

The first step then in Pentheus' transformation into the thyrsus of the god is his willingness to be crowned with long hair and a *mitra* and dressed as a Bacchant.¹³ Dionysus effectively evokes this willingness in Pentheus by arousing his curiosity by his own appearance and by his withholding of the cult's secrets; Pentheus admits, "You have counterfeited this answer well, to make me want to hear!" (457). When Pentheus first sees the Stranger, he comments on his unusual appearance, with particular attention to his complexion and hair (πλόκαμός τε γάρ σου ταναός, οὐ πάλης ὕπο, / γένυν παρ' αὐτὴν κεχυμένος, πόθου πλέως, 455-56).¹⁴ This recalls his earlier comment on the Stranger's hair (235) and his threat to "put a stop to his beating of the thyrsus and tossing his locks, by cutting his neck clean off his body" (240-41). Similarly, the hair and the thyrsus are what Pentheus first thinks of when he tells Dionysus how he will punish him; first, he says, he will cut off his hair (439), and then he asks that he hand over his thyrsus (495). In their encounter following the "palace miracle," Pentheus' emotions are

¹²For discussions of the parallels between or the identification of Pentheus and Dionysus, see, for example, Robert R. Dyer, "Image and Symbol: The Link Between the Two Worlds of the 'Bacchae,'" *Journal of Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association* 21 (1964) 15-16; Foley (note 6 above) 130; A. J. Podlecki, "Individual and Group in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *L'Antiquité Classique* 43 (1974) 155, and Jene A. LaRue, "Prurience Uncovered: The Psychology of Euripides' Pentheus," *CJ* 63 (1968) 212. On Euripides' use of repeated words or thematic ideas to relate actions, see, for example, Richmond Lattimore, *Story Patterns in Greek Tragedy* (Ann Arbor 1969) 57-58, and Dyer (note 12 above) 17.

¹³Segal (note 4 above) 46-47, notes, "When Pentheus wears the Dionysiac wig and headband as a pseudo-maenad, his headdress takes the place of the garland worn by the celebrant in a normal ritual sacrifice," and therefore, "So 'garlanded,' he is as much the maenads' victim as he is their companion."

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 174-77, on "the luxuriance and freedom of hair" and hair as an "initiation motif."

aroused, and he is ready to take arms against the maenads. It is at this point that Dionysus suggests going to view the Bacchants on the mountain and gradually introduces the idea of dressing the young king as a maenad. As Pentheus responds to the suggestion and asks what kind of garment he is to wear, Dionysus begins by mentioning what will go on his head, κόμην μὲν ἐπὶ σῶ κρατὶ ταναὸν ἐκτενῶ (831). The word ταναὸν recalls line 455, where Pentheus used it scornfully of the Stranger's hair. Now it is Pentheus who will be crowned with long hair and a *mītra* (833) to become a Bacchant, much as a narthex is crowned with ivy to become a thyrsus.

When Pentheus returns dressed in maenadic attire, Euripides draws special attention again to his hair and *mītra*. Dionysus notices that a curl has fallen out from under the *mītra*. Pentheus explains that it was shaken loose as he was tossing his head and playing the Bacchant, the very activities he so criticized in the Stranger and Cadmus and Teiresias (240-41, 253-54). When the god offers to put the lock back into place, Pentheus responds, ἰδοῦ, σὺ κόσμει· σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείμεσθα δῆ, "There, you arrange it; for on you we now depend" (934). The line is doubly significant; the word ἀνάκειμαι is also used of being dedicated as a votive offering.¹⁵ Pentheus thus seems to be offering himself up to the god. He then asks for instruction in the use of the thyrsus, with the god approving of his "change of mentality" (944, 947-48). "A creature filled with the Dionysiac sense of power," as Dodds describes him, Pentheus feels that he can carry off Cithaeron, maenads and all.¹⁶ No longer ashamed of being dressed as a woman (cf. 840 ff.), he asks the Stranger to guide him through the center of the city. The sinister power of the god is evident in this first stage of the transformation of the resistant young king into a Bacchant, in appearance and mood if not in true devotion to the god. Pentheus still thinks that he is going to be a victor over the maenads, a spy, not a participant in their revels. Dionysus says to him then (971-72):

δεινὸς σὺ δεινὸς καπὶ δεῖν' ἔρχη πάθη,
ὥστ' οὐρανῷ στηρίζον εὐρήσεις κλέος.

¹⁵See the notes of Dodds, Kirk, and Roux on line 934, and Foley (note 6 above) 130, on Pentheus as a double of the god.

¹⁶Cf. lines 755 ff. of the power possessed by the maenads to carry off items plundered from the houses. Bernd Seidensticker in "Comic Elements in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *AJP* 99 (1978) 318, compares Pentheus to a sacrificial victim, who, "consecrated to the god by a rite of investiture," becomes a surrogate of the god.

This "renown that reaches the sky" anticipates Pentheus' elevation onto the fir tree, where the same verb occurs of the tree (ὄρθῃ δ' ἔς ὄρθον αἰθέρ' ἑστηρίζετο, 1073) and of the light extending between earth and heaven after the god calls the maenads to take vengeance upon Pentheus (. . . πρὸς οὐρανὸν / καὶ γαῖαν ἑστήριξε φῶς σεμνοῦ πυρός, 1082-83).¹⁷

The second messenger's speech details this scene; Pentheus is lifted up onto the tree, which, with its "crown," Pentheus himself sitting on top, becomes a magnified thyrsus, symbolic of the culmination of the god's power. This tree-thyrsus is then raised by the bands of maenads, and Pentheus comes crashing down to his destruction. The messenger first describes the maenads engaged in pleasant labors. Here occurs that reminder of the making of a thyrsus by "re-garlanding" a narthex, "a thyrsus that had come to pieces" (1054-55). Pentheus, unable to see the maenads from his first position, suggests climbing a tall fir tree (1061). Initially he had thought of himself merely sitting under the trees (816) or hiding among them (954). Even the chorus, anticipating the scene in the fourth stasimon, envisioned it differently; they imagined Agave on a cliff or a pinnacle seeing Pentheus lying in wait (982-84). Here, however, Pentheus himself suggests climbing a tree to gain a better vantage point, but Euripides does not do the logical and plausible and have Pentheus simply climb up and sit in the tree. Rather, he creates the incredible picture of Dionysus pulling down the top of the tree, setting Pentheus on the tip, and gradually letting it rise.¹⁸ Dionysus thus "crowns" the tree with Pentheus.

This extraordinary action itself, or θαῦμα as the messenger calls it, and the reasons for its inclusion here have received less critical attention than the much discussed simile that describes it (1066-67), and yet Euripides devotes thirteen lines to the specific details of the god's action. Taking the highest branch (οὐράνιον ἄκρον κλάδον, 1064), Dionysus pulls it down slowly and sets Pentheus on the top of the tree (1070-74):

¹⁷Segal (note 4 above) 144.

¹⁸On the precision of Euripides' visual descriptions and his perception of objects in a spatial relation, see Shirley Barlow, *The Imagery of Euripides* (London 1971) 20, 63, 109-10, 121-22. In discussing the visual impression of the imagery in Euripides, Barlow states that "the poet's imagination . . . finds expression primarily through the appeal to the sense of sight, and in such a way that the impact of an image tends to be sensuously perceptual rather than intellectual" (p. 120). See also H. Delulle, *Les répétitions d'image* (Louvain 1911) 25.

Πενθέα δ' ἰδρύσας ἐλατίνων ὄζων ἔπι,
 ὀρθὸν μεθίει διὰ χερῶν βλάστημ' ἄνω
 ἀτρέμα, φυλάσσων μὴ ἀναχαιτίσειέ νιν,
 ὀρθὴ δ' ἐς ὀρθὸν αἰθέρ' ἐστηρίζετο
 ἔχουσα νώτοις δεσπότην ἐφήμενον . . .

Euripides emphasizes that Pentheus is placed on the very top of the tree and not just somewhere midway up among the larger branches.¹⁹ It is the οὐράνιον ἄκρον κλάδον (1064) which Dionysus draws down and the κλών' ὄρειον (1068) which he bends to the ground. Euripides' choice of words is significant; the word κλάδος means "a branch, twig, or shoot"; ὄζος, "a branch or twig"; κλών, "a twig, spray, or slip"; and βλάστημα, "a shoot or bud." The last two words especially seem to emphasize the delicacy of new growth. The highest branches of a fir tree with the newest growth would certainly not be a secure support for a man's weight. It is significant that, however logically impossible is the position of a seated man on the delicate top of a fir tree, that is exactly where Euripides shows him to be. The fir tree has become a thyrsus with Pentheus in maenadic attire crowning its tip as the ivy does the narthex. The word ἀναχαιτίσειε here is also interesting for it recalls the image of hair, previously intertwined with the ivy and the thyrsus. The verb can be used particularly of a horse tossing its mane (e.g., *Rhesus* 786), and therefore the action involved may call to mind a maenad shaking her hair.

Significantly, when Pentheus becomes visible sitting on high and the tree-thyrsus has thus taken shape, the god is no longer seen.²⁰ Dionysus has manifested himself in this enormous symbol of his power, the tree-thyrsus.²¹ The phallic symbolism of this scene has been noted, for

¹⁹See Kirk on line 1070 for other reasons for the use of the fir tree here.

²⁰Dyer (note 12 above) 19 notes that "when Pentheus climbs the 'heaven-high top bough of the fir tree,' he surrenders himself to the kingdom of Dionysus—both to the αἰθήρ, kingdom of the gods, and to the ὕλμος νάπη of Dionysus. . . ."

²¹See Dodds on lines 1058–75. Compare the curious reference to "thyrsus-trees" in Philostratus, *Imagines* 1.18 (320K):

καὶ ἰδοὺ κιττὸς ἔρπει καὶ ὄφεις ὄρθοι καὶ θύρσου δένδρα οἶμαι μέλι στάζοντα.

Arthur Fairbanks in the Loeb Classical Library edition (London 1931) translates θύρσου δένδρα as "thyrsus trees." He notes in his introduction (xxi) that Philostratus follows Euripides, and the imagery and vocabulary here is reminiscent (cf. *Bacchae* 710–11, for example). The source of the image of the thyrsus-trees used here, whether from literature or painting, is unknown.

example, by William Sale, who sees the rising of the tree as representing "an erection, a display of the penis that Pentheus would not relinquish."²² If, however, the tree with Pentheus on top is seen as a thyrsus, the scene may represent an erection, not of Pentheus, but of the god himself and therefore a manifestation of his power, just as phalli are raised in the Dionysiac procession as symbols of his power of fertility.²³ The Pentheus who had resisted and opposed the appeal of Dionysus is no more. He has been totally transformed, not just into a Bacchant but into a symbol of the god's power; no longer an individual, he is now merely the crown on an enlarged thyrsus.²⁴

As the tree-thyrsus becomes visible, the god commands the maenads to take vengeance on Pentheus. Mounting a high rock opposite the tree, they pelt Pentheus with stones, fir branches, and their thyrsi, but Pentheus sits beyond the reach of their missiles. The maenads then do not attempt to knock the tree over but rather try to pry it up with improvised crowbars (ἀνεσπάρασσον, 1104). When they are unsuccessful in their attempt, Agave calls on the other Bacchants to surround the tree and take hold of it. With "a thousand hands," they tear the tree up and out of the earth (κάξανέσπασαν χθονός, 1110). Sale comments on the curiosity of the attempt to "pluck" the tree from the ground and sees it as Agave's castration of Pentheus,²⁵ but even for a symbolic castration the verbs ἀνασπαράσσω and ἐξανασπάω would seem inappropriate. It seems rather that the maenads, collectively, are simply raising the huge tree-thyrsus just as they lift up their own ivied thyrsi in the ecstatic worship of the god.

When the tree-thyrsus is then raised out of the ground, it "comes to pieces" as Pentheus falls off his perch at the tip. Lying on the ground, he casts off his "crown," his *mītra*, from his hair as if to reverse the transformation and to regain his identity as a man, as Segal puts it, in "a

²²William Sale, "The Psychoanalysis of Pentheus," *YCS* 22 (1972) 74. Cf. Charles Segal, "Pentheus and Hippolytus on the Couch and on the Grid," *CW* 72 (1978) 145-56.

²³On the Dionysiac procession and cult symbols, see Lewis R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford University Press 1909) vol. V, 125.

²⁴Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, in "Tragedy and Religion: *The Bacchae*" in *Euripides: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. by Erich Segal (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1968) 169, notes that at this point "[Pentheus'] role as Pentheus is finished." On the loss of identity, see also Segal (note 4 above) 346.

²⁵Sale (note 22 above) 74. The use of ἀνεσπάρασσον with ἀσιδήροις μοχλοῖς in line 1104 and κάξανέσπασαν in 1110 recalls the scene in which Pentheus first appeared as a Bacchant and, after being instructed in the proper way to raise the thyrsus, imagines himself carrying "the glens of Cithaeron" and asks, μοχλοὺς φέρωμεν; ἢ χεροῖν ἀνασπάσω . . . ; (949).



return to reality."²⁶ Identifying himself completely with reference to his father's name as well, he says, "Look, it is I, mother, your son, your child / Pentheus, whom you bore in the house of Echion!" (1118-19).²⁷ He begs her not to kill him, her child, because of his errors (1120-21). Now freed from the tree-thyrsus and free of his Bacchic crown and Bacchic delusion, Pentheus sees his mistakes. Gold notes that here in this scene Euripides for the first time uses a positive form of μανθάνω or any other related words to describe Pentheus (ἐμάνθανεν, 1113).²⁸ Agave, however, does not yet see clearly, does not recognize her son, for she is still under the power of Dionysus (1124). She and her sisters fall on Pentheus and tear his limbs from his body. Finally Agave places his head on the "top" of her thyrsus: πήξας' ἐπ' ἄκρον θύρσον . . . (1141).²⁹ The use of ἄκρον recalls the scene on the mountain when Dionysus set Pentheus upon the οὐράνιον ἄκρον κλάδον (1064), making him the crown on the tree-thyrsus. Leaving her sisters, Agave returns to the city with her prize. Pentheus literally crowns a thyrsus, not on the grand scale as before when he sat upon the tip of the towering fir and looked down on the bands of women who raised that tree-thyrsus, but now with his bloody head on a narthex held aloft by a solitary maenad.

Here at this critical point Euripides, by the use of a rare word, reminds us once more of the transformation of a profane object into

²⁶Segal (note 4 above) 228; cf. p. 206, of the *mitra* "[symbolizing] his bondage to Dionysiac delusion." The removal of the *mitra* seems thus intended to function more symbolically than actually to aid in recognition. Dodds notes on line 1116 that "the removal of the μίτρα—which was, as the vase paintings show, a mere headband—would not in itself assist much in recognition." Roux, who sees the *mitra* as more than just a headband and very effective in changing the appearance of a young beardless man, also acknowledges the symbolic significance of its removal whereby "Penthée rompt l'envoûtement et retrouve, trop tard, sa lucidité."

²⁷The question of the significance of Pentheus' ancestry and of the references to the absent Echion has been much discussed. See, for example, Arthur (note 6 above) appendix, pp. 171-75; Podlecki (note 12 above) 157; Segal (note 4 above) 129, 132, 136-38, 146, and "Sex Roles and Reversals in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *Arethusa* 2 (1978) 191-92. The serpentine ancestry of Pentheus may be relevant here also in reinforcing the parallels between the thyrsus, Pentheus, and the god; in the parodos the god was described as garlanded with serpents, and here the tree-thyrsus was crowned with the son of Echion, "the dragon's descendant, Pentheus" (1155).

²⁸Barbara K. Gold, "Εὐκοσμία in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *AJP* 98 (1977) 11, n. 14.

²⁹Dodds notes that Agave's fixing Pentheus' head on her thyrsus tip may be Euripides' invention. Such custom, as Roux points out, would strike the Greeks as a typically barbarous practice and would therefore be consistent with the depiction of the cult as foreign (cf. lines 482-83).

something sacred, the idea of the making of a thyrsus. In the fifth stasimon the chorus sings of the misfortune of Pentheus (1156-58):

ὅς τ' ἀν' θηλυγενῇ στολὴν
νάρθηκά τε, πιστὸν Ἀἰδαν,
ἔλαβεν εὐθυρσον . . .

The word εὐθυρσον is attested only here. Kirk translates it literally as "well-thyrsused" and, in agreement with Dodds, explains it as a narthex rod that has been made into a thyrsus. Here the thyrsus is also directly associated with death by the phrase πιστὸν Ἀἰδαν. Kirk says, "The meaning is that Pentheus' taking of the thyrsus and his disguise as a bacchant guaranteed his death."³⁰ Pentheus himself becomes "well-thyrsused" in his fatal transformation, first by putting on the *mītra* and the long flowing hair of a Bacchant and then by becoming the crown on the massive tree-thyrsus and finally on his mother's thyrsus.

As the action of the tragedy moves down from the mountain to the city, from the "thousand hands" of the maenads to the two arms of Agave, holding her "trophy," from the vision of Pentheus sitting on top of a fir tree, like a huge thyrsus, down to a normal-sized thyrsus crowned with a disembodied head, Euripides narrows the focus from a magnified view of the enormity of the god's power to a "close-up" of its consequences when clear vision replaces delusion and distortion. The parallels between the crowning of Pentheus with long hair, Agave's fixing his head on her thyrsus, and the making of a thyrsus by adding an ivy cluster to a narthex are reinforced in this scene when Agave describes what she believes to be her "trophy" (1185-87):

νέος ὁ μόσχος ἄρ-
τι γένυν ὑπὸ κόρυθ' ἀπαλότριχα
κατάκομον θάλλει.

The use of κατάκομον here recalls line 831 of the dressing of Pentheus' hair and line 1055 of the "long-haired" thyrsus. The chorus responds to Agave, also referring to Pentheus' hair (1188). Segal notes that the word used here, φόβη, is also used for foliage in the wild (684, 722).³¹

³⁰Roux explains the adjective πιστὸν as having been transferred from the god to the object which has his magical power and here indicating something that can be counted on to bring death.

³¹Segal (note 4 above) 176.

Last used in line 1138 in the description of Pentheus' limbs scattered through the foliage, φόβη here serves to recall again the scene on the mountain. Kirk notes on line 1170 that the "lion's head that Agave carries on her thyrsus-point, with its 'crest of soft hair,' is described as though it were the ivy that was ordinarily fastened to the thyrsus-tip," and he adds, "Whether this is metaphor or delusion remains ambiguous."³² The evidence of Euripides' use of the motif of crowning, however, supports the metaphorical linking of this instance to a consistent pattern in his treatment of the image of the thyrsus.

When Cadmus gradually brings Agave out of her frenzied state, she realizes that it is Pentheus' head which she holds³³ and says, Διόνυσος ἡμᾶς ὤλεσ', ἄρτι μανθάνω (1296), with μανθάνω echoing ἐμάνθανεν used in line 1113 of Pentheus at the moment of his return to reality. Agave's last words are particularly significant and throw one last backward glance on the action of the tragedy. She wishes to be, literally, where "no remembrance of the thyrsus is dedicated" or, as Dodds translates it, "where no dedicated thyrsus can remind" (1383-87):

ἐλθοιμι δ' ὅπου
μήτε Κιθαιρῶν <ἐμ' ἰδοι> μιὰρὸς
μήτε Κιθαιρῶν' ὅσσοισιν ἐγώ,
μήθ' ὅθι θύρσου μνημ' ἀνάκειται. . . .

Agave does not simply say, "where no thyrsus is dedicated"; the expression θύρσου μνημ' is used, "a reminder of the thyrsus."³⁴ In view of this suggestion that Pentheus is transformed into a thyrsus, the expression is particularly striking. Elsewhere in Euripides μνημᾶ is always used of a tomb or a memorial to someone dead (e.g., *Supplikes* 973) or to someone about to die (*Iphigenia Aulidensis* 1444) and not of an object as here in line 1386. The only other occurrence in the *Bacchae* is in line 6 of the tomb of Semele, another mortal whose contact with a god brought her destruction.³⁵ Here the expression suggests a memorial to

³²A view of this scene differing from that presented in this paper and that maintained by Kirk here as well as Dodds, Foley, Seidensticker, and others, that Agave returns with Pentheus' head on her thyrsus-tip, is held by Segal (note 4 above, 209), who says that she simply holds the head in her arms.

³³See G. Devereaux, "The Psychotherapy Scene in Euripides' *Bacchae*," *JHS* 90 (1970) 41-42.

³⁴See Segal (note 4 above) 334-37, 345, on the tragedy itself as the "monument."

³⁵Segal (note 4 above) 318, comments, "In both cases the *mnēma* that commemorates the power of a god is the token of mortal suffering."

Pentheus, a reminder to Agave of her son, who himself became the crown on her thyrsus. The verb ἀνάκειμαι occurred once before, in fact, in the ironic line when Pentheus said to Dionysus, σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείμεσθα δῆ (934). Pentheus, having become a thyrsus, was indeed dedicated to the god.

Whether these parallels between the images of crowning a narthex with ivy, Pentheus with a *mītra* and long hair, the tree with Pentheus, and finally the narthex with Pentheus' head are simply inherent in the Dionysiac tradition or whether Euripides adapted, altered, or elaborated the myth to create this pattern is a question not easily answered. Little remains of the earlier treatments of the Pentheus story,³⁶ but adding evidence from vase paintings, we can conclude that the elements of the myth apparently common in Euripides' time included the daughters of Cadmus with Agave as Pentheus' mother, Pentheus' resistance to the new religion, the madness of Cadmus' daughters, the god's epiphany as a bull, the sparagmos and omophagia, and Agave's return to the city with Pentheus' severed head.³⁷ Studies of folklore, ritual, and comparative religion which throw light on Dionysus and similar cults allow conjectures about aspects of the story that were also likely to have been a part of the tradition: the dressing of Pentheus, the pelting, the use of ivy, Agave's delusion that she carries a beast's head,³⁸ and the placing of Pentheus in a tree, as in many folk traditions ritual objects representing a vegetation god were carried out of town and set in or hung on trees.³⁹ Euripides' version, however, offers some interesting variations from these traditions. There seems to have been another version in which Pentheus went to the maenads dressed as an armed hunter; Euripides perhaps alludes to this version in the many references to hunting and the idea of Pentheus, the hunter, becoming the hunted. Such a version is depicted on several vases.⁴⁰ Thomas McKay notes that, "whether following an earlier version or constrained by visual limitations, artists continue to portray Pentheus as an armed man" and not dressed as a

³⁶Dodds, p. xxxi ff.

³⁷A. G. Bather, "The Problem of the Bacchae," *JHS* 14 (1894) 247; Dodds, p. xxxii ff.; H. Philippart, "Iconographie des 'Bacchantes' d'Euripides," *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 9 (1930) passim.

³⁸See Bather (note 37 above) 244-63; Dodds, pp. xi ff., xxvii ff., 77; Kirk (note 5 above) 12.

³⁹Bather (note 37 above) 249; Farnell (note 23 above) 119, 195.

⁴⁰Dodds, pp. xxxiv f.

maenad as in the *Bacchae*; he also observes that "it is only in Euripides that Agave becomes the major agent of destruction."⁴¹

Another Euripidean variation occurs in the use of the tree. One vase shows Pentheus between two trees or bushes but not sitting in a tree.⁴² No depictions have survived which show the god bending the tree or Pentheus in a tree or, as in Euripides' version, sitting at the very top. This has been explained by noting that a fall from a tree would have been difficult to depict and a battle scene easier.⁴³ F. T. Van Straten suggests that the episode of Dionysus bending the tree comes into the myth first through Euripides.⁴⁴ Several vases, gems, and reliefs show Agave with the severed head of Pentheus, but in all of these she carries the head in one hand and a sword or a thyrsus in the other.⁴⁵ There is no example of Agave pictured with Pentheus' head fixed on her thyrsus. No arguments about the difficulty of depiction would seem valid here. It is therefore conceivable that Euripides himself created the idea of Pentheus' head fixed on the thyrsus and the vision of Pentheus sitting, not under nor in a tree, but at the very top of it, as the language of the scene indicates.

Such an hypothesis is impossible to prove, but what is significant is that, whether or not he invented these aspects of the story, Euripides deliberately chose this uncommon version of the Pentheus tale for the *Bacchae*. He rejected the idea of an armed battle between a hunter Pen-

⁴¹Thomas W. McKay, "Pentheus, the Literary and Artistic Evidence," a paper presented at the 71st General Meeting of the AIA in San Francisco, December 1969, summary in *AJA* 74 (1970) 199.

⁴²Ludwig Curtius, *Pentheus*, Winckelmannsprogramm 88 (Berlin and Leipzig 1929) abb. 14. See also Dodds, p. xxxv, and Philippart (note 37 above) 54.

⁴³Philippart (note 37 above) 57.

⁴⁴F. T. Van Straten, "Archeologische bydrage tot de bestudering van Euripides' *Bacchae*," *Lampas* 9 (1976) 72. Van Straten also notes that the only time Pentheus is shown with a bent tree is on a Southern Italian bell-krater, dated to the first quarter of the fourth century B.C. and therefore likely to be under the influence of Euripides' version: Dodds doubts that Euripides invented the idea of putting Pentheus in the tree (note on lines 1058-75).

⁴⁵Philippart (note 37 above) 66; McKay (note 41 above). For other discussions of the iconography of the Pentheus myth, see John Edwin Sandys, *The Bacchae of Euripides* (Cambridge 1982) xciv-cxx cxxviii-cxxii, cxiv; Konrad Schauenberg, "Pan in Unteritalien," *Deutsches Archeologisches Institut Roemische Abteilung Mitteilungen* 69 (1962) 34; Maxwell Anderson in *Dionysos and His Circle: Ancient Through Modern*, ed. by Caroline Houser (Cambridge, MA 1979) 102, 105-6. There is no reference to Pentheus in the tree or Pentheus' head on the thyrsus in Theocritus XXVI nor in Philostratus *Imagines* 1.18.

theus and the Bacchantes and produced instead a maenadic Pentheus set aloft on the tip of a fir tree. Euripides' Agave does not merely return to the city with her son's head in her hand but fixes it on the tip of her thyrsus. The effect achieved by these changes and the relation of them to the image of the making of a thyrsus must be considered.

The parallel images of crowning a narthex with ivy, Pentheus with a *mītra* and long hair, the tree with Pentheus, and Agave's thyrsus with Pentheus' head all involve a transformation resulting in a revelation of the power of Dionysus. The god can benefit man as when the maenads' thyrsi summon streams of milk, water, honey, and wine, the liquid gift "which stops wretched men / from suffering" (280-81). He can persuade a young man who once scorned Bacchic garb to dress as a woman. He can bend a fir tree to the ground and set a man on its tip. He can make a mother kill her son. We thus receive a gradually expanding view of the extent, variety, and potential of the god's power. The image of the magnified thyrsus, Pentheus crowning a tree, represents the culmination of the immense power of the god, but the tragedy does not end there. The visual focus is narrowed once more to the human level. The grand image of the tree-thyrsus lifted by the "thousand hands" of the maenads shrinks in size; a narthex rod with Pentheus' head on it is carried back to the city by Agave alone. It may also be that the effectiveness and appeal of the god, symbolized by the thyrsus, are similarly diminished in the end.

In the final scene Dionysus' actual presence is far less effective than earlier when he appeared as the Stranger. Lattimore sees Dionysus here as "brutal and childish" and says that "humanwise, he tries to defend himself and only makes his case sound worse."⁴⁶ Dionysus, like Pentheus, his symbol, suffers a fall in eminence. Cadmus protests that the god's punishments are "too severe" (ἀλλ' ἐπεξέρχη λίαν, 1346). When the god then accuses them of *hybris* (καὶ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμῶν θεὸς γεγῶς ὑβριζόμεν, 1347), Cadmus responds, "Gods should not resemble men in their anger," ὁργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς (1348). Agave calls the god's treatment αἰκείαν, "outrage" or "insult" (1374), a word which occurs only here in the extant works of Euripides.⁴⁷ Recalling the *hybris* attributed to Hera (9), Lattimore asks,

⁴⁶Lattimore (note 12 above) 27. Podlecki (note 12 above) 158 also comments, "Dionysus, by his behavior, shows himself no better, indeed far worse, than the 'gigantic' Pentheus."

⁴⁷Podlecki (note 12 above) 160.

" . . . if a god, jealous of power and honor, simply uses his superior strength to crush the offender, what is that but *hybris*, in the important sense of power abused . . . ?"⁴⁸ *Hybris* is another attribute that contributes to the observed parallels between the god and these symbols of his power, the thyrsus and Pentheus transformed into a thyrsus.⁴⁹ Early in the play the chorus in the parados refers to the thyrsi as "violent thyrsus-rods": ἀμφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς / ὀσιοῦσθ' (113-14). The expression νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς is called by Winnington-Ingram "unexpected and desperately hard to translate."⁵⁰ This striking line first brings together the ideas of holiness and *hybris* with the thyrsus, the symbol of a god who is both holy and violent and who will himself be charged with *hybris* by Pentheus (e.g., 247, 779). The ideas of holiness and *hybris* next come into juxtaposition in lines 374-75, where the chorus denounces the οὐχ ὅσιαν / ὕβριν ἐς τὸν Βρόμιον, the "unholy insolence to Bromios," which Pentheus has shown.⁵¹ It is significant that the theme of Pentheus' *hybris* becomes more dominant (e.g., 516, 555) as the time draws near when he will physically become a thyrsus. The striking use of νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς may subtly foreshadow the hybriatic Pentheus' transformation into a thyrsus, the holy symbol of a violent god.⁵²

In the end the thyrsus, wand and weapon (κίσσινον βέλος, 25), and Pentheus, brought under the god's power by the violence of his own emotions, merge. Is it similarly through the violence of Dionysus' wrath that the god himself is diminished in the end and "made like mortals" (cf. ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς, 1348)? Although the god may have had an appeal to the audience's sympathies in the prologue, in the end the sympathies are with the mortal sufferers.⁵³ Cadmus recalls Pentheus' former kindness toward him (1381 ff.),⁵⁴ and even the chorus shows some pity

⁴⁸Lattimore (note 12 above) 26.

⁴⁹See Segal (note 4 above) 331, n. 77, on *hybris* as "the subject of claims and counter-claims between Pentheus and Dionysus."

⁵⁰R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus: An Interpretation of the Bacchae* (Cambridge 1948) 34.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 60.

⁵²See Podlecki (note 12 above) 159-60.

⁵³Seidensticker (note 16 above) 314, notes, "The emotional tension and the fascinating ambivalence of the *Bacchae* derives in no small part from the fact that our sympathy shifts back and forth between Pentheus and the god." Compare also the end of the *Hippolytus* where Artemis leaves and the final focus of attention and sympathy is on Theseus holding his dying son.

⁵⁴Foley (note 6 above) 121.

for Agave and Cadmus (1184, 1200, 1327).⁵⁵ As Vickers comments, "In Euripides our giving sympathy to the oppressed generates loathing for the oppressors . . . but when the oppressors have been destroyed in various appalling ways our loathing of them is neither satisfied nor appeased; it is converted, transferred to the avengers. . . ."⁵⁶ Here the loathing is transferred to the god.⁵⁷

The reduction from the previous grandeur of the god's power,⁵⁸ represented by the symbol of the massive tree-thyrsus reduced once more to a narthex, this time crowned with the head of Pentheus and transformed from a sacred wand into a horrid reminder, *μνῆμα*, of the power of Dionysiac religion to destroy, reveals Euripides' final judgment of Dionysus. Euripides is aware of the undeniable power of belief in such a god and the power of such a belief to transform or distort reality. The beauty of the early choral odes, which exalt the blessings of worship and the gifts of joy, make clear the potent appeal of such a religion.⁵⁹ If the appeal of Dionysus were not so strong, the dangers of succumbing would not be so great. And it is these dangers which Euripides emphasizes in the end. When Cadmus first tries to bring Agave out of the Dionysiac delusion, to make her see what she has done, he reminds her of her human connections, her place in her family, and he slowly draws her back to reality by emphasizing "looking" at the sky and then looking straight at her thyrsus: "Now consider truly—looking costs little trouble" (1279).⁶⁰ So too Euripides may be asking his audience to see clearly, like Agave, the reality, the consequences, and the horror of the Dionysiac

⁵⁵Brian Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy* (London 1973) 318.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 597.

⁵⁷For similar views of Dionysus at the end, see, for example, Robert Eisner, "Euripides' Use of Myth," *Arethusa* 12 (1979) 169; Ernest Heinrich Klotz, *The Supernatural in the Tragedies of Euripides* (Chicago 1980; reprint of 1919 edition); Patrick Roberts, "Euripides: the Dionysiac Experience," *The Psychology of Tragic Drama* (London 1975) 44; Segal (note 6 above) 116; Vickers (note 55 above) 316–20.

⁵⁸See Eisner (note 57 above) on the "deliberate *reductio ad nauseam* of the commonly accepted personalities of the gods" in Euripides' plays; cf. Segal (note 4 above) 53.

⁵⁹Gold (note 28 above) 10, notes the hints of potential violence in Dionysiac religion even amidst expressions of joy in the parados. On the ambiguity of Dionysus, see Segal (note 4 above) 19 ff., 53 ff., 244–45, 329 ff.

⁶⁰Devereaux (note 33 above) 41–42. For a discussion of the importance of "seeing" in the *Bacchae*, see Foley (note 6 above) *passim*. It is interesting to note that the word used here for "little," *βραχύς*, occurs only once elsewhere in the *Bacchae*, in line 397, *βραχύς αἰών*, directly following the much discussed lines 395–96, *τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία / τὸ τε μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν*.

DIALECTIC, IRONY, AND MYTH IN PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*

I

"Surely at this point," Socrates says near the end of the *Phaedrus*, "let it be that matters about λόγοι have been played through for us proportionately." (Οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων, 278b). The verb "play"¹ cannot be confined to any utterances less than the whole dialogue, though the immediate reference is to a discussion about λόγοι in the writing and speech. Socrates treats not just this speech playfully; playfulness pervades the dialogue.

So far as the content is concerned, it discusses only two main top-

¹G. J. De Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam 1969) 18-19. Citing H. Gundert ("Zum Spiel bei Platon" in L. Landgrebe, ed., *Beispiele* [1965] 188-21) and his own earlier book (*Spel bij Plato*, 1949), De Vries lists six different senses (from Gundert's nine) in which play is used in the *Phaedrus*: "playful social conversation, playful song and dance in the service of the gods, a playful element in rhetoric and eristic, the dialectical play in Socratic irony, the general play in human existence." (One might question the last; all of the citations are from the *Laus*.) However, Plato's play among his many concepts is one procedure. An interpreter's play among Plato's given terms does not have unlimited latitude, or Plato's words make no sense at all.

Jacques Derrida ("La Pharmacie de Platon" in *La Dissémination* [Paris 1972] 69-197) rightly stresses the importance of internal "writing" to Plato, though there would seem to be no reason to enlist Plato as a supposed support for Derrida's own doctrines of absence and difference, when the *Phaedrus* argues for writing in the consciousness as a supreme *presence*. No concept of "play" will allow for so clearly erroneous a reading of Plato's text.

Moreover, with respect to Derrida's title, φάρμακον in the *Phaedrus*, each of the eight times it occurs, always means unambiguously "healing drug" rather than "poison," as Derrida himself admits (109-12). This singleness of unambiguous meaning is the more marked as, in ways I shall indicate, Plato does tend in the *Phaedrus* to play on some ambiguities in this dialogue, and to play in general. Φάρμακον can serve only as "la différence de la différence" (as it is called, 146) if it parts company entirely with Plato's text (in which case why bring up Plato?). The fashionably resurrected neo-Frazerian term φαρμακός "scapegoat," can still less be applied to this text, or to Plato in general. The word does not occur once in all of Plato, and it does violence to much that he says to enlist it reductively under the heading of this anthropological commonplace.

As it happens, Derrida does not permit anything like such liberties with his own text, scolding those who would anachronistically translate Marx's *aufgelöst* as his *déconstruites* (*La Carte Postale* [Paris 1980] 285). Such a translation, Derrida asserts, would "égarer le lecteur."

ics, rhetoric and love, though these prove to entail notions of large import for Plato elsewhere—poetry, the gods, good and evil, σωφροσύνη the ideas, and the transmigration of souls. And it presents ἀπορίαί for all these topics. Socrates begins with a story about a lover of youth, in whose mouth he then places a speech. Within the speech Socrates has the lover himself begin with the very same thesis (τοῦτ αὐτό, 237b) that Lysias has propounded—though it is soon qualified. The speaker is made to begin, in rudimentary Socratic fashion, at square one. The beginning he enjoins (ἀρχή, 237c) asks for a definition of ἔρως and produces one without elenctic intermediation: “It is apparent to all that eros is a desire (ἐπιθυμία) and even non-lovers desire things that are beautiful (τῶν καλῶν).” He then quickly expands to “two primary and leading characteristics” (ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, 237d) that are to be found in lover and non-lover alike, an innate desire (ἐπιθυμία) again, soon defined as ὕβρις for pleasures and an acquired judgment δόξα soon defined as σωφροσύνη that aims at the best. Socrates’ imagined lover allows that the lover himself can pretend disinterest. And this possibility, as applied back to either Socrates or Lysias himself, leaves open the question as to whether either or both have erotic designs on Phaedrus as a defining impetus for their speeches. Indeed, both Socrates and Lysias offer speeches that can be treated as generalized specimen addresses to a beloved. The designs of either speaker are in any case muted, but they cannot be discounted, since Socrates’ imagined speaker himself raises such a possibility (237b, 256e). To apply such possibilities to Socrates’ own utterances would at once bring the delicacy of a combined indirection and frankness into play—and “play,” once again, is a term he uses to define his discourse (278b). Such delicacy easily shades into irony, but it would belong to a larger range of effects, a range that would include irony but not be confined just to irony. Lysias’ speech is notable for lacking just such effects. It is rigid in tone, while Socrates’ conversation provides a constant demonstration of psychological and rhetorical flexibility. Lysias’ earnestness carries the implied claim that he at every point has moved from square one. In the contrast Socrates is besting Lysias philosophically, rhetorically, and poetically. Is he also proving himself the better lover?²

²The distinctions and blendings about love merge into those of philosophy and poetry, as Martha Nussbaum discusses these in “‘This Story Isn’t True’: Poetry, Goodness, and Understanding in Plato’s *Phaedrus*,” in J. Moravcsik and P. Temko, *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (Totowa, NJ 1982) 79–124. She points out that the *Phaedrus* shares with the *Republic* the presentation of a contrast between poetry and philoso-

All that Socrates says, as doctrine, does not really contradict the principle of continence or chastity in Lysias' speech, since he finally recommends a sublimation that rarely, but emphatically, permits physical fulfillment.³ Instead of just contradicting that speech, or testing it dialectically, Socrates amplifies it by other considerations while he is outdoing it in rhetorical variation and subtlety. Along with offering a large theory of psychology to implement his discourse, Socrates puts into words an example of a fuller and more acute psychology by marshalling his "nuanced" presentation through "irony," myth, and drama, rather than just by straight contradiction or disproof.⁴

Though widespread in Greece at the time, homosexuality stood under some legal interdict, and under the kind of family opprobrium that both Lysias' and Socrates' speaker graphically depict (231c).⁵ It was a topic on which, except for Sappho, literature other than comic was usually silent up till then, in spite of the myths about it and in spite of Sophocles' and Pindar's traditional proclivities in that direction. Plato can be said to transmute some air of opprobrium or encapsulation around homosexuality. The *Phaedrus* makes it the main basis for defining love, where the *Symposium* does not confine itself just to homosexuality. Plato's insistence on the ideal of near chastity is not just negative; love is the highest of his four forms of divine madness (μανία). "The lover" (ὁ ἐρῶν) is called "a lover (ἐραστής) of things beautiful" and "every human soul by nature has beheld things as they are (τὰ ὄντα, 249e)." The last expression can be taken as also reflexive; among τὰ ὄντα would be the nature of love, in the gradual exaltation brought to comprise philosophy, the immortality of the soul, and the ideal of the beautiful. Socrates exhibits, and dramatically exemplifies, a corre-

phy: "A new understanding of philosophy . . . reinterprets the distinction between philosophy and poetry." As she says (89), "Philosophy is now permitted to be an inspired, manic, Muse-loving activity."

³Gregory Vlastos effectively demonstrates the presence of some physical fulfillment in the ideal Platonic love, drawing heavily on *Phaedrus* 254-56 ("Sex in Platonic Love," in *Platonic Studies* [Princeton 1981] 38-42).

⁴K. Dorter, in "Imagery and Philosophy in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 9 (1971) 279-88, traces contrasting patterns of imagining in the dialogues. As T. Dalfen says ("Gedanken zur Lektüre Platonischer Dialoge," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 29 [1975] 169-94), "Der innere, und wohl der entscheidende Grund zur Wahl der Dialogform war eine bestimmte Auffassung vom Wesen des Philosophierens: Philosophie als ständiges Gespräch (171). This notion involves "Verschiedene Haltungen zur Philosophie" (187).

⁵Kenneth J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, MA 1978).

sponding participation in these ideals and a demonstration of himself as an ἐραστής by the inspired trenchancy of his definitions, by the clarity of his charioteer myth, and by the exuberant effusions he employs when addressing Phaedrus.⁶ Eros, to begin with, is revered as a god (243), and the speakers' mutual exchanges are characterized as close to dithyrambs (238d).

II

Poetry leavens the discourse of Socrates, helping it to surpass the discourse of Lysias; just so does inspired poetry, and Socrates invokes inspiration (237a), surpass uninspired poetry. Still, Socrates' speech remains rhetorical, a contest speech. It competes with the speech of Lysias not only to the end of philosophical exposition for preferable ideas but also as a demonstration of superior rhetoric. It is offered as the sort of oral performance that in some ways surpasses a written one, though ironically it will have been written down in the *Phaedrus* of Plato, where we read it rather than hear it. Part of its rhetoric is to invert the conditions of Lysias, as it expands and qualifies the assertions of Lysias about love. As Lysias' speech is a real one written for oral delivery later, Plato's speech, attributed to Socrates, is an imaginary one, taken down, as it were, in writing after having first been delivered orally.

Socrates' switch from a version of Lysias' praise of the non-lover to a positive praise of love is mediated by abjuring his "error" (ἁμάρτημα, 242d) against the "god." "The customary sign" (his *daimonion*?) nudges him, and he compares his action of reversal to the verses Stesichorus wrote to expiate his denigration of Helen (243a-b). All of this rhetorical complex modifies the doctrine to be expounded by irony, by lightness, and by a version of piety toward the gods quite removed from straight devotion. At this rhetorical turn Socrates performs one of the two functions of logical discrimination he later classifies; he is subsuming his discourse, all under one heading of inspiration, poetry, and prophecy (εἰμι μάντις, I am a prophet, 242c). The *Phaedrus* in general exhibits, but intermittently, at controlled rhetorical positions, a penchant for classification. As a counterpart to this fusion of discourse-types, Socrates to-

⁶De Vries (note 1 above) 186 lists some of Socrates' many exuberant effusions toward Phaedrus. In addition Socrates playfully refers to him in the third person (261, 257b).

ward the end of the dialogue urges the desirability of distinguishing types of auditors (271–73), in a context where rhetoric has at last become explicitly the topic under exclusive discussion, and where a share in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχειν, 272d) and similitudes of truth (ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, 273d) are at issue.

Lysias' speech stands as a constant counterexample, to be pointed at explicitly or to be contrasted implicitly by what outdoes it. On the one hand, its completion of technique implies a lack of adaptive technique: it is as finished as a piece of joinery (234e). On the other hand, it has no proper order and could begin anywhere (253–54). These seemingly opposed defects are aspects of the same lack. It is not just that Lysias is tendentious. We may say that Plato, as opposed to his represented character Socrates, is comparably tendentious in the irreducibly rhetorical cast of his own discourse. The tendentiousness of Lysias assumes that its object has fixed attributes and can thus be rounded out like joinery and completed. Plato's differing practice has to mean that he values the contrary of these qualities. Lysias' very last word, "ask" (ἔρωτα, 234c), advertises an open-mindedness about further questions, but it actually implies a closure, whether actual (if all questions turn out to have been adduced) or possible (if it turns out that there are some left). "I consider for my part that what has been said is sufficient," he says, "but if you desire further and consider something has been left out (παρὰλελείφθαι) ask." This one-dimensional notion of completeness, in which something might be "left out" or "omitted," helps to underscore, by contrast, the discourse of Plato—and that of Socrates, which it contains—open-ended on all sides because its rhetoric is *not* confined by a single relation to the truth which remains at the same time its constant objective.

Socrates says that this speech has filled him like a bucket (235e), touching satirically on the quantitative assumption in Lysias' presentation.⁷ He begins his qualifications with a reference to the old σοφοί who are not sophists or even philosophers but poets like Sappho and Anacreon. Their discourse will soon be adduced as offering the inspiration to which he will aspire (235c). Quite late, when Socrates takes up his characteristic definition-by-questioning (263), he has begun by continuing his assessment of Lysias' form. And the method applies also to Ly-

⁷The term λογισμός, judging from the lexicon (L-S), would appear to be a favorite of Lysias'. The repetition of προσήκει, "it is fitting," from Lysias' speech by Socrates (238b), may be a somewhat mocking echo.

sias' content. Lysias began where he should end (264d); Eros should have been defined at the outset (263d).

III

Lysias, too, is himself fixed in place as he is imagined to deliver his speech. There is no interplay between him and his auditors, the sort of interplay that gives life to the Platonic dialogue. Particles—which Lysias' speech employs sparingly—touch in these delicate qualifications, and a fine air of self-deprecation, often not measurable or sometimes even traceable, turns Socrates' statements reflexively back on the speaker. In something like courtship, he must show himself somewhat bold while at the same time being somewhat modest.

Socrates certainly shows not only the irony of understatement, traditionally the root meaning of the term, but what might be called the irony of hyperbole, and notably in this dialogue. Nor are hyperbole and modesty necessarily at odds. Hyperbole is the extra effort of the man here dramatized as modest, just as modesty is the come-on that sharply frames his philosophical assuredness.

Possibly Socrates is courting Phaedrus—they are after all reposing on a river bank in the country, as Plato emphasizes (230b). This possibility shadows every statement Socrates makes with a qualification of its assumed impartiality—a faint infinite regress that would turn him into a case that could be subsumed under his version of Lysias' point, the lover tendentiously acting as the non-lover. Whether or not this is so, there is a momentary playfulness, even at such points of definition as the summary of an earlier speech (265), which suggests delectation as well as philosophical definition. Or it would do so, were it not for the fusion of delectation and definition in Plato's discourse, itself to be understood as an instance of his principle stated that love entails philosophy and vice versa (256a).

When he speaks of "Sappho the lovely (καλή) and Anacreon the wise (σοφός)," Socrates speaks of himself as "hearing" them (235c) and therefore in a sort of silent and admiring subordinate position. Their discourse is stated to be superior to the prose he has just been discussing—and at the same time, by implication, to the prose he has so far been uttering. Moreover, the term σοφός applied to Anacreon picks up and ironically redeploys the other uses of the word with which it partly overlaps. Anacreon is a σοφός in the old sense. Σοφός is a Pindaric

word for poet.⁸ Anacreon, though a mere twitterer about pleasure, is still wiser than the sophists, to whom the name may be applied. His devotion to love in the very act makes him wiser in some respects even than the philosopher, to whom the term could also be applied. Yet, by the principle applied to Lysias, it is not enough just to celebrate love; the true σοφός must define it.

And this is not all. Being paired with Sappho the beautiful, Anacreon the wise can only admire what she actually embodies, unless wisdom attains to beauty—which poetry also does. So the adjectives could also be reversed. The terms apply to the poetry and not to the persons here; the poetry of Sappho is beautiful. Is there an ironic suggestion that the beauty of her verse makes her not only Anacreon's equal but his superior? If so, it is only a touch. Socrates moves past it quickly.

When he mounts his very first myth, however, before even the introduction of Lysias, it is framed by no less than five ironic qualifications. Questions about physical location quickly yield Socrates' much-modified reply to Phaedrus' direct question about belief. I underline the terms of qualification:

ΦΑΙ. οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκратες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθῃ ἀληθὲς εἶναι; ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοῖν ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ οὐκ ἂν ἄπορος εἶην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσιν ὥσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι ἢ ἐξ Αἰετοῦ πάγου· λεγεται γάρ αὖ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὥς ἐκεῖθεν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάσθη.

Phaedrus. I hardly noticed it [the altar of Boreas]. But tell tell me, by Zeus, Socrates, do you *believe* this mythologeme⁹ to be true?

Socrates. But if I *disbelieved* as the *wise* do I would not be out of place if I should *speculate*¹⁰ and then *say* a gust of Boreas had pushed her while she was playing with Pharmakeia down from the neighboring rocks and that she *be said* thus to have met her end *being* seized by Boreas—or else from the Areopagus. For there is this account, too, that she was seized from there and not from here.

(229c-d)

⁸Σοφός = poet in Pindar O. 1.116; O. 9.38; P. 3.113; I. 1.45.

⁹Μυθολόγημα is a rare word, possibly a coinage of Plato's, not far in meaning from the modern "mythologeme" or a group of mythologemes.

¹⁰Σοφιζόμενος, judging again from the lexicon, is a favorite word of Lysias and also of Isocrates. The word, we may say, proleptically links the two orators who begin and end the *Phaedrus*.

This myth, from the common stock, teems with foreshadowings of conditions contrary to the loves that will shortly be under discussion. At issue here is a heterosexual affair involving a god and a mortal woman, or nymph, not a homosexual one involving men. Its consummation is doubtful and in the past, not in a hoped-for future. And it was brought about, if at all, by force and not by persuasion. The myth, thus heavily shot with ironies in its relation to the theme of the dialogue and through the qualifications of its telling, was brought up lightly, as a feature of the landscape (229b). When Socrates has passed beyond it they return to the landscape; having led out from the waters, they pause to admire a tree (230a).

Before they do so, however, Socrates, who will be involved in rich mythologizing for the rest of the dialogue, ironically forswears attention to myths. To try to attain greater certainty about this myth would soon involve one in others, he says. A man thereupon would have to set straight (ἐπανορθοῦσθαι) a species or form or idea (εἶδος) of Pegasus, of Hippocentaurs, of the Chimera, of Gorgons, and a host of other prodigies. He declares that he himself, who is here at great leisure, does not have the leisure (σχολή) to do so. And what prevents him is that he cannot yet follow the adage of the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself." It would be laughable, he says, to examine other matters before knowing that. And he does not yet know—he here dovetails his own identity with the very mythical terms he is abjuring—whether he "happens to be some wild beast (θηρίον) more multiplex and swollen than the Typhon or a tamer and simpler creature, partaking of some divine and unpuffed (ἀτύφου "non-Typhon") destiny" (230a). Now we hear nothing more directly in this dialogue about the famous Socratic and Delphic self-knowledge. Indirectly the psychologizing about love, and the mythologizing, fill out such a general picture, thereby ironically contradicting the assertion here that mythology is a distraction having nothing to do with self-knowledge.

IV

Here the introduction of a fragment of a myth, and then the bare names of mythical creatures, at once activates several systems of ironic qualification. And further, as the richness of mythologizing in the *Phaedrus* particularly demonstrates, no one of the several myths that this dialogue raises has a similar dramatic impetus, a similar ontological

set, or a comparable complexity, with respect to any other myth in the dialogue. Such a variety of myths in itself can be taken at once as an ironic demonstration of the instability in myth and also as an indication of the delicate insight, tinged with untrustworthiness, that inheres in this supreme linguistic resource of Plato's. That is, the myth is ironic in function while at the same time hyperbolic in expression.

So later (264-65) Socrates introduces his principles of classification, when he explicitly says he has been playing. He does so in a context where he assigns the good madresses to separate gods, and when he distinguishes between the "not wholly unbelievable account" (λόγος) and the "mythic hymn." He then offers the two principles (εἶδοιν) of association under one heading and of subcategorization. These Stenzel calls "the plainest statement of the method of abstraction from particulars that can be found anywhere in Plato."¹¹

The myth itself is earnest and playful at the same time. And some myths would seem to be more playful than others; in this way too they differ from one another. The most earnest would seem to be the longest, the myth of the charioteer who drives the winged horses of the soul, one white and one black. The final myth, that of Thoth, strikes me as a little less earnest, though nearly as long. It is hard to produce evidence for

¹¹Julius Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, tr. and ed. D. J. Allan (Oxford) 17. These are defined as "seeing them under one idea to bring together particulars that have been scattered in many places (εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διεσπαρμένα, 265d) and "to be able to divide them again into separate ideas according to the ligatures they have by nature (τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν, 265e). I have left εἶδος unglossed, rendering it each time as "idea," though the shift of senses is clear, and still clearer if we adduce the third use of the word in this passage, the question of Phaedrus, "What is the other idea (*eidōs*) you speak of, Socrates?" (265d). Εἶδος in fact changes its meaning throughout the dialogue. We may consider the passage in 229d, τὸ τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι is being paralleled with ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων, πλήθη ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων and ἀτοπία τερατολόγων τινῶν. The term has an almost periphrastic status of rough equivalence to the other three words used to govern monsters. This weaker use occurs in the two uses at 253c8 and another at 253d4, as well as perhaps also in κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς, 259d2. In 237a7 bd odh is paired with γένος μουσικόν in a stronger sense approaching a technical one, as Socrates uses the term while invoking the Muses. The sense is still stronger in 249b7 when understanding, λόγος, memory and psyche are all brought to bear as needed to grasp the perception occasioned by transmigration. Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναρπύμενον. Comparably strong but more liberated from αἰσθήσεις is the πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος of 251b7, and the uses in 263c1. All in all the word occurs twenty-five times in various forms, and it never stays fixed for long in this dialogue.

this view; yet the sun and charioteer are honorific, whereas Thoth is exotic, and there is much byplay with particles at the introduction of this myth. The seed-plants of Adonis would be more earnest than Thoth, less so than the charioteer. Most playful of all is the myth of the playful and endlessly chirruping grasshoppers. Actual grasshoppers sing in the grass, linking the mythical ones to ones that can be simply seen. They function as simple analogues for discourse or music, an aspect of their love. That grasshoppers somehow live for the pleasure of the day perhaps recalls Aesop (mentioned by name in the *Phaedo*, 60c). The grasshoppers have been brought up in the discourse about discourse as an example of discourse. This recursiveness and simplicity are mutually reinforcing.

The myth of the charioteer is adduced as a demonstration (ἀπὸ-δειξις, 245c) and after a preliminary demonstration of the immortality of the soul. This myth does not map a homology of resemblances, even though names could be given to the charioteer and his two horses. On the one hand, his task is quite simple: to move them ahead and on a celestial path. But in another way the difficulties arising from the mismatched team lead to millennial cycles of transmigrations. In accounting for these, Socrates himself shifts ground, and the wings become those not of horses but of the soul. The details of sprouting new wings (250) in turn provide another myth, which opens up another angle on love and the celestial strivings. The final return to the horses (254) engenders a graphic physical description of the black one, which does then have allegorical applications, but partial ones, and only to one undesirable psychological state. Before that, the unfolding transmutations of the myth have produced a typology of souls defined, in still another modality (252), by their attendance to, and dominance by, some particular god, Zeus or Ares or Apollo or Hera. This assignment in turn redirects the typology of the eleven-gods-plus-Hestia, which had been brought in as a contrast to the striving human charioteers (246c-247b). As for credibility, "it is possible to believe it and also possible not to" (252c).

The complicated Thoth myth offers an account of origins, along with a typology of the intellectual functions enabled by writing. It comes up to fill in the insufficiency of an account of rhetorical expression. While the distinction between technical skill (τέχνη) and its lack (ἀτεχνία) has been sufficiently established (274b), that between seemliness (or decorum, or that which is fitting—or handsomeness) and unseemliness (εὐπρέπεια / ἀπρέπεια) has not. The myth of Thoth, unlike the others, in avoiding its introductory topic, has little to say about

εὐπρέπεια. It is as though the solution of how writing will work carries with it a solution to other problems related to expression.

The last myth, that of the seeds in the garden of Adonis, serves more as a metaphorical parable than a myth. It arises, and is addressed to, the problem of making what one learns permanent. Since it fuses memory and expression, the intellectual and the moral, as well as a technique of care, what it includes in its reference is more complex than its elements. Hence this small myth may be said to recapitulate the large myth of Thoth as the grasshopper myth partially recapitulates the charioteer. But all these myths differ among themselves so much in function, status, origin, structure, and tone that such correspondences as these would only provisionally apply.

V

The parable of the seeds is brought in to clarify a refinement not possible through the myth of Thoth. Qualifying and supplementary, it provides a measure to discriminate among kinds of writing. What is written down, including speeches for delivery (λόγοι) like those of Lysias, do permit recall. But they will not answer an auditor (274–75): they lack the suppleness of the “writing” engraved on the living memory, the “knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) that is written on the soul of a learner” (276a).

Such orally revived “writing” has the advantage of being remembered, and at the same time of allowing for dialectic—for the decision “toward whom it is necessary to speak and to be silent” (ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγᾶν πρὸς οὓς δεῖ). Of such a “living” piece of writing the actual physical writing is, properly considered (δικαίως), just an image (εἶδωλον). “Since the power of λόγος happens to be soul-leading (ψυχαγωγία), it will be necessary for the would-be rhetorician to know how many forms the soul has” (271c–d).

The argument brings dialectic to the fore as a resolution of speech modes, but a discrimination is still needed between that which is merely an amusement, like an eight-day garden of Adonis, and that which is serious (σπουδῇ, 276b), like the seeds a husbandman tends for eight months.¹² The eight-day garden is to the husbandman’s seeds as play to

¹²The antithesis between the systems of luxuries associated with Adonis and the necessities associated with the husbandmen are substantiated in Marcel Detienne, *Les Jardins d’Adonis* (Paris 1972), though he does not mention Plato there.

earnest. But the dialectic quickly takes over this distinction as well, since Plato recommends not the solemnity of Lysias but an admixture of play in a higher seriousness. The "serious" man (σπουδῇ is repeated, 276c) will not write his words on water. Having treasured them in "the garden of letters," he will spend his days "playing" (παίζειν) with them. At an earlier extreme of play, the grasshoppers are fancied as produced by the Muses (259c).

The dialectic in itself is not enough, however. Socrates has earlier indicated that even the skill (τέχνη) of "the Eleatic Palamedes" (Zeno) can be used to convince hearers that "the same things are like and unlike, one and many, abiding and fleeting" (261d). This definition supersedes itself also by a playful touch: in calling Zeno by the name of the legendary discoverer of the alphabet and many other things, Socrates assimilates him to a parallel of the later myth of Thoth. In being called a Palamedes, Zeno is treated to the irony of hyperbole. At the same time, higher uses are attributed to him than the paradox-mongering of court controversy (ἀντιλογική) for which it is here said his technique can be used. The mere rhetor is defined by a plain contrast between the horse and the ass (260), itself adduced as an example of false and superficial classification.

When Socrates is conducting his surely playful etymology connecting the prophetic (μαντική) with inspired madness (μανική), he is engaging in a dialectic that leads him shortly to a whole repertoire of intellectual functions—investigation (ζήτησις), mind (νοῦς), conception (οἶσις), inquiry (ἵστορία), and thought (διάνοια). Yet all these are playfully, and dialectically, caught up in a discussion of how bird-signs may be interpreted. In the charioteer myth, a pure thought (διάνοια) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) nourishes the good horse so that he can see justice (δικαιοσύνη), prudence (σωφροσύνη)—and, once again, knowledge (247). These are the horses of the gods, whereas human souls "scarcely catch sight of things as they are" (τὰ ὄντα).

The very beginning of Socrates' first speech is caught up in drama and dialectic, as well as irony. Phaedrus' swearing by the plane tree, and his declaration that he will never say another speech, lay a "necessity" (ἀναγκάσω ἀνάγκη) on the "unwilling" Socrates (236d-e). He professes that shame will induce him to gallop through his discourse, and he invokes the Muses at once (as Lysias will not have done). "I shall speak under a veil," he says (ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἔρῳ), and the word ἐγκαλυψάμενος points ambiguously both to the drama of hiding one's face and the indirect speech of the veiled stories and myths he will begin

forthwith. Drama and indirectness perpetuate the dialectic on another plane, extending it and keeping it playful.

VI

Much has been said about the transition from oral to written expression in Greece, and Havelock has impressively demonstrated how intimately such conditions are bound up into Plato's outlook and expression.¹³ However, these main conditions are not exempt from dialectic—or for that matter from contradiction. Much in Plato substantiates Havelock's contention that Plato was striving for a preponderance of the written over the oral. Yet in the passages surrounding the seeds parable he gives primacy to the oral—an oral that at the same time is defined as a kind of writing in the head.

Plato's very vocabulary in this dialogue seems aimed at combining the oral and the written into dialectical complications. Elsewhere, as Havelock has persuasively shown, Plato associates poetry with oral transmission. Here in one instance he applies the less common sense of ποιητής, "writer," not only to prose but to the uninspired written prose of Lysias (236d), which he contrasts throughout with inspired writing, oral effusion, and verse. The other nine uses of ποιητής and its adjective in the dialogue all refer either to lyrical poetry or to dramatic poetry, or at least to highly imaginative writing inspired by the Muses and by the divine madness (especially 245a). Socrates' own discourse pretends to this higher form of writing, as against Lysias', though it is a kind of prose that in dialogue form carries some of the character of theatrical discourse as well as of the divine inspiration he repeatedly invokes. Furthermore, the term συγγράφειν ("compose in writing") and its cognates, habitually applied to prose writers, and usually by prose writers,

¹³Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge 1963), *The Greek Concept of Justice* (1978). In the large literature on this subject, one might signal Charles Segal, "Tragédie, oralité, écriture," *Poétique* 50 (April 1982) 131–54. See also R. Burger, *Plato's Phaedrus, A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing* (University, AL 1980); and P. Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typographie," in *Mimesis des articulations* (Paris 1975) 167–270. As Burger says, "The dialogue's reflection on its own character as a product of writing results ironically in the apparent deprecation of the activity of writing" (2). "The sweet speech of the divine lover which washes away the bitter taste of the speech of the non-lover, cannot uncover the tension within the condition Socrates lays down for the true art of speaking" (69).

from Herodotus on, occur sixteen times in the *Phaedrus*, where Plato unusually applies them not just to prose—though he sometimes does that (as for example 272b, 258a, 258c). Rather he uses συγγράφειν terms in the sense of “writing in general” or even applies them in cases where only poetry is in question. And at the point of their highest frequency (257–58), they are called into dialectical use, meaning “writing in general” but at the same time applied back recursively to Lysias. And since the *Phaedrus* itself is a written presentation of an imagined oral conversation, it both incorporates and contradicts its own final recommendation of informed oral discourse as the highest form. Even if this recommendation is taken as aiming at Plato’s unwritten doctrine, it retains its qualifying dialectical force within the statement of this particular dialogue itself.

The very act of reading is dramatized at one explicit point (230d); and the reading-recitation of *Phaedrus* himself, the speech of Lysias, is prepared for dramatically at the outset of the dialogue. The procedure vaguely resembles the way the client of such a λογογράφος would read a memorized speech in the law courts. Oral and written are combined in the later designation of Lysias’ text as having been “delivered orally from a book,” ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς (243c).

VII

One can apply back to Plato’s dialogues generally two complementary notions developed in the *Cratylus* (385–86): Plato’s version of Protagoras’ notion that the truth is individual to every man, and Euthydemus’ notion that all men are equally right. Both of these follow from the differentiation of persons through self-consciousness, and the community of language, which Socrates forces on his auditors, implies a concord to be envisioned, if never reached, through various kinds of testing. In the *Phaedrus*, Lysias is out of reach, but the dialogue concludes, as always semi-ironically, with the praise of a young Isocrates. Thus Plato has Socrates act as though he were falling back to the rhetoricians, but in a form that will include potential philosophers, since Isocrates ran a rival school. The very semantic spread of the word σοφοί in the *Phaedrus* carries with it such a possible tolerance. The word “to agree” (ὁμολόγειν) and its derivatives occur eight times in the *Phaedrus*.

Socrates’ critique of Lysias’ dialogue as lacking order refers us back to the order of his own discourse, which slides in and out of myth

and permits all sorts of qualifications and interruptions. And then there is the overarching order of the *Phaedrus* itself, with a return to the initial topics, physically symbolized in the return to Athens at the end of the dialogue. Socrates and Phaedrus go out from the city at the beginning and return to it at the end. "Let's go," is its very last word. The dialogue is almost wholly circular in beginning with Lysias but almost ending with the encomium of Isocrates. At the very end, poetry, myth, and love are delicately touched on by the concluding Prayer to Pan, which seals it as a kind of triptych.¹⁴ A conclusion has been reached about the nature of rhetoric, and another about the nature of love, but the connections between them have only been sketched by comparison. Nor do these topics have the obvious relation to one another that, for example, rhetoric and virtue do in the *Gorgias* or proper classification and proper government do in the *Republic*.

It is, however, Phaedrus who first mentions "Isocrates the fair" (τὸν καλόν, 278e). Does this mean that he is ironically shown not to have fully assimilated Socrates' teaching? Socrates takes the praise up and agrees with him. Does this mean he is somewhat tired, or somewhat infatuated, or both? Again, here at the end the dramatic relations, and positions, all sorts of interplay, perfuse the notions presented.

The term εἶδος, form or idea, a large one in Plato, runs casually through this dialogue, as I have shown above, sometimes as a place-marker for categorizations, sometimes in a weak sense that cannot be pressed. The dramatic presentation, the irony, and the very dialectic permit it to remain fluid while other notions are set complexly into place. Plato's form in the *Phaedrus*, as sometimes differently elsewhere, serves also not only to keep questions open, but to let them participate in various degrees of being open, from the faintly ambiguous hint to full closure.

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¹⁴See Diskin Clay, "Socrates' Prayer to Pan," in G. Bowersock et al., eds., *Arktouros* (Berlin 1979) 345-53. Clay is able to relate the prayer to Pan, Socrates' last full statement, intricately to other themes in the dialogue.

DILEMMA IN CICERO'S *DIVINATIO IN CAECILIUM*¹

Cicero's speech contending that he, rather than Q. Caecilius, will be a more suitable prosecutor of Verres is the only example of the genre of *divinatio* that has survived.² The genre offers an interesting rhetorical challenge: Cicero must persuade his audience that he will be a more effective prosecutor of Verres than Caecilius would be. But being the more effective prosecutor means, at least in part, being the more persuasive speaker. Thus, the orator must use his oratorical powers to demonstrate, among his other points, that he *has* greater oratorical powers and so will be more effective against Hortensius, Verres' *patronus* and the principal orator of the day.³ The purpose of this paper is to provide an example of the way in which Cicero takes advantage of this special context by examining the orator's use of one highly distinctive formal device, the dilemma.

First, it is necessary to understand exactly what Roman rhetoricians considered the nature of this device to be. The most comprehensive definition is that of Quintilian (5.10.69) in his list of the types of *divisio*: "Fit autem ex duobus, quorum necesse est esse alterum verum, eligendi adversario potestas, efficiturque ut utrum elegerit noceat."

¹Of the several commentaries on the speech, I have found the most useful to be K. Halm (Berlin 1874), W. E. Heitland and H. Cowie² (Cambridge 1900), E. Thomas (Paris 1894), and K. Hachtmann (Gotha 1891). Also useful is the commentary of J. R. King (Oxford 1899). I have been unable to obtain the commentary of F. Richter, rev. by A. Eberhard (Leipzig 1884). A full discussion of the structure of the argumentation is provided by W. Sternkopf, "Gedankengang und Gliederung der 'Divinatio in Caecilius,'" *Gymnasium Dortmund Jahresbericht* 1904-5, 4-17 (reprinted in B. Kytzler, ed., *Ciceros literarische Leistung, Wege der Forschung* vol. ccxl [Darmstadt 1973] 267-99). Sternkopf's treatment is complemented by W. Stroh, *Taxis und Taktik: die advocatische Dispositionskunst Ciceros Gerichtsreden* (Stuttgart 1975) 174-87. See also the brief analysis of C. Neumeister, *Grundsätze der forensischen Rhetorik* (Munich 1964) 35-41. Two other articles focus primarily on the speech: L. A. Thompson, "The Relationship between Provincial Quaestors and their Commanders-in-Chief," *Historia* 11 (1962) 339-55, gives helpful background for Cicero's argument in sections 60-61. P. Fabbri, "Q. Cecilio e la *Divinatio*," *Historia: studi storici per l'antichità classica* 6 (1932) 292-96, deals briefly with the select questions of Caecilius' motives, the order of the speeches, and the mechanics of the proceeding.

²For explanation of the term *divinatio*, see Gellius *NA* 2.4.1 and Pseudo-Asconius, p. 186 St.

³Cf. the remarks of Thomas (note 1 above) 36-37.

This definition both includes and clarifies the definition and example of *complexio* at *Inv.* 1.45. It is also consonant with the example used in lieu of the definition of *duplex conclusio* at *Rhet. Her.* 2.38, and with the first two of the three examples of *divisio* at *Rhet. Her.* 4.52. (The third example is of a type of *divisio* which is not a dilemma.) Despite the variety of names, all of these citations define or illustrate the device which Hermogenes (*Inv.* 4.6) and later Greek rhetoricians call διλήμματος, and which we call dilemma. Thus, following Quintilian, we may define dilemma as any offering to an opponent of two alternatives, such that one must be true, and such that whichever one he chooses he will harm his case. However different the names which Cicero, the Auctor ad Herennium, and Quintilian assign to it, the dilemma is securely ensconced as an element of Roman rhetorical teaching.

The use of dilemma in the *Divinatio in Caecilium* is placed in a special context in sections 37-47, the part of Cicero's treatment of Caecilius' inadequacies that focuses primarily on training and ability in speaking. In these sections, Caecilius' failings are characterized in terms of the tenets of the rhetorical education that was the common heritage of the senatorial jury hearing the case. The extensive correlations between Caecilius' supposed deficiencies and the rhetorical teachings of the day are most thoroughly collected by Heitland and Cowie.⁴ Although their commentary makes greatest use of *De Oratore*, these teachings are common to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's youthful *De Inventione*, works that are virtual textbooks of the Hellenistic rhetorical education to which Cicero, and most of his senatorial audience, will have been exposed.⁵ Thus, Caecilius' alleged lack of talent is initially tied to specific inadequacies in four of the five traditional "Aristotelian" parts of oratory, delivery, and memory (sec. 37: "putasne te" *ad fin.*), arrangement (38 through "distinguere"), and style (38: "putasne te posse" *ad fin.* Cf. *Cic. Inv.* 1.9; *Rhet. Her.* 1.3).⁶ The stylistic admonition is simply to find words worthy of the deeds described, a rhetorical maxim at least as old as Isocrates (*Paneg.* 13), and reflected

⁴Heitland and Cowie (note 1 above). See also Halm (note 1 above) *ad loc.*, on whom Heitland and Cowie in part depend.

⁵For the status of *De Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as virtual textbooks of Hellenistic rhetoric, see S. F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome* (University of California Press 1977) 68-69; George Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton 1972) 114-38.

⁶Cf. Hachtmann (note 1 above) *ad loc.*, Strohm (note 1 above) 176, n. 15, Sternkopf (note 1 above) 277-83.

in the *ad Herennium* (3.11).⁷ Equally glaring is the orator's condescending explanation to Caecilius of the very rudiments of schoolboy rhetoric:

perficiendum est, si quid agere aut proficere vis, ut homines te non solum audiant, verum etiam libenter studioseque audiant. (39)

This obvious advice, here applied to all parts of the speech, is incidentally part of the standard admonition on the role of the *exordium* to be found in the textbooks (Cic. *Inv.* 1.20-23; *Rhet. Her.* 1.5-11).

Cicero's careful lecturing of Caecilius on points that any speaker would know, points his hearers would have learned in their school days, is of course calculated to emphasize the central point of his opponent's ineptitude: "ac si tibi nemo responsurus esset, tamen ipsam causam, ut ego arbitror, demonstrare non posses" (44). At the same time, Cicero may contrast Caecilius' preparation with his own hard work (41), and the resultant proficiency that will allow the orator to face Hortensius with confidence (44).

Within this context of Cicero's ostentatious doubt that his opponent is even aware of the lessons that he and his audience learned in school, the orator reveals the tricks Hortensius will supposedly use (45-47). The first of these tricks is described in this way:

quotiens ille tibi potestatem optionemque facturum sit, ut eligas utrum velis: factum esse necne, verum esse an falsum: utrum dixeris, id contra te futurum. (45)

As the commentators have noted, this is the definition of dilemma. This venerable argument form, which is used by the Attic orators,⁸ illustrated by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (β 23 1400b5), and discussed in the Hellenistic rhetorical tradition represented by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De Inventione*, really is the stuff of the schoolroom. It is a recognizable, striking device of the formally trained speaker. Now, Cicero has already evoked other teachings of the schoolroom. Then, before an audience that will certainly recognize from their schooling and their experience this striking device, Cicero tells his opponent that Caecilius will be unable to counter Hortensius' use of dilemma. In saying so, the orator gives a virtual textbook definition of the device. He then tells Caecilius that if he can answer Cicero himself, there might be

⁷Thus Heitland and Cowie (note 1 above) ad loc.

⁸E.g., Lysias 15.8; Isaeus 1.21; Isocrates 19.32; Demosthenes *De Corona* 217; Hyperides *Eux.* 17; Lycurgus in *Leocratem* 63.

hope for him against Hortensius (47). But he will not be able to answer Cicero.

In light of this declaration, it is striking that Cicero's own speech uses the same device that he attributes to the master orator Hortensius, and uses it with remarkable frequency. The speech contains four examples:⁹ Sections 12–13: Cicero has maintained unassailably that the Sicilians want him to represent them: "Utrum, Q. Caecili, hoc dices, me non Siculorum rogatu ad causam accedere? an optimorum fidelissimorumque sociorum voluntatem apud hos gravem esse non oportere?" Sections 30–31: Cicero maintains that one charge against Verres will be that of having made exorbitant exactions of money from the wheat farmers, when Caecilius was his quaestor:

utrum hoc tantum crimen praetermittes an obicies? si obicies, idne alteri crimini dabis, quod eodem tempore, in eadem provincia tu ipse fecisti? audebis ita accusare alterum, ut, quo minus tute condemnare, recusare non possis? sin praetermittes, qualis erit tua ista accusatio, quae domesticum periculi metu certissimi et maximi criminis non modo subscriptionem, verum etiam mentionem ipsam pertimescat?

In section 58, Cicero deals with Caecilius' claim that Verres has become his personal enemy by pointing out that they have since had a reconciliation and have dined together.

denique de iniuria quae tibi facta sit neminem nostrum graviorem iudicem esse oportet quam te ipsum, cui facta dicitur. si tu cum illo postea in gratiam redisti, si domi illius aliquotiens fuisti, si ille apud te postea cenavit, utrum te perfidiosum an praevaricatorem existimari mavis? video esse necesse alterutrum, sed ego tecum in eo non pugnabo, quo minus utrum velis eligas.

Finally, in section 60, Cicero is addressing the moral difficulty of Caecilius as a quaestor prosecuting his own praetor:¹⁰

qui (sc. Caecilius) si summam iniuriam ab illo accepisti, tamen, quoniam quaestor eius fuisti, non potes eum sine ulla vituperatione accusare: si vero non ulla tibi facta est iniuria, sine scelere eum accusare non potes.

⁹F. Rohde, in his otherwise useful *Cicero quae de inventione praecepit quatenus secutus sit in orationibus generis iudicialis* (Koenigsburg diss., 1903) is surprisingly inaccurate in his catalogue of Cicero's use of dilemma (pp. 70–75). For the *Divinatio in Caecilium*, he notes only two dilemmas, that at secs. 12–13, and an argument at sec. 17, which is not a dilemma at all.

¹⁰For background on this line of argument, see Thompson (note 1 above). See also Stroh (note 1 above) 178 and Sternkopf (note 1 above) 286–88.

After two uses of dilemma, at sections 12 and 30-31, the definition given in characterizing the tactics of Hortensius creates a resonance. It implies that Cicero, who has already twice used the memorable device, is in some sense the equal of the eloquent *patronus*. The untrained dullard Caecilius cannot respond to the tactics of the master orator Hortensius, as the master orator Cicero demonstrates by using those same tactics. Hereafter, the dilemmas at sections 58 and 60 not only make their points, they also underscore, for the rhetorically educated audience, Cicero's superiority over the opponent whom he has deigned to instruct about speaking. If any member of the audience is rationally aware of this use of dilemma, he will see it as a sophisticated joke at Caecilius' expense. Those not so analytical will respond nonetheless to the carefully orchestrated resonances reinforcing Cicero's claim to greater skill in speaking. The net result is the same. The use of dilemma becomes a part of the orator's conscious manipulation of his audience's knowledge of the art of persuasion to define a group in which he and the audience are included, and from which Caecilius is excluded. It provides a clear example of the way in which Cicero makes rhetoric, and a shared knowledge of rhetoric, both the tool and the material for persuading his audience.¹¹

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"INUITUS, REGINA . . .":
AENEAS AND THE LOVE OF ROME*

As he is led through the underworld, Aeneas comes to a group of women who have died unhappy in love. The mood is somber and suspenseful as the ghost of Dido appears, indistinct in the shadows. Proclaiming his ignorance of her suicidal despair when last they spoke, Aeneas, weeping, swears that he left Carthage at the command of the gods, not of his own free will: "inuitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi" (6.460).¹ With these words the mood is broken. We are inevitably reminded of a line from Catullus' version of a bagatelle by Callimachus: Queen Berenice's lock of hair, vowed to the gods in thanks for the king's safe return from battle and now mysteriously translated to the sky as the constellation Coma Berenices, protests bathetically to its former mistress: "Inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi" (66.39). It goes on to relate how it had been carried by an ostrich and how it misses the costly perfumes Berenice used to lavish on it. What appears to be a shift from the sublime to the ridiculous in 6.460 goes unnoticed by Virgil's most distinguished traditional commentators, Servius, Heyne, and Norden. But several modern critics, more sensitive to matters of tone, have tried to defend the line as not unworthy of a great poet in his most mature work.² But even if, in accordance with their suggestions, we were not to

*I am grateful to the anonymous reader of *AJP* for several valuable suggestions.

¹Passages from Virgil are cited from R. A. B. Mynors, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford 1969).

²R. G. Austin, ed., *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Sextus* (Oxford 1977) ad loc., disagrees with critics like Williams who see here merely an unconscious echo (R. D. Williams, ed., *The Aeneid of Virgil* [London 1972] ad loc.); he finds no indecorum in "the ennoblement of a piece of fun." For E. L. Harrison, the display of ingenuity in the allusion to Catullus was an end in itself ("Cleverness in Virgilian Imitation," *CP* 65 [1970] 241). Agathe H. F. Thornton, "A Catullan Quotation in Virgil's *Aeneid* Book VI," *AUMLA* 17 (1963) 77-79, sees no incongruity in the line since Berenice was a royal figure worthy of reverential address and since Virgil believed that Aeneas and Augustus themselves were destined to become stars (*Aen.* 1.258-60, 12.794-95; *G.* 1.32-35) as had the lock of hair. Thornton's view is sustained by Michael Wigodsky, *Vergil and Early Latin Poetry* (*Hermes Einzelschr.* 24, Wiesbaden 1972) 127; neither critic considers the fact that, queen though she be, Berenice is not presented as a stately, awe-inspiring figure in Catullus 66, but as a new bride devoted both to her husband and to her coiffure. More convincingly, Wendell Clausen, placing the Virgilian line in the context of the themes—"love (and marriage or fidelity), separation, death"—of poems Catullus wrote

see Aeneas' oath as frivolous, would it follow that the mild shock of distaste that was our first, spontaneous reaction to the line is thereby annulled? This cannot be so: that reaction is inescapably there. Further reflection adds dimensions, it makes our response more complex by giving us additional perspectives, but it does not undo what has been done. And this is Virgil's intention, for in an important sense the words are not only his; direct discourse characterizes the speaker as well as the author. We need not argue, with well-intentioned disingenuousness, that the revered poet has in no way struck a sour note, for the problem lies primarily with the figure in whose mouth he has put the line, a figure unaware of the implications of what he is saying.

Aeneas' response at 6.460 recalls his earlier assertion, at 4.333-61, that he was leaving Dido against his will. Here, too, the hero is admirably aware of his fated historical mission yet insensitive to the emotional nuances of the situation in which he finds himself. As in the later passage, Aeneas protests his good faith. He never entered into a formal marriage, he says (338 f.), to the woman who, thinking of his private and public commitment to her, considers herself his wife (172, 307, 316, 324). And if he were able to lead his life according to his own desires, he continues (340 ff.) . . . : here Dido awaits his warm assurance that he would choose to remain with her in Carthage, but instead he describes his most heartfelt wish, to return to Troy (340-44). Unaware of the solace that he could offer Dido by presenting himself—accurately—as a man forced to deny his deep personal needs, Aeneas instead tells her that Italy, to which the gods call him, is in fact his true love (347). Dido will surely understand this, he says, because of her own loyalty to Carthage. Dido, however, has just finished telling Aeneas that she was willing to compromise the security of her people because of her love for him (320 f.). I have to look after the interests of my dear son, Aeneas goes on to say (354 f.) to the Dido who grieves because she has not conceived a child to comfort her in her abandonment (327-30). Aeneas rests his case: "Italiam non sponte sequor" (361).

The "inuitus, regina . . ." of 6.460 recalls the earlier conversation and adds to Aeneas' unresponsiveness on that occasion his claim that he

at the same time as 66, argues that it is intended seriously ("Catullus and Callimachus," *HSCP* 74 [1970] 92). James Tatum has recently taken a similar approach, discussing the echo of Catullus 66 in the context of the serious tone of 65, where we learn that the adaptation of Callimachus was written while Catullus was in mourning for his brother; the grief expressed here, Tatum argues, carries over into the Catullan echo in Aeneas' speech ("Allusion and Interpretation in *Aeneid* 6.440-476," *AJP* 105 [1984] 8-14).

was unaware of Dido's suicidal intentions (6.456 f., 463 f.), although these should have been clear both from her own words (4.308, 323; cf. 436) and from those of Mercury (564). It also adds an irony perceptible not so much to Dido as to the reader. We have been told that Aeneas' Roman mission will result in his ascent to the stars; Jupiter assures Venus: "sublimem . . . feres ad sidera caeli / magnanimum Aenean" (1.259 f.). Dido had told Aeneas that because of her affair with him she could no longer look forward to the astral immortality of the virtuous: "extinctus pudor et, qua sola sidera adibam, fama prior" (4.322 f.).³ Now, attempting to reassure Dido as he swears by the stars (6.458) and uses the words of the constellation Coma Berenices, he instead unwittingly emphasizes the contrast between his success and her ruin.

In leaving Carthage, Aeneas was not, as it might seem, choosing duty over love.⁴ Mercury had appealed to the hero's concern for his son (4.274-76), and Iulus is the object of his father's *amor* (1.643-46, 2.789). But this is not all: the namesake of the Julian line, the boy in whose interests Aeneas leaves Dido, has been impersonated by Amor himself, cooperating in Venus' plan to beguile the queen (1.657-94). And Aeneas' claim that Rome is the love for which he renounces his love for Dido reveals another, subtler paradox. When he says of Italy, "hic

³Arthur Stanley Pease, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935) ad loc., gives a miscellaneous assortment of references to an association between laudable human beings and the stars, some referring to deification, others, hyperbolically, to the extent of the person's renown. Rejecting as too "commonplace" to apply to Dido the belief that the soul ascended to the sky upon the death of the body, he does not take into account the widespread Pythagorean belief in astral immortality short of deification. Immediately familiar to Virgil's audience were Varro on souls as stars (cited in Augustine *Civ. Dei* 7.6) and Cicero *Som. Scip.* 13-16; see, in addition, Franz Cumont, "Le mysticisme astrale dans l'antiquité" (*Acad. Royale des Sciences, des Lettres, et des Beaux Arts de Belgique, Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 1909) 256-86; *After Life in Roman Paganism* (New Haven 1922) 38-39 and passim; *Lux Perpetua* (Paris 1949) 171-91 and passim; Louis Rougier, "L'origine astronomique de la croyance Pythagoricienne en l'immortalité céleste des âmes" (*Publ. Inst. franç. d'Arch. Orient.* VI, Cairo 1933) and *La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens* (Paris 1939); Pierre Boyancé, *Études sur le songe de Scipion* (*Bibl. des univ. du midi*, Fasc. XX) (Bordeaux and Paris 1936) 134-37, and "La religion astrale de Platon à Cicéron," *REG* 65 (1952) 312-50. On the doctrine of astral immortality with specific reference to the catasterism of Berenice's lock, see Georges Nachtigall, "Bérénice II, Arsinoé III et l'offrande de la boucle," *Chronique d'Égypte* 55 (1980) 245-46.

⁴Richard C. Monti, *The Dido Episode and the Aeneid* (*Mnem. Suppl.* 66) (Leiden 1981) 42-48, points out that Aeneas, in addition to his love for Dido, has incurred obligations to her and that love as well as duty motivates his concern for Anchises, Ascanius, and the Trojans at 4.350-55. Monti does not mention the love of Rome.

amor, haec patria est" (4.347), we hear more than the discrepancy between the loftiness of his world-historical goal and the tactlessness of his appeal to it. Juxtaposing *amor* and *patria*, Virgil provides what seems to be the first allusion in extant Latin literature to Amor as the ὄνομα τελεστικόν of Rome, the city's occult ritual name.⁵ In hinting at the sacred palindrome, the poet shows us Aeneas as the son not only of the Venus who uses Amor to bring about the affair with Dido, but also of *Aeneadum genetrix*, the ancestress and divine protectress of the Romans under their Julian regime. It is with this Venus in mind that Virgil himself will invoke Erato, the muse of love poetry, as he begins the account of Aeneas' exploits in Italy (7.37).⁶

⁵For Amor as the mystical name of Rome, see Keith Stanley, "Rome, ΕΡΩΣ, and the *Versus Romae*," *GRBS* 4 (1963) 237-49, agreeing with the view that this notion is Hellenistic in origin and is associated with the legend of Aeneas, and Erwin Horstmann, *Der Geheime Name der Stadt Rom* (Stuttgart 1979) 33. Neither author mentions the passage from *Aeneid* 4.

⁶With respect to Erato as the poet's muse for the second half of the *Aeneid*, commentators have tended either to avoid giving an account of Virgil's choice or to explain it inadequately. In her otherwise detailed account of the beginning of Book 7, for example, Henriette Boas omits any consideration of line 37 (*Aeneas' Arrival in Latium* [Amsterdam 1938]). More commonly, the invocation of Erato is justified by reference to the forthcoming betrothal of Aeneas and Lavinia; some commentators, like the most recent editor of Book 7, go on to observe that Erato is a surprising choice in view of the fact that the relationship of this couple provides "meagre material" for a love story (C. J. Fordyce, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Libri VII-VIII* [Oxford 1977] 64). This, though, is precisely Virgil's point. The object of the hero's love, and, on another level, of the poet's, is Rome.

Apollonius of Rhodes also appeals to Erato for inspiration, explicitly at the beginning of *Argonautica* 3, implicitly at the beginning of the following book, as he tells the story of Jason's involvement with Medea. Editors of the *Argonautica* occasionally express the opinion that the invocation seems more suitable here than in *Aeneid* 7.37, and indeed Apollonius presents us with a fully developed love story in the usual sense of that term. But Virgil makes interesting use of this source. He calls on Erato as he begins the account of Aeneas' struggle to win his symbolic true love, Rome. But he uses the *context* of Apollonius' reference to the goddess—the story of Jason and Medea—as background to the literal love story of Book 4. That Medea is a literary forerunner of Dido is a critical commonplace that need not be elaborated on here. What concerns us is the significant *displacement* of the reference to Erato from the human context to the abstract one, corresponding to Aeneas' remark to Dido that it is not she but Rome that he loves more. It is important to note that, according to one legend, Rhome or Roma, after whom the city was named, was actually the wife of Aeneas (Servius on *Aen.* 1.273; Plutarch *Romulus* 2). Lavinia, in whom Aeneas has no personal interest, is a mere token of this ultimate historical goal. As represented by Lavinia, Rome corresponds to Glauce in the traditional story of Jason, the politically desirable bride in whose favor the hero rejects his foreign wife, leaving her bitter and vengeful.

In a lecture given at Smith College in March 1982, Helen Bacon discussed Erato in

Because of her love for Aeneas, Dido will not reach the stars. In contrast, the goddess of love had transported Berenice, wife of Ptolemy Soter, to heaven,⁷ and the lock of hair that was a token of the love of the younger Berenice for her husband ascended to the sky from the temple of Arsinoe, an avatar of Aphrodite (cf. Catullus 66.54–56). Julius Caesar became a divine star with the aid of Venus (Ovid *Met.* 15.840–51), and the goddess was traditionally associated with the *Sidus Iulium*.⁸ Aeneas himself, pursuing his patriotic *amor*, will receive similar aid (*Aen.* 1.259 f.). In abandoning her for a higher love, the *coma*-Aeneas deprives Dido of the marriage she wanted. Yet, ironically, the *Coma Berenices* was a pledge of marital devotion, and offerings are to be made to it by other happy brides (Catullus 66.79–88). A girl's sacrifice of a lock of hair was a standard prenuptial rite in various parts of Greece and, it is thought, in Rome as well.⁹ The irony is compounded by the closing lines of Book 4. Dido is suffering through a protracted death-agony: "nondum illi flauum Proserpina uertice crinem / abstulerat" (698 f.). Finally, Iris cuts the lock and releases the queen's soul (702–5). The act of cutting blond hair that marks Dido's death is echoed in Aeneas' plucking of the *auricomos fetus* of the golden bough (6.141). This, too, is an offering to Proserpina (142 f.), but one that will allow the living hero safely to enter the realm of the dead. The Venus who had played a major role in the destruction of Dido now helps her son to acquire the ever-living "golden-haired" bough (6.190–203).¹⁰

connection with the role of Venus in Book 8. Her conclusions, different from but compatible with the ones in the present essay, will appear in a forthcoming study of the *Aeneid*.

⁷Erwin Rohde, *Psyche*³ II (Tübingen and Leipzig 1903) 375, n. 1.

⁸Kenneth Scott, "The *Sidus Iulium* and the Apotheosis of Caesar," *CP* 36 (1941) 263, 267–68.

⁹Ludwig Sommer, *Das Haar in Religion und Aberglauben der Griechen* (Münster 1912) 34–44. Sommer, along with other scholars he cites, believes that similar rites were performed in Rome (p. 42); on evidence for the practice in Rome, see also Ernst Samter, *Familienfeste der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin 1901) 58–59, and in general Louis Séchan, "La légende d'Hippolyte dans l'antiquité," *REG* 24 (1911) 123, and S. Eitrem, *Opferritus und Voropfer der Griechen und Römer* (Kristiania 1915) 364–65.

¹⁰Sommer (note 9 above) 7–9 (cf. *RE* VII cols. 2105–2109) observes that hair was used for ritual sacrifice because it was believed to contain the life force. On the cutting of hair as a sign of death, with special reference to the passage under discussion, see Sommer (61–63). Numerous references in ancient texts to the symbolic function of hair are listed by Pease (note 3 above) ad 698. Tatum, whose article I saw after the present piece was written, also discusses the cutting of Dido's hair in connection with 6.460 (note 2 above, p. ((13))).

The hidden message of the oath "inuitus, regina . . .," a message of which the speaker is unaware, is that Aeneas has succeeded at Dido's expense, and nowhere is this clearer than in Virgil's latent comparison of Dido to Cleopatra.¹¹ Aeneas, unlike Antony, leaves his foreign mistress and fulfills his responsibilities toward Rome. But we must go further, for Cleopatra is a linear descendant of Berenice. Both queens—Berenice, granddaughter of Ptolemy I and thus cousin of her husband Ptolemy Euergetes, and Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemy Auletes and wife of Ptolemy XIII—belonged to the Egyptian royal house both by birth and by marriage. At Catullus 66.22, Berenice's husband is said to be her brother, and the Egyptian encouragement of incestuous royal marriages is shown also in the case of Cleopatra, sister of Ptolemy XIII. The names of both women recur a number of times in the lineage of the Ptolemies; Ptolemy Alexander II, for example, the cousin of Cleopatra's father, was briefly married to his stepmother Cleopatra Berenice.

But despite the optimistic name of her forebear, Cleopatra was conquered at Actium, and Virgil's description of the triumphant Augustus, as he is depicted on Aeneas' shield, is of interest: "stans celsa in puppi, geminas cui tempora flammas / laeta uomunt patriumque aperitur uertice sidus" (8.680 f.). The allusion to the Sidus Iulium, the comet that signified the apotheosis of Julius Caesar, involves a pun not only on *Caesar* / *caesaries*¹² but also on *coma* / *cometes*. Augustus appears with the star in Book 8; at 10.261 the description of Aeneas, "stans celsa in puppi," recalls that passage. The Trojans raise a cry *ad sidera* (262), and soon the imagery of flame and star reappears:

¹¹Thornton (note 2 above) 79, n. 3, mentions the comparison briefly but does not explore its implications; the same is true of Yvan Nadeau, "Caesaries Berenices," *Latomus* 41 (1982) 102 (where there is a concise bibliography of scholars who have observed the analogy). Dido is also, of course, similar to Ariadne, deserted by a lover whom she had helped in his hour of need. The Ariadne of Catullus 64 comes readily to mind as a source for the portrayal of Dido, and thus *Aeneid* 6.460 recalls Catullus 66.60, in which Berenice's lock is mentioned together with the constellation believed to be the crown of Ariadne. (Callimachus refers to Ariadne at 59-60 of the *Plokamos Berenikes*.) This crown was the sign of the princess' marriage to Dionysus, a compensation for her grief. In the realm of the dead Dido has resumed her relationship with the sympathetic Sychaeus (6.473-74), but she is still deeply embittered as far as Aeneas is concerned (467-72). The latent allusion in 460 to her shorn lock of blond hair, unlike the blond lock of Berenice (Catullus 66.62) and Ariadne's crown, suggests a contrast to the celestial immortality and marital happiness of Dido's two predecessors and emphasizes her misery even after death.

¹²The pun itself is mentioned by Nadeau (note 11 above) but without reference to the Sidus Iulium or to the passages from Books 8 and 10 discussed here.

ardet apex capiti cristisque a uertice flamma
funditur et uastos umbo uomit aureus ignis:
non secus ac liquida si quando nocte cometae
sanguinei lugubre rubent. . . . (270-73)

Aeneas, then, as it were the *coma* who left Dido in pursuit of his historical mission, is twice shown bearing the sign of the Julian *cometes* on his shield,¹³ the first time in the context of the defeat of Cleopatra. We have already observed that his own ascent to the stars, anticipating those of his two illustrious descendants, is achieved at Dido's expense; *uertice* at 8.681 and 10.270 contrasts with that word in 4.698 and in the Catullan "Inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi" that underlies 6.460.

There is an allusion to the original appearance of the Sidus Iulium at the Ludi Victoriae Caesaris¹⁴ in the games of Book 5, as Acestes' flaming arrow is compared to a comet trailing its hair across the sky and is considered to be an omen from heaven (525-34). Given Virgil's interest in the star, it is no wonder that Iulus himself is marked out by a similar portent. At 2.680-86 a harmless flame plays about the boy's hair as a sign that his family is to set out at once on the voyage that will take them to Italy. The fiery hair and the key words *uertice* (682), *comas* (684), and *ad sidera* (687) anticipate the confirmation of the portent by a meteor at 692-700.

The flaming hair of Lavinia (7.75), symbolically akin to the fiery star-tresses of the Sidus Iulium, indicates that she is destined to be Aeneas' wife, but of greater importance is the fact that this parallel between Iulus and Lavinia as historical figures also reflects the change in the nature of Aeneas' expression of love. The marriage to Lavinia is based on dynastic considerations rather than affection; indeed the two fated spouses never even meet in the course of the *Aeneid*. For as he is

¹³Scott (note 8 above) 264-65 observes that coins issued in 17 B.C. in honor of Augustus' celebration of the Ludi Saeculares show a herald holding a shield on which is a six-pointed star. On the reverse is the head of Julius Caesar with the comet above it. Scott believes that the star on the shield is also a representation of the comet, but it may be noted that the comet (8.681) and comet-like fire (10.271-73) on Aeneas' shield suggest that the iconography was fixed even earlier than the coinage indicates. There are other, minor associations between Augustus and the Coma Berenices. The constellation is found next to those of the Virgin and the Bear (cf. Catullus 66.65-66); Virgil had mentioned the former as the region in which the stellified Augustus might be located (*G.* 1.32-33), and the Emperor, as Suetonius tells us, had a birthmark in the shape of the constellation of the Bear (*Aug.* 80).

¹⁴On this appearance see Scott (note 8 above) 257-58.

compelled to leave behind Creusa, Anchises, and then Dido, Aeneas' personal ties are replaced by the abstract love of Rome, the love of coming glory ("famae uenientis amore," 6.889). Thus, the embrace he had sought in vain is permitted him only as an accompaniment to the bestowal of his heroic Roman armor (8.615-16; cf. 1.405-9; 2.790-94; 6.698-702).

This subordination of Aeneas' human relationships to his historical mission is clear in the case of Iulus. At first seen only as Aeneas' beloved son, Iulus gradually becomes associated, in the order of narrative, with the love that beguiles Dido in order to keep the hero safe for his journey to Rome, then with the Julian star, and finally with the love of country in the name of which Aeneas sails from Carthage (1.643-46, 663-94; 2.680-700; 4.345-55). Aeneas has not, as Dido sadly observes, begotten a child in Carthage; instead he is destined to rule *gravidam Italiam* and bring forth a new race (4.229-31). Just as his love for Creusa and Dido must yield to the impersonal marriage to Lavinia, so the original tenderness of *pater Aeneas* toward Iulus is modified as he assumes this abstract role as father of his country. This is shown by the interposition of a barrier, the helmet, symbol of patriotic defense, through which Aeneas kisses his son at 12.434, "per galeam delibans oscula." Hector, of whom we are pointedly reminded several lines later (440), had, in a similar scene of parting from his son, removed his helmet—and, figuratively, the warlike preoccupations it represented—in order to embrace the boy (*Iliad* 6.472 f.).

In *Aeneid* 4, divine command interposed itself between Aeneas and Dido's pleas: "fata obstant placidasque uiri deus obstruit auris" (440), and in Book 12 the helmet is a barrier to the expression of love. At 6.460 the barrier is more complex. There is, first of all, what Dido hears: Aeneas' claim about his involuntary departure recalls his insensitivity during their conversation at 4.305-61, now capped by his further claim that he had been unaware of the depth of her feelings. There is also what the audience hears: the incongruity of the literary allusion in "inuitus, regina . . ." immediately distances us from the hero whose grief has begun to elicit a measure of sympathy. Virgil removes us to a more objective vantage point from which he invites us to temper this sympathy with a consideration of the dehumanizing effect of Aeneas' political success. We also think about poets who write of starry tresses in order to please royal patrons, but Virgil differs from Callimachus in this respect in the subtlety with which he deploys the motif. The strong patriotic appeal of the allusions to the Julian comet in Books 2, 5, 8, and

10 is qualified by the discomfort occasioned by 6.460, discomfort arising first from the difference in tone between these words and their model, and then, as we are led by this discrepancy to reflect on the line, from its implications about the cost of the Roman imperial achievement. The passage is not an embarrassment that has to be denied or explained away, but rather a brilliant demonstration of intentional, complex, and controlled ambivalence, essential both to the dramatic effect of the scene and to its thematic import.

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IMITATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN OVID:
METAMORPHOSES 1.477 AND HEROIDES 15*

In a recent article,¹ R. J. Tarrant has raised powerful arguments against the authenticity of several attested lines of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. In many instances we are compelled either to agree that the lines are spurious or to blame Ovid for an infelicity. This still leaves the final choice unestablished—Ovid could be infelicitous. But sometimes evidence of imitations or reminiscences can rule out either authenticity or interpolation. Tarrant himself² has produced evidence that the *Epistle of Sappho* (*Her.* 15) was composed after the *Metamorphoses* and *Ex Ponto* 2.10, both of which it imitates. I will consider first a passage where imitation supports authenticity of a suspected line, and then return to the *Epistle of Sappho*, where similar evidence seems opposed to authenticity.

Tarrant rejects *Met.* 1.477 on grounds of "diction and relation to context."³ His first objection, that the "isolated physical detail" of 477 ("uitta coercebat positos sine lege capillos") is out of place in a passage concerned with Daphne's devotion to the cult of virginity, he himself eliminates by noting that the *uitta* is a mark of Daphne's connection with Diana. He then objects that "hair arranged without order" is a "contradiction in terms." This seems to translate into a claim that Ovid could not use oxymoron. Ovid would not agree. The oxymoron is a slight one: though *positos* here bears the special meaning "dressed," yet, on the analogy of the use of κείμαι in Greek as the perfect passive of τίθημι, there is little difference in basic meaning between *positos*

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¹"Editing Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: Problems and Possibilities," *CP* 77 (1982) 342-60.

²"The Authenticity of the Letter of Sappho to Phaon (*Heroides* XV)," *HSCP* 85 (1981) 133-53. The section on borrowings is 142-47.

³Art. cit. (note 1 above) 355. Tarrant attaches scant weight to the first ground for suspicion, that the verse is omitted by εMN, since he is aware that all other verses omitted in Book 1 by this combination of codices (before correction) are indisputably genuine: 304 f., 326, 427, 698, 742.

("laid") and *iacentes* ("lying"). Nevertheless there is an oxymoron, but one thematically important: for in Ovid's verse the concept of chastity is connected with the image of hair simultaneously kept in check (*coercebat, positos*) and neglected (see note 7 below). Insistence that 1.477 is "out of place" or self-contradictory⁴ arises from a refusal to recognize the connections of image and thought which Ovid observes.

For positive evidence favoring authenticity, consider these passages in apparent chronological order:

Her. 4.77 *positique sine arte capilli*

Met. 1.476 f. *aemula Phoebe*s;

uitta coercebat positos sine lege capillos

Met. 2.411 ff. *non erat huius . . .*

positu uariare comas; ubi . . .

uitta coercuerat neglectos alba capillos . . .

*miles erat Phoebe*s.

Ep. Sapph. 73 *iacent sparsi sine lege capilli*

Sen. Oed. 416 *spargere effusos sine lege crines*

Sen. Phaedr. 803 f. *coma / nulla lege iacens.*

The believer in authenticity can construct an easy stemma of influence: *Her.* 4.77⁵ influencing *Met.* 1.477; *Met.* 1.476-77 influencing *Met.* 2.412-15 and *Ep. Sapph.*; and the last influencing Seneca:⁶ that is, Ovid's description of Hippolytus in *Her.* 4.77, "*positi sine arte capilli*," seems to have passed (with change of *arte* to the bolder *lege*) to his description in *Met.* 1.477 of Daphne, similarly devoted to hunting and chastity, and this passage, together with other connected words, seems to have influenced the diction *positu*, *uitta*, *coercuerat*, *capillos*, and *Phoebe*s in his description of Callisto at *Met.* 2.411-15, she too presented as devoted to hunting and chastity. With change of *positos* to

⁴Note that the charge "contradiction in terms" could as easily be laid against the undisputed line *Met.* 2.412 (quoted below), on the ground that hair that is confined by a fillet is not completely "neglected."

⁵If *Ars* 3.133 (*non sint sine lege capilli*) were composed before *Met.* 1, we would have to understand it as joining in the influence. But as I argue elsewhere in this journal, *Ars* 3 is the later, and we should take it as also composed under the influence of *Met.* 1.477: see "The Date of Ovid's *Ars Amatoris* 3," *AJP* forthcoming.

⁶Tarrant (note 1 above) 355 quotes both the *Ep. Sapph.* and *Phaedr.* 803 f. as evidence that the "correct verb to describe disordered hair is *iacere*." But *sine lege* (or *nulla lege*) is not a normal expression for disordered hair; it is a bold poetic invention, which reaches the *Ep. Sapph.* and Seneca only by imitation. It is a mistake to make the imitation the standard of "correct" usage. On the thematic appropriateness of *positos* in *Met.* 1.477, see above, and note 7 below.

sparsi, *Met.* 1.477 also influenced the description of Sappho (who was far from chaste)⁷ in *Ep. Sapph.* 73, and this verse led both to the "spargere sine lege crines" of Seneca's *Oedipus*, and to the "coma nulla lege iacens" of the *Phaedra*.

The believer in interpolation must suppose an improbable conflation of all the "Ovidian" parallels, including *Met.* 2.413 and the *Epistle of Sappho*.⁸ But 2.415 *miles Phoebe*s is undoubtedly already influenced

⁷Yet the words are not inappropriately used, for we now find neither *positi* nor *coercuerat* of the other passages. With the dropping of the restraint which these words imply, so was dropped chastity. *Sparsi* is a thematically appropriate switch of diction.

⁸To be more accurate, the believer in interpolation must suppose a conflation of at least three passages, since any other explanation leaves him either supposing an even greater improbability or agreeing with my own analysis. For all practical purposes, he must believe that the interpolator got "uitta coercebat . . . capillos" from *Met.* 2.413, since the resemblance is too close to be coincidence, and it would violate Occam's razor to suppose some lost common source when the resemblance is found within a few hundred lines of the same poem. He must believe that the interpolator conflated the passage with *Her.* 4.77 (or some lost passage which also contained the same diction and structure) or be prepared to claim that it was mere coincidence that produced the resemblance "positi . . . sine . . . capilli" versus "positos sine . . . capillos" when the interpolator was supposedly imitating only 2.412 f., which share with the above elements only *positu* in one clause, and *capillos* in a different clause. Note that the resemblances of *Met.* 1.477 with *Her.* 4.77 are at least these: the structure of a participle *posit-i/-os* modifying *capill-i/-os* and in turn modified by a prepositional phrase introduced by *sine*; and the sequence of the phonemes *posit- . . . sine . . . -e capill-* in that order in the same hemistich. *Met.* 2.412 f. shares with the common elements the structure of a participle modifying *capillos*; but the participle is different; the lexically corresponding *positu* is now a noun, in a different line and clause, relating to different words; and there is no prepositional phrase and no *sine*. Finally, the believer in interpolation must recognize *Ep. Sapph.* as an influence on *Met.* 1.477 or believe one of three other theoretical possibilities: (1) that the authors of *Met.* 1.477 and *Ep. Sapph.* 77 independently coined the same bold locution "positos / sparsi sine lege capill-os/-i" (the structure is found in so complete a form only in these two, and *lege* exists in neither *Her.* 4.73 nor *Met.* 2.411-15)—a great improbability to independently create an Ovidian locution (*sine lege capill-*) not attested before Ovid, if the author is not Ovid; (2) that they both imitate a common source (or, if you would believe it, an ordinary locution) which shared *sine lege capill-*—but then there would still be a conflation with a third source; or (3) that *Ep. Sapph.* 73 imitates *Met.* 1.477—but this is my position, and it establishes a *terminus ante quem* for *Met.* 1.477 (as well as *post quem* for *Ep. Sapph.*). But even this does not relieve us of belief in a third source, since *sine lege capilli* is attested as an Ovidian locution in *Ars* 3 (see note 5 above); unless we wish to claim an improbable independent coinage, *lege* in *Met.* 1.477, in any alternative to my own explanation, must come from a third source possessing *sine lege capilli*.

by *Met.* 1.476 *aemula Phoebes*,⁹ and 2.412 possesses *positu*, which looks as if it arose¹⁰ under the influence of the supposedly not yet composed interpolated line: for 1.477's *positos* comes not from 2.412's *positu*, but from *Her.* 4's *positi*, as the surrounding words indicate.¹¹

Only the chronological arrangement which I have given presents a self-consistent picture of the relations, once it is recognized that authors repeat and modify their own combinations of words in no very different way from the manner of imitation of one author by another.¹² What I have done is to apply to the relations among literary texts the same system of argument which might be used in tracing the relations of mss. or their readings: stated in general terms, if B resembles closely A, and C resembles closely B, sharing with B characteristic differences from A, but sharing with A nothing that is not in B, and lacking at least one characteristic element which B and A share, then, if B descends from A, C must descend from B.¹³ As applied to literary passages, the system

⁹I assume (what much evidence has previously convinced me) that Ovid composed the poem in generally the order in which we find it, and that an author is always influenced by his own recent compositions, especially in handling the same themes. The latter arises from the way in which the human brain works and explains why all authors naturally repeat themselves. But here we have besides good evidence for belief in the priority of 1.476's *Phoebes*, and its influence on 2.415: see the Appendix.

¹⁰I do not mean to claim that the expression was created under the influence of 1.477, but that the occurrence of *positos* triggered the recollection of the expression at this point.

¹¹He who would believe that 2.412 *positu* is the source must accept a great improbability: that an interpolator knowing only *positu* (a noun modifying *uariare comas*), and the structure "neglectos . . . capillos" in the following line, independently coined a combination "positos sine . . . capillos" essentially identical with *Her.* 4.77 "positi . . . sine . . . capilli" (see note 8 above). The same improbability attends on anyone who would derive the expression from any of the other passages, or from any conflation of the other passages excluding *Her.* 4.77. If he would claim that *Met.* 1.477's "positos sine . . . capillos" comes not from *Her.* 4.77 but from some lost passage which shared these features, then he would not only violate Occam's razor, but he would concede my claim that *Met.* 2.412 is not the source of *positos* in 1.477.

¹²I have expounded and illustrated this thesis in a number of articles in which I employ a similar method in determining date or authenticity: "The Date of Tacitus' *Dialogus*," *HSCP* 84 (1980) 99-125; "Germania 13.3 and 46.3," *CP* 76 (1981) 132-37; "Pliny's Letters and the *Dialogus*," *HSCP* 89 (1985) 171-206; "Ovid *Met.* 1.544-547 and the Theory of Double Recension," *Classical Antiquity* 3 (1984) 207-35.


¹³It is often claimed that this system may be used only in closed (uncontaminated) traditions. This is not true. It works equally well in contaminated traditions provided that one talks not of relations of mss. (which would require the negative argument

added, that there is nothing in the mss. which indicates a different relationship) but of relations of readings. For instance in Martianus Capella 643 (p. 224 in the edition of J. Willis [Leipzig 1983]), we find the following variants and errors (the correct reading cited first): *Prote Mese quae Plin.* *prote mesque ABD* *prote mes B²* *protemesto M* *prima temesto D²M²G* *prima temisto (temisto prima B³) cett.* We can say, since the testimony of Pliny establishes the original reading, that the error of *cett.* is based on the error of *D²M²G*, that this error in turn is based on the error of *M* (note that *M²* is the corrector of *M*), that *M*'s error is based on either *B²*'s or *ABD*'s, and that *ABD*'s reading is archetypal. In saying this we do have to beware of the possibility of contamination of readings (e.g., *prima temesto* could be a direct conjecture for *prote mesque*, and such a conjecture could have provoked various conflations in the other mss.); but the principle remains true that if *ABD*'s reading comes from Pliny's (and not from any of the other readings) the others come from *ABD*'s, if the reading of *G* and company descends from *ABD*'s (and not from *cett.*'s) the reading of *cett.* comes from it (and so on for the other readings in a line, with each group of three chosen for comparison becoming anew *A*, *B*, and *C*). What we cannot say from this passage alone is that the mss. are so related, since that would require examination of all readings to find consistent testimony, eliminating the possibility of intermediaries which might lead to different conclusions; most of the mss. are in fact contaminated. As I use the system of argument to determine the date of a single line or short passage, it is analogous to tracing the relations of readings of mss. Used to determine the date of whole poems, it is closer to tracing the relations of mss., since now a wide range of evidence must be examined. Note that there is no claim that the poet operates in the same way as a scribe. What makes the method adaptable to poetic reminiscence (or, for that matter, to tracing the genealogy of words and languages in linguistics) is the shared characteristic that the more intermediaries intervene and make changes in an imitated or reproduced text, the more differences from the original tend to be introduced (barring clever intervention, such as conjectural emendation). For the quantity of resemblance required for the system to operate with a high degree of probability (usually three shared words in a short space, or equivalent distinctive items), cf. art. cit. (note 5 above) n. 4. The quantity required varies with the commonness of the words, but they must be in total distinctive; that is, we must find a combination of elements which links two passages and only two passages of extant literature (other than provable copies of one or the other), and which is unlikely to have occurred by chance in lost literature. I describe the requirements for applying the system to a Latin text and particularly to a text of Latin poetry. A much greater quantity would be required for a synthetic language such as English, with a larger history of usage known to its users, and with different canons of originality (a Latin poet took pride in his felicitous use or adaptation of a familiar verse and regarded such adaptation as a mark of originality). Other characteristics of Latin poetry which aid the workability of the system include composition in meters not native to Latin, with a restricted diction, suited in tone to the genre and shaped to the needs of the verse, and therefore tending to be copied once felicitously introduced (for instance, the combination *huc ades*, quoted below, was never used in prose, but was coined to permit a desirable dactyl at the beginning of the hexameter; once introduced by a poet who cultivated initial dactyls in the verse, it tended to be imitated by poets who shared the same need); known familiarity of the poets with the works or verses in question (I apply the argument only to texts already linked in some way, as by shared genre, authorship, proximity in the same work, composition by members of the same literary circle, or such); a limited number of lost potential models (more

establishes that, if passage A is earlier than passage B, passage C descends from a passage which contained all the elements which C shares with passage B, plus the elements which B shares with A. In the current case, it establishes first that, if *Heroides* 4.77¹⁴ was composed before *Met.* 1.476 and 477, C (*Met.* 2.412-15) descends from a passage which shares the elements of diction *Phoebes*, *uitta*, *coerc-*, *posit-*, *sine*, *capill-*, a number of elements of structure (including a perfect passive participle modifying *capillos*, the latter the object of the verb *coerc-*, with *posit-* modifying *capillos*), and *proximity in the textual tradition of the same poem*. Even if one wanted to violate Occam's razor and suppose the existence of some lost common source of B and C which shared all six items of diction and the items of structure, the last shared element, *proximity in the textual tradition of the same poem*, prevents. The system operates by the laws of probability (not metaphysical certainty). Protection against contamination (conflation) is built into its operation provided that there are enough elements of agreement among the passages within a short space (usually three shared distinctive elements suffice). The protection consists in the improbability of a type of contamination which would upset its operations and in the principle of economy. Most linguistic expression can be thought of as operating by repetition, variation, and conflation (that is, the recombining of learned elements of expression); if language operated through pure creation it would be comprehensible only to its creator. Most of us merely repeat and recombine learned locutions with little variation within the locution, but poets may be allowed a greater amount of creativity consisting in recombining learned elements. But those elements may be letters, words, phrases, or almost any unit consistent with the poet's own standards of creativity. For conflation to vitiate the operations of the

of Ovid survives than has perished, especially in the relevant genres; probably more verses of his usual Latin models survive than have perished, if one counts verses imitated rather than names of poets; the quantity of lost Greek models is unimportant when the borrowing of Latin diction is at issue). It is of no importance for the argument whether an imitation or reminiscence is conscious or unconscious, and not essential that it be direct (rather than through one or more intermediaries): when I use terms such as "descends from," "owed to," and "indebted to," I am trying to remain noncommittal on the deliberateness or directness of the debt.

¹⁴It is not necessary to establish that *Met.* 1.477 was composed in imitation of *Heroides* 4.77 for the argument to work. The priority of *Heroides* 4.77 to *Met.* 1.477 establishes that the *expression* (or other combination of elements) shared existed before *Met.* 1.477, and that consequently the expression (or other combination of elements) existed before both *Met.* 1.477 and the combination of elements which it shares with G.



system as I have employed it (limited to passages sharing at least three distinctive items), the conflator must have not only conflated, but chosen for conflation the right passages,¹⁵ from a limited body of literature,¹⁶ choosing those items whose conflation would create an impression of linear descent,¹⁷ and omitting anything which would undermine

¹⁵That is, not simply words or phrases in his memory, but whole literary passages, with at least three items from each passage involved in the conflation; for a conflation of three passages, each passage must be correctly selected as earlier or later than the pretended date of the newly created passage (if there was an equal chance in each instance of selecting an earlier or later passage, the chance of getting all three passages right is one in eight); and each passage must contain the right set of words to make it possible for a conflation to give a misleading date (since A and C will both share diction with each other, the system defines this condition of overlapping diction as a necessary characteristic of the passages selected for conflation, if B arose through conflation of A and C); ideally the later passages should also lack evidence that they obtained the shared locutions from elsewhere (e.g., there should be no known closer antecedent to "coercuerat neglectos capillos" if it is to be claimed to have been created under the influence of "coercebat positos sine lege capillos"; this criterion requires a little discretion in its application, because it is possible for influence to proceed by triggering recollection of an already existing locution; normally conflation in C does not mislead unless it has been diabolically selected). Every choice made, when other options are possible, contributes by multiplication to the total improbability when all choices have to be made correctly. If, in a deck of 52 cards, one out of four is a spade, and one out of thirteen is a jack, the chance of drawing a spade on random selection from a full deck is one out of four, of drawing a jack one out of thirteen, but of drawing the jack of spades (if the deck is fair) one out of 52 ($1/4 \times 1/13$). If three choices have to be made, each of which has one chance in eight of being made correctly, the chance of making all choices correctly is one in 512 ($1/8 \times 1/8 \times 1/8$). When a large number of choices have to be made correctly for a given result to occur, the odds quickly become astronomical against all coming out correctly by chance, even when the individual results are not very improbable.

¹⁶As applied to *Met.* 1.477 the selection would have to be from Latin dactylic poetry (since the locutions are shaped to the Latin hexameter) and from the amatory tradition (to which the diction *capilli* belongs—epic prefers *coma* or *crines*, and when it adopts *capilli* it is probably reflecting the influence of the amatory tradition). It may not seem unlikely that an interpolator would imitate Ovid from Ovid, but other options were open (e.g., non-amatory Vergil, non-dactylic Catullus or Horace), and that choice had to be made for each of three passages (in a triple conflation). Every choice contributes by multiplication to the total improbability (see the preceding note), unless one choice implies the other.

¹⁷E.g., if *Met.* 1.477 had *sparsos* from *Ep. Sapph.* 73, instead of *positos*, we would lack the third distinctive item shared with *Her.* 4.77 against *Ep. Sapph.* 73; the evidence would similarly disappear if its author had chosen (2.412) *comas* or (2.413) *neglectos* instead of their equivalents in 1.477.

that theory,¹⁸ all in violation of the principle of economy,¹⁹ and all to meet a test whose application he could not foresee. Any combination of choices quickly becomes prohibitively improbable when all choices have to be satisfied in a specific way (see note 15 above).

What then does happen when conflation occurs? The normal result is not that the system misleads, but that it cannot be applied, at least not without modification. Let me illustrate:

Met. 1.194 quos quoniam coeli nondum dignamur honore

Met. 3.521 quem nisi templorum fueris dignatus honore

Met. 8.569 quosque alios parili fuerat dignatus honore

All three share a relative pronoun at the beginning, and "digna . . . honore" at the end. The first two share the same structure in the first hemistich (relative, conjunction, genitive modifying *honore*), the latter two the same structure in the second hemistich ("fuer-is/-at dignatus honore" versus "nondum dignamur honore"). But C shares one item with A not in B, the plural *quos* versus *quem*. It is possible to pass the resemblance off as coincidence (see note 20 below) or a necessary result of the context, but most likely Ovid's memory contained both 1.194 and 3.521, and both have affected him. The result is not that the system leads to a false ordering of these lines, but that the system cannot be applied without modification (the differences shared by AB and BC are major; those by AC minor²⁰ and explainable by the context; therefore the weight of the evidence favors C's derivation from B if A is earlier than B), and so with less security. But now ignore either 3.521 or 1.194, or imagine that either had perished, and compare with 8.569 *Pont.* 4.12.3 "ast ego non *aliū* prius hoc *dignarer honore*." The relation between the last two passages is tenuous²¹ (so chosen, since I am using an

¹⁸E.g., since Seneca seems to be indebted to *Ep. Sapph.*, adoption of *effusos*, *crines*, or some word found in a surrounding line of *Oed.* 416 would have interfered with drawing a simple stemma of descent.

¹⁹In *Met.* 1.477, although *uitta coercebat* and *lege* would have single sources, *posit-* would have two, and *capillos* three. The principle of economy is not absolute, but, other things being equal, uneconomical explanations are less likely.

²⁰Since there are only two numbers, there is a 50% chance of random variation's recreating in C the number of A: therefore, in general, agreement in number between A and C does not by itself constitute a sufficiently distinctive agreement to argue that C is closer to A than to B.

²¹Note also that with the removal of 3.521, the relation of 8.569 to 1.194 (which, I have argued, both directly and indirectly influences 8.569) becomes less well attested.

argument *a minore*): though there are three shared elements of diction, the structure is not close except for the construction of *dignor honore*, and this is common and attested even in prose. Ovid is probably not the first to combine *alium dignor honore* (though there is no other extant attestation). Yet there is one additional element shared (if this is conceded) by the passages in question: combination in a single line of verse composed by Ovid. This last cannot reasonably have been shared by any other example of the collocation, and permits invoking the system to say that if either *Met.* 1.194 or 3.521 is earlier than 8.569, then *Pont.* 4.12.3 was composed later than *Met.* 8.569. At worst it can be claimed that the relation of *Pont.* 4.12.3 to *Met.* 8.569 is too tenuous to permit invoking the argument (and yet, even in tenuous cases, it can be shown to work an overwhelming percentage of the time); what cannot be said is that the argument would mislead into the belief that a later line was composed earlier than *Met.* 8.569 (e.g., a line "quos nisi templorum fueris dignatus honore" would look as if it were composed between *Met.* 1.194 and 8.569): since there are an almost unlimited number of ways in which words can be shaped or conflated, it is improbable that they would be shaped or conflated in one of the limited number of ways which would mislead.

This explains why the system works. But what matters is whether it works. If it did not, it would be easily refuted: apply it to a large number of passages selected only on the basis that their chronological relationship is beyond dispute and that the conditions of the system are met, and determine whether it would lead to a false conclusion about relationships. Having myself performed the test, and having found the system reliable when the chronology is assured, I see no reason to doubt the conclusions when the results are, for disputable reasons, subject to challenge.

The *Epistle of Sappho* on similar grounds seems to have been composed before Seneca's tragedies. Its *terminus post quem* is *Pont.* 2.10 (which is imitated in the beginning of *Ep. Sapph.*).

Tarrant's arguments for the priority of *Pont.* 2.10 are two: that the beginning of *Ep. Sapph.* is less successfully integrated with its con-

This is the normal result of the loss of an intermediary: the apparent relationship does not change, but it becomes harder to perceive, because descendants of the intermediary share fewer items with the ultimate source (the whole system would not work if this were not so). Note too that it does not matter for tracing descendants of 8.569 that it arose through conflation: all that is needed is to establish *one* related passage that is earlier than B.

text than the beginning of *Pont.* 2.10, and that the passive form *aspecta est* (*Ep. Sapph.* 1) is grounds for suspicion. I agree that the version in *Ep. Sapph.* is inferior to the beginning of *Pont.* 2.10 as poetry, though what bothers me most is the blunting of the pathos of *ecquid* (1), not only by the passive *est cognita* (2), but by the distracting *protinus* (2). In *Pont.* 2.10.1–2 we find “*Ecquid ab impressae cognoscis imagine cerae / haec tibi Nasonem scribere uerba, Macer?*” (“Do you recognize at all from the seal in the wax that Naso writes you these words, Macer?”), a pathetic and affecting line. In *Ep. Sapph.* 1–2 we have “*Ecquid, ut aspecta est studiosae littera dextrae, / protinus est oculis cognita nostra tuis,*” where not only the switch to passive reduces the personal touch, and so the emotional effect, but *ecquid* is prevented from having its pathetic meaning “at all” by the switch of the sentence’s point to *protinus*: “Was our writing recognized immediately at all” is an ineffective combination. Yet since both *Ep. Sapph.* and *Pont.* 2.10 display variations on what had become a conventional epistolary beginning with *ecquid*, the fact that *Pont.* 2.10 is a more successful effort is not absolute proof of its priority: neither passage has absolute priority in use of the epistolary beginning. That honor, among extant poetry, belongs to Propertius 1.11.²² Though Ovid had started other poems with *ecquid* (*Trist.* 5.2, *Pont.* 1.6), the main influence on *Pont.* 2.10 seems to be Prop. 1.11.1–8, with which it shares five words or concepts:

*Ecquid te mediis cessantem Cynthia Bais . . .
 nostri cura subit memores a ducere noctes?
 ecquis in extremo restat amore locus?
 an te nescioquis simulatis ignibus hostis
 sustulit e nostris Cynthia carminibus?*

This led to *Pont.* 2.10.1–8:

*Ecquid ab impressae cognoscis imagine cerae
 haec tibi Nasone scribere uerba, Macer?
 auctorisque sui si non est anulus index,
 cognitane est nostra littera facta manu?
 an tibi notitiam mora temporis eripit horum,
 nec repetunt oculi signa uetusta tui?
 sis licet oblitus pariter gemmaeque manusque,
 exciderit tantum ne tibi cura mei.*

²²See D. Schaller and E. Koensgen, *Initia carminum Latinorum saeculo undecimo antiquiorum. Bibliographisches Repertorium fuer die Lateinische Dichtung der Antike und des fruhen Mittelalters* (Goettingen 1977) 196. I have listed all occurrences of the beginning except Martial 7.6, which is irrelevant to our concerns.

Although the correspondence of the structure "ecquid . . . an" by itself could be coincidence, *nostri cura* of Propertius has prompted *cura mei* of Ovid; and, though the enemy of Prop. 1.11.7 is not in Ovid a personal enemy, but time, Propertius' *sustulit* and Ovid's *eripit* carry essentially the same function. With allowance for the change of circumstance, the concerns of the two openings are very nearly the same.

Ep. Sapph. 1-4 resembles closely *Pont.* 2.10.1-6, but displays no resemblance to Prop. 1.11.1-8 not shared with *Pont.* 2.10. Its inspiration therefore was *Pont.* 2.10:²³

*Ecquid, ut aspecta est studiosae littera dextrae,
protinus est oculis cognita nostra tuis,
an, nisi legisses auctoris nomina Sapphus,
hoc breue nescires unde mouetur opus?*

"Ecquid . . . an" is shared by all three poems, but *littera, dextrae / manū, oculis . . . tuis / oculi . . . tui, cognita, nostra, auctoris* link *Ep. Sapph.* with *Pont.* 2.10. The extant *Ep. Sapph.* therefore was composed after *Pont.* 2.10 but before Seneca's tragedies.²⁴

²³There is perhaps also influence of *Pont.* 1.6.1 *Ecquid ut audisti*.

²⁴Tarrant (art. cit. note 2 above, p. 134) believed (on grounds of diction and meter) that the poem is "probably of Neronian or Flavian date." The latter can now be excluded. Although many features of the poem do not find parallels before the Neronian age, this does not require us to believe the poem Neronian. There is not much poetry extant for the period between the death of Ovid and the Neronian age in which we could expect to find parallels. In fact the main products of that intervening period seem to be forgeries of Augustan poetry, including much if not all of the *Appendix Vergiliana*, the Helen Episode (and probably other interpolated lines in Vergil, such as the spurious first four lines), and, to pass over the spurious works attributed to Ovid, most if not all of the third book of the Tibullan corpus. The prime period for forgery or misattribution is the generation immediately following an author's death, when he is unable to expose the forgery, but when a claim to discover an author's lost work is still credible. Of course the *Ep. Sapph.* need not be a forgery, but may be an innocent attempt to supply a missing poem as the author believed Ovid would have done it, just as we hear that many poets tried to supply the half-lines in Vergil. Nevertheless it is in the period shortly after Ovid's demise that poets seem to have felt compelled to compose their amatory verse only under the *persona* of an Augustan poet: so we have Lygdamus and much else in Tibullus 3 written ostensibly in the circle of Messalla Corvinus, not necessarily because the poets maliciously wanted to deceive, but because that may have seemed the only safe way to compose amatory elegy (that and scribbling anonymously on the walls of such as *Herculeum* and *Pompeii*). For the period between Ovid and Nero, pseudo-Augustan poetry is what poets did best.

The poems of *Pont.* 2 seem to belong to late 12 or early 13.²⁵ Corroboration of the *terminus* may be sought from a slightly earlier poem, bearing the apparent date of spring of 12:

Verg. *E.* 9.43 **huc ades**; *insani feriant sine litora fluctus*

Am. 1.6.53 *si satis es raptae, Borea, memor Orithyiae*

huc ades et surdas flamine tunde foris.

1.6.59 *Nox et Amor unumque nihil moderabile suadent*

illa pudore uacat, Liber Amorque metu

Trist. 5.3.35 *fer bone Liber opem. . . .*

43 **huc ades et casus releues pulcherrime nostros**

unum de numero me memor esse tuo.

Ep. Sapph. 95 **huc ades**, *inque sinus formose relabere nostros:*

non ut ames uro, uerum ut amere sinas.

I have put shared diction or phonemes in boldface, and merely shared concepts or structure in Roman type. *Ep. Sapph.* 96 is not part of the resemblances which we are here exploring, but is quoted because it has already been proven to be of (at best) late date.²⁶ By tracing imitation we can establish the lateness of the hexameter as well.

Am. 1.6.54 owes to Vergil's *Eclogues* 9.43 the combination of *huc ades* with the shared concepts *feriant* / *tunde* and the onomatopoeic repetition of *s-* and *f-* sounds.²⁷ Its couplet has in turn influenced *Trist.* 5.3.43 f.,²⁸ which shared *huc ades et* and *memor*; the clinching element

²⁵See Sir Ronald Syme, *History in Ovid* (Oxford 1978) 39–42. *Pont.* 2.1 refers to the triumph of Tiberius in October 23 of 12, and if we allow time for the news (2.1.49 *rumor*) to reach Tomis, it could hardly have been composed before early 13. All the poems in the *Ex Ponto* seem to postdate the last date in the *Tristia* (spring of 12; see below).

²⁶Tarrant (note 2 above) 137 f. ("the elision in *uerum ut* has no Ovidian parallel"), and many scholars before him. Those who try to justify the violations of Ovid's metrical practice in suspected poems of the *Heroides* argue that Ovid became freer in his technique late in his career.

²⁷I leave out of account here Tibullus 1.7.49 *huc ades et*, which may also be related to *Am.* 1.6.53, because exterior criteria for their relative dates are insecure. To judge by *Trist.* 4.10.57–60, Ovid may have first recited *amores* when he was seventeen or eighteen. The *terminus post quem* of Tibullus 1.7 is fall of 27 (when Ovid was sixteen and a half), the date of the triumph of Messala mentioned in 1.7.5. For the purposes of our argument, it does not matter whether *Am.* 1.6.54 imitates *E.* 9.43; it only matters that it inherited elements which it shares with *Trist.* 5.43 from some source other than *Trist.* 5.43. The conclusion which follows, that *Trist.* 5.43 is later than *Am.* 1.6.54, is not one which anyone would be tempted to dispute: I am simply exemplifying that application of the system of argument does not lead to a false conclusion.

²⁸I omit as irrelevant to our concern here one other imitation of *Am.* 1.6.54, *Am.* 3.2.46, "**huc ades et meus hic fac, dea, uincat amor.**"

is that both poems are concerned with Liber. *Am.* 1.6 is a paraclausithyron by a drunken lover (so *Liber* in 60; cf. *Liber* in *Trist.* 5.3.35). *Trist.* 5.3 celebrates apparently the Liberalia (5.3.1 f., "Illa dies hanc est, qua te celebrare poetae, / si modo non fallunt tempora, Bacche, solent"). Therefore in both poems the poet is (or is supposed to be) garlanded (*Am.* 1.6.37 f., "ergo Amor et modicum circa mea tempora uinum / mecumst et madidis lapsa corona comis"; *Trist.* 5.3.3 f., "festaque odoratis innectunt tempora sertis / et dicunt laudes ad tua uina tuas"). In both a god is asked to intercede: Boreas with the door, Bacchus with Augustus (45 f., "sunt dis inter se commercia; flectere tempta / Caesareum numen numine, Bacche, tuo"). On any basis, *Trist.* 5.3 is very witty; if recognition of the resemblances to *Am.* 1.6 reduces Augustus, if obdurate, to the level of an obdurate door in a paraclausithyron, that too, I believe, is part of Ovid's wit. But that is another question. For our current purposes it suffices that the general resemblances of the two poems establish that the similarities of diction of *Am.* 1.6.53 f. and *Trist.* 5.3.43 f. do reflect a close genetic connection. Therefore when *Ep. Sapph.* 95 corresponds with *Trist.* 5.3.43 in more than half of the line, sharing the diction or phonemes "Huc ades . . . re- . . . nostros," and the concepts and structure "et / -que" and "pulcherrime / formose," its main debt is to that line.²⁹ *Trist.* 5.3 therefore joins in establishing a *terminus post quem* for *Ep. Sapph.* With a probable date for *Trist.* 5.3 of spring of 12 A.D.,³⁰ and for *Pont.*

²⁹Tarrant (art. cit. note 2 above) 145 argued the lateness of 95 on the claim that it is a conflation of *Met.* 7.813, "meque iuues intresque sinus, gratissima, nostros" and *Her.* 10.149, "flecte ratem, Theseu, uersoque relabere uento." We are not in contradiction, though by my standard, which requires normally at least three shared distinctive elements to prove a genetic relationship, he has not established his case for indebtedness to those sources. So *Ep. Sapph.* 95 *inque sinus* is not as close to *Met.* 7.813 *intresque sinus* as it is to *Met.* 4.596 *inque sinus* (therefore its resemblance to *intresque sinus* is not distinctive). I suppose that for the words *sinus* and *relabere*, which are not owed to *Trist.* 5.3, we may have a conflation of several passages. Tarrant's concern was with the play on *sinus* and the use of *relabere* without mention of a conveyance. But here his case is weak. There does seem to be a play on *sinus* in *Ars* 3.148, "sustineat similes fluctibus illa sinus"; and once there is a play, there is motivation for omission of a word for conveyance. Since *relabere* occurs in only two other Ovidian passages with comparable meaning, there are insufficient grounds to say that he would have included a word for conveyance.

³⁰The Liberalia was celebrated on March 17: see *Fasti* 3.713 ff. For the year, see Syme (note 25 above) 38-40: *Tristia* 4 records the winter of 10/11 (6.19) and the spring or summer of 11 (7.1); *Tristia* 5 was published later than 4 (5.1.1 f.); 5.10.1 records the passing of the winter of 11/12; *Pont.* 1-3 seem to start where the *Tristia* leaves off, and *Pont.* 1.8.27 f. record the autumn of 12. Therefore the spring of *Trist.* 5.3 would be the spring of 12.

2.10 of late 12, *Ep. Sapph.* could not predate the end of 12; in practice it would be unlikely to predate the end of 13, when the full collection of *Epistulae Ex Ponto* was published.

Tarrant (143) identified another imitation of the *Tristia* in *Ep. Sapph.* 79 f. His arguments ("The impression of fickleness . . . is at variance with the portrait of wounded constancy required by the context," therefore the passage is an imitation of *Trist.* 4.10.65 and *Am.* 2.4.10, "which between them contain all the elements of the couplet"; Ovid "does not elsewhere use *uiolabile*, and does not use *uiolo* in this metaphorical sense"; *leuibis telis* almost requires allusion to *Trist.* 4.10.65 to be understood) taken together are powerful, but individually are liable to challenge. A skeptic might argue that the poet intended the inconsistency in order to portray Sappho in love as irrational (the words after all are in her voice, not the poet's); that we cannot restrict the poet's coinage of new metaphors (though I myself believe that if the poet had coined it early in his career he would probably have repeated it later); and that though *leuibis telis* may suppose an allusion, we must eliminate the possibility that it is to a common source of *Ep. Sapph.* and *Trist.* 4.10.65. But we can confirm Tarrant's conclusion by tracing the genealogy of the lines in question.

Met. 12.767 *non agreste tamen nec inexpugnabile Amori*
pectus. . .

Trist. 4.10.65 *molle Cupidineis nec inexpugnabile telis*
cor mihi, quodque leuis causa moueret erat.

The later verse shares with the earlier the diction *nec inexpugnabile* and the concepts *Amori* = *Cupidineis telis* and *pectus* = *cor*, all in the same structure: therefore when *Ep. Sapph.* 79

molle meum leuibisque est cor uiolabile telis

shares with *Trist.* 4.10.65 the phonemes and concepts marked with boldface and Roman type (while sharing nothing with *Met.* 12.767 not shared with *Trist.* 4.10.65, and sharing much with the latter which is not in the former), it is because it derived these elements from that source. Again:

Am. 1.3.2 *aut amet aut facial cur ego semper amem*

Am. 2.4.10 *centum sunt causae cur ego semper amem*

Ep. Sapph. 80 *et semper causa est cur ego semper amem*

shows a progression from *Am.* 1.3.2 to 2.4.10 to *Ep. Sapph.* 80. Here we lack an element of diction shared by A and B but not C. Nevertheless if

we take it as improbable that the *Ep. Sapph.* was composed between Books 1 and 2 of the *Amores*, we can use the shared distinction of A and B here, that they both belong to the same work, as the needed common element shared by A and B versus C, and argue that if *Am.* 1.3.2 is earlier than 2.4.10,³¹ the latter is earlier than *Ep. Sapph.* 80.

In any argument from probability, quantity is important. As I have explained above (note 15) improbabilities grow by multiplication. Just as Tarrant's argument on the lateness of the above couplet is strengthened by the multiplied probability of his separate arguments, so the large probability inherent in his total argument must be multiplied by the large probability inherent in mine to produce a degree of probability which by now is astronomical. When we add the negative argument that not a single line of the poem, when examined either by Tarrant's method³² or by mine, gives evidence of earliness (and if I could find such evidence I would as cheerfully report it, and argue that the poem is a late revision of an early work), the combined probability that the poem is a late composition is overwhelming. Further, the unanimity of internal evidence indicates that the total poem is late. By tracing the genealogy of imitations, I have found lines 1-4, 73, 79, 80, 95 f. to be late. Arguing from different bases, Tarrant concluded the relative lateness of all but one of these (73, whose *sparsi sine lege* he believes a better use of diction than *Met.* 1.477's *positos sine lege*; I have argued above that both are appropriate to their respective contexts). Because of deviation from Ovid's practice in use of Ovid's diction, he argued as well the lateness³³ (indeed spuriousness) of 13, 14, 21, 26, 33, 34, 61-70, 83, 95,

³¹This has not been proven, but, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it has an inherently greater probability than the reverse. In fact we have cited above (note 28) evidence that *Am.* 3.2.46 is later than 1.6.54, and in a number of other poems the books of the *Amores* seem to follow a chronological sequence. The issue of the second edition of the *Amores* complicates all discussion, but *Am.* has not been suspected of being a later insertion. Since the lateness of the hexameter in *Ep. Sapph.* has already been shown, the burden of evidence borne by this issue is slight. What is most important is that the evidence of the pentameter does not conflict.

³²I mean the argument (owed to Axelson) that, of related uses of the same diction, the one that is less well integrated with its context or the less appropriate is the later. This argument can be used to detect early passages as well as late ones. His argument that some lines violate Ovid's metrical practice is not so ambivalent: it is hard to prove a line early by metrical practice.

³³Some of these lines are only shown to be later than the *Amores* or other *Heroides* (and the system which I use could add to that list); but, though these by themselves do not establish composition after Ovid's relegation, the consistent lack of evidence of earliness does so indicate.

99, 111-24, 134, 146, 155, 156, 157, 182, 193, 194, and 208. Fifty-one out of 220 lines show in varying degrees evidence of lateness; not a single line shows internal evidence of earliness. If any lines of the poem were early, where are they?

This last point is crucial. The main reason for belief in the poem's authenticity is that two verses of the *Amores* (2.18.26 and 34) contain references to such a work among the *Heroides*, not only such a poem composed by Ovid, but a reply quickly (*cito*) made to it and other poems by Sabinus. The verses clearly claim a Letter of Sappho as a work of Ovid's youth,³⁴ while the poem which we possess seems, for the reasons given by Tarrant and by myself, a product of a substantially later period. The quantity and unanimity of evidence pointing in this direction, with no internal evidence pointing to earliness, does not even permit us to argue that the extant poem is a revision of an earlier work (unlikely though such activity with amatory themes would be during Ovid's exile).³⁵ The extant poem then cannot be Ovid's.

Tarrant's solution was to brand as interpolations the references in *Amores* 2.18. But it seems hardly likely that an interpolator would center on this one, of all the poems in the corpus of the *Heroides* not specifically mentioned in *Amores* 2.18, and would not merely interpolate a reference to it, and to a response by Sabinus, but would remove two pentameters (26 and 34) referring to a genuine poem of Ovid, and a genuine reply by Sabinus. The only one with a motive for such interpolation would be the author of the extant *Ep. Sapph.* But how would such a forger be in a position to control the textual transmission of Ovid's *Amores*? And for the interpolation in the *Amores* to be credible in antiquity, it would be necessary to forge not only a Letter of Sappho in the style of Ovid, but a reply to Sappho in the style of Sabinus. Nor can I believe Tarrant's apparent suggestion (*HSCP* 151 f.) that the pentameters referring to the Letter of Sappho drove out pentameters referring to the Letter of Briseis to Achilles (*Her.* 3). Though this letter is undoubtedly genuine, Ovid had good reason based on effective rhetoric to omit mention of the poem. *Am.* 2.18 begins, "Carmen ad iratum dum tu perducis Achillen / primaque iuratis induis arma uiris, / nos, Macer, ignaua Veneris cessamus in umbra, / et tener ausuros grandia

³⁴Even the second edition of the *Amores* antedates *Ars* 3 (which mentions it; see art. cit. (note 5 above) note 1, in an upcoming issue of this journal), and that book can hardly postdate Ovid's relegation: *Ars* 3 is attested in *Trist.* 1.111-16 as composed before the relegation.

³⁵It would violate the rhetorical posture of his letters from exile.

frangit Amor." Achilles is the symbol of epic themes, contrasted with the amatory themes of the *Heroides*. Lest the symbols get confused, Ovid has avoided mention of Achilles in an amatory context. Tarrant also seems to forget or ignore the main reason why Heinsius placed the *Ep. Sapph.* (transmitted separately in our earliest mss.) at the end of the single poems of the *Heroides*: the pentameters referring to it are the last in the series for both Ovid's poems and Sabinus' replies, as references to *Her.* 1 are first in both lists. Whatever poem is referred to in the pentameters in question should, if not end the collection, at least follow in order the other poems mentioned. Therefore I think it more likely that, in the general suppression of Ovid's poetry that followed his exile, a genuine Letter of Sappho became lost, and a poet of the next generation, using the clues of *Amores* 2.18, and probably also the reply by Sabinus (if that was still extant), supplied the lack by a composition after the manner of Ovid.

Appendix:
Phoebe the Huntress

Daphne and Callisto are the first two heroines in the poem to choose a life of chastity; for both (described at the moment of attracting the amorous attention of a god) this is expressed as devotion to Diana, in both called Phoebe (there are six references to Phoebe in the poem, versus 25 to Diana), in both in the genitive case (the first two occurrences of *Phoebes* in the poem; the only other occurrence is at 12.36, in a much different context; elsewhere in Ovid it is found only in *Fasti* 5.306; by comparison, *Phoebes* never occurs in Vergil's works, a body of poetry slightly larger than the *Metamorphoses*). In view of the proximity of the occurrences, since 1.476 is indisputably genuine, 2.415 must have arisen under its influence—unless, that is, someone would argue that 1.476 is later than 2.415; but then he would have to deal with my other arguments for order of composition.

In fact, *Met.* 1.476 seems to mark the first occurrence of the form *Phoebes* referring to Diana in extant literature. The earliest attestation of *Phoebe* meaning Diana is in Latin poetry; for Hesiod and other Greek poets, Phoebe was a different goddess. The name does not occur at all in Catullus, though his poem 34 is a hymn to Diana which addresses her by many other names: Diana, Latonia, Lucina, Trivia, Luna. It is lacking in Ennius, Lucretius, Tibullus, Horace (who uses

Diana, Delia, Genitalis, Ilithya, Lucina, Noctiluca), while in Propertius (1.2.15), as in *Her.* 8.77 and *Ars* 1.679, Phoebe is only the daughter of Leucippus, and the genitive is not found. In Vergil, Phoebe occurs twice (*G.* 1.431 and *Aen.* 10.216), both times as the moon, an etymologically appropriate aspect for that eponym; in the story of Camilla (similar in her devotion to Diana, hunting, and chastity) Vergil uses only Diana and Latonia. The Ovidian corpus (including spuria) has 17 occurrences of the name, most of them (as *Met.* 1.11) referring to the moon. Since I take *Her.* 20 (19) to be late, if not spurious, the earliest reference to Diana the huntress under the eponym Phoebe seems to be *Amores* 3.2.51, "auguribus Phoebus adsit, Phoebe uenantibus adsit": here too the use is appropriate, playing on her status as sister of Phoebus. The next occurrence is *Met.* 1.476; here again, there is appropriateness in the use: devotion to Phoebe balances rejection of Phoebus (1.452, 463). In the next book comes the third attested occurrence of Phoebe the huntress, 2.415, and the first "inappropriate" use. For Phoebe is now simply *variatio* for Diana; Callisto is pursued by Jupiter, and Diana's aspect as neither moon nor sister of Phoebus is evoked (in sequence the use is not really inappropriate, because the concepts of hunting and chastity now inhere in the eponym as a result of the reader's experience of 1.476; but that requires recognition of the priority of 1.476). Since *Phoebe* up to now has rarely occurred in literature with reference to Diana, and these two occurrences mark two of the first three references to Diana as huntress, and the very first two occurrences of the form *Phoebes*, and they are there combined within a short space in the same poem, in stories of similar theme, for similar functions, it would push the laws of probability to the limits if there were not a genetic connection between the two. By the principle that of two related passages the one in which shared diction is used with less appropriateness is the imitation, *Met.* 2.415 is the imitation, and later.

The next occurrence in Ovid of Phoebe seems to be *Fasti* 2.41, also in the story of Callisto. The passage shares much common diction with *Met.* 2.409 ff., though the events that such shared diction describes are generally very different (and so the shared diction is not simply the inevitable way to describe the same events). Compare *Fasti* 2.163-65, "mi/le feras **Phoebe siluis uenata redibat** / aut plus aut **medium sole** tenente diem; **ut tetigit lucum**" with *Met.* 2.415, "**miles Phoebes**," 432 "**uenata . . . silua**," 409 "**redit**," 417 "**medio . . . sol . . . cum subit illa nemus**" (note that the form *uenata* occurs in Ovid only in these two passages). Compare also *Fasti* 2.170, "hanc **pudet**, et tardae dat mala

STATIUS *SILVAE* 1.4 UND C. RUTILIUS GALLICUS ALS PROCONSUL ASIAE II*

Als Rutilius Gallicus im J. 92 n. Chr. starb, hatte er alles erreicht, was die Stellung eines Senators in der Öffentlichkeit der frühen Kaiserzeit bestimmte. Zwei Inschriften aus Augusta Taurinorum bezeugen seinen 2. Konsulat.¹ Statius spricht in *Silvae* 1.4.90 ff. in panegyrischen Worten von seiner Stadtpräfektur, die ihm Domitian übertragen hatte. Und auch in zwei Priesterschaften, bei den *sodales Augustales* und den *pontifices*, war er Mitglied geworden.² Seneca charakterisiert *De ira* 3.31.2 einen unzufriedenen Standesgenossen mit den Worten: "Dedit (sc. imperator) mihi praeturam, sed consulatum speraveram, dedit duodecim fasces, sed non fecit ordinarium consulem; a me numerari voluit annum, sed deest mihi ad sacerdotium; cooptatus in collegium sum, sed cur in unum?" Solche Klagen hätten von Rutilius Gallicus nicht kommen können.

Über seine Person sind wir dank des Genesungsgedichtes, das Statius geschrieben hat, relativ gut und ausführlich informiert, zumal verschiedene Inschriften, darunter eine ephesische mit seiner Laufbahn bis zur Designation zum 1. Konsulat, unsere Kenntnisse zusätzlich erweitern.

Einige Verse des Statius haben freilich bisher keine befriedigende Interpretation gefunden, obwohl sie, wie zu zeigen sein wird, für die Charakterisierung des Gallicus von erheblicher Bedeutung sind.³ Nach der Schilderung seiner militärischen Tätigkeit in Pannonien und in verschiedenen Gegenden Kleinasien⁴ (wobei die chronologische

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¹ *CIL* V 6988, 6989.

² *AE* 1920, 55 = *D.* 9499 = *I. Eph.* III 715; *CIL* VI 1984 = *D.* 5025; *CIL* VIII 14882, 23084, 25967 = *D.* 5955; G. di Vita-Evrard, *QAL* 10, 1979, 77 ff.

³ Zuletzt darüber mit einem Teil der Literatur A. Hardie, *Statius and the "Silvae"* (Liverpool 1983) 187 ff. (zitiert Hardie). Die m.W. ausführlichsten Interpretationen bei F. Vollmer, *P. Papini Statii Silvarum Libri* (Leipzig 1898) 281 ff. bes. 290 f.; E. Groag, *RE* I A (1914) 1255 ff.

⁴ Statius, *Silv.* 1.4.72 ff.

Reihenfolge keineswegs völlig eingehalten ist)⁵, folgen 4 Verse, die insgesamt eine sehr eigenwillige und nicht zutreffende Auslegung erfahren haben:

80 ff. Quid geminos fasces magnaeque iterata revolvam
iura Asiae? velit illa quidem ter habere quaterque
hunc sibi, sed revocant fasti maiorque curulis
nec permissa (*oder promissa*) semel.

An diese Verse wird sodann die Schilderung des Sonderauftrags des Rutilius in Africa (der nunmehr genau ins J. 74 datiert werden kann)⁶, seine Statthalterschaft in Niedergermanien und die Stadtpräfektur angeschlossen.

Das Gedicht des Statius ist frühestens im J. 88 geschrieben worden, da die Säkularspiele Domitians bereits gefeiert sind (17 f. 96 f.). Nimmt man dieses Datum ernst, dann ist es auffällig, daß nach der allgemein akzeptierten Interpretation der 2. Konsulat, der unzweifelhaft neben der Stadtpräfektur für Rutilius Gallicus die höchste Anerkennung seiner Bedeutung darstellte, in dem Gedicht nicht erwähnt worden ist. E. Groag, der unter historischem Gesichtspunkt die letzte ausführliche Untersuchung des Gedichtes geliefert hat, zog aus dieser Beobachtung den aus seiner Kenntnis richtigen Schluß, daß das Gedicht des Statius im J. 89 abgefaßt worden sein müsse, nach den Säkularspielen und vor dem 2. Konsulat, da nach dem Quellenmaterial, das im J. 1914, als Groag seinen *RE*-Artikel schrieb, bekannt war, Gallicus nur im J. 90 consul II gewesen sein konnte.⁷

Im einzelnen sollen hier nicht die früheren Behandlungen des Statiusgedichtes vorgeführt werden, da, soweit ich sehe, alle späteren Interpretationen auf den Ausführungen Groags beruhen⁸, der seinerseits zum Teil auf Fr. Vollmer zurückgeht.⁹ Dieser verstand in seinem *Silvae*-Kommentar Zeile 82 f. als Erwähnung des ersten Konsulats (*revocant fasti*); die Designation zum zweiten sei mit *maiorque curulis nec pro-*

⁵ Statius spricht zunächst von Galatien, dann von Pannonien und schließlich von Armenien; vgl. dagegen die Inschrift u.S. □.

⁶ Statius, *Silv.* 1.4.83 ff.; G. di Vita-Evrard, *QAL* 10 (1979) 77.

⁷ E. Groag, *RE* I A 1261.

⁸ Vgl. zuletzt Hardie 187 ff.; vgl. aber z.B. auch J. Nicols, *Vespasian and the Partes Flavianae* (Wiesbaden 1978) 121 f.; B. W. Jones, *Domitian and the Senatorial Order. A Prosopographical Study of Domitian's Relationship with the Senate, A.D. 81-96* (Philadelphia 1979) 7.

⁹ F. Vollmer 290 f.

missa semel ausgesprochen gewesen. Die beiden vorausgehenden Verse bezog er jedoch auf die Stadtprätur (*geminos fascēs*)¹⁰ und eine zweijährige *legatio* unter dem Prokonsul von Asien. Der Deutung der Verse auf den ersten Konsulat und auf die zweijährige *legatio* stimmte Groag durchaus zu, doch lehnte er die Erwähnung der Stadtprätur ab. Denn inzwischen war eine ephesische Inschrift gefunden worden, die keine Spezifizierung der Prätur erkennen ließ. Sie zeigte freilich auch, daß sich Statius keineswegs streng an die Reihenfolge der Ämter gehalten, sondern sich durchaus die eine oder andere Umstellung erlaubt hatte. So spielte er z.B. auf das Legionskommando in Pannonien erst nach dem ersten Hinweis auf seine Tätigkeit in Galatien an. Der Text der Inschrift aber zeigt die umgekehrte Reihenfolge:¹¹

- C. Rutilio C.f.
 Stel(latina) Gallico
 trib. mil. leg. XIII
 4 Geminæ, q., aedili curuli,
 legato divi Claudii leg. XV
 Apollinaris, pr., legato
 provinciae Galaticae,
 8 sodali Augustali
 consuli designato,
 M. Aemilius M. f. Pal.
 Pius praef. coh. I Bosp.
 12 et coh. I Hisp. legato

Dieses epigraphische Zeugnis aber war nun für Groag eine zusätzliche Bestätigung für die etwa bei Vollmer formulierte Behauptung, die *iterata iura Asiae* würden eine zweijährige *legatio* unter dem Prokonsul dieser Provinz bedeuten. In diesem Sinn nämlich verstand Groag die getrennte Anführung von *legato* am Ende der Inschrift. Da die Inschrift aus Ephesus, der Provinzhauptstadt Asiens, kam, sollte damit das Amt eines prokonsularen Legaten gemeint gewesen sein.¹² Diese Interpretation hätte eigentlich von Anfang an nicht überzeugen dürfen. Denn diese prokonsuläre *legatio* hätte dann innerhalb des Cursus vor der Erwähnung der Designation zum Konsulat und auch mit einer

¹⁰ Diese Deutung basiert auf Th. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* I³ 384 Anm. 2.

¹¹ *AE* 1920, 55 = *D.* 9499 = *I. Eph.* III 715.

¹² E. Groag, *RE* I A 1258; ders., *Serta Hoffilleriana* (Zagreb 1940) 217 f. gestützt auch durch E. Ritterling, *JRS* 17 (1927) 29 f. So zuletzt auch A. R. Birley in seiner Rezension des Buches von A. Hardie, *LCM* 9.2 (1984) 27 (dankenswerter Hinweis von St. Mitchell).

Iterationsziffer erscheinen müssen. Schließlich wäre Gallicus schon in seinem zweiten Amtsjahr als Legat gewesen, da bereits die Designation zum Konsulat angeführt wurde. Dies spricht somit gegen die *legatio*. Zudem aber war der Dedikant M. Aemilius Pius Präfekt zweier Kohorten, der *coh. I Hispanorum* und der *coh. I Bosporanorum*, die weit eher in einer kaiserlichen Provinz stationiert gewesen sein können,¹³ da Truppen in Senatsprovinzen insgesamt sehr selten gewesen sind. Und Rutilius war vor seinem Konsulat prätorischer Legat in Galatien. Tatsächlich bezeugt auch ein erst 1959 publizierter Text aus Olbasa im galatischen Pisidien die Anwesenheit der *coh. I Hispanorum* in dieser Provinz und nicht in Asia.¹⁴ Damit ist die ephesische Inschrift als zusätzliches Argument für Groags Interpretation entfallen.

Was besagen dann die oben zitierten Verse des Statius? Zunächst fragt der Dichter, weshalb er auf die *geminos fasces* zu sprechen kommen solle oder auf das zweimalige Amt der Rechtsprechung in der großen Asia. Freilich möchte jene (nämlich die Provinz Asia) ihn (Rutilius Gallicus) für sich noch ein drittes und ein viertes Mal haben, d.h. für ein drittes und viertes Jahr, aber die Jahreslisten (der Konsuln) und die bedeutendere *sella curulis*, die ihm nicht nur einmal zugestanden worden sei, riefen ihn zurück.

Mommsen hatte die *gemiini fasces* auf die Stadtprätur bezogen, doch deuten alle anderen Zeugnisse darauf hin, daß der Stadtprätor sechs fasces hatte.¹⁵ Eine Nennung der Prätur hat also auszuschneiden. Vielmehr hat man zunächst einmal davon auszugehen, daß die fasces,

¹³So schon W. Wagner, *Die Dislokation der römischen Auxiliarformationen in den Provinzen Noricum, Pannonien, Moesien und Dakien von Augustus bis Gallienus* (Berlin 1938) 18 Anm. 67; W. Eck, *Chiron* 12 (1982) 432.

¹⁴G. E. Bean, *AS* 10 (1959) 43 ff. nr. 51 = *AE* 1961, 17 = M. Speidel, in: *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia*, ed. St. Mitchell, *BAR Int. Ser.* 156 (1983) 14 f. (dankenswerter Hinweis von St. Mitchell).

¹⁵Samter, *RE* VI 2003 f. mit besonderem Verweis auf Cass. Dio 53.13. Unverständlich ist, weshalb jüngst H. Gabelmann, *Antike Audienz- und Tribunalszenen* (Darmstadt 1984) 159 ff. das eindeutige Zeugnis von *sellae curules* mit 6 dargestellten Likatoren auf Grabmälern verwirft, indem er die Situation für möglich hält, daß in der konkreten Wirklichkeit neben dem Prätor nur 2 Likatoren standen, während gleichzeitig die bei einer Gerichtsverhandlung Anwesenden auf den *sellae curules* sechs Likatoren erblickten. Zwar ist es vorstellbar, in einer Reliefszene weniger Likatoren abzubilden, da es genügen konnte, durch den Typus der Herrschaftszeichen eine Szene mit einem Imperiumsträger zu charakterisieren. Eine größere Zahl von Likatoren, als einem Prätor in Wirklichkeit zustanden, aber hätte man als usurpatorische Maßnahme verstehen müssen. Die 6 Likatoren sind daher als die reale Ausstattung von Prätores anzusehen — wenn sich die Denkmäler auf diese Magistrate beziehen.

wenn sie nicht in besonderer Weise charakterisiert sind, die Abzeichen der Oberbeamten, der Konsuln, waren, weshalb man *fasces* hier als Chiffre für den Konsulat zu verstehen hat, nicht jedoch als Hinweis auf nur *zwei* Liktores mit den Rutenbündeln. Denn in diesem unmittelbaren Verständnis ergäbe vor allem *geminus* keinen Sinn; zwei *fasces* können kein Hinweis auf den Konsulat, aber auch auf kein anderes Amt sein, das an dieser Stelle des Gedichtes erwartet werden kann.¹⁶ Auf den Konsulat aber mußte Statius auf jeden Fall zu sprechen kommen. Versteht man aber eben *fasces*, wie es ganz üblich ist, als Chiffre, dann ist *geminus* = zwei oder doppelt gerade im Fall des Rutilius Gallicus sehr präzise: Es sind damit zwei Konsulate gemeint.

Oben war nun schon erwähnt worden, daß Rutilius Gallicus, durch von Statius unabhängige Zeugnisse belegt, einen 2. Konsulat erhalten hat. Wie wissen heute, daß dieser vor das Jahr 86 fällt und fast mit Sicherheit ins Jahr 85 gehört,¹⁷ also auf jeden Fall vor das J. 88, in dem frühestens Statius das Gedicht geschrieben haben kann. Dann muß man aber fordern, daß der Dichter diese Tatsache nicht übergangen hat, da der 2. Konsulat ein absolut wesentliches Element zur Kennzeichnung des Gallicus war. In *CIL* V 6988 wird *cos. II* als einziges Amt angeführt, es genügte als Aussage für die Charakterisierung der Stellung des Senators. Statius hat sich zwar nicht auf ein einzelnes hohes Amt beschränkt, aber auch er konnte dieses Faktum eines 2. Konsulats nicht übergangen; vielmehr verwies er darauf mit der Formulierung *gemini fasces*. Nur hat er nicht in der Art einer Cursusinschrift sklavisch einen amtlichen Auftrag nach dem anderen angeführt, sondern die beiden Konsulate zusammengefaßt, so daß er später an der chronologisch richtigen Stelle nicht mehr darauf zurückkommen mußte. Dies wäre für den Dichter vielleicht auch einigermaßen schwierig gewesen, da der 2. Konsulat mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit während der Stadtpräfektur übertragen wurde. Sie aber war der Höhepunkt, mit dem die Aufzählung der Ämter am besten abgeschlossen werden konnte. Damit ist zunächst einmal festzuhalten, daß bereits mit *gemini fasces* die beiden Konsulate, die Gallicus erhalten hat, gemeint sind.

Anschließend an die beiden Konsulate werden von Statius die *iterata . . . iura Asiae* genannt. Wenn man nicht auf das Amt eines prokonsularen Legaten fixiert ist, und wenn man bedenkt, daß Statius

¹⁶ Zudem ist die Prätur, da sie für jeden Senator notwendige Stufe ist, wenig distinktiv gewesen, so daß es keinen Grund gab, sie im Gedicht besonders zu erwähnen; auch Quästur und curulische Ädilität werden von Statius übergangen.

¹⁷ Zuletzt F. Zevi, *RSA* 3 (1973) 104 ff. = *AE* (1975) 131.

keineswegs streng chronologisch beschreibt (die Nennung beider Konsulate in Zeile 80 ist ein zusätzlicher Beweis für dieses Faktum), dann kann es gar keinen Zweifel daran geben, daß mit *iterata . . . iura Asiae* ein Prokonsulat in der Provinz Asia gemeint ist, der, anders als üblich, zwei Jahre dauerte. Doch ist diese Verdoppelung der Amtszeit kein Grund, an der vorgeschlagenen Interpretation zu zweifeln, da solche Fälle immer wieder vorgekommen sind. Am Anfang der vespasianischen Regierungszeit war Epruius Marcellus sogar für drei Jahre, ebenfalls in der Provinz Asia, Prokonsul, und C. Arinius Modestus leitete für zwei Jahre die Senatsprovinz Creta-Cyrene.¹⁸

Daß der Dichter für die Kennzeichnung dieser Statthalterschaft gerade den Begriff *iura* wählte, ist keineswegs verwunderlich. Schließlich war die Rechtsprechung, nachdem die normale militärische Funktion des Prokonsuls zwar nicht durch eine offizielle Beschränkung, aber durch die faktische Situation unbedeutend geworden war, das zentrale Element seiner Tätigkeit. Dem dienten insbesondere die Reisen zu den einzelnen Conventsorten.¹⁹ Natürlich hatten auch die Legaten des Prokonsuls vor allem richterliche Aufgaben,²⁰ aber die Möglichkeit dieser Deutung ist ohnehin nicht gegeben. Im übrigen dürfte der Ausdruck *iura* auch deswegen auf die Stellung des Prokonsuls und nicht auf die untergeordnete Position eines Legaten gemünzt sein, weil Statius diesen Begriff ebenso für die Charakterisierung der Tätigkeit des Rutilius Gallicus als *praefectus urbi* anwendet.²¹ In beiden Fällen handelt es sich um den eigentlichen Träger der Rechtsprechung, nicht um jemanden, an den die Rechtsprechung nur delegiert ist, und der sie nicht in vollem Umfang ausüben kann.

Die Interpretation der Verse 80/81 auf einen doppelten Konsulat und einen zweijährigen Prokonsulat wird nun durch die Zeilen 81–83 gestützt. Statius behauptet, die Provinz habe Gallicus gerne noch für ein drittes oder viertes Jahr als ihren Statthalter gewünscht, allein die Aufnahme in die Liste der Konsuln und eine bedeutendere *sella curulis* hätten ihn zurückgerufen. Und entscheidend, diese *sella* sei ihm nicht nur einmal zugestanden worden.

In der Textüberlieferung gibt es dabei zwei Varianten: *permissa* und *promissa*.²² Häufig fiel in der Gestaltung des Textes die Ent-

¹⁸ W. Eck, *Chiron* 12 (1982) 287 ff.

¹⁹ Vgl. etwa G. Burton, *JRS* 65 (1975) 92 ff.

²⁰ Siehe *Dig.* 1.16.

²¹ Statius, *Silv.* 1.4.12.

²² *Permissa* in Codex G, getilgt durch G¹; *promissa* in MA.

scheidung für *promissa*,²³ was etwa bei der Position Groags nur logisch war. Denn eine *sella curulis*, die nicht nur einmal, sondern zweimal zugestanden worden war, hätte natürlich bereits die *Übernahme* des 2. Konsulats impliziert, was nach Groag ja aber eben nicht der Fall gewesen sein konnte. Gerade diese Voraussetzung ist nun aber ins Gegenteil gewendet, der 2. Konsulat war in der Laufbahn des Gallicus Tatsache geworden, womit auch *permissa* seinen zutreffenden Sinn erhält. Im übrigen war damit eine Verbeugung des Statius vor dem Kaiser verbunden, von dem die Gewährung ausgegangen war.

Diese Kombination zwischen dem angeblichen Wunsch der Provinzialen auf einen über 2 Jahre hinaus verlängerten Prokonsulat des Gallicus und der Rückkehr nach Rom zur Übernahme eines zweiten Konsulats, der in der Formulierung *geminos fasces* schon enthalten war, worauf aber jetzt wegen der Besonderheit der Auszeichnung durch *maior curulis*, das ein untechnischer Ausdruck ist, nochmals verstärkt hingewiesen wird, paßt nun auch bestens zur Chronologie, die sich für den Prokonsulat ergibt. In den Jahren 79/80 und 80/81 sind M. Ulpus Traianus und C. Laecanius Bassus Caecina Paetus als Prokonsuln in Asien sicher bezeugt.²⁴ Sie waren Konsuln mit aller Wahrscheinlichkeit in den Jahren 70 und 71. Aus diesen beiden Beispielen ergibt sich, daß das Intervall zwischen Konsulat und Prokonsulat am Ende der vespasianischen Zeit rund 9 Jahre betrug. Unter Domitian ist die Spanne zwischen beiden Ämtern langsam angestiegen. Nun muß Rutilius Gallicus auf jeden Fall vor dem Jahr 74 die fasces geführt haben,²⁵ entsprechend der Abfolge der consules II im J. 85 (siehe unten) wohl sogar vor 73. Andererseits aber wird der Konsulat, nach allem was wir sonst über seine frühe Laufbahn wissen, in die vespasianische Zeit gehören, nicht etwa bereits in die Zeit vor dem Jahr 69, womit fast notwendigerweise ein Prokonsulat in Asia nach Ulpus Traianus und Laecanius Bassus verbunden sein muß, da sonst das Intervall allzu kurz geworden wäre. Außerdem dürfte Gallicus bis ins Jahr 78 hinein das niedergermanische Heer kommandiert haben. Damit ist aber erst ein Prokonsulat unter Domitian möglich. Die Jahre 81/82–83/84 sind in den Fasten der Pro-

²³ So bei Vollmer (1898), in der Loebausgabe von J. H. Mozley (1928), bei H. Clouard (1943), bei H. Frère und H. J. Izaac (1944), F. Sbordone (1960). *Permissa* z. B. in der *Teubneriana* von A. Klotz (1911), in der *Oxoniensis* von I. S. Phillimore (1917) und in der neuen Teubnerausgabe von A. Marastoni (1970²).

²⁴ W. Eck, *Chiron* 12 (1982) 302 ff.

²⁵ Als er in Africa als *legatus* im J. 74 wirkte, war er bereits Konsul gewesen; zuletzt G. di Vita-Evrard, *QAL* 10 (1979) 77 ff.

vinz Asia am Anfang der domitianischen Regierungszeit noch offen, im Jahr 84/85 amtierte nach allem, was uns heute an Zeugnissen zur Verfügung steht, Sex. Iulius Frontinus in der Provinz.²⁶ Anschließend ist keine Lücke mehr frei, die zwei Jahre betragen würde.²⁷ Somit deutet alles darauf hin, den zweijährigen Prokonsulat des Rutilius Gallicus in diese erste Zeit Domitians zu datieren. Wenn man die beiden Amtsjahre des Rutilius Gallicus in 82/83 und 83/84 setzt, kann man davon ausgehen, daß die Designation zum 2. Konsulat bereits bekannt war, als er im Sommer nach dem Ende der Statthalterschaft im Juli nach Rom zurückkehrte. Darin könnte die Behauptung des Statius: *revocant fasti maiorque curulis* ihren konkreten Ausgangspunkt gehabt haben. Freilich, auch 81/82–82/83 bleibt als Amtszeit durchaus möglich.

Groag hatte in seiner Behandlung der Laufbahn des Rutilius Gallicus bemerkt: "An der Losung zum Prokonsulate von Asia oder Africa, die R. nach seiner consularischen Anciennität gebührt hätte, . . . wird er sich—ob schon auf Grund seiner Stadtpräfektur? . . . —nicht beteiligt haben."²⁸ Die Interpretation des Statiusgedichtes zeigt, daß es gerade umgekehrt war und Rutilius Gallicus sogar für zwei Amtsjahre in Asia geblieben ist. Mit der Stadtpräfektur trat deshalb kaum eine Kollision ein, weil [--] tius Pegasus zumindest noch Anfang des Jahres 83 dieses Amt führte.²⁹ Wenn die später übliche Praxis, daß die Stadtpräfekten bald nach dem Beginn ihrer Tätigkeit mit einem 2. Konsulat ausgezeichnet wurden, damals schon üblich war, könnte man davon ausgehen, daß die Präfektur kurz vor 85, dem Jahr des 2. Konsulats des Gallicus, begann, was mit der vorgeschlagenen Datierung des Prokonsulats von Sommer 82 bis Sommer 84 zusammenstimmen würde.

Schließlich läßt sich nunmehr auch der erste Konsulat des Rutilius Gallicus mit weitgehender Präzision bestimmen. C. Laecanius Bassus Caecina Paetus, der entweder unmittelbar vor Gallicus oder, eher durch ein Intervall von einem Jahr von ihm getrennt, 80/81 die Provinz Asia leitete, war nach den überzeugenden Argumenten von T. V. Buttrey im J. 70 Suffektkonsul.³⁰ Damit sollte Gallicus, da im allgemeinen die Anciennität bei der Zulassung zur Losung um den Prokonsulat

²⁶ W. Eck, *Chiron* 12 (1982) 305 ff.; *Chiron* 13 (1983) 208.

²⁷ W. Eck, *Chiron* 13 (1983) 214.

²⁸ *RE* I A 1260.

²⁹ E. Champlin, *ZPE* 32 (1978) 269 ff.

³⁰ T. V. Buttrey, *Documentary Evidence for the Chronology of the Flavian Titulature* (Meisenheim 1980) 12; W. Eck, *ZPE* 45 (1982) 145 f.

eingehalten wurde, erst nach Laecanius Bassus die fasces geführt haben.

Ein weiterer Fixpunkt ergibt sich aus der Abfolge der consules II im J. 85, die wohl in dieser Form zu rekonstruieren ist:³¹

Domitian XI, T. Aurelius Fulvus II
C. Rutilius Gallicus II, L. Valerius Catullus II
M. Arrecinus Clemens II, L. Baebius Honoratus

Die ersten Konsulate dieser Konsuln sind folgendermaßen zu bestimmen:

T. Aurelius Fulvus, ornamenta consularia 69, möglicherweise Suffektkonsul 70/71
C. Rutilius Gallicus, Suffektkonsul nach 70 (?)
L. Valerius Catullus, cos. ord. 73
M. Arrecinus Clemens, Suffektkonsul 73.

Die Reihenfolge im J. 85 scheint der Anciennität zu entsprechen, insbesondere deutet darauf das zeitliche Nacheinander von Valerius Catullus und Arrecinus Clemens im J. 73, das sich im J. 85 wiederholt, hin. Der *consul ordinarius* von 73 wird 85 früher *consul II* als der *suffectus* von 73. Dann müßte aber Rutilius Gallicus mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit vor dem J. 73 Suffektkonsul gewesen sein, da er während des 2. Konsulats offensichtlich die 1. Stelle vor Valerius Catullus eingenommen hat, der am 1. Januar 73 die *fasces* erhalten hatte. Ob sein Konsulatsjahr 71 oder, was wahrscheinlich ist, 72 war, kann erst ein weiteres Dokument klären.

Daß Rutilius Gallicus in der domitianischen Zeit zu den wichtigsten Trägern vom Kaiser übertragener Macht gehörte, war auch bisher schon durch seinen 2. Konsulat und durch die Stadtpräфекtur klar gewesen. Die außergewöhnliche Übertragung des Prokonsulats in Asia für zwei Jahre verstärkt diesen Eindruck. Außerdem zeigt dieses Faktum unabhängig von dem Eindruck, den Statius insgesamt vermittelt, zusätzlich, daß Domitian ihn als absolut zuverlässig und vertrauenswürdig erachtete. Denn wenn nach Tacitus Agricola nur durch den indirekt übermittelten Druck des Kaisers auf die Losung um den Prokonsulat verzichtete³², dann war auch die Verlängerung der Statthalterschaft in

³¹ Vgl. oben Anm. 17.

³² Tac. *Agr.* 42.1.

Asia über das übliche eine Jahr hinaus nur auf direkten Wunsch des Herrschers möglich. Einen besonderen Grund für die Verdoppelung der Amtszeit nennt Statius freilich nicht. Daß er ihn gekannt hat, ist nicht unbedingt wahrscheinlich.

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JONATHAN AND LATE SPARTA

An intriguing point of contact between Hellenic and Judaic civilizations, though not central, is the curious correspondence reported in I *Maccabees* to have been conducted between Sparta and Jerusalem, in which it is asserted that the Spartans and the Jews have a common ancestry, from Abraham.¹ By the nature of things, many scholars were attracted to the issue, and the very incredibility of the substance of the correspondence led many to doubt or deny its authenticity. It is the object of this note, however, not to examine yet again the question of au-

¹A version of this study appeared in the privately circulated collection of studies presented to Professor Benjamin Shimron of Tel Aviv University on the occasion of his retirement.

"It is a hard and ungrateful task to wade through the vast literature dealing with this problem." M. S. Ginsburg, "Sparta and Judea," *CP* 29 (1934) 117-22 at 118. Bibliography is available particularly in C. L. W. Grimm, *Kurtzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen des Alten Testaments, III: Das erste Buch der Maccabäer* (Leipzig 1853) 184-91; R. Marcus in *Josephus VII: Jewish Antiquities XII-XIV* (Loeb Classical Library) (Cambridge, Mass. and London 1943) Appendix F, 769; F. M. Abel, *Les Livres des Maccabees* (Paris 1949) 231-33, a particularly useful summary of the various positions taken during the previous generation; B. Cardauns, "Juden und Spartaner," *Hermes* 95 (1967) 317-24 at 317, n. 1. To the works referred to in the above may be added Z. Zebelev, "Jews and Spartans" (in Russian), *Comptes-Rendus de l'Academie des Sciences de l'U.R.S.S.* (1928) 65-70 (not seen); S. Schuller, "Some Problems Connected with the Supposed Common Ancestry of Jews and Spartans and their Relations during the Last Three Centuries B.C.," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 1 (1956) 257-68; Y. Gutman, *The Beginnings of Jewish-Hellenistic Literature* I (Jerusalem 1958) 108-11 (in Hebrew); Moses Hadas, *Hellenistic Culture: Fusion and Diffusion* (New York 1959) 84-87; Angelo Penna, "Διοθήκη ε συνθήκη nei libri dei Maccabei," *Biblica* 46 (1965) 149-80 at 154-55; Wolf Wirgin, "Judah Maccabee's Embassy to Rome and the Jewish-Roman Treaty," *PEQ* 101 (1969) 15-20; M. Stern, *The Documents on the History of the Hasmonean Revolt with a Commentary and Introductions* (second edition) (Tel Aviv 1972) 91 ff. (in Hebrew); M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period* (London and Philadelphia 1974) I 72 and II 50-51; A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization* (Cambridge 1975) 113-14; Alfred R. C. Leaney, "Greek Manuscripts from the Judean Desert," in J. K. Elliott, ed., *Studies in New Testament Language and Text—Essays in Honour of George D. Kilpatrick. Supplements to Novum Testamentum* 44 (1976) 283-300 at 284; Joseph Sievers, *The Hasmoneans and Their Supporters from Mattathias to John Hyrcanus I* (Diss., Columbia University, 1981) 148-49. By far the fullest and best discussion of the text is J. A. Goldstein, *I Maccabees. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Anchor Bible, 41) (Garden City, N.Y. 1976) 444-62.

thenticity, but rather, assuming the authenticity of Jonathan's letter, to inquire into his motives for sending it.²

At *I Macc.* 12 we are told that Jonathan, the brother and successor of Judah Maccabee, in about 143 B.C., after his victory in the plain of Asor, sent emissaries to Rome and to Sparta "to confirm and renew friendship." The text of the letter to be delivered at Sparta, though not the one to Rome, is given in full (12.6-23). In it Jonathan refers to a letter he says was sent by Areus, king of Sparta, to Onias the High Priest, to the effect that the two people are kinsmen.³ Though the Jews, continues Jonathan, are in no need of military aid, having the aid which comes from heaven, they do wish to renew the pledge of brotherhood. Although the Spartan initiative had gone unanswered for a long time, the Jews have not forgotten their kinsmen and regularly offer sacrifices and prayers on their behalf. Now that the wars, in which the Jews avoided involving their allies, are over, they wish to renew the offer of brotherhood.⁴ To this letter is appended that of Areus to Onias (12.20-23) in which the king asserts that it has been found in a document concerning the Spartans and the Jews that they are brothers and of the family of Abraham. The king asks that the Jews write "about their welfare," and offers that "your cattle and property are ours, and ours are yours."⁵ To Jonathan's letter the Spartans replied in a short letter (14.20-23) addressed to Simon, who had meanwhile succeeded his brother Jonathan, indicating that the emissaries were received and their message deposited in the public archive.

What, then, were Jonathan's motives in raising the matter of com-

²I refer the reader to the argument in favor of authenticity presented by Goldstein (note 1 above). Most scholars during the last half century have given more credence to Jonathan's letter than to Areus'. Though personally convinced by Goldstein's arguments in favor of Areus' letter as well, my argument here concerns the letter of Jonathan, and only *its* authenticity is assumed. What follows, then, is indeed hypothetical, but the hypothesis is, I believe, not unreasonable.

³"Dareius" of the manuscripts is an obvious, and apparently ancient, mistake for Areus. Cf. Josephus *AJ* 12.225 and 13.167. Grimm (note 1 above) 185. Of the two Spartan kings of that name, Areus II died a minor in 254 and is probably to be excluded. Areus I, who is no doubt intended, reigned from 309 to 265 B.C. and is remarkable for a rather idiosyncratic rule. V. Ehrenberg, s.v. Sparta (Geschichte), *RE* III A 1425. Of several high priests named Onias, most modern scholars identify as the recipient of the letter Onias I, end of the fourth century. Stern (note 1 above) prefers Onias II, whom he dates c. 270, in contrast to the more common opinion dating him to the second half of the third century. Josephus *AJ* 12.225 assigns the letter to Onias III.

⁴An amplified version of the letter is given by Josephus *AJ* 13.166-70.

⁵A version is given by Josephus *AJ* 12.226-27.

mon ancestry a century or more after Areus' letter? Scholars who doubted or denied the authenticity of the letter of course saw no need to explain the motives in events which they believed did not take place. In fact, the lack of apparent motive has served as an argument against authenticity.⁶ Of the scholars who did consider the letter authentic, some suggested that Jonathan, despite his assertions to the contrary, was preparing the way for a military alliance.⁷ It is difficult, however, to imagine that Jonathan would have considered Sparta, weak and distant, a substantial military ally. It has been suggested that the letter was a gesture to a friendly country with a Jewish community.⁸ However, there is not sufficient evidence that there indeed was a Jewish community at Sparta.⁹ Others suggest that the aim was to gain respectability in the Greek world.¹⁰ This suggestion, while more plausible than the preceding, remains with the difficulty that the "ticket to entry into European culture" was the association of one's ancestry with Greek history, not the other way around. Here the Spartans are made to descend from Abraham, a figure of Jewish history.¹¹ Yet others suggest that in addressing Sparta, Jonathan was seeking respectability in Roman eyes. Sparta herself figured prominently in the tradition on Rome's earliest history,¹² and was now enjoying the prestige of a favored Roman satellite.¹³

Along the same line, Goldstein¹⁴ cites as a parallel the events in *SIG* II 591, where we are told that the city of Lampsacus in 197-96 prepared for their embassy to Rome by going first to Massilia, notable for its good relations with Rome. There, pleading common ancestry, the Lampsacene delegation convinced the Massiliotes to send a delegation to Rome to help plead the former's cause. This parallel would be more satisfying were it not for two differences. First, the Lampsacenes could base their request to Massilia on a fact of common ancestry recognized by both sides. Jonathan's address to Sparta, however, was one-sided. Though there was a period in the late fourth and early third cen-

⁶Cardauns (note 1 above) 320.

⁷Schuller (note 1 above) 266; H. Michell, *Sparta* (Cambridge 1964) 92. Wirgin (note 1 above) finds economic motivations in the correspondence.

⁸Michell (note 7 above) 92; Ginsburg (note 1 above) 121 f.

⁹Stern (note 1 above) 91.

¹⁰Implied by Bickermann, *RE* XIV 786 s.v. *Makkabäerbücher*.

¹¹Admittedly, this is not said explicitly by Jonathan himself, but is clearly said in the document attached to his letter.

¹²Momigliano (note 1 above) 113-14.

¹³Stern (note 1 above) 91.

¹⁴Goldstein (note 1 above) 447-50.

turies when the Greeks could think along those lines, and an idiosyncratic Spartan king could flirt with the notion of descent from Abraham, this period ended a century before Jonathan.¹⁵ Second, the embassy to Sparta seems to have been scheduled for the return trip from Rome, not as preparatory for it.¹⁶

I would suggest that a motive may lie in the parallel of events in Spartan and Judean history of a few decades earlier. In 189/8 the Achaeans, led by Philopoemen, forced the Spartans to annul the laws and customs of Lycurgus and replace them with those of the Achaeans, "Lycurgi leges moresque abrogarent, Achaeorum adsuescerent legibus institutisque" (Livy 38.34.3). Specifically, Philopoemen abolished the Spartan training (*agoge*) and substituted the Achaean education (*paideia*), which was the standard Greek education (Plut. *Vit. Phil.* 16.5).¹⁷ Some time later Sparta did restore her traditional education. While it is not certain when this took place it was probably associated with the events of 178. In any case, the *agoge* later figured as a tourist attraction.¹⁸ Indeed, "this was the only really 'Lycurgan' element of the polity still existing after the destruction of the constitution."¹⁹ In Jerusalem, too, traditional education had been replaced by Hellenistic, and subsequently restored. Indeed, the first act of the Hellenists on getting power was to institute an *ephebeia*, by this time (174/5) an educational rather than a military institution.²⁰ The *Torah* was reinstated a decade later (165).

Jonathan's assertion of kinship with Sparta, I suggest, was motivated, at least in part, by the desire to identify one feature common to the educational system of each—their non-Hellenic character. Whatever we may think of the archaic origins of the Spartan *agoge*, in the

¹⁵Momigliano (note 1 above) 92.

¹⁶Implied by the order in I *Macc.* 12.1–2 and 16–17, and so explicitly stated by Josephus *AJ* 13.164. The fact that by the time the Spartan response was composed the accession of Simon was known in Sparta points in the same direction.

¹⁷B. Shimron, *Late Sparta. The Spartan Revolution 243–146 B.C.* (Arethusa Monographs III) (Buffalo 1972) 106.

¹⁸Shimron (note 17 above) 117–18. Perhaps as early as 167, Aemilius Paulus visited Sparta "notable for its educational institutions" (Livy 45.28.4). However, this emphasis may reflect the attraction in the time of Livy, or of his presumed source Polybius, rather than of Aemilius Paulus. Cf. K. M. T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta* (Manchester 1949) 47.

¹⁹Shimron (note 17 above) 128 and cf. N. Kennell, *The Public Institutions of Roman Sparta* (Diss. U. of Toronto, 1985).

²⁰H. I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (New York 1964) 153 ff.

Hellenistic period it differed radically from the standard Hellenistic *paideia*, which was the defining characteristic of Hellenism.²¹ Yet Sparta's claim to an honored place in the community of Hellenic states was unimpeachable. Jonathan, I suggest, was asserting the same claim for the Jews to membership in the community of civilized nations, despite the particularistic non-Hellenic character of the Jewish *paideia*. The claim, I would imagine, was made to impress Hellenized Jews, rather than gentiles, into accepting the Hasmonean regime. The struggle between Hellenizers and traditionalists was not over. Hellenizers were still offering armed resistance in the citadel in Jerusalem, and the battle "for hearts and minds," I argue, was still underway. The attitude to Hellenism appears here to be neither the complete rejection portrayed by the religious tradition,²² nor the basic acceptance suggested by some modern scholars,²³ but a complex one—using Hellenic justification for non-Hellenic separatism.²⁴

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²¹Marrou (note 20 above) 143 ff.

²²Cf. A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford 1940) 33, "the Hasmonean rebellion, which rejected all things Greek."

²³Cf. M. Smith, "Palestinian Judaism from Alexander to Pompey," in P. Grimal, *Hellenism and the Rise of Rome* (Weidenfeld and Nicholson Universal History, 6) (London 1968) 261–66, "It was not a revolt against Hellenism as such."

²⁴For a similar interpretation of some works of Hellenistic Jewish literature, Leaney (note 1 above) 287–89.

INTERPRETATIONS

ἀλλ' εἰδέναι χρή δρῶσαν:

THE MEANING OF SOPHOCLES *TRACHINIAI* 588-93*

When Deianeira, desperately anxious to regain the love of Hercules, is about to send him a robe drenched in the blood of Nessos, she gives the chorus a chance to express its opinion. Will the φίλτρον (or θέλκτρον) help against his infatuation with Iole, or is Deianeira likely to do something μάταιον (v. 587)? The exchange with the chorus (or *coryphaeus*) takes this form (vv. 588-94):

Chorus: ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐστὶ πίστις ἐν τοῖς δρωμένοις,
δοκεῖς παρ' ἡμῖν οὐ βεβουλεῦσθαι κακῶς.

Deianeira: οὕτως ἔχει γ' ἡ πίστις, ὥς τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν
ἔνεστι, πείρα δ' οὐ προσωμίλησά πω.

Chorus: ἀλλ' εἰδέναι χρή δρῶσαν, ὥς οὐδ' εἰ δοκεῖς
ἔχειν, ἔχοις ἂν γνῶμα, μὴ πειρωμένη.

Deianeira: ἀλλ' αὐτίκ' εἰσόμεσθα . . . [for here appears Lichas through whom she means to send the robe].

How are we to understand the chorus' (or *coryphaeus*') attitude? In Jebb's opinion, "the chorus do not say that she ought to make the experiment; but only that until she does so, she can have no certainty." Note the "until!"¹ P. E. Easterling has a different μὲν-δέ comment: "The chorus do not discourage her from trying the charm though they react cautiously at 588-9."² She also speaks of the chorus' "meaning to be non-committal," an expression used earlier by J. C. Kamerbeek, who regards unhelpful "aloofness" in a crisis as typical of tragic choruses.³ A helpful role of this chorus is allowed by R. W. Burton in his regrettably short treatment of the exchange, which he says is "important in that it

*Kenneth Reckford and Lawrence Stephens have kindly given me the benefit of their opinion.

¹Sophocles. *The Plays and Fragments*. Part V: *The Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1894; repr. Amsterdam 1962) 592 f.

²P. E. Easterling, ed., *Sophocles Trachiniae* (Cambridge 1982) 582-93.

³*The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries*. Part II: *The Trachiniae* (Leiden 1959) 588 f.

emphasizes Deianeira's misgivings about using the love charm." He assures us, however, that "her doubts are allayed" or as he also puts it, "momentarily quietened by the coryphaeus' reasoning."⁴ On the opposite side of the spectrum, Easterling quotes the German commentary of Ludwig Radermacher and the Italian of Oddone Longo, for both of whom the words of the chorus embody "warnings" addressed to Deianeira.⁵ R. P. Winnington-Ingram, in his fine recent book on Sophocles, seems close to this kind of position. After recasting the exchange of vv. 588-93 in words of his own, he observes: "Deianeira has leaned upon a reed which breaks."⁶

Correct—up to a point—as this is, it leaves some questions unanswered. Moreover, Winnington-Ingram seems less than fair to the chorus, which for him is only "a set of inexperienced girls," "innocent" and "guileless";⁷ and his paraphrase omits some points of importance.

Faced with this variety of interpretations, we may wonder whether there is an element of ambiguity (deliberate ambiguity) in the text itself and whether this accounts for the impression of irony which has often been recorded. Irony there is indeed, yet it is produced by Deianeira's reaction to the chorus.⁸ As for the chorus itself, the case for reading vv. 588 f. and especially 592 f. as a warning gains strength if some of the words employed are given their proper weight. The words I have in mind are πίστις, δοκεῖν, πείρα (πειρᾶσθαι), εἰδέναι, and γνῶμα. Each of them has what anachronistically might be called its epistemological

⁴*The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies* (Oxford 1980) 58 f. Karl Reinhardt, in his *Sophokles* (Frankfurt 1933) 58, minimizes the function of the chorus: "nur Wiederhall" (scil. of Deianeira).

⁵I regret that of Longo's commentary (Padua 1968) no copy was available to me. Radermacher, in his renewal of *Sophokles erklärt von F. W. Schneidewin und A. Nauck*, vol. 6 (7th ed., Berlin 1914), finds unwillingness to agree in vv. 588 f. and thinks (ad v. 594) that the chorus' "zurückhaltende Vorsicht" ought to be a warning to Deianeira. He regards ἄλλὰ in v. 588 as supporting his view, but the elastic particle serves alternative interpretations no less well.

⁶*Sophocles. An Interpretation* (Cambridge 1980) 79.

⁷Experienced or not, what they say is as prudent as is appropriate under the circumstances. Granted that a shrewder answer might have raised suspicions about Nessus' advice (reported in vv. 568 ff.), this would have made havoc of the plot. It may also be well to point out that while Deianeira worries about moral aspects of her effort (see esp. vv. 582 f., 596 f.), the exchange with the chorus focuses on the prospect of success. The word μάταιον (v. 587) in her consultation of the chorus need not be taken exclusively in its ethical sense, since it also means "vain" or "ineffective" (cf. v. 863).

⁸See below.

import; less ambitiously we maintain that they possess clearly defined meanings both in themselves and in relation to one another.

To accept πίστις, as Jebb and others do, in an "objective sense," as a ground of confidence is suggested by the ἐν construction (v. 588). LSJ s.v. collect under the subheading "that which gives confidence" examples from tragedy, historiography, and oratory. Tangible items of evidence like the lock of Orestes on Agamemnon's tomb would illustrate this meaning and so would solemn pledges, oaths, or trustworthy witnesses.⁹ Nothing of this order can be expected here, and it may even be argued that Deianeira has already indicated the reason for her confidence, namely the counsel given by the dying Centaur (vv. 569-77). Thus, even if we prefer the "objective" meaning of πίστις, the subjective aspect, or the degree of her confidence, is in the offing. In her answer she admits that the πίστις rests on belief but lacks a factual basis.

For γνῶμα (v. 593) I cannot do better than choose the second of the two meanings presented by Easterling (ad loc.): "means of judging" (or of knowing). The thought of the passage requires a word closer to εἰδέναι than to δοκεῖν; and γινώσκειν tends to associate with verbs of knowing, especially ἐπίστασθαι.¹⁰ The alternative meaning in which γνῶμα is the equivalent of γνώμη would be too subjective.

While δοκεῖ and other forms of the same verb lend themselves to a weak or casual use, in τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν ἔνεστι (vv. 590 f.) the word bears so unmistakably a strong accent that we must accept it at its full value with all that it implies. Unlike ἐπίστασθαι and εἰδέναι, δοκεῖν and δόξα are liable to error (this holds good for Sophocles no less than for Parmenides and Plato). Deianeira's δόξα soon enough proves erroneous and fatal.¹¹ στέργημα γὰρ δοκοῦσα πρόσβαλεῖν σέθεν ἀπήμπλαχ' (vv. 1137 f.) is Hyllus' explanation to his father, who shortly afterward realizes that he himself has entertained a wrong δόξα (v. 1171) about the end of his labors at the time which has now arrived. Although δόξα

⁹See *El.* 885 ff. for the lock and evidence of Orestes' sacrifice as σαφὴ σημεῖα (v. 887) and supposedly a πίστις. At *Trach.* 1181, πίστις refers to a pledge by means of the right hand but may cover also the oath demanded at v. 1185. In lawsuits the archaic πίστεις, which Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* classes as ἀτεχνοί (1355b35 ff.; I 15), consist of witnesses, oaths, and confessions under torture. The ἐντεχνοί πίστεις are arguments.

¹⁰Cf. W. S. Barrett, ed., *Euripides Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 380 (pp. 228 f.), who calls the words "near-synonyms."

¹¹At vv. 669 f. she has realized the danger of undertaking an ἄδελον ἔργον. On δόξα and its inadequacy cf. Radermacher, op. cit., N. 5, ad vv. 592 f.; see also Helen North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1966) 62.

in Sophocles has not received the monograph due to its importance, Karl Reinhardt's eloquent discussion about the complex relation between "Sein" and "Schein" in *O. T.* and *Electra*¹² helps also in the other plays; for to "Sein" and "Schein" (ἀλήθεια and δόξα) on the side of the facts εἰδέναι and δοκεῖν represent the correlate in the realm of human cognition.¹³

What the opposite of δοκεῖν is we have already indicated. The chorus insists on εἰδέναι (v. 592), and from vv. 590-93 it emerges quite clearly how they expect "knowledge" to differ from belief. Living several generations before Plato, Sophocles cannot endow his characters with a priori knowledge or innate ideas. The only way to move from a mere δοκεῖν to valid knowledge is the empirical, πεῖρα.¹⁴ Thus, what happens in our passage is that the chorus, inquiring about the presence (or absence) of a πίστις, learns that the πίστις on which Deianeira proposes to act is no better than (subjective) belief and declares this inadequate. The last two words of v. 593, μὴ πειρωμένη, are an integral part of the chorus' argument. Being needed to make it conclusive, the words cannot be intended to encourage Deianeira. Clearly the πίστις for which they ask must be something established beforehand which can now be relied upon.

Our understanding of the thoughts exchanged in vv. 588-93 departs from Jebb and others who follow him particularly with regard to ἀλλ' εἰδέναι χρὴ δρῶσαν (v. 592), which Jebb translates: "Nay, knowledge must come through action," suggesting in the commentary

¹²Op. cit. (N. 4), esp. 110 ff., 115, 170. The subject is too involved for a footnote. I content myself with referring to δόκησις as used in vv. 426 and 427 and to *Al.* 43, 56 (δόξα in madness).

¹³Broadly speaking, the possession of knowledge and truth is in Sophocles reserved to the gods who communicate some of it to human beings through oracles and seers. Human responses to these revelations, including failure to heed, to believe, to understand, or to remember them, determine large portions of the plot, especially in the earlier plays. Cf. Hans Diller, "Göttliches und menschliches Wissen bei Sophokles" in his *Kleine Schriften zur antiken Literatur* (Munich 1971) 255 ff.

¹⁴This is brought out in two ways, (a) in the conditional sentence (vv. 592 ff.) where she is said to have no γνῶμα without making the experiment, and (b) in the first four words of v. 592 where the chorus insists on knowledge after she has admitted to have not yet tried out the device. The present tense of the participle, πειρωμένη need not influence our interpretation. The sentence οὐδ' εἰ . . . μὴ πειρωμένη may generalize the situation, and it is well to bear in mind how little of a temporal quality there is in modes other than the indicative; cf. E. Schwyzler-A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik* 2 (Munich 1950) 257: "Nur nach dem Aspekt (und nicht zeitlich) unterscheiden sich im allgemeinen z.B. . . . ein Partizip des Präsens und des Aorists."

that "the participle expresses the leading idea." This view might carry conviction if one way of gaining knowledge were contrasted with another. However, since the contrast at issue is between knowledge and belief, Jebb's rendering and explanation interfere with the correct understanding. Moreover, Jebb ignores the difference in meaning between the verbs for "knowing" and for "learning," that is, between εἰδέναι and μανθάνειν or ἐκμανθάνειν, the latter of which figures very prominently in Sophocles' vocabulary and tragic conception—in fact, so prominently that Easterling mentions "the pattern of finding out" as fundamental for the construction of the *Trachiniae*. "One by one the characters learn, too late, the truth of their situation."¹⁵ μεθύστερον, | ὅτ' οὐκέτ' ἄρκει, τὴν μάθησιν ἄρνυμαι, says Deianeira (vv. 710 f., 120 lines after our passage). Of other passages, I here content myself with quoting vv. 582 f.: κακὰς δὲ τόλμας μήτ' ἐπισταίμην ἐγὼ | μήτ' ἐκμάθοιμι, which support, if support is needed, my contention that Sophocles observes the difference between knowing and learning.¹⁶ The correct translation of the crucial words in v. 592 is: "But you must know if (when) you act."¹⁷ Fortunately Jebb, despite his misleading interpretation of these key words, did not regard the chorus as offering positive encouragement to Deianeira. Nor, tempting though it may have been, did he look upon Deianeira's words and actions in vv. 594 ff. as confirming his opinion concerning the last two lines of the chorus.

Still, considering Deianeira's response, may our examination of vv. 588–93 not be accused of proceeding on purely rational lines and may the last words of the chorus, even if not intended to encourage the project, yet have the psychological effect of pushing her toward the

¹⁵Op. cit., N. 2, 3 (and ad v. 934). This, she points out, holds good for Deianeira, Hyllus, Heracles, and even Lichas. "ἐκμανθάνειν and ἐκδιδάσκειν (and similar words) are insistently repeated" (ibid.). The importance of this motif for other plays of Sophocles, especially *O.T.* and *Electra*, should be obvious. For *Trach.*, see also Cedric H. Whitman, *Sophocles, A Study of Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1951) 103 ff., 110, and passim.

¹⁶Vv. 335 ff., in which Deianeira is urged to find out the truth about the captive Iole, include forms of μανθάνειν and of ἐκμανθάνειν. Note also v. 2.

¹⁷The scholia as far as they are known seem to support both interpretations. Against the short scholion, δεῖ σε, φησὶν, ἐπιχειροῦσαν γνῶναι, it must be said that in the present context γνῶναι cannot be equivalent to εἰδέναι. The fuller scholion favors my interpretation: δεῖ σε δρῶσαν ἔχειν τὴν πίστιν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοκεῖν ἐπίστασθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχεις τὴν γνῶσιν-ἔως οὐ πεπείρασαι. (It may be worth observing that the word before the last must indeed be read as οὐ, not οὐ with some deteriorates; for it responds to the comment on v. 590: πιστεύω μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι, οὐ μὴν πεπείραμαι.)

πειρα? Questions of this kind suggest themselves readily enough. The answer is that psychology need not engage in gratuitous speculation but should follow the clue provided by Sophocles himself. The word that Deianeira takes up is not πειρα but εἰδέναι (ἀλλ' αὐτίκ' εἰσόμεσθα, v. 594), and if we were right in maintaining that the chorus referred by this word to knowledge antecedently acquired Deianeira's use of the future tense and with the implication that knowledge will result from the effect of the robe runs counter to the intention of the chorus. The misuse of the word is ironic¹⁸ for the spectators who realize that despite her original protestations of looking to the chorus for guidance (vv. 587 f.) she actually disregards its warnings and yields to a contrary impulse caused by the reappearance of Lichas through whom she had meant to send the robe. Lichas, we must realize, returns from the house at this crucial moment because Sophocles made him return just then and there. We might easily believe that Deianeira, in her overwhelming desire to secure Heracles' love, closes her ears to the words of the chorus. But Sophocles' intention must have been that Lichas' reappearance counteracts the counsels of prudence and carries the day. For a brief spell—no more than six lines—hope and suspense have been rising. The disaster may still be averted. But at the very moment when hope gains substance and suspense becomes acute because the fatal weakness of her enterprise, ignorance, is brought home to Deianeira, the action suddenly veers off in another direction.

As I am about to conclude this paper, I may as well record an observation which it would not have been sound method to use as an argument but which, when arguments have done their work, may serve as a confirmation. A warning administered to a character engaged in a fatal course of action is a motif germane to Sophocles' tragic plots. In the *Antigone* both protagonists receive emphatic warnings; in *O. T.* Oedipus is warned by Teiresias and Iocaste; Ajax at the very least has been warned by his father (see *Aj.* 761–70) if the implorations of Tecmessa do not come under this heading; and Electra, although the fatal prospects do not materialize, is warned by her sister—and by the chorus.¹⁹ To be sure, Sophoclean warnings vary greatly in form, content,

¹⁸An ironic note has been indicated by Winnington-Ingram (note 6 above) 78 and by Easterling at vv. 582–93. For a general account of irony in Sophocles' plot construction, see G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1958) 244–88.

¹⁹Instead of collecting familiar instances where a character is warned by another, I cite from *Ant.* and *O. T.* more relevant passages in which the chorus comes forward with counsels of prudence: *Ant.* 278 f., 724 f., 766 f., 1091 ff., 1098, 1103 f.; *O. T.* 404 ff.,

timing, and authority so that it is not astonishing if in the preserved plays there is no close parallel to our passage. Still it is legitimate to ask whether there is difference between Deianeira embarking on her project without being reminded of its uncertainties or despite being reminded of them. And if there is a difference the question which of these alternatives is more truly Sophoclean has already been answered.

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616 f., 649 f., 656 f. Here again the warnings vary a good deal, not least with regard to effectiveness. Note the exceptional success at *Ant.* 1091 ff. and see for contrast *ibid.* 278 f. Deianeira acts on the chorus' advice at v. 389.



INO IN EURIPIDES' *MEDEA*

In the fifth stasimon of Euripides' *Medea*, the chorus of Corinthian women prays to the earth and sun to stop Medea from carrying out the plans to murder her children. After one strophe and antistrophe, however, the cries of the boys are heard from within the house as Medea stabs them to death. The prayer has come too late. As the chorus sings the final antistrophe, they search for a precedent for such a horrendous deed: Ino, driven mad by Hera, laid a murderous hand on her own children and afterward leapt to her death in the sea. It is the aim of this paper to examine the significance and dramatic impact of Euripides' choice of Ino as a paradigm for Medea.

Tragic choruses frequently allude to *exempla* when acts of violence occur, or are about to occur, in a play. These allusions, drawn from the remote realm of myth, provide poetic embellishment for the

tragic *pathē* currently taking place.¹ The allusions also serve the important function of establishing in the minds of both chorus and audience precedents for the shocking deeds. Seen within the broader context thereby established, the *pathē* are mitigated in their severity. Indeed, one may even argue that the events being dramatized are, in a sense, predictable. For what has happened before is likely to happen again.² The ultimate result of the evocation of precedents is to render the horrors less shocking. In Aesch. *Cho.* 585–651, for example, immediately after Orestes enlists the silent cooperation of the Libation Bearers in his plot against Clytemnestra, the chorus recites a catalogue of women notorious for treachery against relatives: Althaea killed her son, Scylla caused the death of her father Nisus, and the Lemnian wives slew their husbands in a mass murder. Just as these wicked women have paid the price for their foul deeds, so too now Orestes is planning to avenge the “old blood” (650) shed by Clytemnestra, another candidate for the list. The paradigms serve to convince the chorus and the audience that it is indeed proper for Orestes to seek revenge in the “blameless crime” (ἀνεπίμομφον ἄταν, 830) of matricide.³ A similar pattern can be discerned in Soph. *Ant.* 944–87. As Antigone is led to her rocky tomb, the Theban elders sing of other victims of punishment by confinement: Danae was pent in a chest, Lycurgus was imprisoned in a cave, and Cleopatra was raised in the cave of Boreas. Antigone’s fate, therefore, is far from unique. The chorus points out that individuals of even greater

¹This embellishment is not merely ornamental but truly “poetic” in the Aristotelian sense. The *exempla* generalize the specific crimes as “the sorts of things that happen and are possible, in accordance with probability or necessity.” Cf. Ar. *Poet.* 1451^a 36–38.

²Cf. Ar. *Rh.* 1394^a 7–8: ὁμοία γάρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν. Analogous is the situation in which characters cite activities of the gods in order to justify a morally questionable act: cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 451–58 (the illicit love affairs of Zeus with Semele and of Eos with Cephalus should encourage Phaedra to approach Hippolytus). For this use of myth in Aesch. *Eum.* 640–80, see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 41–43. In similar fashion, the chorus may attempt to console a sufferer with the sentiment, “You are not the only one to have encountered such grief”: cf. Soph. *El.* 153–54 (οὔτοι σοὶ μούνα, τέκνον, ἄχος ἐφάνη βροτῶν), Eur. *Alc.* 417–18 (οὐ γὰρ τι πρῶτος οὐδὲ λοῖσθιος βροτῶν γυναικὸς ἐσθλῆς ἡμιπλακες), and *Alc.* 892 (οὐ σὺ πρῶτος ὤλεσας). With these passages, cf. Achilles’ questioning the validity of the Trojan War in Hom. *Il.* 9.337–43.

³Cf. the Coryphaeus’ encouragement of Orestes and Electra in 510–13 to honor their father’s tomb with action.

stature than she have suffered so: Danae was not only a princess but also the consort of Zeus, and Cleopatra was of a divine father.⁴ These remarks can hardly comfort the heroine, but they are doubtless welcome to the ears of Creon, the austere tyrant whom the citizens secretly fear but openly obey.⁵ The cowering chorus cites these paradigms to voice their approval of Creon's measures and to imply that they would never court disaster by challenging his authority. "For no one is so foolish as to be in love with death" (220). The same pattern also emerges in Eur. *Hipp.* 525-64. In the first episode of that play, the chorus witnesses the *agōn* between Phaedra and the Nurse. Phaedra has decided to commit suicide rather than allow her intractable passion to bring disgrace upon herself and her family. After the Nurse counters this noble speech with cynical advice against being rigidly idealistic, the Coryphaeus comments, "Phaedra, her words are more practical for your present plight, but my praise lies with you" (482-83). Having thus sanctioned Phaedra's drastic decision, the chorus proceeds in the ensuing stasimon to sing of victims of divinely inflicted passion: Deianeira was compelled by Eros to marry Heracles in "murderous nuptials" (φονίοισι νυμφείοις, 552), and Semele was destroyed by a "fire-clad thunderbolt" (βροντῇ ἀμφιπύρρῳ, 559) from her lover, Zeus. Such *exempla* prepare the chorus and the audience to accept the imminent death of yet another victim of Aphrodite.

Examined in the light of these passages, the reference to Ino in the *Medea* stands out as unusual. As in the other dramas discussed, here too the chorus is closely involved with the action of the play. Convinced that Medea is justified in seeking revenge against her enemies, the Corinthian women have sworn their silence if Medea should discover "any means or contrivance" (260) to retaliate against Jason, Creusa, and Creon. "I will do as you wish," promises the Coryphaeus. "For you will punish your husband justly" (ἐνδίκως γὰρ ἐκτείσῃ πόσιν, 267). But when, in the fifth stasimon, this revenge manifests itself unexpectedly in infanticide, the silent accomplices find themselves at a loss: speaking separately and in dochmiacs, they deliberate, "Shall I enter the house to

⁴Similarly, the chorus reminds Antigone in 834-38 that Niobe, to whom the heroine compares herself, is a "goddess born of a god," unlike the mortal Antigone.

⁵In 690-700 Haemon explains to his father that the citizens fear Creon and dare utter only those words which will please him; secretly, however, they praise Antigone. As for Creon's whereabouts during the fourth stasimon, lines 935-36 and 988-92 make it clear that he remains on stage and listens to the song: cf. G. Müller, *Sophokles Antigone erläutert und mit einer Einleitung versehen* (Heidelberg 1967) 213-15.

save the children?" (1275-76). Searching for precedents which will mollify their horror and justify their involvement, they recall "one and only one woman from the past" (μίαν δὴ κλύω μίαν τῶν πάρος γυναῖκ', 1282-83). The single choice of Ino strikes the audience as abrupt, for in parallel situations in other plays the chorus cites two or three paradigms in succession. The suggestion therefore presents itself that the poet is suppressing other examples. For Euripides could easily have supplemented the ode with allusions to other women guilty of filicide. Althaea and Agave spring readily to mind. Perhaps most appropriate—and therefore most conspicuous by its absence—would be a reference to Procne. For Procne, who killed her son to punish her faithless husband, sets a precedent not only for the murder but also for the motive.⁶ We may wonder, then, why the poet selected the Ino myth and excluded other *exempla*, some of which may have been more apposite.

The Ino myth contains elements which render it particularly harmonious with the events in the *Medea*. First, the tradition of Ino's deification into Leucothea after her leap into the sea anticipates the final tableau, which presents Medea in the chariot of the Sun, in a grotesque parody of the *dea ex machina*.⁷ The suggestion of apotheosis extends even to the children. According to Pausanias (1.44.7, 2.1.3) and Apollodorus (*Bibli.* 3.4.3), Ino's son Melicertes was posthumously renamed Palaemon, and the Isthmian games were established in his honor. In similar fashion, the memory of Medea's sons will be celebrated in annual feasts and sacrifices at the temple of Hera Akraia.⁸ A second fea-

⁶S. Mills, *Euripides' Medea: A Study in Dramatic Mythopoeia* (diss. Stanford University 1976) 134, suggests that Procne's absence is "especially conspicuous" in light of the probability that Sophocles' *Tereus* had recently been performed. Fragments from the lost play (Frr. 524N²-538N²) indicate that Procne was portrayed in a similar light to that of Medea: each laments her difficult plight as a woman (cf. *Med.* 230-51) and each is encouraged to bear her mortal troubles lightly (cf. *Med.* 1018). For the dating of *Tereus* to shortly before 431, see W. Buchwald, *Studien zur Chronologie der attischen Tragödie 455 bis 431* (Königsberg 1939) 35, followed by A. Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen*³ (Göttingen 1972) 262. Cf. also Th. Zielinski, *Iresione I* (Lvov 1931) 449.

⁷Mills (note 6 above) 123-24 suggests that Euripides' detailed reference to Ino's καταποντισμός (cf. Hom. *Od.* 5.333-35) would invite the audience to recall her deification. For the interpretation of Medea's final appearance as a parody of the *dea ex machina*, cf. L. Séchan, "La légende de Médée," *REG* 40 (1927) 234-310; Mills, 108-24; and T. V. Buttrey, "Tragedy as Form in Euripides," *Michigan Quarterly Review* 15 (1976) 155-72, esp. 166-67.

⁸Cf. *Med.* 1378-83. It is also interesting to observe that the figure of Hera looms in the background of both myths. Cf. D. Page, *Euripides' Medea* (Oxford 1938) xxii-xxiii.

ture of the Ino myth which enhances the play is the poignant paradox that Ino, in attempting to save Melicertes from her husband Athamas, becomes herself her child's killer: when Athamas is driven mad by Hera, he shoots his son Learchus with an arrow; Ino, witnessing the scene, takes Melicertes in her arms and flees for safety, jumping with him into the sea.⁹ Medea's actions display the same paradox. For after she momentarily succumbs to pity for the boys and renounces her plans, she considers what will happen if she lets them live: "By the avenging spirits of Hades, it will never be that I leave my children to suffer insolence at the hands of my enemies" (1059-61).¹⁰ In killing her children, the distraught heroine believes that she is protecting them from her foes. Finally, Ino resembles Medea in that each of them has two sons. Procne, Althaea, and Agave, on the other hand, each have only one child to kill.¹¹

It is in the detail of the number of children slain by Ino, however, that the poet surprises us. For although variations exist within the story, one detail remains constant throughout the tradition: Athamas kills Learchus, and Ino kills Melicertes. But the Corinthian women clearly

⁹This is the outline of the story as related in the extant accounts: Schol. in Eur. *Med.* 1284; Serv. in Verg. *Aen.* 5.241; Apollod. *Bibli.* 1.9.2; Hyg. *Fab.* 2-5; Ov. *Met.* 4.464-542; Sen. *Phoen.* 22-25; Paus. 1.44.7, 8. In Ov. *Fast.* 6.485-500, Ino first buries Learchus, slain by Athamas, and proceeds to jump into the sea with Melicertes. In Apollod. *Bibli.* 3.4.3, the mad Ino boils Melicertes in a cauldron (in an attempt to render him immortal?) and jumps into the sea with the corpse. The detail of boiling the child may recall to some Medea's treachery against the daughters of Pelias (cf. *Med.* 504-5). Ino's protectiveness toward her children manifests itself in the events prior to Athamas' madness: when Athamas' second wife, Themisto, plots to kill his sons by Ino, Ino confounds the stepmother and tricks her into slaying her own children. Athamas, driven mad with grief upon learning of the death of these children, then turns against Learchus and Melicertes. As a result of Ino's initial attempt to protect her sons from her enemies, she brings about their death, as does Medea, at the hands of their own parents. For Jason's responsibility for the filicide, cf. *Med.* 1363-68.

¹⁰Concern for the welfare and safety of the children recurs as a *leitmotif*, voiced by many characters throughout the play: cf. 36-37, 89-91, 100, 181-88, 344-45, 515, 555-67, 782, 914-15, 976, 1303-5, 1378.

¹¹Cf. Eur. *Her.* 1016-24: after Heracles slays Megara and his sons, the chorus alludes to the Danaids, who set a precedent for the uxoricide, and to Procne, who sets a precedent for the filicide. But Procne's crime was not as heinous as Heracles', the chorus suggests. For she had only one child to slay (μονοτέκνου Πρόκνης, 1021), while Heracles killed three sons (οὐ δὲ τέκνα τρίγον', ὃ δάϊε, τεκόμενος, 1023-24). Heracles' crime, therefore, has no real parallel. As a result, the chorus does not know what dance to dance or what dirge to sing. Similarly, the Corinthian women in the *Medea* lose their orientation.

allude here to a version in which Ino commits the “ungodly murder of her offspring” (φόνῳ τέκνων δυσσεβεῖ, 1286–87) and “perishes in dying with the two children” (δυσοῖν τε παῖδων συνθανοῦσ’ ἀπόλλυται, 1289). It is possible, of course, that they are referring to a version which, though now lost to us, the ancient audience would have recognized.¹² But it is also possible that the poet is introducing a change in the myth, as the scholiast indicates in his note on 1284: οἱ μὲν ἱστοροῦσι . . . Εὐριπίδης δέ. . .¹³ The possibility of innovation becomes a probability when we consider the larger context of the allusion. For it is well known that the plot of the play revolves around a shocking change in the mythological tradition: Euripides is the first to present Medea as the deliberate murderess of her sons.¹⁴ Indeed, when she declares her real intentions in 792–93, the chorus reacts with shock and disbelief: “Will you dare (τολμήσεις, 816) to kill your own flesh and blood?” “When you look at them . . . and they fall to supplicate you, you will not be able to do it” (οὐ δυνάσῃ, 862). But Medea plunges ahead, deaf to all attempts at dissuasion. At the very moment that she commits the foul deed, the poet does not, as we normally expect, cushion the shock with a catalogue of well-known mythological paradigms. Instead, he drives our sense of horror even deeper by likening the crime to Ino’s murder of her two sons, an event which never occurred.¹⁵ Just as Euripides “de-

¹²Page (note 8 above) 172 dismisses the possibility that Euripides is altering the myth. “The poet cannot have introduced even so slight an innovation in a passing reference intended as a parallel.” He suggests that Euripides may have followed this particular version in his lost *Ino*, although we know neither the plot nor the date of that play. The question of the plot of the lost play is irrelevant to Euripides’ allusion to the myth in the *Medea*. Neither the fragments from the *Ino* (Frr. 398N²–427N²) nor subsequent references to the play (e.g., Hyg. *Fab.* 4, if reliable) give any indication that Euripides departed from the version in which Athamas and Ino each kill one child.

¹³E. Schwartz, *Scholia in Euripidem* I (Berlin 1891) in *Med.* 1284: οἱ μὲν ἱστοροῦσι τῷ παιδί συγκατενεχθῆναι τὴν Ἰνὴν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν· Εὐριπίδης δέ φησιν αὐτὴν αὐτόχειρα τῶν δύο παίδων γενομένην, Λεάρχου καὶ Μελικέρτου, αὐτὴν ὕστερον εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ῥῖψαι.

¹⁴See Page’s introduction, esp. xxi–xxv. Particularly sensitive to Euripides’ revision of the Medea myth and the reversal it effects in the audience’s expectations is Buttery, “Accident and Design in Euripides’ *Medea*,” *AJP* 79 (1958) 1–17.

¹⁵Despite the similarities between Ino and Medea, there lies one crucial difference: Ino kills Melicertes in a fit of divinely imposed madness, in much the same way as Agave mutilates Pentheus. Medea, on the other hand, painstakingly orchestrates her plans and carries them out “with malice aforethought.” In this respect, she has more in common with the unmentioned Procne and Althaea. It is the poet’s aim, however, to suppress such genuine parallels, lest Medea’s crime appear sanctioned by precedent.

mythologizes" the heroine of the play and constructs a new myth around her, so too here he presents in the passing reference to Ino a small-scale version of the same process.¹⁶ Simply stated, there are no genuine mythological examples to mitigate the horror of Medea's actions. For Ino offers no parallel: Medea's crime, lacking a precedent, is truly ἀνῆκουστον. The spectator is tempted to correct the chorus with the retort, "There is not one woman from the past who ever went to such extremes, not even Ino."¹⁷

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¹⁶For Euripides' process of "demythization" followed by "remythization," cf. Mills (note 6 above).

¹⁷Cf. Jason's assertion in 1339-40 that, "No Greek woman would ever have dared such a thing." In the end we must agree with the chorus' assessment in 1290: τί δῆτ' οὐν γένοιτ' ἄν ἐτι δεινόν;



KASTORION OF SOLOI'S HYMN TO PAN (SUPPLEMENTUM HELLENISTICUM 310)

σὲ τὸν βολαῖς νιφοκτύποις δυσχείμερον
ναῖονθ' ἔδραν, θηρονόμῃ Πάν, χθόν' Ἀρκάδων
κλήσω γραφῇ τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ πάγκλειτ' ἔπη
συνθεῖς, ἄναξ, δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῶ κλύειν,
μωσοπόλε θῆρ, κηρόχυτον ὅς μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς

"Dass auch schon leere Spielereien vorkamen," said Wilamowitz in writing of Hellenistic meter, "dafür sind Iamben eines Kastorion ein un-erfreulicher Beleg,"¹ and his verdict set the tone for the understandably few critics that have mentioned Kastorion since.² Merely a fragment,

¹*Griechische Verskunst* (Berlin 1921) 126.

²See Wilamowitz again in *Hellenistische Dichtung* II (Berlin 1924) 149, n. 2 (cited in n. 7 below); W. Kroll, "Kastorion" *RE* Suppl. IV 880: "Das Fragment ist eine törichte Spielerei"; O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen* III (Berlin 1963) 131, n. 2; L. Lehnus, *L'Inno a Pan di Pindaro* (Milano 1979) 99-100.

the beginning of his Hymn to Pan is known to us through Athenaeus (X 454 f.) citing Klearchos Περὶ Γρίφων (fr. 88 Wehrli). But though γριφοειδής indeed, a closer look at the hymn reveals that it is anything but "leer."

Α γραφή σοφή (v. 3) intended for σοφοί (v. 4), the poem challenges the reader to fully understand its art: δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῷ κλύειν. Yet understanding seems easy. The language of the hymn, while consistently elevated,³ and having two hapax legomena in five lines (νιφοκτύποις and πάγκλειτ'), is never an impediment to comprehension. The meter is iambic trimeter in the severe style of Lycophron and Hellenistic tragedy:⁴ Resolution occurs only in polysyllabic words with several shorts, on any longum except in the last metron. Porson's bridge is uniformly observed. Caesura falls on the penthemimeres or hepthemimeres throughout—except in the first line, which because νιφοκτύποις and δυσχείμερον coincide with their respective metra, has no regular caesura.⁵ This verse, inelegantly chopped into three equal parts, is the clue to that part of the puzzle which was solved already in antiquity (cf. Athenaeus X 454 f.), namely that each metron is metrically equivalent and interchangeable with any other, for each begins with a consonant and ends with a consonant or long vowel. Thus, verse one, according to Athenaeus, could just as well be read: νιφοκτύποις σὲ τὸν βολαῖς δυσχείμερον. It was further recognized that each metron has exactly eleven letters, a feature that could only be experienced visually through reading.⁶

³δυσχείμερον already in Homer (*Il.* 2.750 of Dodona); ἔδραν cf. Pind. *P.* 11.63 etc.; for the poetic periphrasis χθόν' Ἀρκάδων cf. LSJ s.v. χθών II; κλήσω cf. Hes. *WD* 1 ἀοιδῆσιν κλείουσαι as opposed to κλήσω γραφῇ here; μωσοπόλε cf. Sappho 150.1 LP; μείλιγμ' see Theocr. 22.221.

⁴Cf. P. Maas, *Greek Metre* (Oxford 1962) #102, and M. L. West, *Greek Metre* (Oxford 1982) 159–60.

⁵Recognized already by Porson in his preface to the *Hecuba* (Leipzig 1824) p. xxix when he compared Kastorion's observance of penthemimeral and hepthemimeral caesura to that in Tragedy: "*Verum, si versus istos recte metieris, Tragicorum regulae unum modo adversantem reperies. Secundus enim, quartus et quintus pertinent ad caesuram Ba, tertius ad Ad. Sed primi similem Tragico scribere nunquam, ut opinor, permissum erat.*"

⁶This led Wilamowitz, *Kleine Schriften* VI (Berlin 1971) 504, n. 3, to suggest that the poem was written in monometers, στοιχηδόν, i.e.:

ΣΕΤΟΝΒΟΛΑΙΣ
ΝΙΦΟΚΤΥΠΟΙΣ
ΔΥΣΧΕΙΜΕΡΟΝ
ΝΑΙΟΝΘΕΔΡΑΝ

A hymn whose metra can be freely reshuffled would seem to attack the very foundations of the genre — and this, perhaps, explains why critics have generally doubted that the poem is in fact a hymn.⁷ For hymnic convention dictated that the god be invoked either with the first word — so in the majority of cases — or, less commonly, elsewhere in the first line; the invocation was usually linked to a verb of singing; the divinity was then glorified with a recitation of its attributes or in a relative clause which attempted to grasp the essence of its being.⁸

The interchangeability of the metra is indeed the key to Kastorion's poem, but not in the sense that we initially assume — that is, not as the "törichte Spielerei" (as Kroll called it, *RE* Suppl. IV 880) that substitutes clever chaos for traditional order. Rather, by making us compose the hymn anew, Kastorion leads us to a reaffirmation of hymnic

ΘΗΡΟΝΟΜΕΠΑΝ
ΧΘΟΝΑΡΚΑΔΩΝ
ΚΛΗΣΩΓΡΑΦΗ
ΤΗΙΔΕΝΣΟΦΗ
ΠΑΓΚΛΕΙΤΕΠΗ
ΣΥΝΘΕΙΣΑΝΑΞ
ΔΥΣΓΝΩΣΤΑΜΗ
ΣΟΦΩΙΚΛΑΥΕΙΝ
ΜΩΣΟΠΟΛΕΘΗΡ
ΚΗΡΟΧΥΤΟΝΟΣ
ΜΕΙΛΙΓΜΙΕΙΣ

but if this were so, neither the eleven letters nor the interchangeability of the metra would be very puzzling as they would be visually obvious. Such a reading is antithetical to the challenge of v. 4. An earlier example of interchangeable verses is the epitaph of Midas (*AP* 7.153, cf. Plato *Phaedr.* 264d) which, however, functions on an exclusively aural level. Imperial times brought a refinement on Kastorion's eleven-letter metra, the ἰσοψηφος poem in which the numerical value of all the letters in a verse are equal; cf. D. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge 1981) 504–6, 508–10.

⁷Cf. Wilamowitz (note 2 above) 149, n. 2: "Ein Hymnus auf Pan, wenn man so sagen darf," and O. Kern, *Rel. d. Gr.* (note 2 above) 131, n. 2: "die Iamben des Kastorion von Soloi, die man nicht als Hymnos, sondern nur als metrische Spielerei bezeichnen darf." A similar attitude may be found in a more recent work, L. Lehnus (note 2 above) 100, where we read that Kastorion's poem is "in realtà un grifhos . . . cui l'assetto esteriormente innico dell' esordio non toglie carattere e finalità da virtuosismo metrico."

⁸On hymnic features, cf. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig 1913) 143–76; H. Meyer, *Hymnische Stilelemente in der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Würzburg 1933) 19 et passim; R. Janko, "The Structure of the Homeric Hymns: A Study in Genre," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 9–24; W. H. Race, "Aspects of Rhetoric and Form in Greek Hymns," *GRBS* 23 (1982) 5–8.

convention and of his particular composition which, as it turns out, can be changed very little without being diminished. That which is *δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῶ κλύειν* is, in other words, the order in which the metra are to be put together.⁹

Because of syntactical constraints, any substitution is effectively limited to within each verse. But even here we must examine carefully to what extent such change is possible—both within the line and in relation to those that precede and follow—from the standpoint of syntax, meter, style, etc. To this end I print the six possible combinations for each verse as it comes up for discussion.

- 1 (a) *σὲ τὸν βολαῖς νιφοκτύποις δυσχεῖμερον*
- (b) *σὲ τὸν βολαῖς δυσχεῖμερον νιφοκτύποις*
- (c) *νιφοκτύποις σὲ τὸν βολαῖς δυσχεῖμερον*
- (d) *νιφοκτύποις δυσχεῖμερον σὲ τὸν βολαῖς*
- (e) *δυσχεῖμερον νιφοκτύποις σὲ τὸν βολαῖς*
- (f) *δυσχεῖμερον σὲ τὸν βολαῖς νιφοκτύποις*

The first verse is understandably the most flexible since it gives us the clue which prompts us to dissect the poem in the first place. It is, moreover, the least sensitive syntactically because the verb does not appear until the second verse. Nevertheless, hymnic tradition, with its strong tendency to locate the poem's subject in the first word—thereby producing almost instant genre-recognition—persuades us to retain *σὲ τὸν βολαῖς* as the first metron.¹⁰ To be sure, we can raise no syntactic or metrical objections to any of the six possibilities, but neither can we point to any possible advantage in (c)–(f). The choice between (a) and (b) is perhaps the only one in the poem in which there is no compelling difference.

- 2 (a) *ναῖονθ' ἔδραν, θηρονόμε Πάν, χθόν' Ἀρκάδων*
- (b) *ναῖονθ' ἔδραν χθόν' Ἀρκάδων, θηρονόμε Πάν,*
- (c) *θηρονόμε Πάν, ναῖονθ' ἔδραν χθόν' Ἀρκάδων*
- (d) *θηρονόμε Πάν, χθόν' Ἀρκάδων ναῖονθ' ἔδραν*
- (e) *χθόν' Ἀρκάδων ναῖονθ' ἔδραν, θηρονόμε Πάν,*
- (f) *χθόν' Ἀρκάδων, θηρονόμε Πάν, ναῖονθ' ἔδραν*

⁹This gives special point to the choice of the word *συνθεῖς* (v. 4), since it thus refers to the task of both poet and reader which consists precisely of "putting together" the discrete metra.

¹⁰We are persuaded even though Athenaeus contemplated version (c). He was concerned, however, only with the metrical peculiarity and the eleven-letter metron, not with matters of style.



In verse two, we can rule out (b) and (e) because of resolution in the last metron. We abandon (c) as well because, like (e), it has no caesura. Alternatives (d) and (f) delay the participle too long—especially as the vocative intervenes—and leave ἔδραν hanging weakly at the end. The word δυσχέιμερον would here naturally be construed with the stately χθόν' Ἀρκάδων, which doesn't need it, rather than with ἔδραν, which does. Version (a) is thus the most satisfying.

- 3 (a) κλήσω γραφῇ τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ πάγκλειτ' ἔπη
 (b) κλήσω γραφῇ πάγκλειτ' ἔπη τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ
 (c) τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ κλήσω γραφῇ πάγκλειτ' ἔπη
 (d) τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ πάγκλειτ' ἔπη κλήσω γραφῇ
 (e) πάγκλειτ' ἔπη κλήσω γραφῇ τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ
 (f) πάγκλειτ' ἔπη τῇδ' ἐν σοφῇ κλήσω γραφῇ

In the received version of verse three, the first of two that deal with the poet, his work, and its reader, we finally encounter the verb of singing. κλήσω is positioned so as to contrast with κλύειν (v. 4), thus framing these two self-conscious lines by means of a word-play with cognate verbs for the activity of both poet and audience. The implied relationship between these two is reflected again in that between book (σοφή) and reader (σοφῶ). Verse three itself is enclosed on either side by the play between κλήσω and πάγκλειτ', the latter term also punning on "Pan" in the second verse¹¹ and paradoxically juxtaposing the poem's "all-renown" with the very circumscribed group that can understand it (δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῶ κλύειν, v. 4). We can disqualify the alternative verses on a variety of grounds: The last four give up the framing device. Versions (b), (c), (d), and (e) have no caesura. Version (f) allows πάγκλειτ' ἔπη to precede κλήσω, and so obscures the object, σέ, leaving συνθείς hanging in v. 4—the same objection applies to (d) and (e). In all, then, option (a) provides the best solution.

- 4 (a) συνθείς, ἄναξ, δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῶ κλύειν
 (b) συνθείς, ἄναξ, σοφῶ κλύειν δύσγνωστα μὴ
 (c) δύσγνωστα μὴ συνθείς, ἄναξ, σοφῶ κλύειν
 (d) δύσγνωστα μὴ σοφῶ κλύειν συνθείς, ἄναξ,
 (e) σοφῶ κλύειν δύσγνωστα μὴ συνθείς, ἄναξ,
 (f) σοφῶ κλύειν συνθείς, ἄναξ, δύσγνωστα μὴ

¹¹This etymological pun was common in hymns to Pan, cf. *H.H.* 19.47 and Pind. *H. Pan* fr.96.2 (Snell-Maehler)= fr. III 2 (Lehnus). See generally L. Lehnus (note 2 above) 162 f.

The same device that we had found in three and four, the frame, appears in verses four and five. It consists here of the opposition of lettered sophistication and rural simplicity, of the literate author, who has composed (συνθείς, v. 4) a learned work (γρᾶφῃ σοφῇ, v. 3) and the wild nature god who utters (ἰεῖς, v. 5) his rustic song (κηρόχυτον μείλιγμα, v. 5). This polarity, central to the fragment's theme, likewise accounts for its structure (so far as we can tell), for the sketch of the god and his milieu embraces on either side the poet's self-portrait (v. 3-4).¹² It is, moreover, a provocative polarity since it highlights and thus makes an issue of the anomalous yet pervasive Hellenistic desire to give highly polished expression to the rudest of themes.¹³ It would therefore be rash to disturb the placement of συνθείς and ἰεῖς. Of the alternatives, only (b) maintains the frame but is ruled out because it has no caesura, as is the case with (c), (d), and (f). In version (e), as in (c), the position of μὴ coming before συνθείς is intolerable.

- 5 (a) μωσοπόλε θήρ, κηρόχυτον ὅς μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς.
- (b) μωσοπόλε θήρ, μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς κηρόχυτον ὅς.
- (c) κηρόχυτον ὅς μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς, μωσοπόλε θήρ.
- (d) κηρόχυτον ὅς, μωσοπόλε θήρ, μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς.
- (e) μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς κηρόχυτον ὅς, μωσοπόλε θήρ.
- (f) μείλιγμ' ἰεῖς, μωσοπόλε θήρ, κηρόχυτον ὅς.

In the final verse we safely reject four options, namely (b), (c), (e), and (f), because of resolution in the last metron. We also note the impossibility of ending the line with κηρόχυτον ὅς in versions (b) and (f), and the lack of caesura in (b) and (c). One would like to believe that the assonance θήρ/κηρ- is deliberate since Kastorion is otherwise very conscious of "Klangspiel" (cf. the pervasive -ον, -αν, -ων sounds in v. 2 and -η sounds in v. 3). This juxtaposition can occur elsewhere only in possibility (f), which is impossible on syntactical grounds. In version (d), the only alternative to (a) that keeps ἰεῖς at the end, the position of ὅς before the vocative is awkward in the extreme. Thus, yet again, we are best served by (a).

We now see that the poem takes us through a two-fold process, the first part of which is to discover that the hymn consists of metrically

¹²Kastorion goes out of his way to stress the contrast: Pan is a beast among beasts (v. 5, μωσοπόλε θήρ/θηρονόμε Πάν, v. 2) as the poet's learned work appeals to the learned (v. 3, σοφῇ/σοφῶ, v. 4).

¹³Leonidas' epigrams, Herodas' mimes, Theocritus' bucolics come to mind.

equivalent and interchangeable metra of eleven letters each. Consequently, we appear to enjoy free rein in reshaping the hymn as we please—such was Athenaeus' instinct—casting Pan and hymnic convention for the most part aside, and rejoicing in yet another example of Hellenistic ingenuity—and of our own! But the second part of our reading reveals a deeply conservative, traditional, though no less ingenious, perspective.¹⁴ For the ostensible *embaras de choix* turns out to be illusory, and we arrive finally at the inescapable conclusion that there are only so many variables in addressing a god, and that Kastorion's achievement in this regard is consummate and would be the less so for any change.

Our conclusion bears on a larger point. We have been dealing here only with Kastorion's Hymn to Pan, yet the critics' skepticism vis-à-vis this hymn typifies the modern stance generally toward the Hellenistic hymn qua hymn: Literary virtuosity is thought to be incompatible with religious intent. Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo is thus "concerned primarily not with politics or religion, but with literature";¹⁵ we are warned that that same poet's "Götterhymnen sämtlich einem Geiste entspringen, der an die persönlichen Götter als wirkliche Lenker irdischer Geschehnisse nicht mehr glaubt."¹⁶ Philikos' Hymn to Demeter in novel stichic choriambic hexameter exhibits "an obvious lack of genuine religious feeling, but since the piece is a confessed literary exercise, this is hardly surprising, even if it accords ill with Philicus' position as a priest of Dionysus at the time of the great procession of the reign of Philadelphus" (cf. Callixenus in Athenaeus 198b).¹⁷ Without wishing to seem reactionary and assert that the hymns were composed for performance at specific religious festivals,¹⁸ one might ask of what a sophisticated

¹⁴Certain, of course, only for the five verses that survive—though I doubt that the hymn was very long: riddling poems such as the epitaph of Midas, the ἱσοψηφός poems (cf. n. 6 above) or technopaignia are invariably short. It would be surprising to find a device such as interchangeable metra of eleven letters spread over a poem of great length.

¹⁵F. Williams, *Callimachus Hymn to Apollo* (Oxford 1978) 3.

¹⁶A. Körte and P. Händel, *Die Hellenistische Dichtung* (Stuttgart 1960) 21.

¹⁷P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) 651–52. For Philikos' role in the procession, cf. E. E. Rice, *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford 1983) 52–58.

¹⁸This has been the tendency of French scholarship on Callimachus' Hymns, e.g., E. Cahen, *Callimaque et son oeuvre poétique* (Paris 1929) 281: "C'est aux lieux mêmes ou la fête est célébrée qu'aurait été déclamé chacun des hymnes" before "un public de dévots"; see also P. Bruneau, *Recherches sur les cultes de Délos à l'époque hellénistique*

scholar-poet's "religion" might consist. Was continued use of traditional genres merely cynical? Could there be for the poet a more personal sign of devotion than the product of his involvement in the intense literary experiments and innovations of the age?¹⁹

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(Paris 1970) 16, with regard to the Hymn to Delos: "Il a sûrement été écrit pour une cérémonie délienne"; or C. Meillier, *Callimaque et son temps* (Lille 1979) 94, on the Hymn to Apollo: "l'oeuvre littéraire intégrée dans le culte."

¹⁹Most recently, Anthony W. Bulloch has examined Callimachus' religious attitude in the Hymns ("The Future of a Hellenistic Illusion. Some observations on Callimachus and religion," *MH* 41 [1984] 209-30), finding that the poet, while not "rejecting religion out of hand" (p. 229), nonetheless presents a "distrustful view" in which "the orderliness assumed by traditional religion is illusory . . . the religious illusion has broken and does not seem to have much of a future" (ibid.). Living in "confusing" times (p. 214), Callimachus, according to Bulloch, was a "realist" (p. 229) whose "'education to reality' involves facing the contradictions which orthodox religion often tries to ignore" (p. 230). Religion, for him, "is found *not to connect* with the adult world in which we, his audience, try to live our lives" (p. 229). Indeed, the ancient poet may be "in the process of forming his own 'personal neurosis'" (p. 230, n. 32). It seems as if Bulloch has projected, in undisguisedly modern psychoanalytic terms, a problem typical of the twentieth century (cf. p. 215, n. 13) onto a poet of the third century B.C. There is little room, on this view, for levity either in Callimachus or in Greek religion more generally. Thus, humorous, fanciful moments, such as when baby Zeus' umbilical cord falls off and becomes the aition for the name of the Omphalian plain, or when an entire landscape takes to its heels before Leto as she tries to find a birthplace for Apollo, appear as products of a "very disturbed, even fractured . . . state of mind," a "febrile wit," "a very bizarre, and one might say frenzied, imagination" (p. 219). But are these images of the divine significantly more irreverent or burlesque than those that we can find in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* or the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (cf. N. Hopkinson's sensible remarks concerning this problem in "Callimachus' Hymn to Zeus," *CQ* 34 [1984] 147-48)?



DID A HILARIUS GOVERN LYDIA IN THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D.?

In his *Lives of Philosophers and Sophists*, Eunapius reports that a pagan ἄρχων τῆς Ἀσίας named Justus built makeshift altars, sacrificed

publicly, and undertook the restoration of pagan sanctuaries at Sardis. It is clear from the fact that Justus is found making his influence felt in the province of Lydia that he was vicar of the diocese of Asia. He held office sometime in the last decades of the fourth century.¹ On one occasion he "summoned [to Sardis] from all sides men who had a reputation for learning" to question them on how to divine the future from a sacrificial victim. This pagan gathering included the Sardinian sophist Eunapius and the distinguished Sardinian Platonist Chrysanthius, Eunapius' friend and mentor.

Justus' activities at Sardis were inspired by his zeal for paganism. Chrysanthius' presence at Sardis must have been encouraging. Something else encouraged him too: the example of another Roman official named Hilarius:

... διὰ μακροῦ τις ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης εἰσεφοίτησεν ἄρχων τῆς Ἀσίας (ἰοῦστος ὠνομάζετο) . . . οὗτος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβὰς ἐκ τῆς Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ἔθνους καταλαβὼν (ἱλάριος ἐκεῖνος ἐκαλεῖτο) συγκορυβαντιῶντα πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, βωμούς τε ἀνέστησεν αὐτοσχεδίου ἐν Σάρδεσιν κτλ.

It has long been confidently asserted that Hilarius was the governor of Lydia.² The notion is due to the mention of Sardis, in the Greek passage quoted here, shortly after the phrase τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ἔθνους. Yet it is much easier and more natural to understand τοῦ ἔθνους to mean the province of Asia. In Eunapius' account of Justus, beginning at *Vitae phil.* XXIII 4.1, there is no reference to Sardis or Lydia before the word ἔθνους, but there are two references to Asia, both of which appear in our passage. When Justus reached Asia—whether the province, the diocese or Asia Minor in a nonadministrative sense is meant is not clear, but does not affect our point—he found that the proconsul of the prov-

¹Eunap. *Vitae phil.* XXIII 4.1-9, 503 Giangrande. C. Foss argues that Justus' activity should be placed in the reign of Valens rather than that of Theodosius, and "hardly . . . after 391": *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* (1976) 117. Cf. G. Fowden, *Pagan Philosophers in Late Antique Society* (Oxford diss. 1979) 102n: "such a display of pagan feeling is improbably later than c. 390 (cf. *Cod. Theod.* XVI.10.10-12)."

²O. Seeck, *Die Briefe des Libanius* (1906) 179; id., *RE* 8:2 (1913) 1601; W. C. Wright, ed., *Philostratus and Eunapius, The Lives of the Sophists* (1921) 592; *PLRE* I s.v. "Hilarius 10"; Foss, *Byzantine and Turkish Sardis* 4, 28. For the sense of ἔθνος, see H. J. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions*, *American Studies in Papyrology* 13 (1974) 136.

ince of Asia was an enthusiastic pagan like himself. This encouraged him to advance the cause of paganism in his diocese, specifically at Sardis. The example of the proconsul of Asia will have been especially assuring: that governor stood outside of the regular Diocletianic hierarchy and held an ἀρχὴν μείζονα than that of the vicar of the diocese of Asia.³

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³Eunap. *Vitae phil.* VII 5.5, 479; A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, 284-602 (1964) 47, 375.



REVIEWS

JENNY STRAUSS CLAY. *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 268.

This book boldly invites controversy by highlighting its most provocative and debatable point in its title and in its organization. Clay contends that the *Odyssey* is decisively shaped by anger on the part of Athena toward its hero Odysseus and that this anger, while it may be played down in the text, actually determines the structure of the poem and is of central thematic importance throughout. The prominence given to this point may, however, result in a misleading impression of the book as a whole. For it is not in fact a sustained attempt to develop a single argument, but rather a series of investigations into various aspects of the poem grouped together under the broad rubric reflected in the subtitle and elsewhere defined as "the relationship between the divine and the human in the *Odyssey*" (p. 7).

Clay's technique is well illustrated by her opening chapter, "The Beginning of the *Odyssey*." There she scrutinizes the opening lines of the poem, fixing on certain details which she seeks to illuminate through an investigation of parallels and other relevant material in Homeric and other Greek poetry. The fact that the poet begins by calling on the Muse leads her into a discussion of poetic inspiration in Homer and the difference between the knowledge normally available to mortals and the special knowledge of the gods and their activities imparted to the poet by the Muse. From this she returns to other aspects of the poem: the omission of the hero's name, the poet's evident partisanship toward the hero, the choice of a starting point for Odysseus' story.

The second chapter centers on the figure of Odysseus with the same technique of coming at its subject from a variety of different angles: Odysseus is approached through his name, his Autolycean heritage, the boar's-tusk helmet that he wears in *Iliad* X, his bow and his role as an archer (especially in relation to Heracles), the relationship between Odysseus and Achilles suggested by the first song of Demodocus, and his behavior during the key episode of his encounter with Polyphemus.

In the third chapter, Clay turns to the relations between gods and men in the poem, exploring the various qualities that define the gods' difference from men: their freedom from death, their agelessness, their knowledge of *moira*, their ability to transform the outward appearances of things, their power to control mortal life through demonstrations of favor and wrath. The two remaining chapters are somewhat more specifically focused: the fourth is an analysis of the encounter between Odysseus and Athena in Book 13, partly aimed at defining the cause of Athena's wrath, and the fifth, entitled "The Double Theodicy of the *Odyssey*," documents and attempts to reconcile a fundamental theological discrepancy in the poem between the view that the gods are just and intervene in human life to assure proper punishments and rewards for human actions and the view that the gods give men good and evil at random.

Throughout these discussions Clay's approach is for the most part straightforward and avowedly commonsensical. She stays close to the text of the *Odyssey* or of the related works to which she turns for parallels (most frequently the *Iliad*), espousing what she at one point characterizes as a "humble phenomenology" (p. 138). This approach allows her to accumulate a collection of valuable insights into the outlook and assumptions of the *Odyssey*, some confirming impressions one may have arrived at less systematically in reading through the poem, others opening up unexpected perspectives that will undoubtedly inspire readers to develop them further and to rethink their own interpretations of various passages. Just to choose a few examples, a careful look at the uses of the word *atasthaliai*, which plays so large a role in establishing the moral context of the story from the outset, leads to the conclusion that it is a term used "to place the blame for a destructive act on one party while absolving another" (p. 37), a refinement that should complicate in interesting ways our sense of how the poem casts its story in moral terms. In a later chapter Clay shows that human *metis* and divine intervention have parallel effects, a point that opens up an illuminating perspective on the way in which human capacities and limitations are represented in Homeric narrative.

The central achievement of the book is the accumulation of such observations, which combine to construct, not a dynamically unfolding argument, but a more richly informed point of view from which to return to the text. Rather than taking her reader through a pointed reading of the poem, Clay prepares him or her for a more thoughtful and well-informed reading of his or her own. Because she usually refrains from pressing specific conclusions, Clay leaves a number of loose ends, insights that call for further development or inconsistent claims that are neither reconciled nor commented on; but she is also able to avoid reductive readings and to fulfill well her announced intention of confronting, and acknowledging as authentic features of the text, the contradictions and discrepancies that have led analyst critics to find distinct, irreconcilable compositional layers. This approach is especially well attuned to one of the projects that guides much of her discussion, the project of appreciating the nature of the *Odyssey's* many-sided and elusive hero and of the quality of *metis* that is his definitive characteristic.

But in those parts of her discussion that she has chosen to highlight, her treatment of the wrath of Athena, Clay's approach is rather different, for there she gives a great deal of weight to what is barely present in the text. Athena's anger toward Odysseus, if it exists at all, is already in the past for the whole of the *Odyssey's* story; indeed Clay's interest in the theme stems from her belief that the cessation of Athena's wrath determines the starting point of the *Odyssey's* narrative. If Athena's wrath is a significant feature of the *Odyssey*, its significance derives from its negation. Thus Clay's decision to give such prominence to this theme invites two questions: first, whether traces of this wrath really can be found in the text; and second, the broader question of how to incorporate awareness of what is perceptibly played down, suppressed, or (as in this case) suspended into one's reading of a text—a question that is especially compelling when applied to highly traditional texts like the *Odyssey*.

On the first question, Clay can only cite one passage in which Odysseus is specifically named in connection with Athena's general wrath against the re-

turning Achaeans, Hermes' speech to Calypso at 5.105-11, and even there a distinction is drawn between Odysseus' companions, who have all been drowned, and Odysseus himself, who has been washed up on Calypso's shore. This one trace of the notion of Odysseus as the object of Athena's anger is thus linked to a distinctive fate, his sojourn with Calypso, which entails his exemption from the destruction that is otherwise the result of Athena's wrath. While the delay brought by his wanderings and his stay with Calypso may cause suffering for Odysseus and his family and may hold the threat of oblivion, it is also a saving concealment that allows him to survive until the proper moment for his return (and thus akin to the disguise that he later adopts with Athena's aid) and so ensures the eventual triumph that sets him gloriously apart from the other Achaean heroes. To the extent that Odysseus suffers from Athena's wrath, he does so in a distinctive way that leads not to annihilation but to a happy conclusion that is only possible because it is delayed, and that important difference should be taken into account in any discussion of this theme. But to turn to the second of my questions, Clay tends not to stress the significance for an understanding of the *Odyssey* of Odysseus' emancipation from Athena's wrath. She concentrates on the poet's deemphasis of Athena's wrath in Odysseus' case as a sign of his bias in favor of his hero rather than as a key to what he has created, presenting it as a form of evasion rather than of imaginative reshaping of the tradition. Thus unlike many neo-analytic critics, whose methods hers at many points resemble, she does not seem to be investigating Homer's departures from tradition as a way of throwing into relief his distinctive creation. For example, she has little time for the wrath of Poseidon, whose unarguable prominence in the text seems to be integrally related to the *Odyssey's* conception of its hero as escaping the wrath of his particular patron, characterizing it as an "alibi" which "many critics gullibly swallow" (p. 44). The result is an interpretation that is stimulating and sensitive to some often-ignored nuances, but also out of tune with the poem's own emphases and preoccupations.

The dangers of reading the poem with such a slant become apparent when Clay turns to an analysis of the encounter between Athena and Odysseus in Book 13. Any interpretation of this conversation as a coherently unfolding dialogue necessarily involves reading between the lines, and when Clay does that, she naturally reads in the issues that she has decided are central. For her, what happens in that scene is that Odysseus essentially performs the overstepping of mortal limits that characteristically provokes divine wrath, in this case through an exercise of extraordinary intelligence that allows him to see through Athena's attempt to blame Poseidon for her absence, but he conceals it, choosing to say nothing because he recognizes his dependence on Athena's help. This is certainly a problematic interpretation, since it depends on Clay's questionable claim that the wrath of Poseidon is simply a red herring and since it makes something that does not happen the central event of the scene. It also seems to lose sight of what is so striking about the scene: the extraordinary affection with which Athena treats Odysseus, asserting her divine superiority as she tricks him by disguising both Ithaca and herself, yet doing so not to destroy him, but as a playful prelude to giving him her unqualified support.

Clay's tendency to play down Athena's affection for Odysseus also leads to a rather tepid explanation of her return to active support for his cause. Accord-

ing to Clay, Athena stops being angry in order to bring about a just resolution of the crisis on Ithaca; she does this, not because of anything to do specifically with Odysseus, but because the gods must occasionally uphold justice in an exemplary fashion in order to retain the worship of humans. This explanation comes in the course of the final chapter, in which Clay does an excellent job of setting out the difficult problem of the poem's conflicting views of divine involvement in human affairs. This is certainly not an easy problem to resolve, but Clay's own discussion is perhaps more revealing than she allows. In the course of it she points to several ways in which the *Odyssey* suggests that the idea of justice is essentially a human construct: it is invoked by mortals in their wishes and hopes but not in their accounts of what they have experienced from the gods, and it is fulfilled only in that part of the narrative that is set in the world of human civilization. And that realization should at least allow us to appreciate the way the *Odyssey*'s plot intertwines unparalleled divine support for the individual aspirations of its hero with unparalleled divine support for collective human aspirations toward a reliable system of just punishments and rewards.

This is not a book that is easily summarized (many of its most interesting points have not been touched on here) or one that will easily win assent for all its conclusions. But rarely does a book that sparks as much disagreement as this undoubtedly will also offer as much illumination and command as much respect. Clay's discussions are invariably vigorous, well-stated, and thoroughly informed about previous scholarship; taken together they form an engaging book that at some points sheds rays of light on the text from a variety of angles and at others challenges its readers with provocative but also stimulating claims.

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THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER. *The Art of Aeschylus*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982. Pp. 393. \$34.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.

For years there has been a need for a comprehensive and up-to-date general study of Aeschylean tragedy. Thomas Rosenmeyer's book goes far to meet this need—perhaps too far. The efficient orientation of novices probably still calls for a shorter, and less idiosyncratic, book. On the other hand, that unwritten handbook is bound to be far less stimulating and dazzling than what we have here: the vigorously formulated results of years of the reading and reflection of one of our most penetrating students of Greek literature, a man unwilling merely to summarize *communes opiniones*. Also, readers of *The Green Cabinet* will be prepared for the bonus of often illuminating parallels drawn from the author's deep familiarity with European literature, a familiarity regrettably rare among contemporary classical scholars.

Rather than survey chronologically the surviving plays one at a time, Rosenmeyer has chosen a topical spectrum with the broad headings of "Hard

Data" (text, verse forms, stagecraft), "The Poetry" (style, imagery), "The Agents" (chorus, rhetoric, *ethos*), "Responsibility" (gods and other constraints on human action), and "The Drama" (arrangement of actions, the trilogy). Each discussion draws on relevant features of the six indubitably genuine complete plays, the *P. V.* (used with cautious alertness to its anomalies), and (only occasionally) the fragments. The author boldly calls his own procedure "tearing the plays apart and writing across them" (p. 5), and it would probably be churlish to chide him for running risks of which he was perfectly aware. Still, that more pedestrian handbook which awaits its author would do well to compensate for such dismemberment by including analyses of individual plays, as well as a survey of fragments.

Rosenmeyer's book is faithful to its title. In these pages Aeschylus the dramatist has expelled several would-be usurpers: most notably, perhaps, Aeschylus the theologian. This is as it should be. Unfortunately, the triumph of the dramatist has been achieved at the cost of a perilous thinning-out of the dramatic experience. Rosenmeyer is correct to find it "quixotic" to construct an "Aeschylean theology" (p. 283), but does it help us to be told that Aeschylus was "in some ways . . . the least religious of the three tragedians" (p. 157)? The problem is that here, as often elsewhere, the author's loyalty to Aeschylus the man of the theater leads him to try to neutralize the potentially distracting claims of "other" spheres of Greek life. Thus, in a discussion of choral appeals to the gods, the presence of religious content is accounted for partly as mimesis of actual belief, but mainly as the poet's way of ensuring that "human actions and reflections are endowed with a sonority which enhances their standing" (p. 157). In the course of a stimulating exploration of the constraints on human action in Aeschylean tragedy, Rosenmeyer does develop a more interesting thesis about the role of the gods. Here they emerge as supple poetic devices which "must do wrong" in order to help the playwright "construct a web of impulses and motivations designed to hint at the moral confusion, and often perversity, of human affairs" (pp. 269 f.). Hence, those who hope to formulate an Aeschylean view of the justice of Zeus are unlikely to succeed, for Zeus is "a poetic way of talking about the context of human action" (p. 277). The problem here is that Zeus becomes a context without content. Any resonance thus achieved must have a hollow sound.

Even seasoned students of Greek tragedy will find Rosenmeyer's discussion of character in Aeschylus a stimulating contribution to a subject which has been showing recent twitches of renewed life. He rightly emphasizes Aeschylus' indifference to the "minute particulars" (Blake's phrase, fathered upon Yeats on p. 213) of modern character portrayal. Rather, an Aeschylean character is a collective set of plausible responses to shifting dramatic stimuli. "Orestes is, thus, less a character than a vehicle for the exploration of the courses of action available to one in his (mythological) position" (p. 251). There is much truth in this, though Rosenmeyer's account would have had more depth had it been anchored in the context of Greek concepts of personality and human nature.

Like the chapter on "Gods," that on "Guilt; Curse; Choice" explores consequences of Rosenmeyer's view of character in Aeschylus. This is a bracingly negative chapter, undermining the claims to interpretive adequacy of concepts like guilt, fallibility, hubris, wealth, "belated explanations," *dikē*, ancestral

curse, and choice. In each case the author persuasively refutes the temptation to find in any one of these concepts the "key" to an Aeschylean tragedy. But here again he is often led to overstate his case. For example, *dikē* as a pattern of retributive acts becomes merely "a poetic construction" (p. 294), and a clash of *dikai* is denied. (*Cho.* 461 is rendered, "Ares will work with Ares, and Right with Right." A solitary and not remarkably pertinent parallel, *O.C.* 901, is unlikely to persuade many scholars of a "cooperative" sense for *ξυμβαλεῖ* here.) Similarly, the focus of the *oikos* in *Ag.* and *Cho.* becomes simply a dramatic convenience in "a genre which enjoins concentration" (p. 295), while the ancestral curse is only "a means of reverberating the suffering" (p. 297). So eager is Rosenmeyer to avoid Snell's emphasis on the role of choice in Aeschylus that he is driven to render *Ag.* 218 "and when he had the runner of the yoke of Necessity adjusted to his neck" (p. 301). Still, one must in balance admire his presentation of a dramatist determined "to prevent the audience from ever settling into an unambiguous understanding of the causes of action" (p. 306).

Approaching Rosenmeyer's concluding discussion of the Aeschylean trilogy, many readers may be prepared for warnings about the dangers of using the *Oresteia* to reconstruct the Danaid and Theban trilogies (to say nothing of the *Prometheia*). The jolt will come when they are told that the *Oresteia* itself was never intended to be an artistic unity. The author's main stated argument for an episodic *Oresteia* falls short of complete cogency: "Since most ancient trilogies were . . . not connected, it is logical to assume that even in a connected trilogy, the forces of unity are not overriding, and that the three plays can be appreciated as relatively independent units" (p. 342). Still, this hypothesis does allow Rosenmeyer to face squarely the problems of the "Göttermimus" of the *Eum.* (the phrase, like much of the interpretation, is indebted to Reinhardt). Here, we are told, "accommodation wins out over significance and cunning over profundity" (p. 347).

The greatest strength of this book stands wedded to what this reviewer finds its greatest weakness. Rosenmeyer's insistence that Aeschylus must be understood as a dramatist alone is based on a conception of artistic activity which has so concentrated a focus that new light is repeatedly cast on old questions. But the beam of this light is not sufficiently wide. The cultural, social, and political matrix of which Aeschylean tragedy was a living part is here consistently—and purposely—ignored or reduced to "sonority." Here, then, is another task for that more succinct and more balanced, but, alas, less interesting general handbook waiting patiently to mount to the shores of light.

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R. L. HUNTER, Editor. *Eubulus: The Fragments* (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries 24). New York, Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 260. \$59.50.

Fate has been unkind to Eubulus and to his genre. Between about 380 and 335 B.C., he wrote some 104 comedies. Of these only 118 fragments from 58 plays and 36 more unplaceable ones survive. Athenaeus furnishes the bulk of them. There are no papyri. The longest of the preserved passages is 27 almost continuous lines, but most are well under a dozen. No plots and very few scenes are recognizable. Nor is Middle Comedy itself well understood. With few practitioners better preserved than Eubulus, it remains a phantom genre better known for what it is not (viz. Old or New Comedy) than for what it is. Mythological and tragic burlesque were apparently favorite topics, but little more can safely be said about this "transitional" art form. Yet it remains important. The idea of comedy changed profoundly in the fourth century, and even small clues to its evolution are invaluable. Now that so much more is known about New Comedy, reappraisal of the old material seems especially desirable. This has been Richard Hunter's goal in editing Eubulus, and he brings to the task a happy combination of traditional skills and new information.

The edition follows a standard format of the Cambridge series: an introduction discussing the author and his genre, the fragments in Kock's order together with their sources, and a commentary with headnotes for each play followed by elucidation of its fragment(s). There are also four excellent indices: of Eubulus' vocabulary, passages discussed, subjects, and words discussed in the commentary.

The text first. Hunter is a sober and intelligent editor who avoids the temptation either to rewrite Eubulus or to read more into a fragment than is there. He handles the difficulties of vocabulary, dialect forms, and the occasionally mysterious syntax with care and good sense. The apparatus is a model of clarity, an especially welcome feature with such difficult fragments as 56 (describing a drinking cup) and 57 (dice throws). Sometimes, perhaps, he is too conservative. In fragment 7, for example, Heracles praises the eating of meat, especially κρέας βόειον ἐφθόν ἄσολοικον μέγα (line 8). Hunter relegates Wilamowitz' brilliant ἄσολοίκως to the apparatus and comments: "The string of four adjectives is a pleasing effect and I have retained ἄσολοικον, 'uncorrupt,' 'which has not gone off'; Wilamowitz' ἄσολοίκως, constructed with ἐφθόν, would make the point that Heracles wants a piece of meat unadulterated by the fancy sauces of the time . . ." (p. 92). Who would prefer corrupt meat, and what then would be the point of ἐφθόν? There is a bookish pleasure in the string of adjectives, but surely more comic punch in the line as emended. Nevertheless, reasonable emendations are always scrupulously discussed, and Hunter demonstrates time and again the virtues of a conservative approach.

The commentary is especially good on vocabulary and syntax and takes care to relate patterns of speech, comic motifs, and dramatic situations to the practices of earlier and later comedy. He is not quite so helpful with the Mediterranean flora and fauna that keep appearing in recipes, riddles, and the like, but his comments are serviceable and proportionate to their importance. The headnotes discussing the title and subject of each play are excellent. The pre-

sentation of the evidence and its interpretation is full and balanced. Is Angylion, the title of the first play, a proper name or a nickname, the character slave or free, protagonist or prologist? Hunter presents the possibilities. He is equally informative on the problem of double titles (e.g., pp. 146-48 on *Lakones* or *Leda*). In discussing *Semele* he shows admirable restraint in suggesting a plot, and so too with *Stephanopolides*. He rightly doubts any link with Naevius' *Corollaria* (pace Webster, *SLGC*² 61-62) and even refrains from putting its nine fragments in a likely dramatic order lest he create "a misleading impression of confidence" (192). His hesitation in all such matters is well rooted in good sense. The reconstruction of lost plots is, as Hunter knows quite well, generally a hopeless task, and he wisely offers the evidence unencumbered by fruitless conjecture.

Yet the very qualities that make Hunter so fine an editor and commentator create problems in the introduction when he addresses larger questions of artistry and literary history. When H. D. Jocelyn edited the fragments of Ennian tragedy for this series, he included a superb introduction to another "lost" genre that is itself an important contribution to scholarship. Even allowing for the leaner pickings among the remnants of Middle Comedy, Hunter is painfully inadequate. He deals beautifully with the ancient testimonia, and with Eubulus' dates, output, metrical practices, and the like. But what of the genre itself and Eubulus' place in it? Hunter surely has a better feel for Eubulus' style than anyone else today, but he is reluctant to apply his knowledge to the obvious literary questions and shows no willingness to phrase any new questions for that knowledge to answer. The introduction is thus entirely conventional. A section entitled "Middle Comedy" shows that this label is only a later scholarly construct and not a unanimous one. A rival scheme in antiquity divided comedy simply into Old and New; a third scheme, not discussed here but eventually represented by Diomedes (XXIV.2 Koster), distinguished among Early (Epicharmus), Old (Aristophanes), and New (Menander). Hunter himself, despite his intensive work on Eubulus, adds nothing to the discussion. He only concludes that the concept of Middle Comedy is "a useful tool of literary history and to do away with it would be to obliterate the considerable progress which scholarship, both ancient and modern, has made in this area" (6). What progress is that? A later section, "Eubulus and Middle Comedy," simply relates well known points about the use of choruses, political references, mythological themes, and tragic parody to the specific case of Eubulus. It is a very useful summary here at the beginning of this edition, but it does not advance our understanding of this puzzling genre. How significant a figure was Eubulus? Can specific comparisons be made with fragments of Alexis or Antiphanes, and what would they show? What might be the dramatic effect of "the ludicrously circumlocutory 'dithyrambic' style" long associated with Middle Comedy and exemplified by fragment 75? It is precisely because Hunter is neither an Edmonds nor a Webster that his thoughts on such issues would be so valuable and that his hesitation to think creatively about them is so regrettable.

Perhaps in coming years Hunter will be more willing to address these larger issues, and because I hope so, one last, minor criticism seems appropriate. His expository style is cool and clear, but academic mannerisms constantly mar it. He shuns positive statements. A suggestion is invariably "not implausi-

ble" rather than plausible, a usage "not uncommon" rather than common. "Very" needs "indeed" to hold its hand, as in "very good indeed." Sexual topics make him wriggle. A reference to Jeffrey Henderson's *The Maculate Muse* (never a quotation) must suffice to explain an obscenity, though sometimes Aristophanes is pressed into service. Thus on the *psaltria*: "These girls often performed other services at symposia as well as musical ones (cf. Ar. *Wasps* 1346). . . ." Philokleon's meaning is clear enough, but why hide behind the reference? Such pedantry and coyness do not suit Hunter's learning and sense.

This remains, however, a fine and useful volume. Its deficiencies will only whet our appetite for more.

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SARAH B. POMEROY. *Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra*. New York, Schocken Books, 1985. Pp. xxii + 241, 21 photographs. \$16.95.

Pomeroy's first book, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity*, has been a staple of undergraduate courses on women in the ancient world since its publication in 1976. It also provided the starting point for much of the specialist scholarship which has proliferated in journals since then. In the intervening years, the study of women in ancient history and literature has become an established and flourishing field, and this new book reflects some of the developments that have taken place.

The author draws on her long-standing expertise in papyrology to produce a thoughtful and well documented account of the Greek-speaking women of Ptolemaic Egypt. It is written in a straightforward and accessible style. Nicely presented, with well-chosen illustrations, it has an excellent general index and the expected index of papyri and *ostraka*. The bibliography is a model of its kind: the inclusion of such standards of modern Mediterranean ethnography as Campbell's *Honour, Family and Patronage* is indicative of the growing tendency among classical scholars to read more widely.

The attempt to cover women of different social strata is evident in the chapter divisions of the book: Queens, Alexandrian Women, Some Married Women in the Papyri, Slaves and Workers, and Women's Role in the Economy. Hellenistic Egypt was a fascinating mixture of cultures, and the work represents a serious attempt to consider this diversity in spite of the author's declared concentration on the Greek-speakers. The value generally attached to Greek culture in Ptolemaic Egypt is interesting: for example, Jewish women gradually assumed the Greek practice of representation by a *κύριος* (quasi-guardian) in legal and commercial transactions, although their own system freed them from the need of a male representative once they attained the age of twelve.

The question of cultural transmission through women is touched on briefly (pp. 121-22), and the apparent differences between the formal educa-

tion of girls and boys leads the author to speculate on the background to this. The use of North African women and Amazons as instances of the preservation of customs through mother-daughter teaching seems forced and is not improved by reference to the warrior queens and princesses of Macedon. The problem is a familiar one in any kind of compensatory history, whether of slaves or women. Basic information on such subcultures is necessarily sparse, and speculation must often be justified by comparative evidence or citation of dubious ancient testimony. On the whole, this difficulty is handled well. Papyri—literary as well as formal—provide the basis of the book, and this factual core is supplemented by intelligent supposition that seldom strays far from the standards of commonsense plausibility.

The economic range of the work is limited by the evidence. Lower class men and upper class women are difficult enough for the historian to resurrect: the women of the lower orders are particularly elusive. But Pomeroy makes a valiant effort to give us as wide-ranging a view as possible, and we are left with some sense of the lives of slaves and peasant women in spite of the author's admission that the sources force a disproportionate concentration on the women at the top of the social spectrum.

Chapter One, on Hellenistic queens, is readable and interesting but contains little that is novel. The rationale for according so much space to this group is thin, and the treatment slips at times into the "Great Mythic Heroines of the Past" mode, quite out of keeping with the rest of the book. The chapter on Alexandrian women focuses necessarily on those of the privileged class of officials and employs both epigraphic evidence (for example, in the dedication of statues, epitaphs, and religious donations) and imaginative literature. There is some interesting biographic material about priestesses, royal mistresses, philosophers, and authors. Pomeroy deftly avoids the appearance of "bittiness" and weaves the information and her own observations into a coherent whole. This and the chapter on queens will doubtless prove favorites with students who come upon the book as a course text.

The best part of the work, however, is the detailed discussion of marriage contracts in Chapter Three ("Some Married Women in the Papyri"). The practice of drawing up agreements before marriage was well established in many ancient Mediterranean societies. Pomeroy rightly points out that they might have been particularly important for women who moved away from their male kin after marriage in this mobile era, since the contracts explicitly recorded their rights for the duration of the marriage and on its dissolution. It is, of course, a separate and unanswerable question whether contracts actually secured women's rights in the absence of male kin to enforce their terms.

Pomeroy shows a proper awareness of the source problems and reminds the reader of the scattered nature of the surviving documents. She is nonetheless tempted to generalize about the situation and contrasts the movable dowry of Greco-Egyptians with the landed dowry common in areas where Greeks expected to be settled for many generations (p. 92). Given her findings elsewhere that these women sometimes inherited land and were capable of owning it, it is certainly interesting that land *never* figures in surviving dotal records from Ptolemaic Egypt (p. 156); but, again, the problems of comparing eras so diversely documented are evident from a perusal of Schaps' study of mainland Greek practices in an earlier period.

This book yields examples of women who actively leased and cultivated land but shows that in general the Greek-speaking women were less independent in their transactions than their Egyptian counterparts. The author is cautious (pp. 156-58) about plotting changes in land-owning patterns or their implications for the decline of the early Ptolemaic system of land tenure (especially the system of cleruchies as incentives for mercenary soldiers) because of the uneven survival of evidence which has made it so difficult to document the final century of the Ptolemaic era.

Chapter Five, "Women's Role in the Economy," is largely concerned with land use but deals also with women's labor, paid and unpaid. It falls into categories connected with the production and processing of food and clothes or of child-care associated with the necessarily female profession of wet-nursing. These categories are similar to those attested for imperial Rome by Treggiari's studies of *CIL* VI tombstones.¹ It is interesting that lower class women of both cultures were apparently concentrated in a limited number of gender-based occupations.

Pomeroy points out that, although the level of commercial activity among Greco-Egyptian women was much lower than that of their menfolk or of contemporary Egyptian women, it presents a striking contrast to that recorded for Greek women of other times and places. She suggests that it is more analogous to that of Roman women of a later date, though she cautions (p. 173) that the type of documentation might have affected the tradition. Specific transactions are more likely to be found in papyri: for other periods we are dependent on law court speeches, mortgage stones, or (in the case of Gortyn) a formal legal code, all of which necessarily present a different kind of picture. Yet some common features emerge, such as the high incidence of women as religious benefactresses— noted by Pomeroy for Alexandria, by Schaps for mainland Greece of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.,² and by van Bremen for other Greek cities of the Hellenistic world.³ Perhaps we would have to alter our other notions if we had records of specific transactions from these different societies. It could be that we take the law too literally for periods which have left few concrete examples of its workings (though Gardner's recent paper on Petronilla reminds us that extraordinary and inconvenient laws might be enforced, if it suited interested parties—at least in litigious Roman Egypt⁴). The findings of Chapter Five might cause some surprise among readers and perhaps stimulate reexamination of the accepted *dicta* about women and commerce in other parts of the Greek world.

Taken as a whole, *Women in Hellenistic Egypt* is a scholarly, accessible treatment of the subject. It will be read with interest by undergraduates and

¹ S. Treggiari, "Jobs for Women," *AJAH* 1 (1976) 76-104, and "Lower Class Women in the Roman Economy," *Florilegium* 1 (1979) 65-86.

² D. M. Schaps, *Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh 1979).

³ R. Van Bremen, "Women and Wealth" in A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt, eds., *Images of Women in Antiquity* (London 1983) 233-42.

⁴ J. Gardner, "A Family and an Inheritance: The Problems of the Widow Petronilla," *LCM* 9 (1984) 132-33.

nonspecialists as well as by historians of Hellenistic Egypt. It is soundly constructed and expertly documented, but it could have made a more significant contribution to women's history if it had provided a thorough analysis of the position of women in this kind of society. At times we are led to expect such an attempt, but the author retreats and we are left with a collection of interesting information and observations.

This is no bad thing in itself. The same criticism could be leveled at most anglophone classical scholarship—though it is, perhaps, particularly true of the “growth areas” such as the history of women or of the family, where scholars feel the need to establish the respectability of new topics with impeccably traditional techniques. I feel we should have passed that stage by now. Hallett's recent book on *Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society* (Princeton 1984), organized around a controversial thesis, is likely to arouse criticism in some quarters, but in the process it will force readers to review their own assumptions about elite Roman women. The applecarts of ancient political and economic history have survived upsets by such as Syme, Finley, Badian, Gruen, and de Ste. Croix.

It is understandable that many scholars shy away from such a treatment. Classical training militates somewhat against the bold or holistic approach, and each scholar needs to settle on a style with which she or he feels comfortable; but Pomeroy's pioneering record fits her for the task of signaling a new direction. She states at the outset of the work that “establishing the status of Greek women in Egypt is a complex task, for status is a relative concept.” True, but she is equal to the complexity. It would have been helpful if she had at least provided a concluding chapter that drew together her observations and ideas. But this is carping criticism. The book is, after all, an exemplary piece of scholarship and proclaims itself as the product of an author in complete command of the topic. The fluency and accessibility of the style are a bonus not often found in combination with such well grounded erudition. It will delight specialists and interested amateurs alike and might widen the circle of those with a serious interest in Ptolemaic Egypt.

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RICHARD BRILLIANT. *Visual Narratives, Storytelling in Etruscan and Roman Art*. Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp. 200, 34 figs., 38 pls. \$37.50.

Although the scholarly literature on various aspects of narrative in ancient art is extensive, few studies have addressed themselves to the important matter of the relationship between the artist's methods of narration and the ways in which the observer might perceive this narrative content. Brilliant's book is particularly welcome not only because it focuses on this question in Etruscan and Roman art, but also because his approach and insights can con-

tribute to an understanding of narrative art of other periods. To some extent the work reflects its origin in a series of lectures presented by the author at the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa in 1980. Besides the introduction there are four chapters dealing selectively within a chronological framework with four different forms of art: (1) Etruscan Cinerary Urns: Mythological Excerpts in Boxes; (2) Pendants and the Mind's Eye; (3) The Column of Trajan and Its Heirs: Helical Tales, Ambiguous Trails; and (4) Mythological Sarcophagi: Proleptic Visions. In these chapters Brilliant tests the analytical method by which he seeks to discover how the ancient observer "decoded" the artist's narrative material and in what ways visual narratives were modified by program, ideology, and history. Herein "narrative" is broadly defined, encompassing both works that tell a story in themselves and individual compositions that spark the viewer to recall episodes or parts of a story that are not represented. Monuments are carefully and succinctly described and problems in interpretation pointed out. Brilliant's own ideas are developed in light of ancient literary sources as well as recent scholarly literature, especially in the areas of semiotics and literary criticism. At times, however, these ideas are rather difficult to follow because of the author's choice of words and turns of phrase. A summarizing concluding chapter would have been helpful. Photographs and other illustrations are well chosen and of generally good quality.

In his introduction, subtitled "Sight Reading," Brilliant concentrates on the ways in which oral and written narratives differ from visual ones. Among his principal general observations are the following: (1) the viewer—more so than the listener or reader—must become his own narrator, "changing the images into some form of internalized verbal expression" (p. 16); (2) the observer usually has greater freedom than the listener or reader to choose how and in what sequence to experience the images with which he is presented; and (3) a truly visual narrative has no visible text to which it must defer. Particularly interesting are Brilliant's comments with regard to the romances of Achilles Tatius, Longus, and Apuleius vis-à-vis such masterpieces of Roman narrative art as the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. He notes that in these literary and visual forms of narrative the past, present, and future are interrelated and can be experienced together by the reader and viewer.

The first chapter begins with the author's questioning the validity of the term "cycle" (e.g., Heroic Cycle, Trojan Cycle, Theban Cycle) as applied to the discrete scenes on Etruscan cinerary urns. In an attempt to understand how these scenes were perceived, he examines the urns themselves and analogous works from the Near East, the Greek world, Etruria, and Rome in the Republican period. The closest parallel is found between the scenes on the urns and those on a number of so-called Megarian bowls, which were produced between the third and first centuries B.C. in several Hellenistic workshops. These terra cotta vessels show portions of now lost narrative picture cycles taken from many sources, including the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and Greek tragedy, with accompanying inscriptions indicating characters, the title of the work, and even the name of the author. Brilliant is of the opinion that these scenes (characterized as "reductive epitomes") may have served only as symbolic reminders of the "classics" rather than as illustrations of them, as he believes may also have been true in the case of the *Tabulae Iliacae* (discussed in Chapter 2). The urns differ from

the bowls in the larger size of the field, the detailed concentration of effects, and the funerary context for which they were intended. This context helps to explain the popularity on the urns of certain themes, such as Meleager and the Calydonian Boar, intended to symbolize man facing death. For the subject matter of a scene to be intelligible "in terms useful to the contemplation of death" (p. 51), and not merely visually appealing, the observer was called on to supply the narrative framework. Brilliant concludes with the observation that the disestablishment of a given story line apparent on an Etruscan urn (termed "the signal reference") "reveals an abstracting tendency in the treatment of time and event that would exercise a profound influence on subsequent Roman narrative art, relying as it does on the observer's prior knowledge to fill the spaces between bits of narrative imagery" (p. 52).

Particularly useful in Chapter 2 is Brilliant's relating of first century B.C. through second century A.D. literature to contemporary visual imagery. Here he focuses on several groups of pendant paintings of the first century A.D. from various houses in Pompeii and on the so-called Spada Reliefs in Rome dating to the second century A.D. These pendant images betray a quasi-narrative connection through analogy, like that apparent in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. Although the subject matter of panels displayed within a given context may be different, the works may be thematically or conceptually related in some way, requiring the observer to perceive the connection among them and thus to become the creator of a form of narrative—what Brilliant terms a "narrative of the interior." Some highly sophisticated associations might be expected in the homes of the highly educated. One thinks, for example, of Livia's house on the Palatine (a case not mentioned by the author) with its *triclinium* decorated with mythological pendant paintings, the subjects of only two (out of three) of which are known. But how complex a meaning necessarily lay behind ensembles chosen for rooms in the homes of the middle class or nouveau riche? As Brilliant notes, "One comes to the reluctant conclusion that sophisticated programmatic painting was uncommon at Pompeii, although certain limited combinations might have been fashionable, especially in pairs, and should be identified" (pp. 82–83). Particularly apropos might have been a discussion of the section in Petronius' *Satyricon* (83, 88–89, cited without comment in n. 72) dealing with the reaction of Encolpius and Eumolpus to certain paintings in a pinacotheca. An apparent group of three mythological scenes is perceived by Encolpius as related by the common subject of handsome youths (Ganymede, Hyacinthus, Hyllas) who were loved by gods, while another panel painting representing the fall of Troy elicits from Eumolpus an *ekphrasis* in verse.

The third chapter is largely devoted to an analysis of the way the author perceives that the spiral frieze of the Column of Trajan was meant to be read, both horizontally (or rather diagonally) and vertically, with due attention being given to the matter of the vantage points in the Forum of Trajan from which certain important figures and scenes were designed to be viewed. Diagrams help elucidate Brilliant's argument that "tableaux," made up of a series of contiguous bands on a given "side" of the column, were established in part by the device of repetitive, related representations of Trajan. Although correspondences among scenes on a single side would not have been difficult to see, especially from the balconies of the flanking libraries or the upper stories of the Basilica

Ulpia, the author believes that because of the limits of visibility the extended narrative of the frieze could not have been readily understood as it spiraled around and up the column. He nonetheless agrees with W. Gauer (*Untersuchungen zur Traianssäule. I: Darstellungsprogramm und künstlerischer Entwurf* [Berlin 1977] 24-54) that there are groups of related scenes forming units of the historical narrative that may continue along for four or more bands. It is worth considering whether the viewer in antiquity might not in fact have been assisted in following this developing narrative by some visual *aide-mémoire*. For example, the scenes depicted on the column might have been represented on an unrolled scroll or scrolls (perhaps with accompanying labels or brief descriptions) permanently displayed in one of the flanking libraries, where (as has often been noted) Trajan's lost *commentarii* on the Dacian Wars would likewise have been kept. These commentaries were undoubtedly the primary historical source for his Dacian campaigns, commemorated also by the column itself. Brief but interesting is Brilliant's discussion of the relationship, regarded as primarily ideological, between the frieze and the *commentarii* of Caesar (pp. 101-2), which could have constituted a model for Trajan's own lost commentaries. Consideration is given also to the question of possible artistic models and sources for the frieze and more particularly for the tableau panels of the column. In the author's discussion of monuments that owe some conceptual debt to the column, some telling observations are made. He notes, for example, that detached ceremonial scenes rather than synoptic tableaux dominate the helical composition of the Column of Marcus Aurelius (p. 115), that the allegorical mode of the panels of the Arch of Septimius Severus in the Roman Forum devalues the historical content (pp. 116-17), and that the reuse of reliefs from earlier monuments on the Arch of Constantine brought the past into the present so that it might become the foundation of future programs, thereby collapsing temporal distinctions (p. 122).

Mythological sarcophagi are dealt with in the fourth and final chapter. The modes of narrative presentation developed for these sarcophagi are seen as departing from the conventional sequence of the literary sources for the myths and moving "in the direction of greater visual coherency as a result of the condensation and rearrangement of traditional subject matter" (p. 125). Brilliant points out that the shape of the sarcophagus conditioned the observer's perception of the narrative, with the large front panel obviously receiving primary emphasis and the scenes on the sides, lid, and sometimes the back serving in a sense as glosses on the narrative represented on the front. Understandably enough, the subject matter of these sarcophagi commonly relates to death or to the transition to an afterlife. Beginning in the second century A.D., the myth of Meleager is found to be particularly popular (as on Etruscan cinerary urns) because of the parallels it might offer with the life and ultimate fate of the patron. Although this chapter is largely devoted to the ways in which the narrative content of this myth and others (e.g., the fate of Actaeon, the life of Achilles) were variously expressed on different sarcophagi, the author also offers a brief discussion of a mid-fourth century A.D. silver plate from Kaiseraugst in Switzerland. He regards its designer as having given the composition a hint of cyclical motion around the polar episode, reminiscent of the helical design of the columns of Trajan and Marcus Aurelius. Perhaps so, but it seems to me that the

composition of the plate resembles far more closely that of a fifth century B.C. *kylix* by the Kodros Painter in the British Museum. This work shows a similar solution to the problem of filling space in its representation of the Theseus cycle in a continuous narrative fashion: Theseus appears in six scenes in a band running around the interior of the cup and in a seventh scene in the central tondo (*ARV*² 1269,4).

Although necessarily selective in the monuments it analyzes, this is an important book rich in ideas about the relationship between visual and verbal ways of conveying a narrative message. As such, it will be of special value and interest to art historians and to those concerned with oral and written forms of narrative.

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THOMAS BERRES. *Die Entstehung der Aeneis*. Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, 1982. Pp. xii + 337. DM 68. (*Hermes Einzelschriften*, Heft 45)

Although his title recalls Alfred Gercke's book by the same name (Berlin 1913), Berres discards as much as he takes from traditional analytical scholarship. This is not an easy book to read, nor can it be: The mass of comparative material he presents invariably forces the reader to consult all the relevant texts, but in so doing we appreciate the scope of his undertaking and the enormous care lavished on it. His methods of analysis, not always new, are applied with considerable ingenuity, rigor, and restraint. He traverses some old analytical ground—contradictions, half-lines, repetitions, similes, stylistic peculiarities—but he also has much of interest to add about Vergil's style and method of composition.

Berres begins by examining what our sources say about the composition of the *Aeneid*. While he accepts the tradition about a (rather general) prose outline (p. 188), he believes (contrary to prevailing opinion) that initially Vergil composed the poem in its present order, arguing that *particulatim* and *nihil ad ordinem* (which Suetonius applied to the process of composition) should be understood as referring to *revision*. He is convinced that Vergil revised constantly (pp. 15, 197, 249), and to determine the nature of such revisions he focuses particularly on the many incomplete verses. It is here that he makes his most significant contribution.

In his view the half-lines are not provisional phrases (*tibicines*), for they occur where revisions appear to have been inserted (pp. 17, 106, and 165, n. 84, with good critique of past work). Little more than a summary of some of his conclusions can be given here:

1. Half-lines can appear *at the end of insertions* and function as transitions to what follows. Thus the half-line 9.295 follows 9.294, which derives from 10.824 (pp. 35–45); 1.534 follows 1.530–33, inserted from 3.163–66 (pp. 56–72); and 5.653 follows Pyrgo's speech—also a later addition (pp. 73–83).

2. Half-lines can indicate *where the original ends* and the revision begins (i.e., they are truncated hexameters). Among these he would place 1.560 (pp. 297 ff.), 2.787 (pp. 110-28); 2.767 (pp. 141-57), 3.470 (pp. 157-68), 5.294 and 5.322 (pp. 169-88), 8.41 (pp. 189-212).

3. Half-lines can indicate *where a simile was inserted* (cf. pp. 84-109, esp. pp. 95, 104). Particularly ingenious is his explanation (p. 88) of how the simile of the ants arose in 4.401-7 (half-line in 4.400). Others in this category are 2.623 (simile in 624-31), 2.468 (simile in 469-75), 7.702 (simile in 703-5), 10.728 (simile in 723-28), and 5.595 (second simile in 594-95).

Sometimes his arguments become convoluted, as in the discussion of the half-line at 3.218 (pp. 212-39). Since the omen of the tables in Book 7 does not presuppose Celaeno's prophecy, Berres considers the omen earlier, even though he also believes that both this scene (esp. 7.130-51) and the rest of Book 7 have been reworked (pp. 220-26). Although generally he treats passages that have echoes in neighboring scenes as original, here he explains several striking parallels between the rest of Book 3 and 3.219-67 (which he considers later) as remnants of an earlier version (pp. 232-34). Such reasoning undermines his methodology, for the presence of original elements in revised passages reduces the significance of verbal links for determining priority. But while we may question aspects of his methodology (see below) or disagree with interpretations of particulars, these intricate and closely reasoned sections still provide a more satisfactory explanation of the origin of the half-lines than any so far proposed.

In the rest of the book Berres concentrates on verbal repetitions, although useful observations on this subject are scattered throughout (cf. pp. 46-55, 129-40, 158-59, 129, n. 2, 131, n. 9, 163, n. 76). The mass of his examples is prodigious; and while the evidence may occasionally admit various interpretations, what he says is quite persuasive about Vergil's method of composition.

Berres argues both that many repetitions arose during revision, because Vergil would study his own works (pp. 51-55, 75, n. 4, 124), in order to incorporate or refine past formulations (pp. 72, 100, 164, n. 77), and also that in the process he deliberately created an intricate web of associations (p. 240, cf. also 107, 188, 226-27). He believes, too, that sometimes Vergil actually consulted passages already written (cf. pp. 14, 51-55, 75 with n. 4, 88). This procedure corresponds to what Knauer previously observed about Vergil's imitations of Homer (cf. *Die Aeneis und Homer*, p. 337, n. 1). The assumption that the echoes reflect a conscious poetic purpose underlies much of Berres' argumentation about the priority or posteriority of the various passages; and in this way he departs radically from traditional analytical scholarship.

His criteria for determining priority generally take the following forms. The *original passage*: (a) does not presuppose the other passage (p. 152); (b) is more natural in its context (p. 71, n. 50); (c) is closer to its ostensible Greek or Latin model (pp. 69, 85, 92-93, 100, 112-13, 144-45, 247, 292, n. 58); and (d) contains verbal associations with the surrounding passages (*passim*). The *imitation*: (a) is not comprehensible without the other passage; (b) is not fully integrated into its context (pp. 114, 228); (c) is more developed, elaborate, mannered, dynamic, enjambed (pp. 163, n. 77, 66, 67, 68, 97, 119, 126, 248, 270); (d) concentrates or combines echoes from various unrelated passages (pp. 141-42, 145, n. 17, 163, n. 76, 47 f., 71, 182-83); (e) contains unusual constructions

or word choices (pp. 42, 83, 86); and (f) uses more compressed or elliptical language (pp. 120, 141-42).

Space does not permit a full discussion of these criteria, many of which have long histories; and I have expressed my own skepticism elsewhere (*Formular Language and Poetic Design in the Aeneid*, pp. 9-12 and nn. 18, 19). While in the abstract many of these criteria seem eminently reasonable, their application to specific instances allows for considerable interpretive latitude. Berres knows the difficulties involved (p. 49) as well as the limits of positivism (p. 239). He works with extraordinary care, recognizing that the evidence can yield more than one plausible conclusion (p. 161, n. 70) and that simpler explanations are not necessarily better (p. 146). Many of his conclusions are probable, or at least plausible; but the very intricacy and ingenuity of his arguments emphasize how elusive questions of priority really are, while the elaborate concatenation of probabilities at times risks becoming circular.

The appropriateness of a line is often a matter of interpretation. The old argument that *Geo.* 4.352 must be a playful echo of 1.127 (p. 304) ignores the fact that *flavum* in *Geo.* 4.352 (from the Homeric *xanthos*?) is a more common epithet than *placidum* (1.127). For *Geo.* 4.420 (= 1.161) and the whole passage in which it occurs, the obvious model is not the Phorkys harbor (*Od.* 13.96 ff.) but the Proteus episode in *Od.* 4.351-572. Berres also believes (pp. 228 ff.) that 3.250 (= 10.104) and 3.395 (= 10.114) must derive from Jupiter's momentous utterance, because the converse—"playful" and "ironic" lines recurring in a serious context—he deems unlikely. Yet what of Catull. 66.39 and its relation to *Aen.* 6.640?

Nor is proximity to the poetic model a reliable guide when several possibilities exist. Is the storm in 3.192-95 (= 5.8-11) closer to *Od.* 14.301-4 (pp. 129-30) or to *Od.* 12.403-6 (Knauer, pp. 186, 187, n. 2)? Did 1.744 (*Arcturum pluuiasque Hyadas geminosque Triones*) derive from 3.516 (pp. 46-55), which imitates Homer (*Od.* 5.270-75; *Il.* 18.486-89), or did it arise independently? The song of Iopas (1.742-46) seems influenced by three cosmological accounts: by the song of Demodocus in *Od.* 8.266-366 (allegorically interpreted in antiquity, cf. Knauer, pp. 168, n. 2), by the end of the *Second Georgic* (1.742 < *Geo.* 2.478, 1.745 f. = *Geo.* 2.481 f.), and by the Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.484 > 1.742 = *Geo.* 2.478, cf. also *Il.* 18.485-89). The description of the Wain which never dips into the Ocean (cf. *Il.* 18.487-89) may well have suggested 1.745 (*Geo.* 2.481), while 1.744 could have been influenced by *Il.* 18.486 f.

Assuming that an original line is linked with its context through verbal echoes, Berres maintains that 6.702, *volucrisQUE SIMILLIMA somno*, antedates 2.794 (pp. 110-11) because of *placidaeQUE SIMILLIMA morti* in 6.522 (from *Od.* 13.80, hence 702 from 522) and because *SIMILLIMA* is rare in the *Aeneid* (4 times). But is this really a "reminiscence"? *Similis* itself is fairly common (17 times), nor is the ratio between positive and superlative very unusual (cf. *facilis*, 11:1; *miser*, 46:8; *acer*, 39:3). Analogous metrical patterns could well have helped shape such a phrase (cf. 2.5, 411, 513, 519, 655, 6.231 = 4.650, 6.618, 11.761). Elsewhere (pp. 282-303) Berres argues that in the Jupiter-Venus scene vv. 157-222 are later, because vv. 223-304 re-echo in the rest of the book, particularly in the description of the storm (pp. 292 f.). Some parallels (e.g., 55 = 245, 58 = 280) are striking, but do they establish

priority? Here a more detailed analysis of Vergil's structural indebtedness to Homer would have been appropriate, and it is surprising that in his discussions of Homeric models Berres makes very little use of Knauer's monumental work. But the main problem is that intentional and unconscious echoes are not easily distinguished. The latter can reveal patterns of thought and thus support the priority, or at least the genetic coherence of certain passages, but the former are unreliable guides, for (as Berres has admitted) Vergil may well have inserted such lines later.

But these criticisms should not detract from the overall value of the book. Its subject invites debate. Reservations about the analytical approach remain, but they must now be argued much more closely than before.¹

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¹ There are very few misprints. P. 61: read "sense-pause" not "sens-pause"; p. 46 n. 6: "Furius Bibaculus fr. 9" not "Furius Antias"; p. 167: "III 471-505" not "II"; p. 120: "II 792-4" not "782"; p. 172: "Szene in IX" not "XI"; p. 184: "Versuch" not "Versucht"; p. 272, n. 110: "VI 1f." not "V 1f."

TOMAS HÄGG. *The Novel in Antiquity*. Oxford, Blackwell and Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 364, 90 illustrations. \$30.00.

This is a splendid book. Hägg entitles it *The Novel in Antiquity* and does not disappoint his reader, for he discusses virtually all imaginative prose fiction from antiquity. Where he does not discuss a work in detail, he chooses examples carefully and illustrates intelligently so that he whets the reader's appetite for further study. Then in a comprehensive bibliography admirably arranged, Hägg points the interested reader in the right direction. This book is in fact the second, revised edition of a work of the same name published in Swedish in 1980. Armed with a sense of humor and an English style designed to clarify and to inform, Hägg sets out to take his reader through the ancient world's version of popular literature. While Hägg is as familiar as any scholar with certain defects in the ancient novels, he is also aware, unlike many, of the great merits. Since the *Satyricon* of Petronius and the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius are more often studied than the other ancient novels and thus more familiar, Hägg seems content to fit these two Latin novels into places in the larger scheme of ancient prose fiction and not to try to break new ground in research in them.

The largest part of this book is given over to a discussion of the five Greek novels (those of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, Longus, Achilles Tatius, and Heliodorus) which have come down to us whole. By laying out the structure of each novel and showing how the characters play off against each other, Hägg clearly demonstrates the differences among the five major Greek novels and

perhaps now, and once and for all time, has set aside the handbook comment that the Greek novels are really similar copies of the same thing. Hägg also offers brief summaries and evaluations of those tantalizing fragments of Greek novels (*Ninus Romance*, *Sesonchosis Romance*, *Metiochus and Parthenope*, Lollianus' *Phoenicica*, the *Iolaus* fragments) of which there is still some hope to find more in the papyrus dumps of Egypt.

After a short discussion of reasons for the rise of the novel in antiquity, the society that gave birth to it, and the literary heritage that formed it, Hägg devotes considerable attention to the "historical" novels (Pseudo-Callisthenes' *Alexander Romance*, romances of Dictys and Dares, and the anonymous *Apolonius of Tyre*) showing how they were a natural development from the fiction of "tragic history."

Hägg concludes his study of the ancient novel with a brief but fascinating look at the hagiographic novels of the lives of "saints" (*Paul and Thecla*, and the Pseudo-Clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions*). Some novels were and remain literary works; some are folktales that have literary futures; some were literary works that have begun to slip back toward popular tales; some were religious works that are transformed into pretentious novels; and finally some are edifying religious works that formerly were adventure stories.

The ancient novel did not, however, die and remain buried in the political ruins of the ancient world. Like epic, tragedy, and lyric poetry, the novel as a literary genre was born in the fertile imagination of the classical mind and through discovery and rediscovery came to form the basis for the modern equivalent. Hägg traces the *Nachleben* of the Greek novel to its first renaissance in the Byzantine era, and of the "popular" novel to its preservation in Christian guises. He demonstrates that by the sixteenth century the ancient novel was one of the most vibrant literary forces in Europe. Throughout his book Hägg supplies appropriate pictures and appropriately ends with a pleasant pictorial supplement entitled "Daphnis and Chloe in the Mirror of Art."

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


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